1:24-cv-10732•EWINGS et al v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
Testo completo
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 1 of 9 PageID: <pageID>
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 2 of 9 PageID: <pageID>
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 3 of 9 PageID: <pageID>
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 4 of 9 PageID: <pageID>
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 5 of 9 PageID: <pageID>
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 6 of 9 PageID: <pageID>
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 7 of 9 PageID: <pageID>
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 8 of 9 PageID: <pageID>
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 9 of 9 PageID: <pageID>
OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 1 of 9 PagelD:
<pagelD>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
DAISHA EWINGS, ef al., HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS
Plaintiffs, _
Civil Action
‘ No. 24-10732 (KMW-SAK)
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Andrew R. Frisch, Esq. Alex D. Silagi and Matthrew Joseph
MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A. Mailloux
8151 Peters Road, Ste. 4000 United States Attorney’s Office
Plantation, Fl, 33324 970 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Attorneys for Defendant
WILLIAMS, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiffs Daisha Ewings, Brian Bauska,
Camron Paige, and Mellany Thomas’ (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion to Conditionally Certify
Collective Action (Dkt. No. 53); Defendant United States Postal Service’s (“USPS”) opposition
thereto and Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 56); Plaintiffs’ reply (Dkt. No. 57); and USPS’s Sur-
Reply (Dkt. No. 68). The Court has considered the parties’ submissions without oral argument
pursuant to L.Civ.R. 78.1(b). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS USPS’s Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. No. 56) and dismisses Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint without prejudice.
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 2 of 9 PagelD:
<pagelD>
I. BACKGROUND!
This action arises from allegations that USPS failed to pay overtime compensation to its
City Carrier Assistants (“CCAs”) in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and
parallel state wage-and-hour laws. (Am, Compl. {7.) USPS is an independent establishment of the
executive branch of the United States government that provides postal services throughout the
United States and its territories. Ud. J 7.) Plaintiffs allege that USPS operates under centralized
payroll and timekeeping practices applicable to CCAs nationwide. Ud. 4 62.)
A. The Named Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs Daisha Ewings and Elizabeth Thomas aliege that they reside in Chicago, Illinois.
(2d. {| 8-9.) Piaintiff Brian Bauska alleges that he resides in Sultan, Washington. (7d. J 10.) Plaintiff
Camron Paige alleges that he resides in Cinnaminson, New Jersey. (/d. § 11.) Ewings alleges she
was employed by Defendant as a CCA from November 2022 through February 2024. Ud. YJ 21-
22.) Thomas alleges two periods of employment, from May 2021 through May. 2022 and again
from April 2023 through September 2023. Ud. JY 24-27.) Bauska alleges employment from
January 2021 through February 2023. Ud. fff 29-30.) Paige alleges that he was hired in April 2023
and remains employed by USPS. Ud. {fj 32-33.) The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs were paid
hourly wages ranging from approximately $18.43 to $19.80 per hour. Ud. Jf 23, 28, 31, 34.)
B. Alleged Duties and Work Schedules
Plaintiff alleges that CCAs perform duties including casing mail prior to delivery and
delivering and collecting mail and packages. (Ud. ¥ 36.) Plaintiffs allege that CCAs generally do
1 When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is obligated to accept as true allegations in the
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See Rocks vy. City of Phila., 868 F.2d 644, 645
(3d Cir, 1989). The facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”),
2
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 3 of 9 PagelD:
<pagelD>
not have fixed schedules, may work up to seven days per week, and typically work at least forty
hours in each workweek. (Ud. J 36.)
C, Alleged Compensation Practices
Plaintiffs allege that USPS automatically deducts thirty minutes of time from each workday
for a meal break, regardless of whether a meal break is taken. (/d. J 37.) Plaintiffs further allege
that they and other CCAs are regularly required to work through meal periods or to forego meal
breaks entirely in order to complete assigned duties, yet the automatic deduction is nevertheless
applied, (id. {ff 48-49.) Plaintiffs allege these deductions resulted in their working more than forty
hours in certain workweeks without being compensated at the statutory overtime rate. (id, § 50.)
Plaintiffs allege that USPS supervisors and management employees required, permitted, or
suffered such off-the-clock work as part of a broader effort to limit overtime payments. (Ud. 7 51.)
D. Allegations Regarding Location of Work
The Amended Complaint alleges that ‘‘venue is proper because [Plaintiff] Paige resides and
worked in this District and the claims arose in this District.” Ud. J 5.) Beyond this assertion, the
Amended Complaint does not allege that Paige worked in a USPS facility in New Jersey, identify
which USPS facility or facilities where Paige worked, does not specify when such work occurred,
and does not allege that any of the unpaid overtime at issue was performed in New Jersey. (See
generally Am, Compl.) As to Plaintiffs Ewings, Thomas, and Bauska, the Amended Complaint
alleges their states of residence but does not allege that they worked for USPS in New Jersey or
that any alleged wage-and-hour violations occurred in New Jersey. (/d. {ff 8-10.)
