Stegemann v. FCI Berlin

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Joshua G. Stegemann
v. 	Case No. 20-cv-00102-SM
FCI-Berlin
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is Joshua G. Stegemann’s “Request for an
Order Directing FCI-Berlin to Cease Interfering with Court and
Legal Correspondence” (Doc. No. 1), which the Clerk of Court
docketed as a complaint initiating a prisoner civil rights
action, seeking a preliminary injunction, and his subsequent
motion to convert this action to one proceeding under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (Doc. No. 3). 	Document No. 1 is before the court for
preliminary review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and LR
4.3(d)(1); the request for preliminary injunctive relief has
been referred to the magistrate judge for a report and
recommendation, see Jan. 15, 2020 Order; and Stegemann’s motion
to convert this civil action into a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus (Doc. No. 3) is before this court for a ruling.
Background
Stegemann is a federal prisoner housed at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Berlin, New Hampshire (“FCI-
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Berlin”). 	He claims FCI-Berlin has violated his First Amendment
right of access to the courts by opening, copying, and
withholding correspondence mailed to him from courts and “other
legal entities.” 	He asserts that FCI-Berlin’s actions are
causing unspecified irreparable harm to his active litigation in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York. 	He seeks an order from this court requiring FCI-
Berlin to immediately cease opening, copying, and withholding
his mail from the courts and other legal entities.
Stegemann began this action by filing his self-titled
“Request for an Order Directing FCI-Berlin to Cease Interfering
with Court and Legal Correspondence,” seeking relief pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1651. 	He contends § 1651 provides this court
jurisdiction to issue such an order “because it is necessary and
appropriate to the right of access to the courts — an
indisputably clear right enjoyed by prisoners confined within
this Court's jurisdiction at FCI-Berlin. 	Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 821-822 (1977)[.]” 	Doc. No. 1, at 2. 	Stegemann seeks
expedited review of his request under Local Rule 7.1(f). 	See
id. 	(Doc. No. 1).
The Clerk of Court docketed Stegemann’s filing as a civil
complaint seeking preliminary injunctive relief. 	Stegemann is
proceeding pro se, but he has not paid a filing fee or filed a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 	On January 13, 2020, the
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Clerk mailed Stegemann a deficiency notice alerting him that
this action “will not be considered a civil case” and no action
will be taken by the court on it until the $400 filing fee has
been paid or an application to proceed without prepayment has
been granted.” 	Filing Fee Notice (Doc. No. 2). 	The filing
docketed as the complaint (Doc. No. 1) was referred to the
undersigned magistrate judge for preliminary review, and the
district judge then designated the undersigned to consider
Stegemann’s request for preliminary injunctive relief, to hold a
hearing if necessary, and to issue proposed findings and
recommendations. 	See Jan. 15, 2020 Order.
On January 15, 2020, Stegemann filed a motion to convert
this action to a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	See Doc.
No. 3, at 1. 	He contends that “[t]he access to the courts claim
— the sole claim raised herein — directly impacts the conditions
of [his] confinement and thus is wholly cognizable under §
2241.” 	See id. 	Stegemann also asserts that “[u]pon conversion
of this action to a § 2241 (habeas) action, [he] will forward
the $5.00 filing fee.” 	Jan. 15, 2020 Ltr. (Doc. No. 3) at 2.
Discussion
I. 	Motion to Convert and Filing Fee Notice (Doc. Nos. 2, 3)
The court’s January 13, 2020 Filing Fee Notice (Doc. No. 2)
is based in part on the court’s docketing of the initial
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pleading in this case as a “Complaint” seeking the type of
relief that is available in a civil rights action. 	The court is
required to construe pro se submissions liberally and hold them
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations
omitted). 	The policy behind the liberal construction rule is
that if pro se litigants “present sufficient facts, the court
may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was
imperfectly pled.” 	Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). 	Consequently, the pleadings of a
pro se litigant also “may be interpreted in light of
supplemental submissions[.]” 	Wall v. Dion, 257 F. Supp. 2d 316,
318 (D. Me. 2003) (examining pro se litigant’s other pleadings
to understand the nature and basis of his claims against the
defendants) (citing Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)).
Stegemann has demonstrated that he is not confused about
the authority under which he wishes this action to proceed. 	In
view of his “motion to convert,” it appears he did not intend
his original filing to be a civil rights complaint; rather, he
has made clear that he intends to invoke this court’s
jurisdiction to consider his access-to-the-courts claim as the
basis for finding that he “is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” under 28
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U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to
particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas
corpus,” while requests for relief “turning on circumstances of
confinement” are more typically presented in civil rights
actions. 	Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). 	The
First Circuit has taken the position that challenges to certain
prison conditions may be reviewed under § 2241. 	See, e.g.,
Gonzalez-Fuentes, 607 F.3d 864, 873 (1st Cir. 2010)
(jurisdiction existed to address § 2241 petition by federal
prisoners not challenging the fact or duration of custody but
challenging or seeking “a quantum change in the level of
custody”); Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2008)
(jurisdiction existed to address § 2241 petition by federal
prisoners challenging delay in transfer to community corrections
centers as contrary to statutory duty of BOP); Rogers v. United
States, 180 F.3d 349, 357 (1st Cir. 1999) (§ 2241 is appropriate
vehicle for challenging BOP’s failure to designate state prison
as place for confinement). 	The First Circuit also has stated,
in dicta, that “[i]f the conditions of incarceration raise
Eighth Amendment concerns, habeas corpus is available.” 	See
United States v. DeLeon, 444 F.3d 41, 59 (1st Cir. 2006).
