PENNETTI v. HARROP

1:24-cv-05270Njd9 gen 2026

Testo completo

[ECF No. 52]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
VICTORIA PENNETTI,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM HARROP,
Defendant.
Civil No. 24-5270 (ESK)(EAP)
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court by Motion of Plaintiff Victoria Pennetti, ECF No. 52
(Pl.’s Motion), seeking leave to file an amended complaint to bring direct claims against proposed
Defendant Louis G. Guzzo, Esquire1 (Proposed Defendant). Defendant William Harrop opposes
the motion. 	ECF No. 53 (Def.’s Opp.). 	The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and
decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local
Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons that follow and for good cause, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
On December 10, 2020, the New Jersey Superior Court entered a judgment in the amount
of $171,098 (“Judgment”) in favor of Defendant Harrop and against Plaintiff Pennetti in a
matrimonial case. 	See Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 23. 	Defendant transferred the Judgment to
1 	Proposed Defendant Louis G. Guzzo, Esquire represented Defendant William Harrop in
the “post-judgment matrimonial transactions involving the Harrop’s and Pennetti’s real estate[,]
and the satisfaction of Defendant Harrop’s judgment.” 	ECF No. 52-5, Ex. B (Proposed Am.
Compl.) ¶ 28; see also ECF No. 52-2 (Pl.’s Br.) at 1.
2 	The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint. 	See
Proposed Am. Compl.
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Pennsylvania for enforcement where Plaintiff held real property. See id. ¶ 3. On March 5, 2021,
Plaintiff sold her real property in Pennsylvania (the “Pennsylvania Property”), and $430,000 from
that sale was escrowed to satisfy the Judgment. Id. ¶¶ 3-5, 25-27. Plaintiff alleges that due to the
sale, Plaintiff fully satisfied the Judgment. 	Id. ¶ 5. 	On May 21, 2021, Defendant executed a
warrant to satisfy the Judgment in Pennsylvania. 	Id. 	Plaintiff further alleges that in 2021,
Proposed Defendant Guzzo “was aware [of] his obligation to prepare a warrant to satisfy the
judgment in New Jersey and, in fact, agreed to do so” based on email communication involving
Guzzo and two non-parties regarding the issue. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. After the sale, however, Plaintiff
contends that “Defendants Harrop and/or Guzzo failed to enter a warrant of satisfaction or mark
the judgment satisfied in New Jersey,” and the lien remained on Plaintiff’s real property in New
Jersey. Id. ¶¶ 31-32.
On July 1, 2023, Plaintiff attempted to sell her property in North Wildwood, New Jersey
(the “New Jersey Property”) for $2.415 million. Id. ¶¶ 1, 33. Plaintiff’s real estate agent informed
her that the judgment lien from the New Jersey Superior Court action remained on the New Jersey
Property. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff sent her real estate agent a copy of the warrant of satisfaction entered
in Pennsylvania to provide to the title company. Id. ¶ 36. However, despite that proof, Plaintiff
was not able to complete the sale of the New Jersey Property with the buyer because, according to
Plaintiff, the lien remained open in New Jersey. Id. ¶¶ 37-38.
On December 5, 2023, Plaintiff attempted to sell the New Jersey Property again for $1.9
million to a different buyer. 	Id. ¶ 40. 	Shortly before the sale of the property was finalized on
February 8, 2024, the judgment lien on the New Jersey Property was marked satisfied in New
Jersey. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff completed the sale of the New Jersey Property. Id.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a two-count Complaint against
Defendant Harrop for the $515,000 difference between the first, aborted sale of the New Jersey
Property and the second, completed sale. Plaintiff asserts a claim for Slander of Title, ECF No. 1
(Compl.), Count I, ¶¶ 41-50; and a violation of N.J.S.A. § 2A:16-46, id., Count II,3 ¶¶ 51-57.
