Mogaji v. NH Department of Revenue Administration et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Martha Mogaji
v. 	Case No. 20-cv-1067-JL
New Hampshire Department of
Revenue Administration; and
Nancy J. Smith, General Counsel
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Martha Mogaji, appearing pro se and in forma
pauperis, has sued the New Hampshire Department of Revenue
(“DOR”) and DOR General Counsel Nancy Smith, claiming that they
violated her federal constitutional rights by rejecting her
application for an emergency business loan made available
through the state during the COVID-19 pandemic. 	The defendants
move to dismiss the complaint (Doc. No. 6), arguing that the
plaintiff: (1) lacks standing; (2) has misjoined Attorney Smith;
(3) has asserted claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment and
qualified immunity; and (4) has otherwise failed to state a
claim for relief against either the DOR or Attorney Smith. 	The
defendants’ motion has been referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. 	See LR
72.1(c). 	For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that
the district judge grant defendants’ motion to dismiss because
the plaintiff lacks standing to sue. 	In the alternative,
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 1 of 20

2
plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against either
defendant.
I. Factual Background
A. 	The Self-Employed Livelihood Fund 1
In late March 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) was enacted into federal
law. 	See Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (Mar. 27, 2020).
Pursuant to the CARES Act, the State of New Hampshire (“State”)
received funds to be used for “necessary expenditures” incurred
as a result of the coronavirus public health emergency
(“Coronavirus Relief Funds”). 	See 42 U.S.C. § 801. 	Among other
things, the State could use Coronavirus Relief Funds for
expenditures “incurred to respond to second-order effects of the
emergency, such as by providing economic support to those
suffering from employment or business interruptions due to
COVID-19-related business closures.” 	U.S. Dep’t. of the
Treasury, Coronavirus Relief Fund Guidance for State,
1 The relevant legislation is both attached to the
plaintiff’s complaint and is a matter of public record. 	The
court therefore considers it in analyzing defendants’ motion.
See, e.g., Goodall v. Worcester. Sch. Comm., 405 F. Supp. 3d
253, 259 (D. Mass. 2019) (“[T]the Court may take judicial notice
of statutes, regulations and formally enacted government
policies and procedures.”); see also, Foley v. Wells Fargo,
N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014) (relying on documents
attached to the complaint to describe factual background of
case).
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 2 of 20

3
Territorial, Local, and Tribal Governments, 86 Fed. Reg. 4182
(Jan. 15, 2021). 	In or around early July 2020, the State
allocated a portion of its Coronavirus Relief Funds into a fund
designated as the Self-Employed Livelihood Fund (“SELF”). 	See
Gov.’s Office for Emerg’cy Relief and Recovery (“GOFERR”), New
Hampshire Self Employed Livelihood Fund (SELF) Frequently Asked
Questions, https://www.goferr.nh.gov/covid-expenditures/new-
hampshire-self-employed-livelihood-fund-self/new-hampshire-self-
employed (accessed July 26, 2021); Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 7
(unmarked attachment from GOFERR’s website concerning
“Information on the Self-Employed Livelihood Fund”). 	SELF was
established to provide economic support to “self-employed”
businesses through the distribution of grants of up to $50,000
for qualifying applicants. 	GOFERR, supra; Compl. (Doc. No. 1)
at 7. 	To qualify for a SELF Grant, applicants had to meet the
following criteria:
 	Be a for-profit business with its principal place of
business in New Hampshire;
 	Have been in operation for at least one year before
July 17, 2020;
 	Have total 2019 gross receipts of less than
$1,000,000;
 	Not be in bankruptcy;
 	Not have permanently ceased operations;
 	Not have received a Main Street Relief Fund Grant; and
 	Not have any non-owner employees during any time of
year.
Id.; Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 9 (unmarked attachment showing the
same qualifying criteria). 	Of particular relevance to this
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 3 of 20

