Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

1:26-cv-01945Njd3 mar 2026

Testo completo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ABNER F MARTINEZ AMAYA,
Petitioner,
v.
PAM BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26–cv–01945–ESK
OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on petitioner Abner F Martinez
Amaya’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Petition) (ECF No. 1) and this Court’s February 25, 2026 order (ECF No. 2.)
Respondents oppose the Petition. (ECF No. 3.)
1. Petitioner is a citizen of El Salvador. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) He entered
the United States without inspection in June 2001. (Id. ¶ 16.)
2. The Department of Homeland Security (Department) arrested
petitioner on February 24, 2026 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) without
providing him any bond hearing or other individualized custody determination
following his detention. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 14.)
3. Respondents filed an answer on February 28, 2026 arguing that
petitioner is properly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) because he is
a noncitizen “entered without inspection or parole who was detained by
immigration authorities in the interior of the country without having been
lawfully admitted. Accordingly, [p]etitioner is an ‘applicant for admission’ as
described in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and in the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(‘BIA’) decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).”
(ECF No. 3 p. 4.)
4. Additionally, respondents acknowledge that the statutory arguments
and facts in this case are materially identical to those that the Court has
already rejected in Ayala Amaya v. Bondi, No. 25–cv–16428, 2025 WL 3033880,
D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2025) and other cases. (Id. p. 1 & n. 1.)
5. I conclude that petitioner is being unlawfully detained under
respondents’ repeated invocation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 because petitioner was
apprehended inside the United States after residing here for an extended
Case 1:26-cv-01945-ESK Document 5 Filed 03/03/26 Page 1 of 4 PageID: <pageID>
2
period, and therefore he should have been detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226,
which requires an opportunity to seek bond.1 See Ayala Amaya, 2025 WL
3033880, at *2–3.
6. I further note that federal courts have in near unanimity similarly
rejected respondents’ position in approximately 300 cases to date, a number
which climbs with every passing day. See, e.g., Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila.,
No. 25–cv–05488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (noting “the
law is clear” and that “of the 288 district court decisions to address the issue,
282 have determined that § 1226(a) applies or likely applies in situations
similar to those presented here. Those decisions are plainly correct.”); but see
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026) (holding that
noncitizen’s status as an applicant for admission does not turn on where or how
the noncitizen entered the United States).2
7. The basis for the petitioner’s continued “detention [was] blatantly
unlawful from the start, the only commensurate and appropriate equitable
remedy to even partially restore [petitioner] is to immediate[ly] release him and
enjoin the Government from further similar transgressions.” Martinez v.
McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). “[T]he Supreme Court
has repeatedly upheld prisoners’ rights to challenge the constitutionality of
their detentions, and allow[ed] courts to implement corrective remedies,
regardless of whether there were other bases for the petitioners to be
subsequently detained … .” Id. at 366.
8. I decline to allow respondents to transform an unlawful detention
into a lawful one through alternative, retrospective, post hoc justification
presented mid-litigation, as doing so would give the Government a free pass to
violate a person’s statutory and constitutional rights first and search for
authority later. “The Constitution does not permit the United States
Government to target people on the streets, arrest them without serving any
papers, deny them meaningful due process, and detain them for arbitrary or
indefinite periods of time while they engage in phishing expeditions to justify
the arrests.” Id. at 373; see also Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475,
1 I note that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction over
petitioner’s challenge to his continued detention because the challenge is collateral to
“the removal process,” and is not “inextricably linked” to any removal action. See
Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 274 (3d Cir. 2026).
2 Buenrostro-Mendez is not binding authority, and I am unpersuaded by its
reasoning for many of the reasons articulated in Judge Douglas’s dissent, including
that the majority’s interpretation risks rendering significant portions of the statutory
scheme superfluous and internally inconsistent. See Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th
at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Case 1:26-cv-01945-ESK Document 5 Filed 03/03/26 Page 2 of 4 PageID: <pageID>
3
486 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (releasing petitioner and explaining that the court “cannot
credit [r]espondents’ new position as to the basis for . . . detention, which was
adopted post hoc and raised for the first time in this litigation.”); Arias Gudino
v. Lowe, 785 F. Supp. 3d 27, 46 n. 8 (M.D. Pa. 2025) (releasing petitioner and
discussing the impropriety of allowing the government to proceed on “post hoc
justifications for detention”).
Accordingly,
IT IS on this 3rd day of March 2026 ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner’s § 2241 Petition is GRANTED. Respondents shall on
this date IMMEDIATELY RELEASE petitioner under the same conditions, if
any, that existed prior to his detention, including, but not limited to, release:
(1) within the State of New Jersey; (2) without the imposition of additional
conditions (such as ankle monitors or electronic tracking devices); and (3) with
all clothing and outerwear worn at the time of detention, or other appropriate
attire.
2. Respondents shall return to petitioner all personal property
belonging to petitioner—including, but not limited to, any driver’s license,
passport, immigration documents, currency, or cellphone—that was seized at
the time of detention and that is currently in their custody, possession, or
control, whether maintained directly by respondents or by any contracted or
affiliated facility, and that such property shall be returned in the same
condition as it existed immediately prior to petitioner’s detention.
3. Respondents shall file a letter on the docket confirming the date and
time of petitioner’s release and that the conditions set forth above have been
satisfied.
4. Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from rearresting
or otherwise detaining petitioner under § 1225, which this Court has found
inapplicable to him.
5. Respondents shall not arrest, detain, or otherwise take petitioner
into custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for a period of 14 days following his
release, so as to ensure full effectuation of this Court’s judgment and to prevent
circumvention of the relief granted.
6. Any future detention or re-detention of petitioner must comply with
all statutory and constitutional requirements, including the identification of a
Case 1:26-cv-01945-ESK Document 5 Filed 03/03/26 Page 3 of 4 PageID: <pageID>
4
lawful statutory basis for detention and the provision of adequate procedural
and substantive due process.
7. To the extent that respondents seek to re-arrest or otherwise re-
detain petitioner under any statutory authority, including but not limited to
§§ 1225 or 1226, this Court shall retain jurisdiction over the matter and
petitioner may move to reopen these proceedings before this Court without the
need to file a new habeas petition.
8. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case.
/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:26-cv-01945-ESK Document 5 Filed 03/03/26 Page 4 of 4 PageID: <pageID>

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.