USA v. GOETTSCHE et al

2:19-cr-00877Njd4 feb 2026

Testo completo

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
JOBADIAH SINCLAIR WEEKS,
Defendant.
Criminal Action No. 19-877
OPINION & ORDER
CECCHI, District Judge.
Before the Court is pro se defendant Jobadiah Sinclair Weeks’ (“Weeks” or “Defendant”)
motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 511, of the Court’s Opinion and Order dated October 8, 2025
(the “Opinion and Order”), which denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and other
various motions, see ECF No. 497. The Government opposed Defendant’s motion, ECF No. 522,
and Defendant replied, ECF No. 534. Also before the Court is Defendant’s motion to seal, ECF
No. 466, and the parties’ supplemental submissions, ECF Nos. 510, 512, which respond to the
Court’s orders regarding the issue of sealing, ECF Nos. 497, 508. 	Additionally, Defendant has
filed a motion to compel production and to correct the record, ECF No. 503; a supplemental motion
for return of property, ECF No. 520; a motion to supplement the record, ECF No. 535; a notice of
supplemental authority, ECF No. 542; and a letter requesting case scheduling, ECF No. 546. The
Court has considered the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons expressed below, Defendant’s
motions are denied, and certain filings stipulated to by the parties shall be unsealed.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court refers to the Opinion and Order for a complete background of this case, and
otherwise assumes familiarity. 	For purposes of this motion, the following procedural history is
relevant.
On October 8, 2025, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and
addressed numerous other motions filed by Defendant. ECF No. 497. The Court denied all but
one of Defendant’s motions: 	the motion to seal, ECF No. 466. 	Id. at 23. 	The Court reserved
ruling on Defendant’s motion to seal and directed the parties to file a joint letter stipulating to or
setting forth arguments regarding which sealed documents should remain sealed or be unsealed.
Id.
On October 17, 2025, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which exceeded the
page limit set forth in Local Rule 7.2(b). See ECF No. 500; see also ECF No. 508. The Court
directed Defendant to file an amended motion for reconsideration that complies with the Local
Rules. 	ECF No. 508. 	On October 30, 2025, Defendant filed a compliant motion for
reconsideration, which “supersedes ECF No. 500 in its entirety.” ECF No. 511 at 1. In response
to the Court’s order requiring a joint letter addressing issues of sealing, the parties filed separate
letters setting forth their positions. See ECF Nos. 510, 512.
Since the Opinion and Order was issued, Defendant has submitted numerous additional
submissions with this Court, in addition to several filings requesting relief from Magistrate Judge
Michael A. Hammer. 	See ECF Nos. 503, 520, 535, 542, 546. 	The Court notes that several of
Defendant’s motions are repetitive, seek to supplement his prior motions, or both, despite prior
warnings. Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed all of Defendant’s submissions.
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II. 	DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Reconsideration
Motions for reconsideration are filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), which allow a party to seek reconsideration of matters the party believes
the judge has “overlooked.” See Shore Options Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Grp., No. 20-3835, 2021
WL 2103260, at *2 (D.N.J. May 25, 2021). Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) applies to criminal cases in
the District of New Jersey. 	See L. Crim. R. 1.1. 	“The standard for reargument is high and
reconsideration is to be granted only sparingly.” Yarrell v. Bartkowski, No. 10–5337, 2012 WL
1600316, at *3 (D.N.J. May 7, 2012). 	To be successful on a motion for reconsideration, a
petitioner has the burden to demonstrate: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence that was not available when the court [issued its order]; or (3) the
need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Shore Options, 2021
WL 2103260, at *2 (alteration in original) (quoting Max’s Seafood Cafe ex. rel. Lou–Ann v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). Mere disagreement with the Court’s decision is not
a basis for reconsideration. 	United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345
(D.N.J. 1999); L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).
Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is difficult to parse and includes a number of
overlapping requests, many of which seek “clarifications,” “corrections,” or the production of
documents from the Government. 	Defendant does not frame all of his requests within the
governing standard for reconsideration, i.e., by demonstrating that the Court’s prior rulings were
clearly erroneous, caused a manifest injustice, or that new evidence or intervening law warrants
relief. 	The Court treats Defendant’s motion as one seeking reconsideration only, and will not
consider extraneous requests for relief that Defendant has previously raised and that the Court has
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already denied. Based on Defendant’s briefing, the Court liberally construes his motion to seek
reconsideration of the Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, ECF No. 401;
motions for return of seized property, ECF Nos. 446, 448, 486; and discovery motions, ECF Nos.