K, Procedural Posture
Plaintiffs bring this action as a proposed nationwide FLSA collective action and assert
parallel state-law class claims under Illinois, New Jersey, and Washington law. Ud. Jf 66-113.)
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 4 of 9 PagelD:
<pagelD>
USPS moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim. (Dkt. No. 56.)
L STANDARD OF REVIEW
a. Rule 12(b)(2)
When a defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, sufficient facts to show that
jurisdiction exists. See Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295-96 (3d Cir, 2001); Weber v. Jolly
Hotels, 977 ¥. Supp. 327, 331 (D.N.J. 1997). “[I]t is well established that in deciding a motion to
dismiss for lack of [personal] jurisdiction, a court is required to accept the plaintiff’s allegations
as true, and is to construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Mercalfe v. Renaissance Marine,
Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir, 2009) (citing Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446,
457 (3d Cir, 2003)). “Once the defense has been raised, then the plaintiff must sustain its burden
of proof in establishing jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits or other competent evidence.”
Time Share Vacation Club v, Atl, Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1984). The plaintiff “need
only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384
B.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, “at no point may a plaintiff rely on the bare pleadings
alone” to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction—‘[o]nce the motion is
made, plaintiff must respond with actual proofs, not mere allegations,” Time Share Vacation Club,
735 F.2d at 66.”
b. Rule 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court is required to accept
as true all factual allegations in the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences from those
“Courts may rely upon matters outside the pleadings to determine jurisdictional facts.” See DiSantis v. Allied Constr.,
LEC, No, 17-11379, 2018 WL 3647210, at #3 (D.N.J. July 31, 2018).
4
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 5 of 9 PagelD:
<pagelD>
allegations in the light most favorable to the non-movant, see Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515
FB.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir, 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S, 265, 286 (1986). To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading
must therefore contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Asheroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted),
il. DISCUSSION
a. Personal Jurisdiction
A district court must undertake a two-step inquiry to assess whether it has personal
jurisdiction over a defendant. First, the court analyzes whether the state’s long arm statute permits
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Miller Yacht Sales, Inc,, 384 F.3d at 96 (‘A federal court
sitting in New Jersey has jurisdiction over parties to the extent provided under New Jersey state
law.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k). “Second, the court must apply the principles of due process,”
WorldScape, Inc. v. Sails Capital Memt., No. 10-4207, 2011 WL 3444218 (D.N.J. Aug.5, 2011)
(citing IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998)). “In New Jersey, this
inquiry is collapsed into a single step because the New Jersey long-arm statute permits the exercise
of personal jurisdiction to the fullest limits of due process,” IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 259.
“Personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause depends upon ‘the relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 259 (quoting Shaffer
vy. Heitner, 433 U.S, 186, 204 (1977)). “There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction, only the latter of which is implicated in this case.” Warner »,
Warner, No. 23-3334, 2024 WL 1198112, at *2 n.4 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2024) (citing D’Jamoos ex
rel. Est. of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2009)), The exercise of
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 6 of 9 PagelD:
<pagelD>
c
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is proper if the defendant has “‘certain
minimum contacts with [New Jersey] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 Gd Cir. 1987) (quoting Jnt’] Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S, 310,
316 (1945)). “Physical presence within the forum is not required to establish personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant.” IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 259 (citing Burger King Corp. y,
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). “Instead, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has
purposefully directed its activities toward the residents of the forum state, or otherwise
‘purposefully availfed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” fd,
“The Third Circuit has laid out a three-part test to determine whether specific jurisdiction
exists: (1) ‘the defendant must have purposefully directed [its] activities at the forum’; (2) ‘the
litigation must arise out of or relate to at least one of those activities’; and (3) if the first two
requirements are met, the exercise of jurisdiction must ‘otherwise comport[ |] with fair play and
substantial justice.’” £. Concrete Materials, Inc. v. Jamer Materials Ltd,, 2019 WL 6734511, at *2
(D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2019), R & R adopted, No. 19-9032, 2019 WL 6726476 (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2019)
(quoting O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (Gd Cir. 2007),
In an FLSA collective action, personal jurisdiction must be established on a plaintiff-by-
plaintiff basis. The Third Circuit has made clear that an FLSA collective action “should operate
like an individual in personam suit for purposes of personal jurisdiction,” meaning the Court must
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to each plaintiff’s individual claim.