4
case, applicants also had to anticipate a loss of gross receipts
from 2019 to 2020 due to COVID-19 in order to qualify. 	Id.;
Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 9.
The SELF Grant application period opened on July 6, 2020 and
closed on July 17, 2020. 	Id.; Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 7.
Applicants were informed that even after submitting their
applications they could make changes up until the application
period closed on July 17. 	Id. 	(“How do I fix errors I have
identified in my business’s Grant Application?”). 	Applicants
were also provided with information concerning how to appeal
ineligibility determinations. 	Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 7. 	Those
instructions included the following notice:
Please 	note: 	The 	[Department] 	cannot 	consider 	appeals
regarding 	any 	dollar amounts 	that 	you 	reported 	on 	your
application. 	The 	State 	is 	unable 	to 	allow revisions 	to
a 	business’s 	gross 	receipts 	or 	COVID-19-related 	grant
and/or 	loan 	amounts 	so 	as 	to 	not 	jeopardize 	program
integrity 	or 	any 	of 	the 	State’s 	CARES Act funding.
Id. (bold and italics in original).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Claims
According to the complaint, Ms. Mogaji applied for a SELF
Grant but did not receive one. 	Id. at 4. 	In her application,
Ms. Mogaji indicated that her business was not anticipating a
loss of gross receipts from 2019 to 2020. Id.; see Order (Doc.
No. 3) at 2. 	As such, the DOR determined she was ineligible.
Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 4, 10. 	Ms. Mogaji claims that she
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 4 of 20

5
“incorrectly reported” that her business was not anticipating a
gross loss of receipts in 2020 because of a “typographical
error.” Id. 	She further asserts that she reported the error to
the DOR on or around July 25, 2020 and in doing so provided
evidence that her business “was experiencing losses” and that
COVID-19 “made it worse.” 	Id. 	Based on this new evidence and
her purported typographical error, Mogaji asked the DOR to
reverse its denial and award her a SELF Grant. 	Id. 	The DOR
denied Mogaji’s appeal. 	Id. at 11.
On October 26, 2020, Ms. Mogaji filed this action, asking
the court to order the DOR to provide her with a SELF Grant.
Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 5. 	She appended bank statements and tax
returns to her complaint, which she claims demonstrate her
entitlement to a SELF Grant. 	See id. at 12–15 (bank
statements), 16–28 (tax returns).
The court preliminarily reviewed the complaint in
accordance with LR 4.3(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	Based on
that review, the court liberally construed the complaint to
“allege[ ] that the [DOR] and Attorney Smith violated [Ms.
Mogaji’s] Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by denying
her an opportunity to correct her loan application.” 	Order
(Doc. No. 3) at 2. 	In due course, the defendants filed a motion
to dismiss. 	(Doc. No. 6).
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 5 of 20

6
II. Discussion
A. 	Standing
Invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), defendants first argue
that this case must be dismissed because the plaintiff lacks
standing. 	Article III of the U.S. Constitution confines the
federal courts to the adjudication of “actual, ongoing cases or
controversies.” 	Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477,
(1990). 	“One element of the case-or-controversy requirement” is
that a plaintiff must establish Article III standing to sue.
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997); see Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“Standing to sue is a
doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or
controversy.”).
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing.
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1993). 	As
previously noted, defendants premise their standing argument on
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), “[t]he proper vehicle for challenging
a court's subject-matter jurisdiction,” including a claim that
the plaintiff lacks Article III standing. 	See Valentin v. Hosp.
Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362 (1st Cir. 2001); Anvar v. Tanner,
No. 19-523-JJM-LDA, 2021 WL 3023025, at *2 (D.R.I. July 16,
2021).
In assessing standing under Rule 12(b)(1), the court “must
take the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true and indulge all
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 6 of 20

7
reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor.” 	Hochendoner v.
Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation
omitted). 	The court may also consider materials outside the
complaint to the extent they shed light on the jurisdictional
analysis. 	See Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 288 (1st
Cir. 2002) (“While the court generally may not consider
materials outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it
may consider such materials on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion . . . .”).
Where, as here, “a Rule 12(b)(1) motion contests factual
allegations of the complaint, the court must engage in judicial
factfinding to resolve the merits of the jurisdictional claim.”
Ceboller-Bertran v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., No. 20-1096,
2021 WL 2699040, at *3 (1st Cir. July 1, 2021); 	see also
Valentin, 254 F.3d at 364 (noting that “when a factbound
jurisdictional question looms, a court must be allowed
considerable leeway in weighing the proof, drawing reasonable
inferences, and satisfying itself that subject-matter
jurisdiction has attached.”).
The “‘irreducible constitutional minimum’” of Article III
standing is well established: The “plaintiff must have (1)
suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, 136 S.
Ct. at 1547 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. 	These requirements
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 7 of 20