Following the parties’ stipulated dismissal of Count II on July 30, 2024, ECF No. 16 (Stipulation),
Defendant Harrop filed an answer to the Complaint. ECF No. 17 (Answer). On November 22,
2024, Defendant amended his answer and filed a third-party complaint against his former attorney,
Third-Party Defendant Louis G. Guzzo. ECF No. 32 (Answer & Third-Party Compl.). Defendant
alleged that Third-Party Defendant Guzzo failed to timely file the warrant of satisfaction in New
Jersey following the sale of Plaintiff’s Pennsylvania Property. Id. at 13, ¶ 9.
On March 19, 2025, the parties appeared for a settlement conference. 	Although no
settlement was reached with Plaintiff, Third-Party Plaintiff/Defendant Harrop settled his claims
against Third-Party Defendant Guzzo. ECF No. 49 (Stipulation of Dismissal). On June 30, 2025,
Plaintiff timely filed the present motion to amend her Complaint to add claims against Proposed
Defendant Guzzo as a direct defendant. See Pl.’s Motion. On July 21, 2025, Defendant Harrop
opposed the motion as futile. See Def.’s Opp. This motion is now ripe for disposition.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs amendments to pleadings before trial. 	A
party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within either twenty-one days after serving
it, or, if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, the earlier of twenty-one
days after service of a responsive pleading or a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Fed. R. Civ.
3 	Count II of the Complaint is misnumbered as a second Count I. For clarity, the Court
will refer to this claim as Count II.
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P. 15(a)(1). If those deadlines have expired, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give
leave when justice so requires.” Id.
The Third Circuit has adopted a liberal approach to the amendment of pleadings. Spartan
Concrete Prods., LLC v. Argos USVI, Corp., 929 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2019); see also Donovan
v. W.R. Berkley Corp., 566 F. Supp. 3d 224, 229 (D.N.J. 2021) (“Generally, there is a presumption
in allowing the moving party to amend its pleadings.”). However, a court may deny a motion for
leave to amend in one of four instances: (1) the amendment would be futile; (2) the moving party
has demonstrated undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motives; (3) the amendment would prejudice
the non-moving party; or (4) the moving party was put on notice of deficiencies in its pleading but
chose not to resolve them. U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849
(3d Cir. 2014). Ultimately, the decision of whether to grant leave to amend is within the sound
discretion of the Court. Arab Afr. Int’l Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1993).
Amendments are futile if they would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 	Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). 	Futility is governed by the same
standards of legal sufficiency as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), such that the Court must accept all factual allegations in a proposed amended complaint
as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335,
340 (3d Cir. 2022). 	Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). 	Moreover, a
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complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. As such, “[t]he trial court may properly deny
leave to amend where the amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Massarsky v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983).
A. 	Plaintiff’s Slander of Title Claim Against Proposed Defendant Guzzo Is Futile.
Under New Jersey law, “the tort of slander of title requires a plaintiff to establish that
defendant falsely published an assertion concerning plaintiff’s title which caused special damages
to the plaintiff and that defendant acted out of malice, which was express or implied.” Lone v.
Brown, 199 N.J. Super. 420, 426 (App. Div. 1985). 	“Malice is defined as the intentional
commission of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse.” Id. (citing Mayflower Indus. v. Thor
Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 152 (Ch. Div. 1951)). 	“Common-law malice, or malice-in-fact, has
meant variously that the statement was published with an improper purpose or ill will, or without
belief or reasonable grounds to believe in its truth.” Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., 104
N.J. 125, 136 (1986) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Proposed Defendant Guzzo “failed to enter a warrant of
satisfaction or mark the judgment satisfied in New Jersey” after Plaintiff had fully satisfied the
Judgment by the sale of the Pennsylvania Property. 	Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-51.4 Plaintiff
asserts that the “improper and invalid judgment [lien]” that remained on the New Jersey Property
4 	The Proposed Amended Complaint misnumbers the paragraphs, such that the “Factual
Background” section ends with paragraph 44 and “Count I-Slander of Title” then begins with
paragraph 41, thereby duplicating paragraphs 41-44. For clarity, the Court hereinafter presumes
that the second paragraph 41 should be paragraph 45, the second paragraph 42 should be paragraph
46, etc. and refers to them as such.