402, 403, 406, 477.
1. 	Reconsideration of the Motion to Withdraw Defendant’s Guilty Plea
Defendant appears to make four arguments in support of his motion to reconsider the
Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea: (1) the Court relied on documents that
were not in the record, which he contends makes the Court’s resulting rulings invalid; (2) the Court
overlooked evidence of coercion; (3) the Court retroactively applied new interpretations of the law
that did not apply to Defendant at the time of his conduct; and (4) Defendant lacks access to
discovery he deems necessary to “verify the plea’s factual basis.” 1 ECF No 511 at 5; see generally
ECF No. 511. The Court will address each in turn.
First, Defendant argues that the Court relied on documents that are not publicly filed or
that he otherwise does not have in his possession, which he considers a clear error of law.
Specifically, Defendant points to the transcript of his plea hearing, the transcript of his Faretta
hearing, an “August 12, 2020 letter or proffer,” and “the IRS-CI SAR summary and related internal
investigative exhibits cited as Dkt. 1 at 12.” 	ECF No. 511 at 3–4.
The Court did not rely on an “August 12, 2020 letter or proffer” in reaching any of its
holdings, see ECF No. 497 at 17, and the other materials referenced are and were available to
Defendant to review. Copies of the plea hearing transcript and the Faretta hearing transcript “may
be obtained from the court reporter or transcriber at the rates established by the Judicial
1 Defendant also mentions, without elaboration, that the Opinion and Order “omitted the Jones prejudice prong.” ECF
No. 511 at 7. To the extent Defendant is referring to the prejudice prong of the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea,
see United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 255 (3d Cir. 2003), the Court sufficiently discussed this prong in its Opinion
and Order, see ECF No. 497 at 18–19.
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Conference” by “any party or attorney of record” and anyone who visits the public terminals of
the Clerk’s Office, where the transcript can be made available for public inspection. See “Policy
on the Electronic Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.” 2 	And the document that
Defendant mistakenly refers to as “the IRS-CI SAR summary and related internal investigative
exhibits cited as Dkt. 1 at 12” appears to be the Indictment, which is available to Defendant. See
ECF No. 1.
Notwithstanding the fact that all materials relied upon by the Court were and are available
to Defendant, Defendant has failed to demonstrate any clear error of law regarding his purported
lack of access to documents. 	Defendant contends that his lack of access to certain documents
“violates the adversarial-record rule and constitutes a facial Rule 11(b)(3) error.” ECF No. 511 at
4. Defendant neither defines the purported “adversarial-record rule,” nor does the Court recognize
such a doctrine. A rule that appears not to exist cannot be a basis for reconsideration. And Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) requires courts to “determine that there is a factual basis for
the plea” “[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea.” 	Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). 	Defendant
does not explain, and the Court does not discern, how his lack of access to these materials could
have impaired the Court’s ability to make that determination at his plea hearing. Defendant also
contends that United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010) supports his position, but
Dupree is not relevant to this issue. Dupree addresses whether an argument must be raised in the
district court to be preserved on appeal. 	See id. 	The decision has no bearing on whether the
availability of documents to a criminal defendant affects the voluntariness of his guilty plea. See
id.
2 Available at https://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/PolicyETranscripts.pdf.
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Most saliently, Defendant does not appear to dispute the substance of the proceedings in
which he participated. 	At his plea hearing, he swore under oath he was guilty and that his plea
was voluntary, and at his subsequent Faretta hearing, he knowingly waived his right to counsel.
The mere fact that Defendant does not possess transcripts of those proceedings does not render
their contents inaccurate or unreliable.
Second, Defendant argues that the Court overlooked conditions that coerced him to plead
guilty. He argues that the Opinion and Order failed to discuss his conditions of confinement, denial
of discovery access, communication restrictions, multiple transfers, limited counsel access,
isolation from family, asset restraint, and refusal to release digital funds needed for counsel or bail.
ECF No. 511 at 7–8. 	Defendant argues that his position is supported by Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), which, by
Defendant’s interpretation, deem the cumulative impact of these conditions coercive.
The Court did not, however, overlook the bases for coercion that Defendant raised in his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In its Opinion and Order, the Court expressly considered and
rejected each of Defendant’s coercion arguments based on applicable law. See ECF No. 497 at
11–13. Defendant now largely reiterates his complaints about his conditions of confinement and
adds a list of other generalized grievances that he did not raise as coercive in his original motion.
