Patterson v. FCI Berlin, Warden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Joseph Ira Patterson, III
v. Civil No. 25-cv-259-JL-AJ
Warden, FCI-Berlin
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Joseph Ira Patterson, III, a prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Berlin, New
Hampshire (“FCI-Berlin”), filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 1), using a form
seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (hereinafter “Petition”). That Petition is before this court
for preliminary review to determine whether Patterson’s claims are facially valid and may
proceed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243; LR 4.3(d)(4)(A); Rules 1(b) and 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases (“§ 2254 Rules”). Because Patterson is proceeding here without a lawyer,
the court liberally construes his Petition. Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2008).
Background
In February 2010, Patterson was indicted on multiple felony counts in West Virginia state
court, including robbery, kidnapping, and conspiracy. See Patterson v. W. Va. Reg'l Jail & Corr.
Fac. Auth., No. 3:11-cv-00943, 2012 WL 3308607, at *1, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112801, at *5
(S.D.W. Va. July 3, 2012), R&R adopted, 2012 WL 3295876 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 10, 2012). In
April 2012, Patterson, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree
robbery, and the remaining charges were dismissed. See id., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112801, at
*5 n.2. The state court in that case imposed a 12-year sentence. See Pet. (Doc. No. 1), at 1.
Case 1:25-cv-00259-JL-AJ Document 4 Filed 02/09/26 Page 1 of 8

2
Patterson filed a pro se motion in his state case challenging his conviction based on
W. Va. Code § 63-3-21 (codifying state speedy trial right). Patterson asserts that the trial court
did not rule on that motion, and that his pro se notice of appeal citing the same state law received
no response from the state supreme court. He abandoned those efforts after he did not receive a
response and was paroled from his state sentence.
In August 2022, in the Southern District of West Virginia, Patterson entered a plea of
guilty to a federal drug-trafficking offense. United States v. Patterson, No. 3:21-cr-00218-1
(S.D.W. Va. Aug. 17, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-4481, 2024 WL 489478 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024)
(“Direct Appeal”), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2648 (2024). At the time of his sentencing,
Patterson’s ten criminal history points corresponded with Category V. See United States v.
Patterson, No. 3:21-cr-00218, 2025 WL 2655455, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 16, 2025). Patterson’s
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) appears to have listed his 2012 state robbery
conviction as part of his criminal history. See id. (ECF 114-2, at 43) (federal sentencing
transcript) (judge noted that Patterson had been convicted of state crime in 2012, received a 12-
year sentence, and was paroled after two or three years). The court in Patterson’s federal
criminal case imposed a 220-month term of imprisonment, towards the lower end of the 210- to
262-month range that corresponded with that court’s acceptance of Patterson’s request for a
variance relating to drug purity. See Direct Appeal, 2024 WL 489478, at *1; see also Patterson
v. United States, No. 3:24-cv-00669 (S.D.W. Va., docketed Nov. 20, 2024) (ECF No. 114-2, at
32-33).
In November 2024, Patterson filed a motion to vacate his federal sentence in the Southern
District of West Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. That motion remains pending in that court.
See Patterson v. United States, No. 3:24-cv-00669 (S.D.W. Va., docketed Nov. 20, 2024).
Case 1:25-cv-00259-JL-AJ Document 4 Filed 02/09/26 Page 2 of 8

