Bedard v. Weare, NH, Town of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
GARY ALAN BEDARD
v. Civil No. 25-cv-159-LM-TSM
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
FOR THE TOWN OF WEARE, ET AL.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Self-represented Plaintiff, Gary Alan Bedard, proceeding in forma pauperis, brings this
action against the Administrative Office for the Town of Weare (“Town” or “Weare”); Weare’s
Tax Collector, Naomi Bolton; Weare’s Assessor, Mary-Ann Green; and Town Counsel, Laura
Spector-Morgan, Esq. Doc. No. 1. The matter is before the court for preliminary review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Local Rule 4.3(d)(2). For the reasons that follow, this court
recommends that the district judge dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims, but that the dismissal be
without prejudice to Mr. Bedard’s right to file an amended complaint, within thirty (30) days from
the date of the court’s ruling on this Report and Recommendation, to allege facts sufficient to state
due process and/or unconstitutional takings claims against one or more of the named Defendants
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW STANDARD
When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, this court conducts a preliminary review of
the complaint. LR 4.3(d)(2). The court may dismiss the complaint sua sponte if it determines,
among other things, that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, the action is frivolous or malicious, or the complaint seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);
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LR 4.3(d)(2). In evaluating whether or not the complaint states an actionable claim, the court uses
the same legal standard that applies to motions brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Becker v.
N.H. Div. for Children, Youth, & Families, No. 24-cv-430-JL-TSM, 2025 WL 2646467, at *1
(D.N.H. Aug. 28, 2025), approved by 2025 WL 2647202 (D.N.H. Sept. 12, 2025). Accordingly,
the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded facts set forth in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader’s favor.” Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46
(1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Artuso v. Vertex Pharm., Inc., 637 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2011)). It then must
determine whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
To determine plausibility, “the court must distinguish the complaint’s factual allegations
(which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be
credited).” García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quotations and
citation omitted). Next, “the court must determine whether the factual allegations are sufficient to
support the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(quotations and citation omitted). Because Mr. Bedard is self-represented, his complaint must “be
liberally construed[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, it “must still contain ‘the crucial detail of who, what, when,
where, and how’ in order to provide fair notice of what the claims are and the grounds upon which
they rest[.]” Richard W. Porter v. City of Framingham Framingham Police Dep’t James
McDermott, No. 25-cv-526-LM-AJ, 2026 WL 941013, at *1 (D.N.H. Mar. 6, 2026) (quoting
Byrne v. Maryland, No. 1:20-cv-00036-GZS, 2020 WL 1317731, at *5 (D. Me. Mar. 20, 2020)),
approved by 2026 WL 938318 (D.N.H. Apr. 6, 2026). “If the factual allegations in the complaint
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are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere
conjecture, the complaint is open to dismissal.” Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d
49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010)).
BACKGROUND
Mr. Bedard’s complaint consists of approximately forty-four pages of allegations and a
number of attachments containing, inter alia, correspondence from Mr. Bedard to certain Town
employees.1 Although the complaint is lengthy, it contains no recitation of facts and is therefore
difficult to comprehend. The attachments similarly provide little if any insight regarding the
factual nature of Mr. Bedard’s dispute with the Town and the individual Defendants. Accordingly,
the following description of the complaint reflects this court’s best effort to summarize the
substance of Mr. Bedard’s allegations.
Mr. Bedard alleges that he was the owner of private property located on Route 77 in Weare,
New Hampshire, as well as the beneficiary of securities and other assets that were held in trust
until he reached the age of majority. See Doc. No. 1 at pgs. 5, 11, 16, 21-22. He further alleges
that the Town of Weare, the New Hampshire “State Courts,” and the “State” Bankruptcy Court
violated his constitutional rights by ordering the seizure of his property without affording him a
jury trial or due process protections, and by effectuating the taking of his property without just
compensation. See id. at pgs. 5, 7, 11-12, 21, 23-24, 30-33. Additionally, Mr. Bedard asserts that
the Town, the State Courts and the “State” Bankruptcy Court lack jurisdiction over matters
involving private rights and property, and that any such matters must be adjudicated in federal
district court. See, e.g., id. at pgs. 5-24. He contends that he never gave consent to have the Town
1 Mr. Bedard refers to his complaint as a “Civil Petition.” Doc. No. 1.
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or any state courts decide matters regarding his property, and that Weare, the “State” bankruptcy
court, and the “State Court” abused their authority by doing so. See id. pgs. 11, 14, 17-19, 33.
