LUNDY v. RODRIGUEZ et al

1:25-cv-02151Njd20 gen 2026

Testo completo

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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cv-02151-KMW-SAK Document 7 Filed 01/20/26 Page 1 of 6 PagelD:
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS

NAJEE M. LUNDY,

Plaintiff, Civil Action
v. No. 25-2151 (SMW-SAK)
PATROL OFFICER RODRIGUEZ,
BURLINGTON TOWNSHIP POLICE MEMORANDUM OPINION
DEPARTMENT, AND ORDER
Defendants.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of Defendants Patrol Officer Rodriguez,
(“Officer Rodriguez”) and the Burlington Township Police Department’s (“BTPD,” collectively
with Rodriguez, “Defendants”) unopposed Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6) pro se Plaintiff Natee
M. Lundy’s (‘Plaintiff’) Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

WHEREAS, Plaintiff's Complaint! alleges that while driving his motor vehicle in
Burlington Township, Officer Rodriguez of the BTPD “stopped his private mode of conveyance
without reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause.” (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 4}; and

WHEREAS, Plaintiff further alleges that, without justification, Officer Rodriguez
shattered his driver’s side window, broke his driver’s side door, and caused significant property

damage (id.); and

' For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint as true and draws all
inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Phillips » County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir,
2008),

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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WHEREAS, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Rodriguez and unidentified “assisting officers”
used excessive force to remove him from his vehicle and that the BTPD failed to train and
supervise its officers (id.); and

WHEREAS, Plaintiff claims that Officer Rodriguez and other officers violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Ud.)
Plaintiff also asserts claims for failure to train and/or supervise and intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress (/d.); and

WHEREAS, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” (o survive a
motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), A complaint “that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a
complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “naked assertion[s}’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.” Jd, (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S, at 555, 557), “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A
complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). fd.
(quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557); and

WHEREAS, to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must first show the
defendant’s conduct deprived them of their “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States.” Pettit ». New Jersey, No. 09-3735, 2011 WL 1325614,

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at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2011). A plaintiff must “identify the exact contours of the underlying right
said to have been violated,” Downey v. The Coalition Against Rape and Abuse, Inc., 143 F, Supp.
2d 423, 437 (D.N.J. 2001); and

WHEREAS, “‘[iJn Section 1983 actions, police departments cannot be sued in conjunction
with municipalities, because the police department is merely an administrative arm of the local
municipality, and is not a separate judicial entity.” Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 App’x
272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004); and

WHEREAS, a municipality may be liable under § 1983 “if the plaintiff identifies a
municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury.” Jewell ». Ridley
Township, 497 F. App’x 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Monell vy. Dept of Soc. Serv of NYC,
463 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). A complaint against a municipality cannot simply assert an entitlement
- to relief, it must identify a custom or policy and link that custom or policy to the facts contained
in the complaint. McTernan v. City of York, 564 F. 3d 636, 658 Gd. Cir. 2009); and

WHEREAS, to state a claim against the Township under Monell, Plaintiff must allege that
it had a “policy or custom” which served as the “proximate cause of the injuries suffered.” G.S. v,
Penn-Trafford Sch. Dist., 813 Fed. App’x 799, 803 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon,
915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). An official policy is made when a “decisionmaker possess[ing]
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official
proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v, City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir, 1990); and

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to assert any fact that suggests an unconstitutional
municipal policy, practice, or custom of Burlington Township. (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not allege any policy of the Township regarding traffic stops or the use of force

that caused a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s Complaint likewise fails to assert that

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a Township custom existed regarding traffic stops and the use of force that caused a violation of
his constitutional rights (Gd.); and

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has held that the failure to train “serve]s| as [a] basis for
§ 1983 liability only where [it] .. . amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). A plaintiff
sufficiently pleads deliberate indifference by showing that ‘(1) municipal policymakers know that
employees will confront a particular situation[,] (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a
history of employees mishandling[,] and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently
cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Doe vy Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169, 180 Gd Cir,
2011) Gnternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339,
357 (3d Cir, 1999)); and

WHEREAS, here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint does not sufficiently plead
the elements of deliberate indifference; and

THE COURT NOTING that Plaintiff's Complaint asserts a § 1983 cause of action against
the BTPD—not Burlington Township—for alleged failure to train and supervise Officer Rodriguez
(Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 4); see Padilla, 110 F. App’x at 278;

CONSEQUENTLY, Plaintiff's Monel/ claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff will be afforded an opportunity to amend his Complaint to correct the deficiencies
identified herein; and

WHEREAS, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 3); and

WHEREAS, the Fifth Amendment applies only to violations of constitutional rights by

the United States or federal actors, and not to state actors. See, e.g., Bergdoll v. City of York, 515

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F. App’x 165, 170 Gd Cir. 2013) (“Bergdoll's Fifth Amendment claim fails because the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only applies to federal officials, and [defendant] is a state
official.”); Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App’x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he due process clause
under the Fifth Amendment only protects against federal governmental action and does not limit
the actions of state officials.”); and

WHEREAS, all of the Defendants identified in Plaintiff’s Complaint are state actors;

CONSEQUENTLY, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim for
violation of the Fifth Amendment with respect to Defendants. Accordingly, the Court dismisses
Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims against Defendants with prejudice; and

WHEREAS, excessive force claims arising in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop
are properly characterized as invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees
citizens the right “to be secure in their persons .. . against unreasonable .. . seizures” of the person.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). “[B]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive
governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due
process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims,” /d, at 395;

CONSEQUENTLY, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims must
be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his Complaint to assert a
cause of action for violation of the Fourth, rather than Fourteenth, Amendment based on the alleged
use of excessive force. For all the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown;

ITIS thie? day of January, 2026, hereby:

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6) is GRANTED; and further

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ORDERED that Plaintiff's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are DISMISSED
with prejudice; and further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the BTPD is DISMISSED with
prejudice; and further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Monell claim is DISMISSED without prejudice; and

ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint to correct the
deficiencies identified herein by no later than February 20, 2026. Plaintiff is cautioned that if he
fails to timely file an Amended Complaint, the Court may deem Plaintiff to have abandoned his

claims and dismiss this action with prejudice.

KAREN M. WILLIAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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