3
Claims
Patterson filed his Petition here in July 2025, using a form for filing a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Construed liberally, the Petition asserts that the 2012
state robbery conviction was obtained in violation of Patterson’s federal or state speedy trial
rights, and that the PSR’s listing of that conviction (which he claims was invalid) affected the
length of his present federal sentence. Doc. No. 1, at 14. Lacking access to the PSR and other
records in Patterson’s criminal cases, this court assumes without deciding that the prior state
conviction affected the duration of Patterson’s current federal sentence. Cf. Johnson v. Saad,
No. 5:18-cv-5, 2018 WL 7636504, at *5 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 18, 2018) (claims attacking the
federal court’s use of prisoner’s prior state convictions as predicates for deeming him to be a
career offender -- though “couched as a challenge” to BOP’s classification -- were properly
construed as a “challenge to the [federal] sentence imposed, including the career offender
enhancement”), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 1245796 (N.D.W. Va. Mar. 18, 2019).
Discussion
I. Savings Clause Jurisdiction to Review Federal Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
To the extent Patterson’s Petition challenges the length of his current federal sentence,
based on the alleged invalidity of the 2012 state robbery conviction, Patterson seeks to invoke
this court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. But pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the trial court
where the petitioner was sentenced generally has exclusive jurisdiction over a petitioner’s post-
conviction motions challenging his federal sentence. The type of claim Patterson seeks to bring
here under § 2241 is within the scope of claims that could be covered by § 2255. See
Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 402 (2001) ( “text of § 2255 . . . is broad
Case 1:25-cv-00259-JL-AJ Document 4 Filed 02/09/26 Page 3 of 8

4
enough to cover a claim that a current sentence enhanced by an allegedly unconstitutional prior
conviction violates due process”).
Section 2255(e), known as the “savings clause,” preserves a limited role for the court in
the district where a federal prisoner is incarcerated to consider a § 2241 petition challenging his
current detention. The savings clause provides, in pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to
apply for relief by motion pursuant to [§ 2255], shall not be entertained . . . unless it . . .
appears that the remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). That provision preserves the ability of the court in the district where the
petitioner is incarcerated to exercise jurisdiction over a collateral attack on the federal sentence if
“unusual circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing
court.” Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 478 (2023).
The fact that a prisoner may no longer obtain relief under § 2255 in his criminal case,
standing alone, will not trigger savings clause jurisdiction. See id.; Trenkler v. United States,
536 F.3d 85, 99 (1st Cir. 2008). The First Circuit has explained that the savings clause applies in
such circumstances only if the “configuration of section 2255 is such ‘as to deny a convicted
defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification.’” Trenkler, 536 F.3d at 99 (citation
omitted).
While Patterson remained incarcerated in West Virginia, Patterson asserts he initiated and
then abandoned a direct appeal raising a state law speedy trial statutory claim. Patterson was not
limited to seeking judicial review only in a direct appeal; he could have pursued state post-
conviction proceedings challenging his conviction. See, e.g., W. Va. Code §§ 53-4A-1 to -11
(West Virginia Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act). Patterson could also have filed a timely
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, for claims asserting a violation of
Case 1:25-cv-00259-JL-AJ Document 4 Filed 02/09/26 Page 4 of 8

5
his federal rights, after exhausting such state court remedies as remained available. If he
succeeded in voiding that prior conviction through those efforts, he could have raised due
process arguments concerning the PSR’s reference to that previously invalidated conviction in
his sentencing hearing or later.
Patterson does not appear to have pursued such post-conviction remedies when they were
available. His failure to do so is not attributable to the configuration of § 2255. This court’s
savings clause jurisdiction does not extend to Patterson’s Petition.
II. Jurisdiction to Review State Conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Patterson used a form § 2254 petition to challenge his state robbery conviction. The
federal courts have jurisdiction to review a state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 if the person
seeking such review is “in custody” pursuant to a state court judgment, in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Id. § 2254(a). The “in custody”
requirement is jurisdictional. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 493 (1989) (per curiam). The
petitioner must be “in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his
petition is filed.” Id. at 490–91 (quotation marks omitted). A person is not “in custody” for
purposes of § 2254 if the sentence at issue has fully expired at the time the petition is filed. Id.
at 492.
Patterson received a 12-year sentence in his state robbery case. He filed his Petition here
in 2025, after that sentence expired. He does not otherwise appear to be in custody pursuant to
any state court conviction at this time.
[O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right
because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or
because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as
conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the
Case 1:25-cv-00259-JL-AJ Document 4 Filed 02/09/26 Page 5 of 8

