Doe v. Trustees of Dartmouth College

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John Doe,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 26-cv-0343-SM
v. 	Opinion No. 2026 DNH 071
Trustees of Dartmouth College,
Defendant
O R D E R
John Doe filed this action against the Trustees of
Dartmouth College, alleging that Dartmouth discriminated against
him when it denied him admission to its Tuck School of Business.
Contemporaneously with his complaint, Doe filed a motion to
proceed under a pseudonym (document no. 2). 	That motion is
denied.
“Litigation by pseudonym should occur only in exceptional
cases.” 	Doe v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 46 F.4th 61, 70 (1st Cir.
2022) (internal quotations omitted). 	Indeed, a “strong
presumption” exists against proceeding by pseudonym, which “dims
the public’s perception of the matter and frustrates its
oversight of judicial performance.” 	Id. at 73, 67. 	That
presumption, however, is rebuttable. 	In Doe v. Mass. Inst. of
Tech., the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit described
circumstances in which appearance by pseudonym may be
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appropriate: (1) when the moving party “reasonably fears” that
disclosure of his identity will cause “unusually severe”
physical or psychological harm; (2) when public disclosure of
the party’s identity “would harm innocent non-parties”; (3) when
“anonymity is necessary to forestall a chilling effect on future
litigants who may be similarly situated;” and (4) when the suit
is “bound up” with a prior confidential proceeding such that
disclosure of the movant’s identity “would significantly
undermine” the interests served by maintaining the
confidentiality of the prior proceeding. 	46 F.4th at 71-72. 	If
a movant can establish that his or her situation presents one of
these circumstances, “anonymity ordinarily will be warranted.”
Id. at 71.
Doe alleges that he was denied admission to Dartmouth’s
business school because of his “non-Jewish White ethnic
heritage.” 	Compl. (document no. 1) at ¶ 14. 	He says that
despite his “outstanding qualifications,” his application was
rejected. 	Id. 	He further asserts that Dartmouth excludes
nearly all “non-Jewish Whites” from admission, unless the
applicant is female, “queer” or a “veteran[] of the U.S. armed
forces,” because those applicants “pose no threat to the Jewish
Supremacists.” 	Id. at ¶ 16. 	According to Doe, Dartmouth’s
admissions decisions are part of a greater plan “drafted by the
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Jewish Supremacists with the express goal of exterminating non-
Jewish Whites.” 	Id. at ¶ 14.
Doe claims that he will be subject to a “significant risk
of professional retaliation and social stigma within his
academic and professional community, causing irreparable harm to
his career and personal well-being” should his identity be
publicly disclosed (presumably due to his application’s
rejection, but perhaps due to his litigation theories).
Document No. 2 at ¶ 1. 	He goes on to argue that “[p]ublic
identification in a high-profile discrimination suit against a
major institution like [Dartmouth]1 carries a significant risk of
‘blacklisting’ from potential future employers and professional
collaborators.” 	Id. at ¶ 7. 	And, because his complaint alleges
that defendant’s admission practices “unfairly favor Jews,” Doe
argues that, if his identity is disclosed, he could be subjected
to financial harm such as “debanking,” physical harm, or murder
by Mossad agents.2 	Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. 	That is because, he says,
“Jews commonly harm or murder their opposers and the families of
1 	Doe mistakenly references Harvard instead of Dartmouth in
his motion.
2 	Doe alleges President John F. Kennedy was murdered by
Israeli intelligence agents in an effort to thwart Kennedy’s
attempts to obstruct Israeli military efforts.
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the opposers.” 	Id. at ¶ 9. 	Finally, he argues that anonymity
is warranted because his case relies on his academic records,
which are confidential and protected under federal law.
In his motion, Doe refers to a similar case he filed in the
District of Massachusetts, styled John Doe v. President and
Fellows of Harvard College, No. 26-cv-10486-ADB. 	There, Doe
seeks damages because he was denied admission to Harvard’s
business school due to his “non-Jewish White ethnic heritage.”