“New arguments that could have been raised in [a party’s] original motion are inappropriate
grounds for reconsideration,” and so the Court will not consider these additional grounds. Denger
v. Merret, No. 08-3454, 2011 WL 5825971, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2011). 	In any event, these
alleged harms, which are either routine aspects of criminal proceedings or unsupported assertions
of misconduct, do not establish coercion, much less clear error of fact or law warranting
reconsideration.
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Moreover, Defendant is mistaken to the extent he suggests that Machibroda and Brady
establish any clear error of law. 	In Machibroda, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s
promise of a specific sentence, coupled with instructions to the defendant not to discuss this
promise with his counsel, and threatening him for doing so, would, if true, render a guilty plea
coerced. See Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 489–93. Defendant has not alleged, in either his original
motion or his reconsideration motion, that anything similar transpired here. 	And in Brady, the
Supreme Court held that a guilty plea is not coerced just because it was influenced by the fear of
a possibly higher penalty—a holding that certainly does not support Defendant’s position. 	See
Brady, 397 U.S. at 750–51.
Third, Defendant argues that the Court retroactively applied new interpretations of the law
that did not apply to Defendant at the time of his conduct. Specifically, Defendant argues that his
conduct—which he describes as “peripheral promotional activity” causing no investor harm—was
not subject to section 5 of the Securities Act at the time it occurred. ECF No. 511 at 9. Defendant
states that “[b]etween 2014 and 2019—the conduct period—the United States lacked clear,
publicly available guidance classifying participation in distributed-network mining or promotional
activity as a securities or wire-fraud offense” and “[t]he absence of pre-2020 regulatory definitions
deprived Defendant of constitutionally adequate notice and rendered any Rule 11 factual-basis
finding incomplete.” Id at 10–11.
Defendant’s argument—which he made in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea—still
fails. 	Count Two charges Defendant with conspiracy to commit an offense against the United
States. 	See ECF No. 1. 	The “offense against the United States” here is offering and selling
unregistered shares in violation of section 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e and 77x. See
ECF No. 1 at 15. As the Court explained in its Opinion and Order, Defendant was not indicted
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based on a novel theory of securities law; he was charged with conspiring to offer and sell
unregistered shares of BitClub Network (“BCN”), which are securities as defined by 15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(1) and the Howey test, established in 1946. See ECF 497 at 8. Neither the facts nor the
governing law have changed since the Court’s Opinion and Order, and Defendant has failed to
point to any clear error of law or fact that would warrant a different outcome.
Furthermore, Defendant admitted to conspiring to promote and sell shares in BCN mining
pools, which he acknowledged, under oath, he knew were unregistered securities. 	At the plea
hearing, the Government stated all the elements of Count Two, conspiracy to commit an offense
against the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371), and the elements of the underlying offense, offering
or selling unregistered securities (15 U.S.C. § 77e, 77x). See ECF No. 417-1 at 22:12–23:20. The
Government clearly described the scienter element—that Defendant knew the securities were not
registered—and Defendant testified that his conduct satisfied that element. See ECF No. 417-1 at
23:15–17 (describing the third element as “knowing that the securities were not registered and not
exempt, . . . the Defendant willfully sold them or caused them to be sold to the public”); id. at
38:7–10 (Q: “Do you also agree that you knew at the time you and others were selling these shares
that the sale of those shares was wrongful?” A: “Yes.”). The Court then stated its findings based
on Defendant’s testimony, and accepted Defendant’s plea. Id. at 43:10–44:2. Defendant has not
offered any persuasive argument or evidence that such testimony was coerced, or that the Court or
Government misstated the law at the plea hearing. 3
3 The Court notes that its Opinion and Order inadvertently referenced the civil standard for offering or selling
unregistered securities. However, as explained above, at Defendant’s plea hearing, the Court applied the criminal
standard in determining, pursuant to Rule 11, that a sufficient factual basis existed for Defendant’s guilty plea.
Moreover, the reference to the civil standard was not outcome-determinative. Nonetheless, to clarify this issue, the
Court issues an amended version of the Opinion and Order.
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Fourth, Defendant argues that after his Faretta hearing, he was denied “access to prior-
counsel files and Rule 16 and Brady materials necessary to verify the plea’s factual basis,”
rendering “self-representation meaningless and the plea unknowing.” 	ECF No. 511 at 5. 	This
argument is unavailing. Given that Defendant’s Faretta hearing occurred after he pleaded guilty,
any alleged lack of access to discovery thereafter could not have affected the voluntariness of his
plea. And to the extent Defendant argues that his plea may be withdrawn because he did not have
access to documents after his plea, the Third Circuit has stated that a “knowing and voluntary plea
constitute[s] a waiver of any right [a criminal defendant] may have had to receive documents.”
