CAMPBELL v. HICKS et al

2:17-cv-04183Njd3 feb 2026

Testo completo

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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 2:17-cv-04183-EP-CF Document130 _ Filed 02/03/26 Page 1 of 6 PagelD:
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CURTIS CAMPBELL
Plaintiff,
No. 17cv4183 (EP) (CF)
Vv.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
MARCUS HICKS, et al.,
Defendants.
PADIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Curtis Campbell brings this action against Defendants Marcus Hicks and Willie
Bonds for allegedly violating several of his state and federal civil rights by: (1) discriminating
against him because he is blind; (2) denying him access to administrative grievance and court
processes; and (3) subjecting him to conditions of incarceration that have caused serious harm and
create a substantial risk of harm. D.E. 59 (“Third Amended Complaint”). As explained in more
depth below, Plaintiff passed away in early 2024, and the Court has provided Plaintiff's counsel
approximately two years to locate Plaintiff's next of kin and determine whether they would like to
prosecute this action on behalf of Plaintiff's estate.

Given nearly two years has passed and Plaintiff's family still has not chosen whether to
prosecute this action—despite multiple extensions to do so—the Court sua sponte considers
whether to dismiss this action without prejudice. For the reasons explained below, the Court will
do just that.

1. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action in June 2017. See Dkt. In 2019, Plaintiff was appointed

pro bono counsel, who is currently the counsel of record. D.E. 36. Over the next several years,

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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this case crawled through the early stages of litigation and discovery. Indeed, in April 2020, the
Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for a failure to
prosecute. D.E. 44.

In January 2024, as the parties neared summary judgment briefing, Plaintiff unfortunately
passed away. D.E. 115. As a result, the Court provided Plaintiffs counsel time to ascertain
Plaintiff's estate. D.E. 118. After multiple status conferences throughout the first half of 2024,
the Court provided Plaintiff's counsel additional time to search for Plaintiff's family, and in the
interim, administratively terminated the action. D.Es. 121-23. On October 23, 2025—nearly
twenty-two months following Plaintiff's passing and with no real progress to show—the Court
ordered the parties to provide a status update. D.E. 124. In that order, the Court indicated that a
“failure to provide an update or demonstrate meaningful progress in locating Plaintiff's family
since this case was stayed may result in dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b).” D.E. 124.

Plaintiff's counsel provided an update that the late-Plaintiff's sister was still unsure
whether she (or the family) intended to pursue this action, D.E. 125, and the Court subsequently
provided until December 5, 2025, for Plaintiff's counsel to provide another update, D.E. 126. On
December 5, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel requested another extension of time for the late-Plaintiff’s
sister to speak with her brothers and decide whether she or they wished to pursue this action. D.E.
128. The Court granted an extension until January 16, 2026, and made clear that “[n]o further
extensions of this deadline [would] be granted, and a failure to provide the Court with a definitive

answer with a proposed course of action [would] be deemed a failure to prosecute.” Id.

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On January 20, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel indicated that the family informed him that they
would let him know by January 16, 2026, whether they wished to pursue this action, but he never
heard back. D.E. 129.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits courts to sua sponte dismiss an action if a
litigant fails to prosecute a case or to comply with a court order. Qadr v. Overmyer, 642 F. App’x
100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Emps. Pension
Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that courts may sua sponte dismiss an
action under Rule 41(b)). The decision to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute lies within the
sound discretion of a court. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). That
discretion is cabined and guided by the factors identified by the Third Circuit in Poulis v. State
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). The Poulis factors are:

(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the

adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery;

(3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was

willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which

entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim
or defense.

Id. at 868. “[N]o single Poulis factor is dispositive.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir.
2008) (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003)). Nor do “all of the
Poulis factors need to be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Jd. (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti,
964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). In addition, [w]hen a litigant’s conduct makes adjudication
of the case impossible . . . balancing under Poulis is unnecessary.” Asubuko v. Bell Nat. Org., 243

F. App’x 728, 729 (3d Cir. 2007).

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No matter the circumstances, however, district courts should always “provide the plaintiff
with an opportunity to explain his reasons for failing to prosecute the case or comply with its orders
prior to dismissing a case sua sponte.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258.

