USA v. Conchas

1:25-cr-00047Mtd27 gen 2026

Testo completo

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 1 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 2 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 3 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 4 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 5 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 6 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 7 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 8 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 9 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 10 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 11 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 12 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 13 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 14 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 15 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 16 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 17 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 18 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 19 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 20 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 21 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 22 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 23 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 24 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 25 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 26 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 27 of 28
Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 28 of 28

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page1of 28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
CR 25-47-BLG-WWM

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

VS.
ROSAICELA PLASIDA CONCHAS,

Defendant.

Before the Court is a Motion to Suppress filed by Defendant Rosaicela
Plasida Conchas (“Ms. Conchas”). (Doc. 29). Ms. Conchas is charged with
possession with the intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl, in violation of
21 U.S.C, § 841 (a), and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2.

(Doc. 1). The charges arise from a traffic stop conducted on October 25, 2024,
when Montana Highway Patrol Sergeant Barry Kilpela (“Sergeant Kilpela”) pulled
over a tan sedan driven by Ms. Conchas. (Doc. 29 at 2). Ms. Conchas moves to
suppress all evidence obtained from the stop, arguing that (1) the stop was
unlawfully prolonged and (2) Ms. Conchas’s consent to search was not given
voluntarily. V/d. at 13,21). The Government opposes the Motion. (Doc. 36). The
Court held an evidentiary hearing on January 9, 2026. (Doc. 42).

For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion to Suppress.

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 2 of 28

I. Factual Background

On October 25, 2024, at approximately 2:27 p.m., Sergeant Kilpela! was
parked on the shoulder of the west-bound lanes of Interstate 94 near Billings.
(Doc. 29 at 2). He observed a tan, Chevrolet sedan traveling east in what appeared
to be the middle of the two-lane roadway. (/d.). Sergeant Kilpela crossed the
median and caught up with the sedan before witnessing it cross the centerline a
second time. (U/d.). He initiated a traffic stop by activating his emergency lights,
and the sedan pulled over. (/d. at 3; Doc. 30 at 2:27:40-2:28:03)*.

Sergeant Kilpela approached the passenger-side window and spoke with the
driver, who was later identified as Ms. Conchas. (Doc. 29 at 2; Doc. 30 at
2:28:17). Sergeant Kilpela explained that the reason he pulled her over was
because she was driving over the centerline, and he asked her whether she was
getting tired. (Doc. 30 at 2:28:21—2:28:32). Ms. Conchas denied being tired, but
she acknowledged that she “kind of bit the line.” (Doc. 29 at 2). Sergeant Kilpela
asked Ms. Conchas for her registration and proof of insurance; she responded that

she rented the vehicle from Enterprise in Los Angeles, two days earlier, and that

' Sergeant Kilpela has 13 years of experience as a Montana Highway Patrol Trooper. (Hearing
Transcript, 5:22, Jan. 9, 2026). In the course of his employment, he has obtained over 800 hours of K9
training and over 250 hours of highway interdiction training, founded his department’s interdiction team,
and taught criminal interdiction nationally. (/d., 9:23, 10:2, 13:11). He also has on the ground, practical
experience in observing human behavior in the course of making over 7,000 traffic stops, (7d., 14:15).

* Doc. 30 refers to Sergeant Kilpela’s body-camera footage. The Court notes that while the body-camera
footage was not played at the evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion, it is an exhibit in the record.
Citations to this exhibit include internal timestamps indicating the point at which the cited conduct
occurs.

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 3 of 28

she lost the rental contract. (Doc. 30 at 2:28:37-2:29:22; Doc. 29 at 3; Doc. 36

at 3), Sergeant Kilpela informed Ms. Conchas that he could retrieve the rental
contract information on his computer and asked her to retrieve her driver’s license
and accompany him to his patrol car. (Doc. 30 at 2:29:30-2:29:50). Sergeant
Kilpela told her “As long as everything checks out, I’ll give you a warning, but you
gotta make sure to stay in one lane.” (/d. at 2:29:34—-2:29:39), While speaking
with Ms. Conchas, Sergeant Kilpela looked at the interior of the rental car and
observed multiple empty energy drinks, a purse, and a second small handbag in the
cabin of the vehicle. (Doc. 35-1 at 3).

