Malcolm McFall Babb

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WILMINGTON DIVISION
IN RE:
MALCOLM MCFALL BABB,
Debtor. 	Case No. 06-03003-8-JRL
Chapter 7
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
This matter came before the court on the Chapter 7 Trustee’s motion for approval of
compromise with Mitchell McFall Babb. The court conducted a hearing in Wilmington, North
Carolina on February 18 and March 17, 2009. This order confirms and provides the rationale for
the oral ruling at the conclusion of the hearing allowing the motion.
BACKGROUND/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The compromise proposed by the Trustee arises from a dispute in ownership of two
separate pieces of real property located in North and South Carolina. On August 2, 1973, the
Kingston Corporation conveyed by quitclaim deed a one-half undivided interest in approximately
10.3 acres of land in Charlotte, North Carolina (the “Charlotte Property”) to “M. McFall Babb.”
The deed was recorded in Book 3609, page 157 of the Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 16 day of April, 2009.
________________________________________
J. Rich Leonard
United States Bankruptcy Judge
____________________________________________________________
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On August 28, 1987, Cedar Creek Village, Inc., a South Carolina corporation, deeded real property
located in Little River Township and described as Lot Nine, Block “C” of Cedar Creek Village
(the “Little River Property”) to “M. McFall Babb.” The deed was recorded in the Horry County
Register of Deeds, Book 1170, Page 282.
The debtor filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 22,
2006 and his case was converted to Chapter 7 on February 26, 2007. On September 11, 2007, the
Trustee filed a motion for authority to list and sell properties and for determination of ownership
(the “Motion for Sale”). The Trustee sought through its Motion for Sale authority to sell the
Charlotte and Little River Properties and a determination that these properties were owned by the
debtor and constituted property of the estate. The debtor, whose full name is Malcolm McFall
Babb, denies that he is the grantee and owner of the Charlotte and Little River Properties. Instead,
the debtor alleges that the properties belong to his son, Mitchell McFall Babb (“Mitchell”).
On August 21, 2007, the court concluded at a hearing that Mitchell was incompetent to
testify before the court. Mitchell is permanently disabled as the result of a stroke suffered in 1994.
As a result, and pursuant to an order entered on October 22, 2007, the court appointed Stephani W.
Humrickhouse as the guardian ad litem “for the protection of Mitchell’s financial interest and to
discern the truth regarding property ownership.” In response to a motion filed by the guardian ad
litem, the court entered an order on March 20, 2008, authorizing her to engage in settlement
negotiations with the Trustee concerning the ownership of the Charlotte and Little River
Properties. The Trustee and guardian ad litem were successful in reaching a compromise and on
July 16, 2008, the Trustee filed a motion to approve compromise with Mitchell.
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DISCUSSION
Under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, after notice and a hearing, the trustee may “use, sell,
or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. §
363(b)(1). The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide that “on motion by the trustee and
after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.” FED R. BANKR . P.
9019(a). The court may approve a compromise if it is “fair and equitable” and in the best interests
of the estate. U.S. ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assoc., P.C., 269 B.R. 139, 150 (D. Md. 2001)
(citing In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 730 F.2d 1128, 1135 (8th Cir.), cert. den., 469 U.S.
1207 (1985)); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1010 (4th Cir.
1985) (a debtor’s objection to approval of compromise is not fatal if “it is found to be in the best
interests of the estate as a whole.”). The Supreme Court has provided several guidelines for
bankruptcy courts to consider before approving a compromise. Protective Comm. for Indep.
Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968) (“TMT”)). As the
Supreme Court explained in TMT, the bankruptcy court should
apprise [itself] of all facts necessary for an intelligent and objective opinion of the
probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be litigated. Further, the judge
should form an educated estimate of the complexity, expense, and likely duration of
such litigation, the possible difficulties of collecting on any judgment which might
be obtained, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair assessment of the
wisdom of the proposed compromise.
TMT, 390 U.S. at 424.
With regard to the role of a guardian ad litem, other circuit courts have concluded that,
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although a guardian ad litem may negotiate a proposed compromise to be referred to the court, the
effectiveness of the compromise is subject to the court’s order approving the settlement. Dacanay
v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he binding characteristic of the
settlement derives from the approval of the court and not from the consent of the guardian ad
litem, who is but an officer of the court.”); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974) (“[T]hrough
a guardian ad litem the court itself assumes ultimate responsibility for determinations made on
behalf of the [ward]. . . ”). Similarly, North Carolina courts have ruled that a guardian ad litem
cannot consent to a judgment or compromise without the investigation and approval by the court.