Among the relief Mr. Bedard seeks in this action are orders declaring “that the Bankruptcy or State
Court lacks jurisdiction over non-core matters involving private property rights, contractual
disputes, and the restoration of rights upon attaining the Age of Majority,” vacating “any previous,
Municipal Town or State Court order[s] directly or indirectly associated with [his] private property
rights and/or interests,” affirming Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial “in all matters involving private
rights and property,” and enjoining Weare and the state courts from conducting any further
proceedings regarding his property rights. Id. at pgs. 7, 33. He also seeks compensatory and
punitive damages “for the unlawful seizure of property and violation of constitutionally secured
rights by the Town of Weare inc.[,] its attorneys Laur[a] Spector-[M]organ [et] al[.] and New
Hampshire State Courts and other administrative bodies[.]” Id. at pg. 34 (emphasis omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
A substantial portion of Mr. Bedard’s complaint is aimed at vacating or otherwise
invalidating state court orders relating to the disposition of Plaintiff’s real and/or personal property.
Those allegations implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which deprives this court of jurisdiction
over collateral attacks on state court judgments. See D’Angelo v. New Hampshire Sup. Ct., No.
12-cv-411-SM, 2012 WL 6647807, at *2 (D.N.H. Dec. 20, 2012) (ruling that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine deprived the federal court of jurisdiction over plaintiff’s “efforts to collaterally attack
various decisions of the state courts as ‘unlawful’ or ‘unconstitutional’”), aff’d, 740 F.3d 802 (1st
Cir. 2014). To the extent Mr. Bedard seeks to challenge a state court judgment or obtain relief
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based on the unlawfulness of a state court judgment, those claims are not actionable and should be
dismissed.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine preserves the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from final state-court judgments by divesting lower federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
certain cases brought by parties who have lost in state court.” Klimowicz v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l
Trust Co., 907 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The doctrine
applies “where ‘the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings
ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and
rejection of that judgment.’” Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo
de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)). Thus, “if federal litigation is initiated after state proceedings
have ended, and the plaintiff implicitly or explicitly seek[s] review and rejection of [the state]
judgment, then a federal suit seeking an opposite result is an impermissible attempt to appeal the
state judgment to the lower federal courts, and, under Rooker-Feldman, the federal courts lack
jurisdiction.” Id. at 24 (emphasis and alterations in original) (quotations and citation omitted).
“[A] federal court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not contingent upon an
identity between the issues actually litigated in the prior state-court proceedings and the issues
proffered in the subsequent federal suit.” Klimowicz, 907 F.3d at 66. Therefore, “a plaintiff cannot
escape the Rooker-Feldman bar through the simple expedient of introducing a new legal theory in
the federal forum that was not broached in the state courts.” Id. If the plaintiff’s alleged injury “is
ultimately still caused by a state court judgment[,]” the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the
plaintiff’s claim for relief. Davison v. Gov’t of P.R.-P.R. Firefighters Corps., 471 F.3d 220, 223
(1st Cir. 2006).
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Although Mr. Bedard’s complaint is almost entirely devoid of facts, it indicates that he was
the losing party in state court proceedings. It further indicates that his claims arise, at least in part,
out of harm allegedly caused by final state court judgments regarding the disposition of his
property. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court lacks jurisdiction over his challenges to
those judgments. Moreover, to the extent his claims against Weare or any of the individual
Defendants challenge Defendants’ implementation of a state court judgment, those claims “would
necessarily invite the district court to review, reject, and reverse the state courts’ rulings[.]”
Klimowicz, 907 F.3d at 66. Accordingly, all such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine as well. See id.
Notwithstanding Mr. Bedard’s allegations to the contrary, bankruptcy courts are federal
courts rather than state courts. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307 (1995) (“The
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, like that of other federal courts, is grounded in, and limited
by, statute.”). Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to bankruptcy court
judgments or to Mr. Bedard’s allegations of misconduct by the Bankruptcy Court. Nevertheless,
none of the named Defendants appear to have any connection to the Bankruptcy Court and nothing
in the complaint purports to explain how any of those Defendants could possibly be responsible
for the Bankruptcy Court’s actions. Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the Bankruptcy
Court’s lack of jurisdiction over private property and its violations of his constitutional rights fail
to support a plausible claim for relief in this action.