8
ensure that the plaintiff has “a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy.” 	Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929
(2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
An injury in fact is the “‘[f]irst and foremost’ of
standing’s three elements.” 	Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547
(citation omitted); see Griffin v. Dep't of Labor Fed. Credit
Union, 912 F.3d 649, 653 (4th Cir. 2019) (“An injury in fact is
an indispensable aspect of constitutional standing . . . .”).
To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, the plaintiff must
demonstrate “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that
is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical.” 	Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548
(quotation marks and citation omitted). 	A particularized injury
“must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”
Id. at 1548 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiff claims to have been injured by the DOR’s
determination that she was ineligible for a SELF grant and by
its not affording her a subsequent opportunity to correct what
she has described as a typographical error.
Defendants’ standing argument is based on the fact that
various documents - including tax returns and publicly filed
business records – cast doubt on whether she applied for a SELF
loan, and thus, with respect to her standing to sue, whether she
has been injured by the defendants and whether a favorable
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 8 of 20

9
decision will redress her injury. 	Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (1993)). 	The court first
recounts the documents upon which the parties rely, including
those appended to the complaint as well as those submitted by
the parties in connection with the pending motion.
1. Tax Returns
Tax returns and other related documents from 2019 appended
to the complaint do not contain plaintiff’s name, but instead
that of an individual taxpayer named “Fharah Ladey.” 	For
example, an IRS Form 1040 – an individual tax return -
identifies the taxpayer as “Fharah Ladey” and contains a redacted
social security number. 	Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 18. 	Also, an IRS
Schedule 1 (Adjustments to Income) reiterates that “Fharah
Ladey” is the individual “on Form 1040 or 1040-SR” and contains
a redacted social security number. 	Id. at 20. 	Finally, several
profit-and-loss statements (“Schedule C”) identify “Fharah
Ladey” as the sole proprietor of several other sole
proprietorships. 	The presence of a redacted social security
number on these statements suggests that “Fharah Ladey” is an
individual. 	More importantly, however, there is no indication
as to how these tax documents are relevant to plaintiff’s
lawsuit.
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 9 of 20

10
2. 	Bank Statements
Bank statements from September 2019 and January 2020 2
appended to the complaint denote the account holder as
“[redacted] dba Farah Ladey.” 	While these documents, unlike the
tax returns, suggest that “Fharah Ladey” is a business, they do
not demonstrate any connection to the plaintiff.
3. 	Affidavit
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit from an unrelated suit
pending in this court (Doc. No. 14-1), suggesting that she was
an independent contractor doing work for “Fharah Ladey” (the
business) and that she suffered financial loss when COVID-19
caused that business to lose money. 	While this affidavit might
be probative of whether plaintiff qualified for a SELF grant, it
does not provide any support for plaintiff’s claim that she
applied for a SELF grant, and thus is not probative of her
standing to sue.
4. 	Letters from the State
Attached to the complaint are two letters from the State of
New Hampshire. 	The first, dated July 24, 2020 from DOR, is
addressed to “Fharah Ladey” and begins with the salutation,
“Dear Fharah Ladey.” 	(Doc. No. 1 at 10). 	The letter states
2 While it is not clear to the court how a bank statement
from January 2020 would support a claim of COVID-related
business losses, it need not reach that issue.
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 10 of 20

11
that Fharah Ladey is ineligible for a SELF Grant because “Your
business does not anticipate a loss of gross receipts from 2019
to 2020 due to COVID-19.” 	Id.
The second letter, dated September 18, 2020, from Attorney
Smith, is addressed to plaintiff and “Fharah Ladey African
Food.” 	It begins with the salutation “Dear Ms. Mogaji.” (Doc.
No. 1 at 11). 	The letter notes that on August 25, 2020, Ms.
Mogaji requested in writing “an amendment to the Regulation and
for the approval of [her] ‘SELF’ application.” 	The letter from
Attorney Smith reiterated that the application was denied
“because it did not indicate a loss of gross receipts from 2019
to 2020 due to COVID-19.” 	Id. 	The August 25, 2020 letter
referenced in Attorney Smith’s letter has not been provided to
the court.
5. 	Defendants’ Declaration
In a declaration (Doc. No. 15-1), DOR Information Systems
Management System Director Lisa J. Crowley avers that a search
of the relevant database indicated that “[t]here is no record .
. . of a person or business with the name ‘Mogaji’ having filed
a SELF Grant Application.” 	Crowley Decl. (Doc. No. 15-1) ¶ 3.
Together with the Crowley Declaration, the defendants
provided, under seal pursuant to state records laws, a SELF
application submitted on behalf of a business named “Fharah
Ladey d/b/a Softcharms” on July 9, 2020. 	(Doc. No. 16). 	The
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 11 of 20

