Holbrook Holdings, INC., v. Cohodes

2:24-cv-00175Mtd24 nov 2025

Testo completo

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BUTTE DIVISION
HOLBROOK HOLDINGS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARC COHODES,
Defendant.
CV 24–175–BU–DLC
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Marc Cohodes’s motion to strike/anti-
SLAPP motion. (Doc. 18.) For the reasons herein, the motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Holbrook Holdings, Inc. (“Holbrook”) is a financial advisory firm
that is incorporated in Oregon and has its principal place of business in Atlanta,
Georgia. (Doc. 1 ¶ 15.) Defendant Marc Cohodes is a citizen of the State of
Montana and resides in Bozeman, Montana. (Id.)
In November 2024, Holbrook filed this diversity action alleging that
Cohodes committed libel through a series of posts on X, formerly known as
Twitter. (Id. ¶¶ 84–116.) Holbrook alleges that it is “an award-winning financial
advisory firm” with a goal of providing “potential high risk-adjusted returns for
clients” through two funds. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 21–22.) One of the funds holds B. Riley
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corporate bonds. (Id. ¶ 6.) B. Riley—a publicly traded company on NASDAQ—
had done business with an individual referred to as “Conspirator #2” in a federal
securities fraud indictment. (Id. ¶ 53.)
According to the Complaint, Cohodes is a short seller. (Id. ¶ 2.) Cohodes
“bets against the stock prices of companies that he shorts, with the hope that he
will earn profits if the company’s stock price goes down.” (Id.) Cohodes’s
followers believe Cohodes is proficient in identifying companies that are engaging
in fraudulent or illegal activity; therefore, “when he takes a short position and
begins targeting a company, he commonly claims to have determined that the
company is corrupt and run by criminals.” (Id. ¶ 3.)
In Fall 2023, Cohodes announced on X that he had a short position in B.
Riley stock. (Id. ¶ 5.) Around the same time, Cohodes began publicly accusing B.
Riley and its management of corruption and fraud. (Id.) In response to the
accusations, Holbrook’s CEO, Scott Carmack, published a tweet which was
“mildly critical” of Cohodes. (Id. ¶ 7.) Cohodes responded on X by calling
Carmack an “asshat” and calling Holbrook’s mutual fund a “bag of shit.” (Id. ¶ 9.)
Cohodes published additional tweets accusing Holbrook and its principals of
engaging in securities fraud and an unlawful “kickback” scheme with B. Riley. (Id.
¶ 11.) Cohodes repeated these allegations on social media over the course of nearly
a year. (Id.)
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Based on these allegations, Holbrook asserts three claims of libel per se.
First, Holbrook alleges libel per se for Cohodes’s December 17, 2023 post on X, in
which he tweeted:
He also has a problem with $BW I think I will write a letter about
@HolbrookHldgs to the @SECGov about hold non Investment Grade
Securities.. I also wonder if the @RILY clients on his Shit Ass Mutual
Fund.. Friends dont Let Friends own $HOBIX.. Good to see another
$RILY 	victim 	on 	TILT 	on 	a 	Sunday 	@FriendlyBearSA
@AureliusValue @joe_bananas9.. I wonder if this guy is one of Parker
Petite’s illegit kids?
(Id. ¶¶ 61, 86.) Next, Holbrook alleges libel per se for Cohodes’s February 29,
2024 X post, in which Cohodes tweeted: “He is on the fraud. betcha riley asset
management owns his shit ass fund,” allegedly referring to Holbrook. (Id. ¶¶
68, 97.) Finally, Holbrook alleges a third claim of libel per se for Cohodes’s
August 13, 2024 X post in which he tweeted “I am sure there is a kickback
from $RILY to him.” (Id. ¶¶ 71, 108.) Holbrook asserts that through this post,
Cohodes claims that Holbrook and B. Riley were engaged in an unlawful
“kickback scheme.” (Id. ¶ 72.)
Cohodes filed the present motion to strike Holbrook’s Complaint,
arguing that his speech is protected by Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute.1 (Doc.
1 The acronym “SLAPP” stands for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation.” Gopher Media LLC v. Melone, 154 F.4th 696 n.1 (9th Cir. 2025).
Georgia’s “anti-SLAPP statute applies to claims brought against ‘a person or entity
arising from any act . . . which could reasonably be construed as an act in
furtherance of the person’s or entity’s right of petition or free speech under the
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18.) Holbrook opposes the motion. (Doc. 28.) Holbrook contends that
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute is irrelevant because under Montana’s choice
of law rules, the Court must apply Montana law.2 (Id. at 11.) Holbrook further
argues that even if Georgia law applies, Cohodes’s motion would still fail
because Cohodes’s tweets were not nonactionable statements of opinion and
Holbrook sufficiently pled actual malice. (Id. at 28–38.)
