Johnson v. Lynch et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Robert W. Johnson
v. 	Case No. 21-cv-1065-SE
Sandra Lea Lynch, Bruce M. Selya, and David J. Barron
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court for preliminary review is pro se plaintiff
Robert W. Johnson’s complaint (Doc. No. 1) and amended complaint
(Doc. No. 3),1 seeking relief in connection with a recent
decision issued by a First Circuit panel comprised of the
defendants, First Circuit Judges Sandra Lea Lynch, Bruce M.
Selya, and David J. Barron. 	For the reasons that follow, the
district judge should dismiss all of Mr. Johnson’s claims and
judgment should enter.
Preliminary Review Standard
Mr. Johnson’s complaint is subject to preliminary review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and LR 4.3(d)(2). 	After
preliminary review, the magistrate judge may recommend to the
district judge that the complaint be dismissed because, among
other things, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, or
1 The court construes Document Nos. 1 and 3 in the aggregate
to be the complaint in this case.
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the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	See LR
4.3(d)(2)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 	The complaint
must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quotation omitted). 	In determining whether the
complaint has done so, the court accepts well-pleaded factual
allegations in the complaint as true and views all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 	Mehta v. Ocular
Therapeutix, Inc., 955 F.3d 194, 205–06 (1st Cir. 2020)
(quotation omitted). 	The court may also take judicial notice of
its own records and the records of sister tribunals. 	See
Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1114 n.14 (1st Cir. 1995); see
also Zenon v. Guzman, 924 F.3d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 2019)
(explaining the court may consider “not only the complaint but
also matters fairly incorporated within it and matters
susceptible to judicial notice”). 	The court construes pro se
complaints liberally. 	See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam).
Background
On September 3, 2019, Johnson filed a civil complaint in
the United States District Court for the District of
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Massachusetts and sought to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
See Johnson v. Credit Collection Servs., No. 19-111872-FDS (D.
Mass.) (“Johnson I”); see also Johnson v. Credit Collection
Servs., No. 19-2168, slip op. at 1 (1st Cir. Dec. 2, 2021)
(“Johnson II”). 	Mr. Johnson filed multiple motions in Johnson
I, seeking leave to proceed IFP; the district court in Johnson I
declined to grant IFP status to Mr. Johnson. 	See, e.g., Johnson
I, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237471, at *1, 2019 WL 11639551, at *1
(D. Mass. Oct. 17, 2019); see also Johnson II, No. 19-2168, slip
op. at 1. 	Mr. Johnson’s underlying civil complaint was
ultimately dismissed by the district court. 	See Johnson II, No.
19-2168, slip op. at 1. 	Mr. Johnson appealed the Johnson I
court’s denial of his IFP status to the First Circuit, where a
panel consisting of Judges Lynch, Selya, and Barron affirmed the
district court. 	Id.
In his complaint filed in this court, Mr. Johnson alleges
that, in affirming the district court, Judges Lynch, Selya, and
Barron engaged in criminal behavior, violated his due process
rights, see Doc. No. 1, and improperly denied him relief in
light of the “illegal IFP application misinterpretations and
other frivolous grounds for dismissal that were mere assumptions
and not actual facts founded by Courts,” Doc. No. 3. 	Mr.
Johnson’s complaint seeks damages for “denial of default
judgment,” “failure to award plaintiff merits for errors ordered
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by courts,” and “abuse of authority & falsifying . . .
government documents.” 	Id. (capitalization omitted); see also
Doc. No. 1. 	Mr. Johnson also seeks to have the First Circuit’s
decision overturned and for “federal probes & prosecutions for
judicial errors” to be initiated. 	Doc. No. 3 (capitalization
omitted); see also Doc. No. 1.