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“constitute[d] a malicious publication of false allegations[.]” Id. ¶ 53. Plaintiff further alleges that
the Proposed Defendant “acted with intent and malice, purposely failing to remove the invalid
judgment lien to the detriment of Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff contends that in 2021, Proposed
Defendant Guzzo had allegedly agreed to file a warrant of satisfaction in New Jersey according to
email communication with a non-party. Id. ¶¶ 29-30.
In opposition, Defendant Harrop argues that Plaintiff’s slander of title claim is futile.
Defendant contends that even if the facts in the Proposed Amended Complaint are taken as true,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Proposed Defendant Guzzo because the Proposed Amended
Complaint fails to plead any facts that show the judgment lien was false at the time of alleged
publication or that Proposed Defendant Guzzo acted with malice when he allegedly made that
publication. Def.’s Opp. at 5. The Court agrees.
The Court has not identified—nor has Plaintiff cited—any Third Circuit case law in which
a lien on property that remains despite satisfaction constitutes a publication for a slander of title
action. Further, Plaintiff does not provide any facts in support of her allegation that the alleged
publication of the lien in New Jersey was false when it was made. Instead, it is undisputed that
the lien was proper following the New Jersey Superior Court action. Plaintiff has also failed to
plausibly support her allegation that Defendants’ apparent failure to satisfy the lien in New Jersey
was done maliciously. Even if the Proposed Defendant delayed in removing the lien, that alone
does not plausibly demonstrate that he acted with actual or implied malice. For all of these reasons,
the Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to bring a claim for slander of title against
Proposed Defendant Guzzo is futile, and leave to amend the Complaint to add this claim is denied.
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B. 	Plaintiff’s Claim for a Violation of N.J.S.A. § 2A:16-46 Is Futile.
Likewise, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed claim for violation of N.J.S.A. § 2A:16-
46 is futile because the statute does not grant Plaintiff a private right of action against Proposed
Defendant Guzzo.
The starting point for the Court’s analysis is whether the statute’s plain language confers a
private right to sue for a violation of the statute. It does not. See generally N.J.S.A. § 2A:16-46.
As such, “‘a private cause of action would have to be implied from the statutory scheme involved
or the administrative regulations promulgated thereunder.’” MHA, LLC v. Amerigroup Corp., 539
F. Supp. 3d 349, 354 (D.N.J. 2021) (quoting Jalowiecki v. Leuc, 182 N.J. Super. 22, 28 (App. Div.
1981)). New Jersey courts apply a three-part test to determine whether a statute implies a private
right of action. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)). The Court considers three factors:
[1] whether the plaintiff is “one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted”; [2] whether there is any evidence
that the Legislature intended to create a private cause of action under
the statute; and [3] whether implication of a private cause of action
in this case would be “consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme.”
Jarrell v. Kaul, 223 N.J. 294, 307 (2015) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up). 	“Through this
inquiry the Court seeks to ascertain the underlying legislative intent.” Id. (citing Jalowiecki, 182
N.J. Super. at 30). “When the Legislature has expressly created specific remedies, a court should
always hesitate to recognize another unmentioned remedy.” 	Id. (citing Transamerica Mortg.
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
Here, the legislative history does not suggest that the New Jersey Legislature intended to
create a private right of action under the statute. And even if there were, the language of the statute
contradicts any such intention by expressly conferring on the New Jersey Attorney General the
responsibility to investigate any violations of the act and pursue a civil action against the violating
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party. See N.J.S.A. § 2A:16-9.2. 	Given that the statutory scheme already expressly provides a
civil remedy via the Attorney General’s investigation and litigation, the Court finds no basis to
imply a private right of action for Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed
amendment is futile. Therefore, leave to amend the Complaint to add this claim is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to amend her Complaint is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An appropriate Order follows.
s/Elizabeth A. Pascal
ELIZABETH A. PASCAL
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: Hon. Edward S. Kiel, U.S.D.J.
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