Sergeant Kilpela testified that he often asks drivers to come to his patrol car
so that he can fill out the warning or citation on his computer, rather than make
multiple trips back and forth. (Hearing Transcript, 23:19-24:8). He further
testified that during every traffic stop, as a standard practice, he will check the
vehicle’s license plate, insurance, and registration. (/d. at 24:12—24:13), Ifitisa
fleet vehicle, then he will additionally check the vehicle identification number
(“VIN”). Ud. at 24:14, 31:22-31:24). Sergeant Kilpela explained that he does this
because fleet vehicles often get paired with the wrong license plate. Ud. at 32:7-
32:8). Thus, the VIN represents the true identity of the vehicle, rather than a
potentially mismatched license plate. Ud. at 32:17-32:18). Lastly, he will check if

the driver has any outstanding warrants, determine whether their license is valid,

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 4of 28

and confirm that all of the information on the license is up to date. (/d. at 24:14—
24:18).

Before getting to the patrol car, Sergeant Kilpela stood behind the rental car
and asked that Ms. Conchas give him her driver’s license. (Doc. 30 at 2:30:22).
While she attempted to remove her driver’s license from her wallet, he asked her
what happened to the rental contract. Vd. at 2:30:24-2:30:28). She responded, “I
honestly lost it... I don’t know what happened to it.” Ud. at 2:30:28~-2:30:33). He
asked her how much further she had to go, and she said that she was driving to
Rockford, Illinois, where she lived. (/d. at 2:30:32—2:30:42), Sergeant Kilpela
then asked where she said she was coming from; Ms. Conchas responded, “L.A.”
(id, at 2:30:41—2:30:44). Sergeant Kilpela noticed that Ms. Conchas was unable to
get her driver’s license out of her wallet, and he began to assist her. (/d. at
2:30:48).

Noting that Billings is not on the route from Los Angeles to Illinois,
Sergeant Kilpela asked why she was coming through Montana. (/d. at 2:30:53-
2:31:00). Ms. Conchas responded, “Well, this is the route it took me.” (/d. at
2:3 1:03-2:31:06). Sergeant Kilpela asked incredulously, “To go from L.A. to
Rockford?” (/d. at 2:31:07). Ms. Conchas then clarified that she was actually
coming from Sacramento, California, and asked whether Sacramento and Los

Angeles were the same place. (/d. at 2:31:10—2:31:22; Doc 35-1 at 3). Because

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page5of 28

Los Angeles and Sacramento are in different regions of California, and because
Billings is not on the route to Illinois from either location, Sergeant Kilpela
became suspicious that she was either lost or being deceptive about the nature of
her trip. (Doc. 35-1 at 3).

Meanwhile, Sergeant Kilpela was unable to get the Defendant’s driver’s
license out of her wallet, so he asked her to get in the passenger seat of his patrol
car while she continued to try to remove the license. (Doc. 30 at 2:3 1:27-2:3 1:33).
As they got in the patrol car, Sergeant Kilpela confirmed that Ms. Conchas rented
the vehicle from Enterprise in Los Angeles, rather than Sacramento, and began to
do a search for the electronic record of the rental contract on his computer. (/d. at
2:31:57-2:32:03). Sergeant Kilpela commented that she should be on Interstate 80
if she was traveling from Los Angeles to Chicago, (/d. at 2:32:21—2:32:34).