Fischer v, FedEx Corp., 42 F.4th 366, 380 (3d Cir. 2022), The FLSA does not authorize nationwide
service of process, and therefore does not itself expand the Court’s personal jurisdiction. fd. at
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 7 of 9 PagelD:
<pagelD>
385-86, Because Rule 4(k)(1)(A) applies, the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is limited
by New Jersey’s long-arm statute, which extends jurisdiction only to the outer bounds of federal
due process. Accordingly, Plaintiffs must establish either general or specific personal jurisdiction
over Defendant with respect to their claims. |
i. General Personal Jurisdiction
General personal jurisdiction exists only where a defendant is “at home.” For corporate or
quasi-corporate entities, that inquiry is ordinarily limited to the place of incorporation and principal
place of business. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Although
USPS operates facilities nationwide, including in New Jersey, such continuous operations are
insufficient to render it “at home” in every foram in which it conducts business. The Third Circuit
has expressly rejected the proposition that nationwide operations alone support general personal
jurisdiction. Fischer, 42 F.4th at 383. Plaintiffs argue that USPS’s status as an agency of the United
States confers general personal jurisdiction in all federal courts. That argument is unavailing.
Neither 39 U.S.C. § 409 nor 28 U.S.C, § 1391(e) creates universal general personal jurisdiction
over USPS for damages actions. Section 409 addresses subject-matter jurisdiction and waiver of
sovereign immunity; Section 1391 (e) is a venue statute that does not independently confer personal
jurisdiction. The Court must reject Plaintiffs’ request to transform USPS’ agency status into
nationwide general personal jurisdiction. See Fischer, 42 F4th at 370-72 (discussing limits on
general jurisdiction and rejecting nationwide jurisdiction absent consent or statutory authorization)
(citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co, y. Superior Court, 137 8. Ct. 1773 (2017)).
Accordingly, the Court lacks general personal jurisdiction over USPS in New Jersey.
it. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
To establish specific personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that:
(1) USPS purposefully directed its activities at New Jersey; and (2) the litigation arises out of or
7
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 8 of 9 PagelD:
<pagelD>
relates to those forum-directed activities. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316
(3d Cir. 2007). Here, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the second requirement.
The Amended Complaint does not allege with factual specificity that any Plaintiff
performed compensable work for USPS in New Jersey. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on a conclusory
assertion that Plaintiff Paige “resides and worked in this District and the claims arose in this
District.” (Am. Compi, { 5.) This allegation is insufficient. Critically, the Amended Complaint
does not identify: (i) any USPS facility in New Jersey where Plaintiff Paige worked; (ii) any dates
or time periods during which Plaintiff Paige performed work in New Jersey; (iii) any alleged wage-
and-hour violations that occurred in New Jersey; or (iv) any facts connecting the challenged payroll
ptactices to work performed in New Jersey. (See generally Am. Compl.)
Such a generalized assertion that a plaintiff “worked” in the forum—untethered to factual
allegations regarding where the alleged FLSA violations occurred—does not plausibly establish
that the claims “arise out of or relate to” USPS’ New Jersey contacts. See Fischer, 42 F.4th at 384—
85 (rejecting jurisdiction where claims were not tied to forum-state employment). Moreover,
residence in New Jersey, standing alone, is legally trelevant to the personal jurisdiction analysis.
The operative question is where the work giving rise to the claims occurred, not where Plaintifs
reside, The Amended Complaint’s failure to allege that Plaintiff Paige performed the unpaid work
at issue in New Jersey is fatal to jurisdiction at the pleading stage. As to the remaining named
Plaintiffs, the deficiency is even clearer, The Amended Complaint affirmatively alleges that they
reside in Illinois and Washington and does not allege that they worked for USPS in New Jersey at
any time. (Am. Compl. {ff 5, 36.) Under Fischer, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over their
claims.
Case 1:24-cv-10732-KMW-SAK Document 70 Filed 01/31/26 Page 9 of 9 PagelD:
<pagelD>
iil, Nationwide Service Arguments
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Rule 4G) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) is misplaced. (See Pls.” MTD Opp.
Br. at 7-11, Dkt. No. 57.) As the Third Circuit explained in Fischer, Rule 4(k)(1)(C) permits
nationwide personal jurisdiction only where a federal statute affirmatively authorizes it. The FLSA
does not do so, See Fischer, 42 FAth at 385-86. Nothing in § 1391(e) alters that conclusion, While
§ 1391{e) expands venue and permits nationwide service in certain actions against federal officers
and agencies, it does not eliminate the requirement that the Court possess personal jurisdiction
consistent with due process in damages actions such as this one.
In sum, because Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that their claims arise out of
USPS’s contacts with New Jersey, and because the Court lacks general personal jurisdiction over
USPS, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over USPS with respect to all Plaintiffs’ claims.
Accordingly, the Amended Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).?
iy. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, USPS’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 56) is GRANTED. An
Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: January 3 |, 2026 Lea
“pol Ot ne _
REN M. WILLIAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 USPS also moves to dismiss Piaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for failure (o state a claim, however, “if personal
jurisdiction is absent, the court is powerless to address (he merits of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Murphy »v. Eisai, Inc.,
503 F, Supp. 3d 207, 214 (D.N.J, 2020). Accordingly, the Court will not address USPS’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, See id.
9Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.