12
application indicates that the personal contact for this
business is an individual named Ladefara Gem, and that the
business owner is Fharah Ladey, whose social security number is
redacted in the exhibit. 	Id. at 4. 	The application further
indicates that the business is a beauty salon, and that it
expected no change in gross receipts between 2019 and 2020, as
the figure “50,000” was entered in two boxes labelled “2019
Actual Gross Receipts” and “Estimated 2020 Actual Gross
Receipts.” 	Id. at 6. 	The “authorized signor” of the
application is “Ladefara Gem.” 	Id. at 8. 	Ms. Mogaji’s name is
not on this application.
6. 	Plaintiff’s argument
In response to the defendants’ claim that she lacks
standing to sue, the plaintiff asserts that she was a contractor
with Forsyte Von Buren & Company (an entity referenced above,
supra, at 10, as one of the sole proprietorships of which Fharah
Ladey was a sole proprietor). 	Pltf. Mem. Re: Standing (Doc. No.
14) at 2. 	She further asserts that she lost income as a result
of Forsyte Von Buren & Company’s financial demise. 	Id. at 1-2.
Plaintiff also attached a copy of what she describes as her SELF
loan application. 	(Doc. No. 14-3). 	In fact, the referenced
two-page document appears to be only a small portion of an
application. 	This excerpt does not include the name of the
applicant, and several questions and answers – including the
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 12 of 20

13
pivotal questions related to income in 2019 and expected income
in 2020 - are not included. 	Id. 	As such, this document has no
probative value to the court’s standing inquiry.
Ultimately, the plaintiff has not met her burden to
demonstrate that she has standing to sue. 	While she asserts in
her complaint that the defendants rejected her loan application,
that bare assertion is not only unsupported, but also directly
contradicted by the documents before the court, including many
that, as described above, the plaintiff herself provided. 	There
is no information before the court showing that Ms. Mogaji
applied for the grant at issue. 	As such, the court finds that
plaintiff has suffered no injury that can be redressed by the
relief requested. 	She therefore lacks standing to sue. 	Cf.
Deutsch Bank Nat. Trust. Co. v. Fadili, No. 09-cv-385-LM, 2011
WL 4703707, at *9 (D.N.H. Oct. 4, 2011) (explaining, in breach
of contract action, that “the general rule [is] that a non-party
to a contract has no remedy for breach of contract.”) (quoting
Brooks v. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll., 20 A.3d 890, 900 (N.H.
2011)). 	The district judge should therefore dismiss this suit
because the plaintiff lacks standing to sue.
B. 	Failure to State a Claim
1. 	Protected Property Interest
Relying on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the defendants also
argue that, even if Ms. Mogaji had standing to sue, dismissal is
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 13 of 20

14
warranted because the complaint fails to state a claim for which
relief can be granted.
To defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff must plead
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” 	Martinez v. Petrenko, 792 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir.
2015). 	This standard “demands that a party do more than suggest
in conclusory terms the existence of questions of fact about the
elements of a claim.” 	A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc.,
732 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 2013). 	In ruling on such a motion,
the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts set forth in
the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor. 	See Martino v. Forward Air, Inc., 609 F.3d
1, 2 (1st Cir. 2010). 	The court may also consider judicially
noticed documents, matters of public record, and documents
introduced by the plaintiff in her objection to the motion to
dismiss or concessions in that objection, without converting the
12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. 	See
Breiding v. Eversource Energy, 939 F.3d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 2019);
Greene v. Rhode Island, 398 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2005).
On preliminary review, see LR 4.3(d) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2), the court liberally construed the allegations in the
Complaint as invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claiming that the
defendants violated plaintiff’s right to procedural due process
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 14 of 20

15
when it denied her an opportunity to correct a typographical
error in her application. 	Order (Doc. No. 3) at 2.
“To state a procedural due process claim under § 1983, the
plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, establish that the
plaintiff (1) had a property interest of constitutional
magnitude and (2) was deprived of that property interest without
due process of law.” 	Clukey v. Town of Camden, 717 F.3d 52, 55-
56 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing García-Rubiera v. Fortuño, 665 F.3d
261, 270 (1st Cir. 2011)).
“The threshold issue in a procedural due process action is
whether the plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property
interest at stake.” 	Clukey, 717 F.3d at 55 (quoting Mard v.
Town of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 2003)). 	Here, the
defendants first assume that, in general, an individual can have
a protected interest in the type of grant at issue in this case.
But, reiterating the facts – or lack thereof – upon which the
court relied to assess plaintiff’s lack of standing, the
defendants assert that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts
showing that she has such an interest. 	Def. Mem. (Doc. No. 6-1)
at 15-16. 	The court’s standing analysis, however, included
documents – such as the Crowley Declaration (Doc. No. 15-1) and
the “Fharah Ladey” grant application – that exceed the
boundaries of what the court will consider in a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 	See Breiding, 939 F.3d at 49. 	The
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 15 of 20