Ms. Conchas did not respond to this comment. (V/d.). At this point, Ms. Conchas
was finally able to produce her driver’s license to Sergeant Kilpela, which took
two minutes and twenty seconds from the point of his initial request. (/d. at
2:32:40), Ms. Conchas confirmed for Sergeant Kilpela that she picked up the
rental car on October 23, a mere two days earlier, and then drove with her cousin
from Los Angeles to Sacramento to attend a funeral. (/d@. at 2:32:53-2:33:05).

While Sergeant Kilpela entered her license information into his computer, he

asked Ms. Conchas more about the funeral and her travels and she noted that the

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 6 of 28

funeral was the previous day. (/@. at 2:34:04--2:35:10; Hearing Transcript, 25:15—
25:18). He asked why she did not fly home, and she responded that she thought it
would be better to drive. (Doc. 30 at 2:35:31—2:35:40). Sergeant Kilpela asked
whether she had a job that she had to get back to, and Ms. Conchas responded that
she was not working at the moment. (/d. at 2:35:39-2:35:47).

Sergeant Kilpela asked Ms. Conchas to verify her address and middle name
and whether she had any tickets or arrests. (/d. at 2:35:43—2:36:10). He then
contacted dispatch and requested “Triple-I” and El Paso Intelligence Center
(“EPIC”) checks. (Ud. at 2:36:20).

Sergeant Kilpela asked Ms. Conchas if she drove through the night. (/d. at
2:37:35-2:37:41).3 She responded that she had stopped once for about two hours.
(id. at 2:37:58). Sergeant Kilpela continued typing on his computer and asked
Ms. Conchas about the last time she worked. (/d. at 2:38:45). She answered,
“about a month ago.” (Ud. at 2:38:48). He asked her how much it would have cost
to fly home; she responded that the flight would have been $512, while the rental
car was $437. Ud. at 2:39:36-2:39:48), Sergeant Kilpela asked if she planned to

stop anywhere or knew anyone in the area. (/d. at 2:39:58-2:40:08). Ms. Conchas

* The government asserts that Ms. Conchas claimed to have begun her drive at midnight (Doc. 36 at 5),
but the audio in the record is not clear on this point.

6

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 7 of 28

shook her head no. (/d. at 2:40:10). She claimed that her GPS routed her through
Montana. (/d. at 2:40:18).

Sergeant Kilpela noted to himself that Ms. Conchas was not dressed in
funeral clothing, and that when he first approached Ms. Conchas’s vehicle, he only
noticed a small bag in the cabin of the rental car. (Doc. 35-1 at 4). Sergeant
Kilpela asked Ms. Conchas if she had luggage in the trunk. (/d. at 2:40:59-
2:41:06). Ms. Conchas denied that she did and noted that she had not accessed the
trunk of the car. (/d. at 2:41:01—2:41:06).

During this conversation, Sergeant Kilpela could not locate Defendant’s
rental contract with Enterprise online. (Doc. 35-1 at 4). However, he was able to
pull up an Enterprise contract under her name from April 2024 that indicated she
rented a car in Beloit, Wisconsin, and returned it to Logan International Airport in
Boston, Massachusetts.’ (/d.). When Sergeant Kilpela asked her about this rental,
she recalled renting it but could not remember where she went with the car.

(Doc. 30 at 2:41:53-2:42:10). When he explained that she dropped it off in
Boston, Ms. Conchas thought for a moment and said, “I’ve rented in Phoenix.”

Ud, at 2:42:10—2:42:23).

‘The information obtained from Enterprise confirmed that Ms. Conchas rented the car for a total of 24
hours and drove 1,106 miles beginning at 9:46 a.m. on April 29th and concluding at 9:57 a.m. on April
30th. (Doc. 35-1 at 8-9). Ms. Conchas drove through the night on this occasion as well.

