Perlow v. Johnson & Johnson et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Ashley Perlow
v. 	Case No. 26-cv-81-LM-AJ
Johnson & Johnson, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Ashley Perlow, proceeding pro se, brought this
action in state court against Defendants Johnson and Johnson,
J and J Pension Committee, and Alight Solutions LLC related to
the denial of her short-term disability benefits. 	See Doc. No.
1-1 (Compl.). 	Defendants removed the action to this court,
asserting diversity jurisdiction. 	See Doc. No. 1 (Notice of
Removal); 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 	Before the court for recommended
disposition are Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s
motion for remand. 	See Doc. Nos. 8 (Mot. to Dismiss); 9 (Memo.
in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss); 10 (Mot. to Remand). 	For the
following reasons, the district judge should deny both motions.
Background
Plaintiff was employed by Johnson and Johnson and
participated in its short-term disability plan. 	Doc. No. 1-1 ¶
3. 	In 2025, Plaintiff sought to exercise her short-term
disability benefits related to postpartum depression, anxiety,
and post-traumatic stress disorder she experienced following
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childbirth. 	Id. 	Defendants denied her claim despite her
provision of supportive medical documentation. 	Id. ¶ 4.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied her claim based on
inaccurate and incomplete interpretations of her medical
records. 	Id. ¶¶ 4, 7.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages including lost wages,
lost benefits, and other economic losses sustained as a result
of Defendants’ denial of her short-term disability claim. 	Id. ¶
A. 	Plaintiff values her claim at $4,000,000. 	Id. ¶ 3.
Before initiating this suit, Plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination with the New Hampshire Commission for Human
Rights (“NHCHR”) against Defendants. 	Doc. No. 9-1 at 6. 	The
charge of discrimination arose out of the same denial of short-
term disability benefits and alleged gender, pregnancy, and
disability discrimination as well as retaliation. 	Id. at 8.
Discussion
I. 	Motion to Remand
Defendants removed this action from state court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. 	To invoke diversity
jurisdiction under § 1332, two requirements must be met: (1) the
amount in controversy must exceed $75,000; and (2) the parties
must be citizens of different states. 	28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Plaintiff resides in New Hampshire. 	Doc. No. 1-1 ¶ 1.
Defendant Johnson & Johnson is a New Jersey corporation with a
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principal place of business in New Jersey. 	Doc. No. 1 ¶ 7.
While no legal entity named J and J Pension Committee exists,
there is a corporate committee of the same name operated by
Johnson & Johnson. 	Id. ¶ 8. 	Lastly, Defendant Alight is an
Illinois limited liability company wholly owned by Alight, Inc.,
which is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of
business in Illinois. 	Id. ¶ 9.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is a resident of New Hampshire and
Defendants are residents of New Jersey, Illinois, and Delaware.
See Potts v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 780 F. Supp. 3d 333, 335
(D. Mass. 2025) (“A corporation’s citizenship, for diversity
jurisdiction purposes, is both the state where it is
incorporated and the state where it has its principal place of
business.” (citation omitted)). 	Further, the amount in
controversy exceeds the requisite $75,000. 	See Doc. No. 1-1
(seeking $4,000,000 in damages). 	Because the parties are
citizens of different states and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, the court has diversity jurisdiction over this
matter.
In her motion to remand, Plaintiff argues that because her
claims are based in state law, rather than federal law,
Defendants cannot establish subject matter jurisdiction. 	For
the reasons outlined above, the court need not address whether
it has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
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because the court’s jurisdiction is satisfied by the diversity
of the parties and the amount in controversy. 	When the court
exercises its diversity jurisdiction, the claims need not be
based in federal law. 	Sandsbury v. Teers, No. 24-CV-92-SM-TSM,
2024 WL 2939155, at *1 (D.N.H. April 19, 2024) (“A federal court
can exercise jurisdiction over state law claims in the absence
of any federal claim if the case satisfies the requirements for
‘diversity’ jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”), R&R adopted
(May 24, 2024). 	In other words, the court can exercise its
jurisdiction despite the fact that Plaintiff’s claims sound in
state law.
Because the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is
satisfied through diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the
district judge should deny the motion to remand.
II. 	Motion to Dismiss
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must “accept as true all well-pleaded facts set out in the
complaint and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the
pleader.” 	SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 441 (1st Cir. 2010).
Although the complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), it must allege each of the
essential elements of a viable cause of action and “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal punctuation
omitted).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court construes
her complaint liberally. 	See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam) (“[A] pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” (internal citations
omitted)). 	Pro se status, however, “does not insulate a party
from complying with procedural and substantive law. 	Even under
a liberal construction, the complaint must adequately allege the
elements of a claim with the requisite supporting facts.”
Chiras v. Associated Credit Servs., Inc., No. 12-10871-TSH, 2012
WL 3025093, at *1 n.1 (D. Mass. July 23, 2012) (quoting Ahmed v.
Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies related to Defendants’ denial of short-
term disability benefits. 	Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s
claims here are akin to those she asserted in her charge of
discrimination with the NHCHR and, thus, characterize them as
arising under New Hampshire’s Laws Against Discrimination, RSA
chapter 354-A. 	Doc. No. 9 at 4 n.3. 	Consequently, they argue
that Plaintiff cannot bring suit prior to exhausting the
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administrative remedies. 	See RSA 354-A:21-a (outlining the
procedure for bringing a civil suit following a charge of
discrimination). 	Plaintiff responds that her claims do not
arise under RSA chapter 354-A, but rather state law causes of
action including breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligent
misrepresentation. 	Doc. No. 14 (Obj.) at 2.
Construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally and indulging
all inferences in her favor, she does not plead a claim arising
under RSA chapter 354-A. 	Plaintiff does not allege or mention
discrimination in her complaint. 	Rather, her claims here are
based on the Defendants’ denied her claim for short-term
disability. 	By contrast, in her charge of discrimination,
Plaintiff clearly articulated alleged discrimination. 	See Doc.
No. 9-1. 	Therein, Plaintiff explicitly alleged gender and
disability discrimination, retaliation, failure to engage in the
interactive process, and FMLA violations. 	Id. 	Upon review of
her complaint in conjunction with her charge of discrimination,
the court cannot conclude on the record before it that Plaintiff
has alleged a discrimination claim subject to an administrative
exhaustion requirement. 	Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss should be denied.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should deny
the motion to remand (Doc. No. 10) and the motion to dismiss
(Doc. No. 8).
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. 	Failure to file any objection within the specified time
waives the right to appeal the district court's Order. 	See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016). 	Only those issues raised in written objections to this
Report and Recommendation “are subject to review in the district
court,” and any issues “not preserved by such objection are
precluded on appeal.” 	Id. (citations omitted).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
April 24, 2026
cc: 	Ashley Perlow, pro se
Counsel of Record
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