Ballard v. Hunter, 12 N.C. App. 613, 619, 184 S.E.2d 423, 427 (1971) (“A judgment or
compromise settlement negotiated by a next friend or guardian without the investigation and
approval of the court is invalid.”); State ex rel. Hagins v. Phipps, 1 N.C. App. 63, 159 S.E.2d 601,
603 (1968); Butler v. Winston, 223 N.C. 421, 425, 27 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1943).
After carefully considering the evidence on record, the court concludes that the debtor is
unlikely to succeed in litigation concerning the ownership of the Charlotte and Little River
Properties, and that the proposed compromise is fair and equitable and in the best interests of the
estate and Mitchell.
The Charlotte Property
The Trustee contends that the Charlotte Property is property of the estate which may be
sold and the proceeds of which may be distributed to unsecured creditors. The Charlotte Property
was conveyed by quitclaim deed, dated August 2, 1973, to “M. McFall Babb.” At hearing, the
Trustee introduced multiple documents supporting his position that the grantee is the debtor and
not his son.
First, the Trustee introduced two checks for the payment of property taxes on the Charlotte
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1Answer and Third Party Complaint, Susan S. Purser and Cynthia S. Hattersley v. M.
McFall Babb, Case No. 88-CVS-2332 (Aug. 5, 1988); Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim
of the Defendants, The City of Charlotte v. M. McFall Babb and wife, Brenda Babb, et al., Case
No. 95-CVS-11662 (July 29, 1996); Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim of Defendants, City
of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County v. M. McFall Babb and wife, Brenda Babb, et al., Case
No. 04-CvD-15103 (Sept. 27, 2004).
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Property. The first check, dated November 20, 1987, was in the name of M. McFall Babb and
signed by the debtor. Enclosed with the check was a letter signed by the debtor indicating that the
check represented payment “for my ½ 1987 property tax on the Milton Rd/CLT investment.” The
second check, dated December 31, 1993, was drawn from the account of Brenda Babb. A letter
accompanying this check was also signed by the debtor and provided that the payment represented
“my share” of property taxes for the Charlotte Property. The Trustee asserts that these letters
establish that the debtor held an ownership interest in the Charlotte Property. In response, the
debtor argued that the property belonged to Mitchell and alleged that he wrote the letters on behalf
of Mitchell as Mitchell’s attorney-in-fact. However, the debtor was unable to produce any
evidence of a power of attorney to act on behalf of Mitchell during that period of time. In
addition, the debtor failed to adequately explain why he did not sign the letters as Mitchell’s
attorney-in-fact. On cross-examination, the debtor stated that he could not remember holding a
power of attorney prior to 2004.
Second, the Trustee introduced copies of pleadings filed in three cases involving the
Charlotte Property, each of which was before the Mecklenburg County Superior Court.1 In each of
these pleadings, the debtor admitted to owning a one-half undivided interest in the Charlotte
Property. In response, the debtor again alleged that his actions related to the Charlotte Property
were performed on behalf of Mitchell as Mitchell’s attorney-in-fact. However, the named
defendants in two of the cases consisted of “M. McFall Babb and wife, Brenda Babb” (emphasis
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added). Significantly, the debtor admitted at hearing that he did not contend in proceedings before
the Superior Court that Mitchell was the owner of the Charlotte Property.
Third, the Trustee introduced the debtor’s personal financial statement, which the debtor
signed and provided to First Atlantic Bank on December 2, 1991. In his financial statement, the
debtor represented that he held a 50% ownership interest in the Charlotte Property. At hearing, the
debtor argued that his financial statement was void because it was never notarized.
Fourth, the Trustee introduced several statements of disclosure in which Mitchell indicated
that he did not own any real property. Among the statements requiring the disclosure of assets
were three applications for Medicaid filed between 2004 and 2006. In addition, Mitchell filed a
sworn declaration of assets with the Horry County Family Court on August 8, 1997. In both the
Medicaid applications and the sworn declaration of assets, Mitchell stated that he owned no real
property. In response, the debtor argued that the Medicaid applications were submitted without
the debtor’s knowledge and that Mitchell no longer qualified to receive Medicaid because he
owned real property.
In support of the debtor’s position that the Charlotte Property belongs to Mitchell, the
debtor relied on evidence that Mitchell’s uncle provided money to the children of the debtor.