7

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 8 of 28

Sergeant Kilpela testified that in his experience rental cars are popular for
drug smuggling because they are not tied to a certain individual, making them
difficult to surveil or track. (Hearing Transcript, 30:19-31:5). Additionally, drug
couriers do not run the risk of their vehicle being seized or forfeited because the
vehicles do not belong to them. (7d. at 59:8-59:10). Consequently, when Sergeant
Kilpela learned that Ms. Conchas had rented different vehicles in different cities
across the country and returned them with high mileage for the rental period, he
became suspicious that Ms. Conchas was involved in criminal activity. (Ud. at
31:5—31:11).

Having been unable to find information for her current contract with
Enterprise, Sergeant Kilpela got out of his patrol car and walked back to her rental
vehicle to retrieve the VIN. (Doc. 30 at 2:42:45—2:43:22), When he came back to
the patrol car, Ms. Conchas revealed that she had a text message from the rental car
company which advised that she received the wrong vehicle. (/d. at 2:43:23-
2:43:55). She offered to show him the message. (/d.).° Sergeant Kilpela did not
respond to her offer but verified that he was giving her a warning for driving over

the centerline, cautioned her not to drive while tired, and handed her the warning.

*Ms. Conchas contends that her seizure could have been briefer if Sergeant Kilpela would have accepted
her offer to provide information received by e-mail from Enterprise. It is unclear whether the e-mail
would have included the information that he needed, but the timing of her disclosure undermines the
contention, The first time that she mentioned the existence of the e-mail coincided with the completion of
the mission of the stop, so the length of the stop would not have been shorter had Sergeant Kilpela
reviewed the e-mail.

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 9 of 28

(Ud. at 2:43:55-2:44:39), In total, it took approximately 17 minutes from the time
Sergeant Kilpela pulled Ms. Conchas over to issue her the traffic warning.

Sergeant Kilpela retained the Defendant’s driver’s license and explained to
her that it was his job to make sure that nothing illegal crossed into Montana, (/d.
at 2:44:39-2:44:59). He asked whether the car contained anything illegal, and
Ms. Conchas said no. (/d. at 2:44:59-2:45:03). She confirmed that she was
responsible for everything in the car. (fd. at 2:45:05). Sergeant Kilpela then asked
if Ms. Conchas had any issue with him searching the car. (/d. at 2:45:09-2:45:13).
She shook her head and said “nuh-uh,” indicating that she did not. (/d.). At this
point, Sergeant Kilpela handed Ms. Conchas her license back and printed a waiver
titled “Montana Highway Patrol—Permission to Search and Seize.” (Doc. 35-1 at
7).

Sergeant Kilpela showed Ms. Conchas the waiver and explained that her
signature would confirm her authorization for him to search her vehicle and seize
any contraband found. (Doc. 30 at 2:46:36~2:46:45). Ms. Conchas took the
waiver, read it over for about 20 seconds, and signed it. (Ud. at 2:46:45—2:47:19).
The one-page waiver contained the following language:

The undersigned, does hereby voluntarily authorize SGT BARRY

KILPELA and other officers that may be designated to assist them, to

search my person and any vehicle... Iam giving this written

permission to these officers freely and voluntarily, without any threats
or promises having been made, and after having been informed by said

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 10 of 28

officer that I have a right to refuse this search and or seizure, and to
stop such search at any time.

(Doc. 35-1 at 7).° Sergeant Kilpela told Ms. Conchas he was going to start
searching her vehicle “with her consent” and if she needed him to stop or had a
question for him, she could honk the horn. (Doc. 30 at 2:47:34-2:47:48), As
Sergeant Kilpela got out of the patrol car, dispatch informed him that Ms. Conchas
did not have a criminal history in their system, nor did she have any warrants in her
name. (Hearing Transcript, 26:18-26:23).

Sergeant Kilpela’s search uncovered 16 vacuum-sealed packages hidden
beneath the trunk’s carpet lining. (Doc. 35-1 at 5). Believing the packages to be
narcotics, he returned to the patrol car and arrested Ms. Conchas. (Doc. 30 at
3:01:58). Sergeant Kilpela advised Ms. Conchas of her Miranda rights, and she
verbally indicated that she understood. (/d. at 3:01:57—-3:02:13),

Montana Highway Patrol Sergeant Josh French arrived at the scene of the
stop following the arrest of Ms. Conchas and assisted in the remainder of the
search, which ultimately yielded approximately six kilograms of heroin,

four kilograms of powdered fentanyl, and two cell phones. (/d.; Doc. 36 at 6).