United States v. Daisi, 510 F. App’x 194, 196 (3d Cir. 2013).
For these reasons, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea is denied.
2. 	Reconsideration of Motions for Return of Property
Defendant appears to make three arguments in support of his motion to reconsider the
Court’s denial of his motions to return property: 	(1) the Court denied these motions as moot,
indicating that they were overlooked rather than adjudicated on the merits; (2) the Government did
not respond to these motions; and (3) due-process concerns recognized in Culley v. Marshall
support the return of his property.
First, Defendant argues that the Opinion and Order “declared numerous live motions
‘moot’ based solely on denial of plea withdrawal, sweeping in Rule 41(g) property-return and
Brady and Rule 16 discovery requests that remain justiciable irrespective of a plea or conviction.”
ECF No. 511 at 6. Defendant contends that his property return motions were thus overlooked. Id.
But the Court did not deny Defendant’s property motions as moot; they were denied because a
motion to return property “must be filed in the district where the property was seized,” and
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Defendant’s property was not seized in this district. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g); see also ECF No. 497
at 19. Defendant makes no argument challenging this holding, and thus identifies no clear error
of fact or law.
Second, Defendant appears to argue that his motions to return property should be granted
because the Government did not respond to them. But “the Court need not grant [a] motion solely
on the basis that it was not opposed.” Ali v. Hilton Gateway/ WIPC Mgmt., No. 05-2459, 2006
WL 8458200, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2006) (citing Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29 (3d
Cir. 1991) (holding that a district court should not have granted a motion solely on the basis that
it was unopposed)). Accordingly, the Government’s lack of opposition does not, on its own, justify
granting Defendant’s motion.
Third, Defendant argues that the continued retention of his property “implicates the due-
process concerns recognized in Culley v. Marshall, 144 S. Ct. 790 (2024) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).” ECF No. 511 at 14. However, in Culley v. Marshall, 601 U.S. 377 (2024), the Court
held that in civil forfeiture cases, the Due Process Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing, but
not a preliminary hearing. Defendant’s property was not seized under civil forfeiture laws, nor is
he complaining about a lack of hearing. Therefore, Culley does not support Defendant’s position.
Defendant makes no further arguments that the Court’s denial of his motions to return
property were clearly erroneous, or that new evidence or a change in law warrants reconsideration.
In his reply brief, Defendant notes that he requests information from the Government, including
the identity of custodians of certain property, the statutory basis for continued restraint of assets,
and other information related to his seized digital assets. See ECF No. 534, Ex. A at 2. None of
these requests fall within the scope of a motion for reconsideration, nor does Defendant provide
any authoritative basis for his requests. Therefore, the Court will not consider these extraneous
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requests, and Defendant’s motion to reconsider the Court’s denial of his motions for return of
property is denied.
3. 	Reconsideration of Motions for Discovery
Defendant argues that the Court erred by denying his discovery motions as moot “based
solely on denial of plea withdrawal,” and that his motions should have been granted. ECF No. 511
at 6. He contends that the motions “remain[ed] justiciable irrespective of a plea or conviction,”
and that United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 1999) and “United States v. Noel, 708
F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 2013)” support this proposition. As an initial matter, Chambers does not concern
discovery, and the case citation for Noel appears to be incorrect. To the extent Defendant refers
to United States v. Noel, 905 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2018), that case likewise does not appear to be
relevant to Defendant’s arguments.
The only other argument Defendant offers, without elaboration, is that the Government has
violated its Brady and Rule 16 obligations by failing to provide certain discovery. Putting aside
that Defendant has not explained any clear error of law or fact, Defendant’s proposition is
incorrect. “There can be no violation of Brady unless the Government’s non-disclosure infringes
upon the defendant’s fair trial right.” Gov’t of Virgin Islands in Int. of N.G., 34 F. App’x 417, 419
(3d Cir. 2002). By pleading guilty, Defendant waived his right to trial, and so his right to a fair
trial cannot be infringed. 	Furthermore, the purpose of Rule 16 discovery is “to assist trial
preparation.” United States v. Worman, No. 07-00040, 2007 WL 2221425, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
1, 2007) (citing United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 209 (3d Cir. 2007)). A defendant who has
waived trial, therefore, does not require discovery to assist trial preparation. See United States v.
Parsons, No. 13-104, 2015 WL 898259, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2015) (“[S]ince Defendant will
not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, there will be no trial in this case. 	Therefore,
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Defendant has no need for discovery to prepare his case.”). 	Furthermore, Defendant has not
provided any other authority that supports a right to discovery after pleading guilty. 	For these
reasons, Defendant’s argument fails.