See id. 	Doe also seemingly filed an action against the
University of Pennsylvania for denying him admission to the
Wharton School because he is a “White, non-Jewish male.” 	See
Doe v. The Trustees of The University of Pennsylvania, No. 26-
2472, 2026 WL 1497184, at *1, n. 1 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2026).
Doe’s motions to proceed anonymously were denied in both
actions, as both courts found that Doe’s “non-specific” and
“speculative” allegations were insufficient to outweigh the
public’s interest in open litigation. 	Id. at *7; John Doe v.
President and Fellows of Harvard College, No. 26-cv-10486-ADB,
Document No. 7 (Feb. 2, 2026, electronic order finding that Doe
failed to rebut the presumption in favor of disclosure where the
“alleged risks that Plaintiff sets forth in his motion are
without corroboration and do not rise above a level of mere
speculation”).
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So too, here. 	Doe fails to sufficiently establish that his
is an “exceptional” case that warrants use of a pseudonym. 	MIT,
46 F.4th at 68. 	To warrant anonymity here, Doe must establish
that he “reasonably fears that coming out of the shadows will
cause him unusually severe harm (either physical or
psychological).” 	MIT, 46 F.4th at 71 (emphases added). 	Doe
alleges only that disclosure of his identity will result in
injury to his reputation, employment prospects, and financial
status. 	Courts have regularly held, however, that “[o]rdinary
reputational injury, embarrassment, or economic loss do not meet
that standard.” 	Smith v. Bentley Univ., No. 25-CV-12317-AK,
2026 WL 194339, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2026) (citing Doe v.
Word of Life Fellowship, Inc., No. 11-40077-TSH, 2011 WL
2968912, at *2 (D. Mass. July 18, 2011) and Doe v. Bell Atl.
Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass. 1995)).
See also Verogna v. Twitter, Inc., No. 20-CV-536-SM, 2020 WL
5077094, at *2 (D.N.H. Aug. 27, 2020) (noting that courts “have
tended to not allow pseudonymous pleading when the request was
based on generalized fears of retaliation, embarrassment,
reputational injury, or economic injury”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 10, commentary); Doe v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., No. 18–CV–
040–LM, 2018 WL 2048385, at *4 (D.N.H. May 2, 2018) (“It is not
enough that the plaintiff may suffer embarrassment or economic
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harm as a result of public identification; the plaintiff must
show both a fear of severe harm and that the fear is
reasonable.”) (citations omitted).
Doe does assert that his physical safety will be threatened
if he is not allowed to proceed pseudonymously because “Jews
commonly harm or murder their opposers.” 	Document No. 2 at ¶ 9.
But, those allegations, unsupported by any particularized
evidentiary showing, are, to put it charitably, not credible.
That is, Doe fails to plausibly allege with any degree of
specificity a legitimate threat to his physical safety. 	And,
finally, as noted by Judge Burroughs in her February 2, 2026,
order, plaintiff’s concerns regarding the confidentiality of his
academic record can be easily addressed using tools “such as
redacting or sealing documents to manage privacy concerns that
arise during the litigation.” 	Doe v. President and Fellows of
Harvard College, No. 26-cv-10486-ADB, Document No. 7 (Feb. 2,
2026, electronic order). 	See also Smith v. Bentley Univ., No.
25-CV-12317-AK, 2026 WL 194339, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2026)
(stating “FERPA permits limited disclosures in litigation and
does not by itself mandate anonymity for a plaintiff who has
chosen to bring a public lawsuit.”).
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Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed under a pseudonym
(document no. 2) is necessarily DENIED. 	Within fourteen days of
the date of this order, plaintiff shall notify the Clerk of the
Court whether he wishes to proceed by filing his complaint on
the public docket under his actual name or withdraw the
complaint.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
June 12, 2026
cc: 	Counsel of Record
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