16
court therefore declines apply its standing analysis to the
portion of defendants’ motion premised on Rule 12(b)(6).
Defendants also argue that plaintiff has failed to plead
that she met the grant’s qualification requirements, including,
inter alia, whether her business was not in bankruptcy, had been
in operation for the requisite time period, and did not exceed
the maximum allowable gross receipts. 	Def. Mem. (Doc. No. 6-1).
In her opposition to defendants’ motion, however, the plaintiff
indicated that she did satisfy those criteria. 	See Pltf. Mem.
(Doc. No. 10) at 2. 	At this stage of the proceedings, the court
therefore declines to recommend dismissal on the basis that the
plaintiff has failed to allege a protected property interest.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the plaintiff has adequately
alleged a property interest, the complaint and documents
properly before the court demonstrate that she received all the
process she was due.
2. Process Due
Assuming the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she
had a protected interest in receiving a SELF grant, the court’s
analysis turns to a determination of “what process was due.”
Zell v. Ricci, 957 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing Goss v.
López, 419 U.S. 565, 577 (1975)). 	Ultimately, “due process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 16 of 20

17
particular situation demands.” 	Id. (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
The due process analysis turns on “three distinct factors.”
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
“First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”
Id.
“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’” Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
Certainly, given the scope and impact of the COVID-19
pandemic, Ms. Mogaji’s private interest in a grant designed to
help keep small businesses afloat is significant. 	But her due
process claim falters on the remaining Eldridge factors. 	As
noted above, supra, at 6-7, applicants had clear notice that if
they were deemed ineligible for a SELF Grant, they could file an
appeal with an explanation and documentation to substantiate
their claims. Id. 	Applicants were also notified that no appeals
regarding any dollar amounts reported on an application would be
considered. 	Id. 	Applicants were notified, however, that they
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 17 of 20

18
could make changes to their applications up until the
application period closed on July 17. 	Id. 	This procedure is
adequate to protect against erroneous deprivations and, given
the economic impact of the pandemic and the need to distribute
funding to qualified applicants in a timely and organized
manner, the administrative burdens of treating plaintiff’s
application differently from all others would be considerable.
A more elaborate appeals system is not required. 	Courts
have found streamlined procedures sufficient to comport with due
process under many circumstances. 	See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (finding that an
“informal administrative remedy” of meeting with a designated
employee of the utility company to review billing errors was
sufficient due process); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540
(1971) (“Clearly ... the inquiry into fault or liability
requisite to afford the licensee due process need not take the
form of a full adjudication of the question of liability.”);
Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 717 (9th
Cir. 2011) (finding that the federal government did not violate
contractor’s right to due process when it revoked a product’s
certification but gave contractor opportunity to submit written
evidence following revocation decision); Frandsen v. Univ. Of
Alaska Fairbanks, No. 4:20-cv-00016-JWS, 2021 WL 1966821, at *5-
6 (D. Alaska May 17, 2021) (finding that terminated employee
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 18 of 20

19
received due process where she was provided three-months’ notice
and an opportunity to present a written objection to the
decision and provide any evidence she thought relevant); AMI
Affiliates v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 94-cv-7194,
1995 WL 611324, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1995) (finding no
deprivation of due process where plaintiffs had the opportunity
to object to HUD's proposed foreclosure through written
objections as well as an informal hearing).
Here, while the consequences of entering the incorrect
business income figures were serious, “fundamental fairness
[only] requires that an exacting application standard, enforced
by the severe sanction of dismissal . . . be accompanied by full
and explicit notice of all prerequisites for such
consideration.” 	JEM Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 22 F.3d 320, 329
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Salzer v. F.C.C., 778 F.2d 869, 871–72
(D.C. Cir. 1985)).
Against this factual and legal backdrop, the court finds
that the State’s SELF Grant application and appeal mechanism
comported with due process. 	The defendants are, therefore, also
entitled to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
II. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should grant
the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 6) because the
plaintiff lacks standing to sue, or, in the alternative, because
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 19 of 20

20
the complaint fails to state a claim for relief. 3 	Any objections
to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen
days of receipt of this notice. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The
fourteen-day period may be extended upon motion. 	Failure to
file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court's order. 	See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
July 29, 2021
cc: 	Martha Mogaji, pro se
3 Having found that dismissal is warranted under both Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the court does not reach
defendants immunity and misjoinder arguments.
Case 1:20-cv-01067-JL Document 18 Filed 07/29/21 Page 20 of 20