6
defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under
§ 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.
Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 403-04 (citation omitted).
The Lackawanna Court recognized an exception to the § 2254 “in custody” requirement
for uncounseled convictions, and a plurality of that Court further acknowledged a possible
exception for prior convictions for which no channel of review was actually available to the
prisoner “through no fault of his own.” Id. Patterson, who had counsel in state court when he
pleaded guilty, and who had access to state post-conviction proceedings while he remained in
state custody, see, e.g., W. Va. Code §§ 53-4A-1 to -11 (Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act),
seeks to attack his robbery conviction on grounds of a speedy trial violation; he does not assert a
claim that might fit within Lackawanna’s exceptions. Moreover, he is simply not “in custody”
pursuant to any state court judgment. See Alaska v. Wright, 593 U.S. 152, 154 (2021) (“That
[petitioner’s] state conviction served as a predicate for his federal conviction thus did not render
him “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” under §2254(a). . . . [H]is second
judgment was entered by a federal court.”). Patterson thus fails to satisfy the “in custody”
jurisdictional requirement for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).1
III. Dismissal
In general, this court will dismiss a case without prejudice if it finds that it lacks
1 Patterson’s claims under § 2254 also appear to be time-barred. There is a one-year
limitations period for prisoners to seek relief under § 2254, which begins to run when the
challenged state court judgment becomes final “by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In Patterson’s case,
no basis for equitable or statutory tolling is suggested by the record here, cf. Holland v. Florida,
560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Patterson asserts no claim of actual innocence; and the one-year
statute of limitations appears to have expired more than a decade before he filed this case.
Case 1:25-cv-00259-JL-AJ Document 4 Filed 02/09/26 Page 6 of 8

7
jurisdiction, unless a transfer to a court with jurisdiction is in the interests of justice. See 28
U.S.C. § 1631. Because there are restrictions on § 2255 motions challenging prior sentences that
resemble those under Lackawanna,2 a transfer to the Southern District of West Virginia does not
appear to be in the interest of justice at this time. Patterson remains free, however, to file an
appropriate motion in that court asserting any claims he may have that could provide grounds for
relief under § 2255. Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss this case without prejudice to
Patterson’s ability to pursue appropriate relief in the sentencing court.
Certificate of Appealability
The Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings require the court to “issue or deny a
certificate of appealability [“COA”] when it enters a final order adverse to the party.” § 2254
Rule 11(a). Here, the grounds for dismissal are purely procedural, and not substantive.
When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching
the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner
shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Reasonable jurists would not find it debatable that
the instant petition is subject to dismissal for lack of savings clause jurisdiction and the
limitations on § 2254 relief set forth in Lackawanna. The district judge should thus decline to
2 In Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382-83 (2001), the Court limited federal
defendants’ ability to challenge their federal sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 when the focus of
the challenge is a prior sentence used as a predicate to enhance the current federal sentence. See
id. at 383-84 (if prior conviction is no longer subject to challenge directly or collaterally in its
own right “because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or
because the defendant did so unsuccessfully),” then “the presumption of validity that attached to
the prior conviction at the time of sentencing is conclusive,” and defendant may not collaterally
attack that conviction under § 2255). The Daniels Court identified the same exceptions to that
general rule that apply under Lackawanna with respect to § 2254’s “in custody” requirement.
Case 1:25-cv-00259-JL-AJ Document 4 Filed 02/09/26 Page 7 of 8

8
issue a COA here.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should dismiss this action without prejudice
for lack of jurisdiction and decline to issue a certificate of appealability. Any objections to this
Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended upon motion. Only those
issues raised in the objections to this Report and Recommendation are subject to review in the
district court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010).
Any issues not preserved by such objections are precluded on appeal. See id. Failure to file any
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s Order. See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
_______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
February 9, 2026
cc: Joseph Ira Patterson, III, pro se
Case 1:25-cv-00259-JL-AJ Document 4 Filed 02/09/26 Page 8 of 8