D ISCUSSION
“[A] federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law rules of the
forum state.” Aqua-Marine Constructors v. Banks, 110 F.3d 663, 670 (9th Cir.
1997). The Court’s jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because there is a
complete diversity of citizenship among the parties. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17.) Montana is the
forum state; therefore, the Court must apply Montana’s choice of law rules.
I. 	Montana’s Choice of Law Approach
Montana applies the approach from the Restatement (Second) Conflict of
Laws to disputes over which state’s substantive law applies to a particular action.
Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Georgia in connection with an issue
of public interest or concern.’” Carbone v. CNN, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2018) (quoting O.C.G.A. §9-11-11.1(b)(1)).
2 Following the completion of briefing on the present motion, Montana Governor
Greg Gianforte signed into effect House Bill 292, the Uniform Public Expression
Protection Act. (Doc. 42.) Neither party suggests that the Act is retroactive, (id.)
and therefore, the Court concludes it is inapplicable to Defendant’s motion.
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Talbot v. Ainuu, 2024 WL 896370, at *2 (D. Mont. Mar. 1, 2024) (citing Buckles v.
BH Flowtest, Inc., 476 P.3d 422, 424 (Mont. 2020)). The Restatement’s Conflict of
Laws analysis is two-part. Buckles, 476 P.3d at 424. Under Section 6 of the
restatement, the Court must first determine whether the forum state has a statutory
directive that is applicable. Id. If a statutory directive exists, the Court applies the
statute. Id. In the absence of a statutory directive, the Court “considers the
principles outlined in [Section] 6(2) with the specific section of the Restatement
that is applicable to the case.” Id.
A. Section 6(2) Factors
Here, neither party asserts that a statutory directive exists, and the Court is
unaware of a statutory directive that would apply to this case. The Court will
therefore apply the principles set forth in § 6(2) along with the specific
Restatement section(s) applicable to this case.
Section 6(2) of the Restatement provides the following factors to consider:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems;
(b) the relevant policies of the forum;
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relevant interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue;
(d) the protection of justified expectations;
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law;
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(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Talbot, 2024 WL 896370, at *3.
The Montana Supreme Court recently applied the Section 6(2) factors to a
defamation case. Goguen v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 544 P.3d 868, 875–76 (Mont.
2024). In Goguen, the plaintiff, a Montana resident, sued a New York newspaper
and journalist for defamation. Id. at 874–75. The newspaper moved to dismiss the
action on the basis that the newspaper was protected by New York’s fair report
privilege. Id. at 876. The district court denied the newspaper’s motion to dismiss,
finding that the issue of privilege was a matter of Montana law. Id.
In determining which state’s law should apply to the litigation, the Montana
Supreme Court first considered the principles of Section 6(2). Id. at 880. As to the
first factor, the court highlighted that New York’s fair report privilege protects the
speaker, and thus, “application of New York’s privilege would respect New York’s
significant policy interests and substantive law on the particular issue.” Id. The
court determined that the respect of these policy interests and substantive law
would foster a harmonious relationship between the laws of New York and
Montana. Id.
As to the second and third factors, the court explained:
Although Montana does have an interest in protecting its citizens from
defamation, the issue we are addressing under Montana's choice of law
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rules is the privilege and not the underlying defamation. While conduct
in New York may impact residents of other states, the conduct
nonetheless took place in New York. The New York legislature has
spoken through its privilege regarding its policy and the broad scope of
protection to be afforded the media. We conclude that New York has a
stronger interest in the determination of the privilege issue which is due,
in part, because the privilege protects the speaker, New York's privilege
provides more protection to the press than Montana's, and the conduct
occurred in New York.
Id. at 881 (internal citation omitted).
The court explained that the fourth factor “is less important in tort law
because justified expectations have less impact in tort cases.” Id. Nonethless, the
court determined that the Defendant, as the holder of the privilege, “had a
justifiable expectation that New York law would be applied . . . to its conduct.” Id.
Regarding the fifth factor, the court explained that when there is a major
difference between the laws of the states, the fifth factor is inapplicable. Id. at 882.
The court determined that the sixth factor weighed in favor of the Defendant,
explaining that in a case “where the tortious conduct occurred in one state and the
injury occurs nationwide,” the certainty and predictability factor weigh in favor of
applying the law of the state in which the conduct occurred. Id.
As to the final factor—ease of determination and application—the court
determined that either state’s law could be applied without difficulty. Therefore,
this factor did not weigh in favor of either party.
Here, like in Goguen, the Section 6(2) factors favor the application of
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Montana law.
The first factor—the needs of the interstate and international systems—favor
application of the law of the speaker’s state of domicile. Georgia’s anti-SLAPP
statute’s stated purpose is protecting “participation by the citizens of Georgia in
matters of public significance and public interest.” OCGA § 9-11-11.1(a). This
language makes clear that the statute protects the speech of Georgia citizens.