Defendant also requests that the Government “certify or provide” various records to
“permit verification of the factual basis and tax calculations.” ECF No. 511 at 14. None of these
requests fall within the scope of a motion for reconsideration, nor does Defendant provide any
authoritative basis for his requests. 	Therefore, the Court will not consider these extraneous
requests. For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to reconsider the Court’s denial of his
motions for discovery, ECF Nos. 402, 403, 406, 477, is denied.
B. Request to Correct a Clerical Error
Although not relevant to his motion for reconsideration, Defendant includes in his motion
a request to correct the record pursuant to Rule 36 and Local Rule 79.1. ECF No. 511 at 13. He
contends that a “Notice of Dismissal of Counsel” dated January 22, 2025 was never filed on the
docket. ECF No. 511, Ex. A. This issue appears to be resolved, given that this submission now
appears on the docket. See ECF No. 552.
C. Motion to Seal
Also before the Court is Defendant’s motion to seal. 	ECF No. 466. 	Defendant filed
subsequent letters expressing his intent to unseal the documents he previously sought to seal. See
ECF Nos. 484, 489. Given the volume of submissions filed regarding sealing, the Court requested
the parties’ positions as to which sealed documents should be unsealed. See ECF No. 497 at 22.
The parties submitted letters, and agreed that the following docket entries may be unsealed: ECF
Nos. 448, 451, 452, 466, 467, and 468. See ECF Nos. 510, 512. Upon review of these submissions,
and considering the parties’ stipulations, the Court agrees that these documents shall be unsealed.
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Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to seal, ECF No. 466, is denied as moot, and ECF Nos. 448,
451, 452, 466, 467, and 468 shall be unsealed.
D. Other Submissions
Defendant has additionally filed a motion to compel production and to correct the record,
ECF No. 503; a supplemental motion for return of property, ECF No. 520; a motion to supplement
the record, ECF No. 535; a notice of supplemental authority, ECF No. 542; and a letter requesting
case scheduling, ECF No. 546. To the extent these submissions seek relief, they are denied.
ECF No. 503 and ECF No. 520 seek the same relief sought in his motion for reconsideration
and prior motions. 	See ECF No. 503 (seeking public filing of plea hearing transcript, Faretta
hearing transcript, and Notice of Dismissal); ECF No. 520 (seeking return of property). For the
same reasons stated in this opinion and in the Court’s prior Opinion and Order, these motions are
denied.
Defendant also filed a motion to supplement the record, ECF No. 535, and a “Notice of
Supplemental Authority,” ECF No. 542. 	Defendant notes that the “motion does not seek any
determination on the merits of the pending motions,” ECF No. 535 at 1, and the notice “is not a
motion and seeks no additional relief,” ECF No. 542 at 1. 	Notwithstanding these statements,
Defendant’s submissions contain further argument in support of his motion for reconsideration
and a recitation of alleged factual inconsistencies provided to “clarify” the record. See ECF Nos.
535, 542. Defendant cites no authority requiring the Court to take any action in response to these
submissions. 	Furthermore, Defendant did not seek leave to supplement his motion for
reconsideration, and his filings violate the Court’s order, which limited his motion to fifteen pages
with double-spaced text, and set a due date of November 5, 2025. See ECF No. 508. Therefore,
these submissions are not properly before the Court. 	In any event, the Court notes that the
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arguments contained in Defendant’s supplemental filings are without merit, and would not change
the outcome of this decision.
Lastly, Defendant filed a letter requesting “pretrial scheduling and discovery milestones.”
ECF No. 546. As stated, Defendant has pleaded guilty, the Court has determined that his plea was
valid, and so there will be no trial for which scheduling or discovery is needed. 	Therefore,
Defendant’s request is denied.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court hereby denies Defendant’s pending motions.
Accordingly, IT IS on this 4th day of February, 2026:
ORDERED that Defendant’s motions (ECF Nos. 466, 503, 511, 520, 535) are DENIED;
and it is further
ORDERED that ECF Nos. 448, 451, 452, 466, 467, and 468 shall be UNSEALED; and it
is further
ORDERED that sentencing in this matter is scheduled for April 16, 2026 at 10:30 AM in
the Martin Luther King Building and U.S. Courthouse, 50 Walnut Street, Courtroom 5B, before
Judge Claire C. Cecchi.
SO ORDERED.
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.
V&ODLUH&&HFFKL
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