Specifically, the debtor asserted at hearing that Mitchell received funds from his uncle, David
Hutto, as the result of a trust created by Mitchell’s grandmother, Winnifred L. Hutto. At hearing,
the debtor introduced a copy of the Last Will and Testament of Winnifred L. Hutto. According to
her will, which was neither signed nor dated, Ms. Hutto intended to devise a one-half share in her
residual estate to David Hutto, as trustee, for the benefit of her daughter, Winnifred Babb. Ms.
Hutto’s will further provided that upon the death of Winnifred Babb, the trustee was required to
divide the trust estate into equal parts for the benefit of her children. However, the debtor admitted
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2Winnifred Babb was the daughter of Ms. Hutto and wife of the debtor at the time of her
death.
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at hearing that Ms. Hutto’s will became invalid when she remarried. Subsequently, on July 14,
1969, Ms. Hutto died intestate and her son, David Hutto, was appointed as the administrator of her
personal estate. After Ms. Hutto’s death, the South Carolina probate court issued an
Administration Bond for her estate in the amount of $193,714.00.
In addition, the debtor established that Winnifred Babb attempted to create a trust for the
benefit of the debtor’s children.2 On October 15, 1971, approximately two years after the death of
her mother, Winnifred Babb died in a car accident and was survived by the debtor and their three
children, Mitchell, David, and Susanne (collectively, the “Babb Children”). At hearing, the debtor
introduced a copy of a trust agreement executed by Winnifred Babb and David Hutto. The
purpose of the trust agreement was to create a revocable trust in the name of Winnifred H. Babb to
be managed by David Hutto as the trustee. Under the terms of the trust agreement, the trustee was
responsible for managing the trust’s assets and distributing the income of the trust in support of the
Babb Children. Although the trust agreement was unsigned, the debtor provided Schedule K-1 tax
documents from 1973 and 1974 in which the Babb Children reported income from a trust entitled
the “Winnifred H. Babb Trust.” These tax documents listed taxable income generated by the trust
in the amounts of $40.84 in 1973 and $55.39 in 1974.
In further support of the debtor’s position, David Babb testified that he believed a trust
existed from which David Hutto paid certain expenses of the Babb Children. David Babb
explained that, with respect to money, his relationship with his uncle was “call as you need it.”
Among the expenses allegedly paid by David Hutto were David Babb’s rent and attorney’s fees,
Susanne’s tuition for college and medical school, and the cost of Susanne’s trip to Europe. As for
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Mitchell, David Babb established that David Hutto contributed money for the payment of
Mitchell’s rent while Mitchell was in law school. David Babb further testified that he believed
Mitchell owned the Charlotte and Little River Properties as a result of financial assistance from
David Hutto.
The court acknowledges that there is some evidence that Mitchell may have had access to
funds from the estates of his grandmother and mother around the time that the Charlotte Property
was conveyed; however, the court finds that the documentary evidence favors the Trustee’s
position that the debtor is the owner of the Charlotte Property. Prior to bankruptcy, the debtor
consistently represented that he was the owner of a one-half undivided interest in the Charlotte
Property in signed statements accompanying property tax payments, a personal financial statement
required by a bank, as well as in sworn pleadings in three cases before the Mecklenburg County
Superior Court. Conversely, disclosure statements required of Mitchell in connection with his
divorce and applications for Medicaid were consistent in representing that Mitchell held no
interest in real property. Further, the debtor was unable to provide documentary evidence that he
held a power of attorney to represent Mitchell when engaging in actions related to the Charlotte
Property. In fact, the debtor admitted that in past litigation involving the Charlotte Property he
never indicated that he was acting on behalf of Mitchell. Finally, there is no documentary
evidence from which to conclude that sufficient funds were available to Mitchell for the purchase
of real property in 1973; rather, tax documents from the same year reflected income generated
from the Winnifred H. Babb Trust insufficient to fund the purchase of real property. To the extent
that David Hutto may have provided Mitchell with funds outside of the trust from which to
purchase the Charlotte Property, such an inference cannot overcome substantial documentary
evidence supporting the Trustee’s position that the Charlotte Property is property of the estate.
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The Little River Property
The Trustee further contends that the Little River Property is property of the estate subject
to sale. In support of this contention, the Trustee introduced a Deed to Real Estate, dated August
28, 1987, pursuant to which Cedar Creek Village, Inc. (“Cedar Creek”) conveyed the Little River
Property to “M. McFall Babb.” In addition, the Trustee introduced an agreement between Cedar
Creek and M. McFall Babb for the purchase of the Little River Property. At hearing, the debtor
admitted to signing the purchase agreement but asserted that he did so as Mitchell’s attorney-in-
fact. However, the debtor was unable to produce documentary evidence of a power of attorney
authorizing him to purchase property on behalf of Mitchell. The debtor further asserted that he
was acting as the guardian of Mitchell; however, Mitchell was 25 years old and competent at the
time of the transaction.