II. Plaintiff’s Claims for Violations of His Constitutional Rights
When liberally construed, Mr. Bedard’s complaint appears to assert claims against the
named Defendants for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Fifth
Amendment right to protection against the taking of his property without just compensation. See
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Doc. No. 1 at pgs. 5, 11-12, 21, 23-24, 30. “[A] litigant complaining of a violation of a
constitutional right does not have a direct cause of action under the United States Constitution but
must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925
(9th Cir. 2001). “Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against a ‘person’ acting ‘under
color of’ state law who deprives another of ‘any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution’ or federal laws.” Wright v. Martin, 158 F.4th 286, 290 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1983). To hold Defendants liable for violations of his rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, Mr. Bedard must state claims against them pursuant to section 1983.
A. Elements of a Claim Under Section 1983
“To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: 1) that the
conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and 2) that this conduct
worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Barreto-Rivera
v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1999). “A defendant acts under color of state law by
exercis[ing] power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer
is clothed with the authority of state law.” Wright, 158 F.4th at 290 (alteration in original)
(quotations and citations omitted). “The second element requires the plaintiff to show ‘that the
[defendant’s] conduct was the cause in fact of the alleged deprivation.’” Gagliardi v. Sullivan,
513 F.3d 301, 306 (1st Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Rodríguez-Cirilo v. García, 115
F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1997)).
“When pursuing a § 1983 claim against a municipality, municipal entity, or municipal
employee in their official capacity, . . . the plaintiff must also show that the deprivation of the
federally protected right resulted from the enforcement of a municipal policy, practice, or custom.”
Hewes v. Pangburn, 162 F.4th 177, 190 (1st Cir. 2025). Thus, “[m]unicipal liability may be based
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on either an official policy or an unofficial policy or custom that municipal officials both knew of
and tolerated to such an extent that they essentially adopted it as official policy.” Office of the
Pub. Guardian v. Elliot Hosp., 626 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (D.N.H. 2022). Under either scenario,
the plaintiff must show that the policy, practice, or custom “was the cause of and the ‘moving
force’ behind the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Kennebec Cnty., 219
F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2000)). Therefore, to state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege the following three elements: “(1) a violation of the constitution or federal
law; (2) a custom or policy of the municipality; and (3) causation between the custom or policy
and the constitutional deprivation.” Id. As detailed below, Mr. Bedard fails to allege sufficient
facts to state a claim against the Town or any of the individual Defendants under section 1983.
B. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving
any person of ‘life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” Harron v. Town of Franklin,
660 F.3d 531, 535 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). “It ‘applies fully to a
state’s political subdivisions, including municipalities and municipal agencies.’” Id. (quoting
DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 2005)). Moreover, “[t]he Due Process Clause
has both procedural and substantive components. The former ‘ensures that government, when
dealing with private persons, will use fair procedures.’” Id. (quoting DePoutot, 424 F.3d at 118).
“The latter ‘safeguards individuals against certain offensive government actions, notwithstanding
that facially fair procedures are used to implement them.’” Id. at 535-36 (quoting DePoutot, 424
F.3d at 118). It is not clear from the complaint in this case whether Mr. Bedard seeks to assert
claims for deprivation of his right to procedural due process or his right to substantive due process.
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“To state a valid procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must (1) ‘identify a protected
liberty or property interest,’ and (2) ‘allege that the defendants . . . deprived [him] of that interest
without constitutionally adequate process.’” Air Sunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir.
2011) (punctuation and alteration in original) (quoting González-Droz v. González-Colón, 660
F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011)). To state a claim for deprivation of substantive due process based on
the specific acts of a state or municipal actor, “the plaintiff must show both that the [defendant’s]
acts were so egregious as to shock the conscience and that they deprived him of a protected interest
in life, liberty or property.” Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 32 (1st Cir. 2006). Mr. Bedard’s
complaint lacks sufficient facts to satisfy the elements of either type of due process claim.
