Isbell v. Goodwin et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CASE NO. 5:25-CV-103-MEO-DCK
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on Plaintiff’s “Motion To Remand Back
To State Court” (Document No. 12) filed August 29, 2025. This motion has been referred to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and is now ripe for disposition.
Having carefully considered the motion and the record, the undersigned will respectfully
recommend that the motion be denied without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed her “Complaint” in Iredell County Superior Court.
(Document No. 1-1). This case arises out of an incident between Plaintiff and a co-worker during
Plaintiff’s employment at a Lowe’s Supermarket in Mooresville, North Carolina. (Id. at 5).
Plaintiff brings the following causes of action: 1) negligent supervision; 2) harassment; 3)
wrongful constructive discharge/constructive dismissal; and 4) discrimination. (Id. at 6–8).
On July 2, 2025, Defendants removed this case to this Court. (Document No. 1).
Defendants removed this case based on federal question jurisdiction, arguing Plaintiff’s claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and/or the Age Discrimination in
JANET G. ISBELL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND
RECOMMENDATION
)
SCOTT GOODWIN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
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Employment Act (“ADEA”) are federal claims. (Id. at 3). Defendants also allege this Court
should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. (Id.)
On August 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed her “Notice Of Partial Voluntary Dismissal With
Prejudice” (Document No. 11). Plaintiff represented she dismissed the federal discrimination
cause of action, contained in paragraphs 25 through 28 of her Complaint. (Id.) Notably, only
Plaintiff signed the filing. (Id.) Also on August 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed her “Motion To Remand
Back To State Court” (Document No. 12). In her motion, Plaintiff argues the “Federal Issue that
was alleged in the Plaintiff’s Complaint and relied upon by the Defendants for removing the case
to Federal Court, has been dismissed with prejudice. Therefore, there is no Federal issue for this
Court to determine.” (Id. at 1) (emphasis in original).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue, and any
removed case lacking a proper basis for subject matter jurisdiction must be remanded.” UMLIC
Consol., Inc. v. Spectrum Fin. Servs. Corp., 3:09-CV-184-RJC-DSC, 665 F.Supp.2d 528, 532
(W.D.N.C. 2009). The party seeking federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving that subject-
matter jurisdiction exists. Id. “If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.”
Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).
In cases where a federal district court has original jurisdiction over at least one claim, the
court shall also “have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
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under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Two or more claims
form part of the same case or controversy for supplemental jurisdiction purposes where they
“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” and “would ordinarily be expected to [be tried]
in one judicial proceeding.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1996).
“[C]ourts enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state
law claims when all federal claims have been extinguished.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106,
110 (4th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff cannot always automatically divest a court of subject-matter
jurisdiction by dismissing his federal causes of action. Harless v. CSX Hotels, Inc., 389 F.3d 444,
448 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining “subject matter jurisdiction is not divested from the district court
when the federal claims are dismissed form the complaint,” but a court has discretion to remand a
case where Plaintiff has substantive grounds for amending the complaint); 14B Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3721 at 63–66 (“[A] plaintiff cannot destroy
federal-question jurisdiction by dismissing the federal-question claims.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges she dismissed one cause of action: her discrimination claim. (Document
No. 11). Based on this, Plaintiff moves to remand this case, arguing “there is no Federal issue for
this Court to determine.” (Document No. 12). Defendants disagree, and they argue Plaintiff
improperly attempted to use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 to dismiss her discrimination claim
when she should have sought to amend her Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15. (Document No. 16, pp. 4–5). Defendants contend Plaintiff’s “discrimination claim remains
in the operative pleading . . . .” (Id. at 5). Defendants also argue Plaintiff’s claims of harassment
and constructive discharge “can only arise under federal law” and Plaintiff did not dismiss them.
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(Id. at 5–6). Lastly, Defendants claim this Court can, and should, exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. (Id. at 6–9).
A plaintiff “may dismiss an action without a court order by filing” either “a notice of
dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment”
or “a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). “[A]
majority of courts[, including throughout the Fourth Circuit,] have permitted plaintiffs to move for
voluntary dismissal of fewer than all defendants pursuant to Rule 41(a).” Redding v. Ameriprise
Auto & Home Ins., 2012 WL 1268327, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 13, 2012). However, some courts hold
“Rule 41 is limited to dismissal of entire ‘actions,’ not discrete claims and less-than-all parties.”
Carpenter v. Meridian Indus., No. 1:00CV247, 2001 WL 1019765, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2001)
(Cogburn, Mag. J.). Generally, “Rule 15 is technically the proper vehicle to accomplish a partial
dismissal.” Skinner v. First Am. Bank of Virginia, 1995 WL 507264, at *2 (4th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam).
Here, Plaintiff did not dismiss an entire defendant. (Document No. 11). Plaintiff also did
not dismiss her entire action. (Id.). Plaintiff dismissed only one cause of action, her discrimination
claim, and given the case law regarding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, the undersigned
recommends this Court find the dismissal insufficient. Based on that, the undersigned further
recommends this Court allow Plaintiff twenty-one (21) days to seek leave to amend her Complaint,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The parties are reminded they may raise a lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction at any time prior to the entry of final judgment, and as such Plaintiff
may renew her motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc.,
519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008).
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
Plaintiff’s “Motion To Remand Back To State Court” (Document No. 12) be DENIED without
prejudice. The undersigned recommends Plaintiff be permitted twenty-one (21) days to seek
leave to amend her Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
V. TIME FOR OBJECTIONS
The parties are hereby advised that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and Rule 72 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, written objections to the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendation contained herein may be filed within fourteen (14) days
of service of same. Responses to objections may be filed within fourteen (14) days after service
of the objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file objections to this Memorandum and
Recommendation with the District Court constitutes a waiver of the right to de novo review by the
District Court. Diamond v. Colonial Life, 416 F.3d 310, 315-16 (4th Cir. 2005). Moreover, failure
to file timely objections will preclude the parties from raising such objections on appeal. Diamond,
416 F.3d at 316; Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2003); Snyder v. Ridenhour, 889
F.2d 1363, 1365 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985), reh'g denied, 474
U.S. 1111 (1986).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Signed: February 17, 2026
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