Also at hearing, the Trustee introduced mortgage documents related to the Little River
Property. According to a Mortgage of Real Estate filed with the Clerk of Court for Horry County
on August 9, 1985, Cedar Creek and Hubert and Lois Dameron entered into a mortgage agreement
on the Little River Property in the amount of $55,000.00. Subsequently, on October 16, 1987, the
mortgage was assigned to M. McFall Babb pursuant to a Transfer of Mortgage. The Transfer of
Mortgage was signed by Hubert and Lois Dameron and notarized. The Trustee also introduced a
copy of an instrument purporting to assign the mortgage “to Mac Babb this 9th day of October,
1987.” However, the debtor claimed that he had never seen the Transfer of Mortgage. In addition,
the Trustee introduced Cedar Creek’s closing statement for the sale of the Little River Property.
Cedar Creek’s closing statement listed the purchase price of the Little River Property at
$107,500.00 and the payoff of a mortgage on the property in the amount of $52,325.86. The
Trustee introduced a copy of a check in the amount of $52,325.86 drawn from the debtor’s account
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and signed by the debtor. Based on these mortgage documents and the debtor’s check, the Trustee
contends that the debtor purchased the Little River Property and paid off the mortgage.
Additionally, the Trustee introduced a 1099 tax statement listing the names and addresses
of the parties involved in the sale of the Little River Property. The 1099 statement identified the
purchaser as “M. McFall Babb” and contained the social security number of the debtor. In
response, the debtor asserted that the 1099 tax statement failed to establish that he was the
purchaser because the social security number was hand-written whereas the rest of the statement
was typed. In his deposition, George W. Cox, the attorney who represented Cedar Creek at
closing, could not explain why the debtor’s social security number was written by hand or who had
written it.
Other documentary evidence in support of the Trustee’s position included the debtor’s
personal financial statement and Mitchell’s divorce records. On December 2, 1991, the debtor
submitted a personal financial statement to First Atlantic Bank in connection with an application
for a loan. His signed financial statement indicated that he was the owner and title holder of the
Little River Property. Consistent with this assertion is the sworn financial declaration of Mitchell,
filed with the Horry County Clerk of Court on August 8, 1997. Mitchell filed his financial
declaration for the purpose of disclosing all of his assets at the time of his divorce from his ex-
wife. Among the assets he disclosed were a checking account in the amount of $700.00 and cash
on hand in the amount of $15.00. However, Mitchell’s financial declaration did not provide for
any interest in real property.
At hearing, the debtor introduced affidavits of Mitchell and Brenda Babb taken in 2004 in a
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3M. McFall Babb v. Horry County Assessor, Docket No. 04-ALJ-17-0130-CC (Jan. 13,
2005).
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case before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court.3 The case concerned the eligibility of
the Little River Property for a special assessment ratio for the 2003 tax year. In order to qualify
for the special assessment, the debtor was required to show that Mitchell was the owner of the
Little River Property. Although Mitchell and Brenda Babb indicated in their sworn affidavits that
Mitchell was the sole owner of the Little River Property, the Administrative Law Court found no
independent or documentary evidence supporting the assertion that Mitchell had the means to
purchase the Little River Property or construct a home on it. M. McFall Babb v. Horry County
Assessor, Docket No. 04-ALJ-17-0130-CC at 6 (Jan. 13, 2005). As a result, the Administrative
Law Court found that the debtor, as the next friend of Mitchell, failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that Mitchell was the owner of the property. Id. at 7.
The Trustee further asserts that there is no evidence that Mitchell was known within the
Babb family as “M. McFall Babb.” David Babb testified on behalf of the debtor and established
that three members of his family carried the middle name “McFall,” including Mitchell. However,
David Babb established that his family did not typically refer to Mitchell as “McFall.” When
asked why the Charlotte and Little River Properties were conveyed to “M. McFall Babb” if
Mitchell was intended to be the grantee, David Babb stated that he did not know. In fact, the
debtor has never satisfactorily answered the court’s persistent question as to why both properties
were titled in the name of “M. McFall Babb,” a name not otherwise used by either father or son, if
not to intentionally create an ambiguity as to ownership.