Therefore, like in Goguen, because the asserted defense protects the speaker, this
factor favors application of the law of the speaker’s home state. See 544 P.3d at
880.
The second and third factors—relevant policies and interests of the forum
state and other interested states in determining the issue—likewise favor
application of Montana law. As explained by the Montana Supreme Court, a state’s
“interest in fixing the scope of a privilege applicable to conduct taking place within
its borders is paramount.” Id. at 881. Here, application of Georgia’s anti-SLAPP
statute would not further the statute’s purpose. Like in Goguen, the second and
third factors favor application of the law of the speaker’s state of domicile.
The fourth factor, while less important in tort law, see id. at 881, likewise
favors application of Montana law. Like in Goguen, Cohodes could have
justifiably expected that his speech would be protected by defenses available in
Montana. It would be less justifiable for Cohodes to expect that his speech was
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protected by Georgia law, for the sole reason that the subject of his speech happens
to be domiciled in Georgia.
Because the difference between Georgia and Montana law is not minor, the
fifth factor does not apply to the analysis in this case.
The sixth factor—certainty, predictability, and uniformity of results—favors
application of Montana law. Like in Goguen, because the tortious conduct occurred
in one state and the injury occurred nationwide, application of the law of the state
in which the conduct occurred—here, Montana—results in certainty and
predictability for speakers.
Finally, the seventh factor—ease of determination and application—does not
favor the application of either state’s law. Holbrook contends that there is an
ongoing dispute as to whether particular anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal
court. (Doc. 28 at 16–17.) However, the Ninth Circuit has held that anti-SLAPP
motions to strike are “available against state law claims brought in federal court.”
DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., 706 F.3d 1009, 1013 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013). Like
in Goguen, “[r]egardless of which state’s law is applied, the privilege can be
determined and applied without difficulty.” 544 P.3d at 882.
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B. Specific Restatement Section(s) Applicable3
After analyzing the Section 6(2) factors, the Goguen court examined “the
contacts of the respective jurisdictions to ascertain which has a superior connection
with the occurrence and thus would have a superior interest in having its policy or
law applied.” Id. Those factors, found at Section 145(2) of the Restatement, are as
follows:
(a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of
business of the parties; and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties centered.
Id.
As to the first factor, the court found that the injury occurred where Goguen
is domiciled, though the injury was not confined to Montana alone due to the
nation-wide nature of the publication. Id. Therefore, the first factor weighed in
3 As noted by Judge Brian M. Morris of this Court, Sections 149 and 150 of the
Restatement provide guidance on the choice of law in defamation claims. Talbot,
2024 WL 896370, at *3. However, following Judge Morris’s order in Talbot, the
Montana Supreme Court issued its opinion in Goguen. In Goguen, the court
followed its Section 6(2) analysis with a consideration of the factors found in
Section 145(2). While the reason for the court’s decision to focus its analysis on
Section 145(2) but not Sections 149 and 150 is not immediately clear, the Court
will follow the Montana Supreme Court’s lead and consider the principles set forth
in Section 145(2).
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favor of Montana Law. The court found that the second and third factors also
weighed in favor of applying New York law, because the conduct that caused the
injury occurred in New York, and the privilege protects the speaker who was
domiciled in New York. Id. The court found that the final factor also weighed in
favor of applying New York law, because the privilege protects the media, the
conduct occurred in New York, the Defendant’s place of business was in New
York, and the injury was not exclusive to Montana. Id. at 883.
Based on its examination of Sections 6 and 145, the court determined that
“Montana’s choice of law rules require [the court to] apply New York law to the
fair report privilege at issue.” Id.
Here, the Section 145(2) factors favor application of Montana law.
The first factor—place of injury—slightly favors application of Georgia law
because Georgia is where Holbrook is headquartered. However, under Goguen, the
significance of this factor is tempered by the fact that the speech at issue was
broadcasted internationally, and therefore the injury is not confined to Georgia
alone. 544 P.3d at 882. The second factor—place of the conduct causing the
injury—favors application of Montana law, where the speech took place. Id. The
third factor—domicile of the parties—favors application of Montana law. In
Goguen, the court applied New York law in part “because the privilege [at issue]
protects the speaker, the conduct occurred in New York, and the speaker [was]
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located in New York.” Id. While Holbrook is domiciled in Georgia, Goguen
suggests that this factor should nonetheless favor application of the speaker’s state
law. Finally, the fourth factor does not favor application of either state’s law
“because there is no relationship between the parties aside from the publication[s]
and lawsuit.” Id.
The foregoing makes clear that, under Montana’s choice of law analysis,
Montana law applies to this case. Therefore, Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute is
inapplicable to the speech at issue.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the motion (Doc. 18) is DENIED.
DATED this 24th day of November, 2025.
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