Til. ANALYSIS

The Court will dismiss this action because Plaintiffs family has failed to comply with the
Court’s repeated orders to decide whether to prosecute this action.

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff's family is entirely responsible for the delays in this
action. For nearly two years they have not decided whether to even prosecute this action despite
several prompts from the Court and outreach from Plaintiffs counsel. As Plaintiff's counsel
indicated in his latest filing, Plaintiff's brother indicated he would call counsel back, but never did.
D.E. 129.

Second, “Defendants are prejudiced by Plaintiff's failure to prosecute. Prejudice occurs
when a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute burdens the defendant’s ability to prepare for trial.” Hagins
v. Pierce, No. 17-494, 2018 WL 3559097, at *2 (D. Del. July 24, 2018) (citing Ware, 322 F.3d at
222-23). Here, Plaintiff's family’s failure to take any action has delayed Defendants from being
able to defend this action. For nearly a decade Defendants have been forced to defend this action.

Third, there is a meaningful history of dilatoriness in this action. Not including the
previous warning to dismiss this action for Plaintiffs failure to prosecute, the Court has given
Plaintiff's family nearly two years to decide whether to continue with this case, and they have yet
to make up their minds. The several extensions of time to consider whether to even prosecute this
case or meaningfully respond to Court orders demonstrates a history and pattern of dilatoriness.
See Adams, 29 F.3d at 874 (“Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of

dilatoriness .. . .”); Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191 (finding that a history of dilatory conduct existed

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because the “procedural history of this case reflect[ed] continuous dilatoriness” as demonstrated
by the plaintiff's multiple requests for stays and failure to comply with multiple deadlines).

Fourth, it is not clear to the Court whether the delays from Plaintiff's family are either
willful or in bad faith, but the fact that the family has been unable to decide for nearly two years
whether to continue on with this action suggests they have, on some level, abandoned this case.
See Hagins, 2018 WL 3559097, at *2 (“[B]ecause [p]laintiff has taken no action in close to a year,
the Court is unable to discern whether his failure to prosecute is willful or in bad faith, but notes
that [p]laintiff failed to respond to the motion to dismiss and letter/motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute and appears to have abandoned his case.”’).

Fifth, there are no alternative sanctions available. Plaintiff's family is not a party to this
action and the Court finds that monetary sanctions would be inappropriate.

Sixth, with respect to the meritoriousness of Plaintiff's claims, the Court finds this factor
is neutral. The parties were on the precipice of briefing summary judgment motions when Plaintiff
passed away, and without said motions, the Court cannot ascertain to a meaningful extent the
merits of Plaintiff's case. In any event, when the first five Poulis factors all weigh in favor of
dismissing with prejudice, courts routinely! elect not to address this final factor as not all of the
Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss [an action].” Riley v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t
of Corr., 536 F. App’x 222, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2013).

On balance, the Poulis factors strongly weigh in favor of dismissing this action. It is clear
from the letters from Plaintiff's counsel that Plaintiffs siblings have been slow to return his calls

and make the preliminary determination as to whether even prosecute this action on behalf of their

' See, e.g., McNamara v. Buehler, No. 16-841, 2018 WL 9880301, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2018),
report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5448684 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2019) (citing Macon v.
City of Asbury Park, No. 07-1413, 2008 WL 1882899, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2008)).

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late-brother’s estate. After nearly two years to make that choice—and numerous warnings and
extensions from the Court—the Court is left with the conclusion that Plaintiff's family has
abandoned this case and does not wish to pursue this action.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS, on this 3" day of January 2026,

ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice against Defendants for the
failure to prosecute this action; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall mark this case as CLOSED.

Food Tode

Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.

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