In the instant case, Mr. Bedard alleges that he was deprived of his real and personal
property without due process of law. See Doc. No. 1 at pgs. 5, 23, 30. However, he does not
allege any facts explaining when, where, or how any of the named Defendants deprived him of his
property. Nor does he allege any facts describing what process was due, explaining how any of
the named Defendants deprived him of that process, or identifying any specific actions by one or
more of the named Defendants that could be considered “so egregious as to shock the
conscience[.]” See Pagán, 448 F.3d at 32. Additionally, there are no allegations indicating that
Weare was carrying out a custom, policy, or practice in connection with the alleged seizure of Mr.
Bedard’s property, or that the Town’s implementation of a custom, policy, or practice was the
“moving force” behind the alleged due process violations. See Elliot Hosp., 626 F. Supp. 3d at
530 (quoting Miller, 219 F.3d at 12). Accordingly, Mr. Bedard fails to state a plausible claim
against any of the Defendants for violations of his right to substantive or procedural due process.
Nevertheless, this court cannot rule out the possibility that Mr. Bedard may be able to assert
adequate facts to state a due process claim against one or more Defendants. Therefore, this court
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recommends that the district judge dismiss these claims without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to
amend his complaint to allege sufficient facts to state actionable due process claims pursuant to
section 1983.
C. Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Takings Claims
“The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides: ‘[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.’” Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147 (2021) (alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). “To make a cognizable claim of a taking in violation of
the Fifth Amendment, [a] plaintiff[ ] must first show that [he] possess[es] a recognized property
interest which may be protected by the Fifth Amendment.” Asociación De Subscripción Conjunta
Del Seguro De Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d 1, 27 (1st Cir. 2007). To
satisfy this requirement, “[t]he plaintiff[ ] must point to credible sources for [his] claimed property
interest . . . such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. (punctuation in original) (quotations and citations
omitted). “Assuming that the plaintiff can establish a constitutionally protected property interest,
the plaintiff must next show that the challenged action caused an illegal taking of that interest.”
Id. (cleaned up). “[A] physical taking does not violate the Constitution unless just compensation
is denied.” Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir. 2008).
Here, Mr. Bedard alleges that he suffered an unconstitutional taking when his property was
taken for public use without just compensation. See Doc. No. 1 at pgs. 11-12, 23-24, 29-30.
However, he fails to allege any facts describing when, where, or how any of the named Defendants
caused or contributed to the alleged taking. Moreover, the complaint contains no details describing
the extent of Mr. Bedard’s interest in the property at issue, the circumstances surrounding its
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seizure, or any efforts Mr. Bedard may have made to recover just compensation. To the extent
Mr. Bedard asserts a takings claim against the Town or against the individual Defendants acting
in their official capacities, he alleges no facts plausibly linking the alleged taking to a custom,
policy, or practice. Nor does he allege facts showing that a custom, policy, or practice was the
moving force behind the allegedly unconstitutional taking. In short, Mr. Bedard fails to state a
plausible takings claim against any of the Defendants. Nevertheless, because this court is unable
to rule out the possibility that Mr. Bedard may be able to allege sufficient facts to support such a
claim, this court recommends that the district judge dismiss Plaintiff’s takings claims without
prejudice to his ability to amend his complaint to state such claims against one or more of the
Defendants pursuant to section 1983.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court recommends that the district judge dismiss Mr.
Bedard’s complaint, but that the dismissal be without prejudice to Mr. Bedard’s right to file an
amended complaint, within thirty (30) days from the date of the court’s ruling on this Report and
Recommendation, to allege sufficient facts to state due process and/or unconstitutional takings
claims against one or more of the Defendants pursuant to section 1983.2 Any objections to this
Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this notice. The
fourteen-day period may be extended upon motion. Failure to file any objection within the
specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s Order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
2 Mr. Bedard is cautioned that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint “must contain . . . a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” “[C]omplaints
that are ‘unnecessarily lengthy, repetitive, convoluted, or otherwise difficult to comprehend may
be dismissed.’” Currier v. Town of Gilmanton, No. 18-cv-1204-LM, 2019 WL 3779580, at *2
(D.N.H. Aug. 12, 2019) (quoting Chalifoux v. Chalifoux, No. 14-CV-136-SM, 2014 WL 1681626,
at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 25, 2014)).
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Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016). Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to this
Report and Recommendation “are subject to review in the district court” and any issues “not
preserved by such objection are precluded on appeal.” Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat’l Ins. Co.,
617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Keating v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 848 F.2d
271, 275 (1st Cir. 1988)).
______________________________
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
April 27, 2026
cc: Gary Alan Bedard, pro se
Counsel of record
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