Discussion
I. 	Request for Review and Reversal
This court does not sit in an appellate capacity over any
decision of the First Circuit. 	“It is an elementary rule of
federal jurisdiction that district courts have strictly original
jurisdiction . . . and thus cannot exercise appellate
jurisdiction. 	Appellate jurisdiction is reserved for the courts
of appeals and the Supreme Court.” 	Liviz v. Howard, No. 19-cv-
10096-PJB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36440, at *8, 2019 WL 1082403,
at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 4, 2019) (citations omitted). 	Mr.
Johnson’s recourse for errors of law or fact in Johnson II, if
any, may lie in a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc in
the First Circuit, see Fed. R. App. P. 35, 40, or in a petition
for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1); Sup. Ct. R. 10, 12-14. 	Accordingly, the
district judge should dismiss his claims seeking review and
reversal of the decision in Johnson II.
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II. 	Criminal Prosecution
Mr. Johnson has asked this court to initiate a criminal
investigation and prosecution of the defendant judges. 	A
plaintiff, in general, does not have standing to bring claims of
criminal misconduct in a civil case. 	See Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution of another.”). 	Accordingly, the district judge
should dismiss Mr. Johnson’s claims seeking to initiate a court-
ordered investigation and to charge the defendants with criminal
misconduct.
III. Absolute Judicial Immunity
Mr. Johnson’s claims against Judges Lynch, Selya, and
Barron individually are barred by the doctrine of absolute
judicial immunity. 	See, e.g., Elias v. Elias, CA 13-11602-JLT,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98984, at *12, 2013 WL 3777069, at *4 (D.
Mass. July 15, 2013) (holding claims for civil rights violations
and torts against defendant judges were “not cognizable because
absolute judicial immunity protects judges from acts performed
within the scope of their jurisdiction”). 	It is well-
established that adjudicatory functions are cloaked with
absolute judicial immunity. 	See Zenon, 924 F.3d at 616.
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“[A]bsolute judicial immunity means not just immunity from
damages, but immunity from suit altogether.” 	Id. at 617 n.10
(citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)). 	Under the
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, even if Mr. Johnson is
correct that the judges’ actions were unfair or even corrupt
(claims about which this magistrate judge makes no finding), Mr.
Johnson has no recourse against them in this court. 	See id. at
616-17. 	As the First Circuit instructs, “[t]he breadth of the
protection is fulsome, shielding judges even when their actions
are malicious, corrupt, mistaken, or taken in bad faith; its
purpose not to buffer bad judges but for the benefit of the
public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at
liberty to exercise their functions with independence and
without fear of consequences.” 	Id. at 616 (quotation omitted).
“To determine if a judge is entitled to the full protection of
the doctrine’s deflector shield, the Supreme Court has assessed
whether the judge’s act was one normally performed by a judge,
and whether the parties were dealing with the judge in his or
her judicial capacity.” 	Id. (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 362 (1978)).
Here, Mr. Johnson’s claims against the judges fit squarely
within the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. 	The
complaint challenges the defendants’ collective decision as
members of the panel that affirmed the denial of his motions for
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IFP status. 	See Doc. Nos. 1, 3. 	In doing so, Judges Lynch,
Selya, and Barron were acting in their judicial capacity to
review and adjudicate his appeal, and such actions are those
normally performed by a judge. 	Therefore, Mr. Johnson’s claims
against the judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity,
and, accordingly, the district judge should dismiss all of the
claims asserted against the defendant judges.
Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, the district judge should dismiss
this action in its entirety, and judgment should enter, for lack
of jurisdiction over Mr. Johnson’s claims and the absolute
immunity of the defendant judges. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B); LR 4.3(d)(2)(A). 	Any objections to this Report
and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of receipt
of this notice. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day
period may be extended upon motion.
Failure to file any objections within the specified time
waives the right to appeal the district court’s Order. 	See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016). 	Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to this
Report and Recommendation are subject to review in the district
court. 	See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d
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554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). 	Additionally, any issues not
preserved by such objection(s) are precluded on appeal. 	See id.
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
January 24, 2022
cc: 	Robert W. Johnson, pro se
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