Woodham v. Scheffer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Grace Woodham
v. Civil No. 20-cv-304-LM
Tucker Scheffer
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Grace Woodham has filed a complaint (Doc. No. 1), under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and state tort law, alleging that Tucker
Scheffer, her former boyfriend, violated her federal
constitutional right to due process, conspired to violate her
civil rights and is liable to her under state law for tortious
acts he committed against her. The complaint is here for
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and LR
4.3(d)(2). Also before the court for consideration is Ms.
Woodham’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. No. 4).
Background
Mr. Scheffer is the sole defendant in this case. Ms.
Woodham alleges that Mr. Scheffer, who lives in Franconia, New
Hampshire, lied to members of the Franconia Police Department
(“FPD”), and committed perjury in state court, to obtain a
protective order against Ms. Woodham. Specifically, Ms. Woodham
alleges that Mr. Scheffer falsely told the state court and the
FPD that she had engaged in certain illegal conduct, which he
characterized as verbal threats, harassment, and attempts to
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harm Mr. Scheffer and his roommate, Audrey Hall. Ms. Woodham
suggests that Mr. Scheffer may have conspired with the FPD to
obtain that protective order and to have Ms. Woodham falsely
arrested on criminal charges, but acknowledges that the
protective order and false arrest may been the result of the
court’s and FPD’s reliance on Mr. Scheffer’s false statements.1
Discussion
I. Preliminary Review
The federal district courts have jurisdiction over claims
asserting violations of a plaintiff’s rights accruing under
federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Ms. Woodham alleges that by
committing perjury in order to obtain a protective order, Mr.
Scheffer violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
See Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 2. The Constitution “erects no
shield against merely private conduct, however . . . wrongful.”
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982).
Ms. Woodham appears to rely on two federal statutes (42
U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985) as providing a cause of action for her
1The court declines to construe the complaint in this case
to assert claims against the FPD, or any member thereof, as Ms.
Woodham has filed a separate suit in this court against the FPD
and an FPD employee arising out of the events which underlie the
claims in this case. See Woodham v. Franconia Police Dep’t, No.
20-cv-413-JD (D.N.H.).
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federal constitutional claims against Mr. Scheffer. Section
1983 provides a cause of action against individuals who, while
acting under color of state law, violate the federal
constitutional rights of another. See Gray v. Cummings, 917
F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section
1983 does not provide a cause of action, however, for purely
private conduct alleged to have an impact on a plaintiff’s
federal constitutional rights. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 53 (1992) (citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312
(1981)). A private party is deemed to be a state actor for
purposes of § 1983 only under limited circumstances, which are
not present here. See generally Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05
(describing circumstances under which a private actor can be
deemed to be a state actor for purposes of § 1983).
In order to state a cause of action arising under
section 1985(3), a plaintiff must assert (a) racial or
class-based discrimination; and (b) interference with a
federally protected right. Additionally, a claim of
conspiracy must allege facts that suggest a conspiracy
rather than set out conclusory allegations that the
defendants made an unlawful agreement.
Boyle v. Barnstable Police Dep’t, 818 F. Supp. 2d 284, 318 (D.
Mass. 2011) (citations omitted). See also Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); Aulson v. Blanchard, 83
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).
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Stripped of legal conclusions and speculation, the
complaint contains no factual assertions to show that Mr.
Scheffer colluded with state actors to violate Ms. Woodham’s
federal constitutional rights. The mere possibility of a
conspiracy, without more, does not provide an avenue for relief.
See Jones v. Higgins-O’Brien, No. CV 16-11666-LTS, 2018 WL
935421, at *7, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25854, at *20-21 (D. Mass.
Feb. 16, 2018) (§ 1983 and § 1985 conspiracy claims subject to
dismissal where complaint only conclusorily alleged agreement);
Hudson v. MacEachern, 94 F. Supp. 3d 59, 70 (D. Mass. 2015)
(same). Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss Ms.
Woodham’s claims asserted under § 1983 and § 1985 for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, thus leaving no
federal claims in this case.
C. Diversity Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
The federal court has original jurisdiction over claims
arising under state law only where the parties are of diverse
citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). Ms. Woodham cannot invoke the diversity
jurisdiction of this court over her state law claims against Mr.
Scheffer because both she and the defendant are citizens of New
Hampshire.
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D. Supplemental Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367
To the extent Ms. Woodham relies on this court’s
supplemental jurisdiction to litigate any of her remaining
claims against Mr. Scheffer in this case, the court has
discretion to decline to exercise such jurisdiction. See
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (federal court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where
all claims arising under court’s original jurisdiction have been
dismissed). For reasons stated above, the federal claims in
this case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and
her allegations do not provide a basis for exercising diversity
jurisdiction over any of her claims. Pursuant to § 1367(c)(3),
the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over any claims here that arise under state law, and those
claims should be dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff’s
ability to file them in a state court of competent jurisdiction.
II. Request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Ms. Woodham has requested injunctive relief in this action,
specifically, an injunction directing the Grafton County
Department of Corrections to provide her with certain financial
paperwork to allow her to obtain in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
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status in this case. “‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.’” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736 (2015)
(citation omitted). The likelihood of success and irreparable
harm are the factors that weigh most heavily in the
analysis. See Esso Std. Oil Co. v. Monroig–Zayas, 445 F.3d 13,
18 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v.
MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). The
burden of proof is on the movant. See Esso Std. Oil Co., 445
F.3d at 18.
Here, because Ms. Woodham has failed to state any federal
claim upon which relief might be granted, and the court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law
claims she may have, she has necessarily failed to demonstrate
that she is likely to succeed on any of the claims asserted in
this case. For that reason alone, her request for injunctive
relief should be denied. Additionally, Ms. Woodham’s request
for injunctive relief concerning IFP paperwork is moot, as she
has been granted IFP status in this matter. See Order (Doc. No.
5) (granting plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP). Accordingly,
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the district judge should deny Ms. Woodham’s motion for
preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. No. 4).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should: (1)
deny Ms. Woodham’s motion seeking preliminary injunctive relief
(Doc. No. 4); and (2) dismiss this action in its entirety,
without prejudice to Ms. Woodham’s ability to file an action in
state court against Mr. Scheffer, asserting any state law claims
she may have. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation
must be filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be
extended upon motion. Failure to file specific written
objections to the Report and Recommendation within the specified
time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016).
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
January 29, 2021
cc: Grace Woodham, pro se
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