Stegemann’s access-to-the-courts claim is not comparable to
the conditions-of-confinement claims for which the First Circuit
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has recognized § 2241 subject matter jurisdiction. 	Stegemann’s
access-to-the-courts claim arises out of the circumstances of
his confinement without implicating any question of an Eighth
Amendment violation, his custody level, or the fact or duration
of his current detention. 	Moreover, the relief he seeks, a
preliminary injunction mandating how his incoming court mail
should be handled, is not the type of relief that is generally
available in a § 2241 petition. 	See Czekalski v. Zenk, No. 17-
cv-064-JL, 2018 WL 1787945, at *1, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63629,
at *2-3 (D.N.H. Mar. 2, 2018) (Doc. No. 11) (request for
preliminary injunction to enjoin seizure of inmate’s legal
materials is not properly considered in habeas action (citing
cases)), R&R approved, 2018 WL 1787931, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62794 (D.N.H. Apr. 13, 2018) (Doc. No. 16). 	Because the only
claim raised in this action does not fall within the province of
a petition for writ of habeas corpus or seek the type of relief
this court could properly order in a § 2241 proceeding,
Stegemann’s motion to convert this action into a § 2241 petition
(Doc. No. 3) is futile, and the district judge should deny it as
such.
Should Stegemann wish to proceed with this action, the
court’s January 13, 2020 filing fee notice (Doc. No. 2) provides
him with appropriate guidance for the steps he must take to
avoid dismissal of this action for failure to pay the filing
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fee, or failure to file a completed application to proceed in
forma pauperis. 	If Stegemann does not wish to pursue this civil
rights action at this time, he may file a notice of voluntary
dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1).
II. 	Preliminary Review
A. 	Standard
This court conducts a preliminary review of complaints
filed by inmates seeking relief from government agents. 	See LR
4.3(d)(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 	In considering whether
the complaint states a claim, the court determines whether,
stripped of legal conclusions, and with all reasonable
inferences construed in plaintiff’s favor, the complaint
contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief’” upon which relief can be granted. 	Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). 	Claims
may be dismissed, sua sponte, if the court lacks jurisdiction, a
defendant is immune from the relief sought, or the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b); LR 4.3(d)(1)(A).
B. 	Access to Courts Claim
The Supreme Court has long recognized that prisoners have a
right to meaningful access to the courts and that prison
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officials are barred from “actively interfering with inmates’
attempts to prepare legal documents.” 	Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 350 (1996) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)).
To state a claim that an inmate’s right of access to the courts
has been violated, the inmate must allege facts showing he was
actually injured in his ability to pursue a nonfrivolous claim
in a post-conviction proceeding or other civil rights matter
that he had a right to litigate. 	See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352,
354-55. 	In other words, the inmate must allege facts that if
taken as true would show “that an actionable claim has been lost
or rejected or that presentation of the claim is currently being
prevented” due to the actions of prison officials. 	Guglielmo v.
N.H. State Prison, 111 F.3d 122, 1997 WL 205290, at *1, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 8616, at *2–*3 (1st Cir. Apr. 25, 1997)
(unpublished table decision) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Stegemann alleges that FCI-Berlin is opening, copying
and withholding his court correspondence; that he is litigating
two cases in the Northern District of New York; that in April
2019, the court in his criminal case denied his request for
relief relating to FCI-Berlin’s handling of his mail, see United
States v. Stegemann, No. 1:13-cr-357-GLS-1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,
2019), ECF No. 273; and that FCI-Berlin’s actions are causing
“irreparable harm” to his litigation. 	Stegemann’s reference to
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irreparable harm is a legal conclusion that this court does not
credit in performing its preliminary review of his claims.
Stegemann does not identify any non-frivolous actionable
claim at issue that has been irreparably harmed because of the
handling of his mail at FCI-Berlin. 	“[T]he underlying cause of
action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be
described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must
describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.”
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). 	Because
Stegemann has failed to describe the nature of the claims that
have been affected by the handling of his mail, and the manner
in which the handling of his mail has caused him actual injury,
he has failed to state a claim that he is being denied access to
the courts with respect to any non-frivolous claim. 	The court
cannot rule out the possibility, however, that Stegemann may be
able to plead an actionable access-to-the-courts claim.
Accordingly, in an Order issued this date, the court has granted
Stegemann leave to file a motion to amend the complaint, along
with a proposed amended complaint, that states such a claim.
III. Preliminary Injunctive Relief
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never
awarded as of right.” 	Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). 	A
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petitioner seeking “a preliminary injunction must establish that
he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” 	Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.
Ct. 2726, 2736 (2015) (citation and internal quote omitted).
The likelihood of success and irreparable harm are the factors
that weigh most heavily in the analysis. 	See Esso Std. Oil Co.
v. Monroig–Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006); see also
Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645
F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). 	The burden of proof is on the
movant. 	See Esso Std. Oil Co., 445 F.3d at 18.
As noted, Stegemann has failed to allege sufficient facts
to state a claim that he has been denied access to the courts.
As such, he has not forecast that he is likely to be successful
on the merits of his claim or that he will suffer irreparable
injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction. 	Accordingly,
to the extent Stegemann seeks preliminary injunctive relief in
this action, the district judge should deny that request,
without prejudice to Stegemann filing a new motion for a
preliminary injunction that satisfies the prerequisites for
obtaining such relief, after he files an amended complaint that
states an actionable claim.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should:
1. 	Deny Stegemann’s request for a preliminary
injunction (Doc. No. 1), without prejudice to his ability
to file a new motion for a preliminary injunction after he
files an amended complaint that states an actionable claim;
and
2. 	Deny Stegemann’s motion (Doc. No. 3), seeking to
convert this action into a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. 	Failure to file specific written objections to the
Report and Recommendation within the specified time waives the
right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos
v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
________________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
February 13, 2020
cc: 	Joshua G. Stegemann, pro se
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