Despite substantial evidence to the contrary, the debtor contends that Mitchell owns the
Little River Property. First, the debtor introduced a copy of an application for a special assessment
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ratio filed in 1990 with the Horry County Assessors Office. The application named M. McFall
Babb as the owner of the property and included Mitchell’s signature. Second, the debtor
introduced copies of two checks made out to the county treasurer on December 2, 1991 and
December 22, 1992. The checks represented payments for property taxes on the Little River
Property in the amounts of $1,619.76 and $1,665.24, respectively. The checks were signed by
Mitchell but did not reference the name or address on the account. Third, the debtor introduced
copies of Mitchell’s medicare and identification cards, as well as records from the Veteran Affairs
Medical Center in Fayetteville, North Carolina, each of which listed the Little River Property as
Mitchell’s home address. Fourth, the debtor introduced a contact sheet produced by Mitchell’s
caseworker at the Department of Social Services. The caseworker noted on the sheet that Mitchell
told her that he owned real property.
The court finds that the record supports the Trustee’s position that the debtor is and always
has been the owner of the Little River Property. The debtor signed the purchase agreement and
paid off the mortgage on the Little River Property. The address on the debtor’s bank account
matched the address belonging to the transferee and grantee on the Transfer of Mortgage, Deed to
Real Estate, and seller’s closing statement. The debtor admitted to owning the Little River
Property in a personal financial statement filed with a bank. Similar disclosure statements of
Mitchell’s, such as his financial declaration filed with the Family Court of Horry County at the
time of his divorce, indicated that Mitchell held no ownership interest in real property. In
addition, the South Carolina Administrative Law Court confronted the issue of ownership of the
Little River Property and concluded that the debtor failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mitchell was the owner.
The court recognizes that there is some evidence supporting the debtor’s assertion that
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Mitchell is the owner of the Little River Property. For example, the Little River Property is listed
as Mitchell’s address on his identification and medicare cards, as well as the records of the
Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Fayetteville, North Carolina. In addition, Mitchell filed an
application for a special assessment of the Little River Property, and there is evidence that he paid
property taxes for the years 1991 and 1992. Although the court finds that it is unlikely that
Mitchell is the owner of the Little River Property, evidence in favor of Mitchell’s ownership
corroborates the court’s view that a compromise is in the best interests of the estate.
CONCLUSION
When a case comes into Chapter 7, the Trustee obtains custody and control over all
property of the estate. Therefore, it is in the Trustee’s discretion whether to litigate title, abandon
property, or to compromise disputed claims. In this case, the Trustee reached a compromise
regarding the ownership of the Charlotte and Little River Properties with the court-appointed
guardian ad litem for Mitchell. The guardian ad litem established at hearing that she conducted a
thorough investigation of the ownership of the Charlotte and Little River Properties. Following
her investigation, the guardian ad litem concluded that she could not prove, based on the evidence
available, that Mitchell owned either property. Instead, the guardian ad litem testified that there
was substantial evidence that the debtor owned the property. Additionally, the guardian ad litem
estimated that the cost of going forward with litigation regarding the ownership of the Charlotte
and Little River Properties would be between $10,000.00 and $15,000.00. As a result, the
guardian ad litem testified that the compromise proposed by the Trustee was in Mitchell’s best
interest. This court agrees.
The terms of the compromise may be summarized as follows: the Trustee is permitted to
sell the Charlotte Property and apply the proceeds thereof, combined with proceeds of property of
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the debtor located in Oconee County, South Carolina, to the payment of allowed claims in the
debtor’s case. If these proceeds are insufficient to pay all allowed claims in full, the Trustee has
the right to sell the Little River Property. However, the Trustee will provide the debtor and
Brenda Babb with an opportunity to prevent a sale of the Little River Property upon payment of
the full amount of the deficiency. In the event that there are excess proceeds of sale or the
Charlotte or Little River Properties remain unsold, the Trustee will deliver such proceeds and
quitclaim such property to “Mitchell McFall Babb.”
The court finds that the proposed compromise is commensurate with the evidence on
record. The compromise provides for the payment of allowed claims in the debtor’s case through
proceeds from the sale of the Charlotte and Little River Properties. In addition, the compromise
provides for the transfer to Mitchell of any proceeds and property remaining after the payment of
allowed claims. Therefore, the court concludes that the proposed compromise represents a fair and
equitable resolution to the dispute over ownership of the Charlotte and Little River Properties, and
its approval is in the best interests of the estate and Mitchell.
Based on the forgoing, the Trustee’s motion for approval of compromise is ALLOWED.
“END OF DOCUMENT”
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