5 Following issuance of the warning, it took 34 seconds for Sergeant Kilpela to request and receive her
verbal consent to search. It took an additional 2 minutes and 6 seconds for Ms. Conchas to sign the
waiver,

10

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 11 of 28

Il. Legal Standard

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection extends to all forms of seizure,
including brief detentions that fall short of a formal arrest, such as a traffic stop.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed
that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014). The reasonableness of a seizure
“depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878,

In order to effectuate the Fourth Amendment’s protection, defendants have
the right to have any evidence secured by means of an unlawful search and seizure
excluded from trial, upon motion and proof. Simmons v. United States, 390 US.
377, 389 (1968) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)); Fed. R.
Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C). Characterized as “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence
seized as a result of an unlawful search or seizure is subject to exclusion unless it
has been sufficiently “purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States,

371 U.S. 471, 485-88 (1963). A defendant has the ultimate burden of proof on a

I]

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 12 of 28

Fourth Amendment motion to suppress. United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196,
1199 (9th Cir. 2005).
If. Discussion

At the outset, Ms. Conchas appears to concede—and the Court agrees—that
the initial traffic stop was lawful. (Doc. 29 at 15). By stating that their interaction
reached a point at which the mission of the stop was complete, Ms. Conchas does
not appear to take issue with the legal viability of the stop. Ud). Sergeant
Kilpela’s observations of Ms. Conchas driving in the middle of the roadway and
crossing the centerline—a violation of Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-328(1)—provided
sufficient justification for a lawful traffic stop. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 (“[T]he
decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause
to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”).

Given the legitimacy of the initial stop, the Court turns to the remaining
issues: whether the stop was unlawfully prolonged and whether the subsequent

search was supported by voluntary and intelligent consent.’

The parties stake out different positions on the question of whether the consent to search the vehicle by
Ms. Conchas provides a basis to deny the motion to suppress. The United States argues that the Court
should deny the motion because an officer may request consent to search at any time after a lawful traffic
stop has been initiated with or without reasonable suspicion even though the stop was prolonged while the
consent to search was requested and obtained, (Doc. 36 at 9; Hearing Transcript, 71:15-—71:25),
However, Ms. Conchas asserts that the time it took for Sergeant Kilpela to request and receive her
consent to search unlawfully prolonged the search after the mission of the stop had concluded. The
Defendant also suggests that the analysis of the legal viability of the search might be different if Sergeant
Kilpela sought her consent to search earlier in their interaction, (Doc. 29 at 21). The Court does not
reach these questions based upon its holding that Sergeant Kilpela’s actions did not unlawfully prolong
the seizure of the Defendant and that he had reasonable suspicion to suspect the occurrence of a separate
offense by the time he sought and received her consent to search the vehicle.

12

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 13 of 28

A. Duration of the Stop

A traffie stop “can only last as long as is reasonably necessary to carry out
the ‘mission’ of the stop, unless police have an independent reason to detain the
motorist longer.” United States v. Gorman, 859 F.3d 706, 714 (9th Cir, 2017).
The “mission” of a traffic stop includes determining whether to issue a traffic
ticket and “ordinary inquiries incident to the stop.” Rodriguez v. United States,
575 U.S, 348, 355 (2015); see also United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 868
(9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2015). These
inquiries include “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s
registration and proof of insurance.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. Police may
order the driver to exit the vehicle, request identification, and ask questions about
travel without exceeding the scope of a traffic stop. Jd. at 356. In short, “[w]hen
the police pull someone over for a traffic violation, the officer can obviously
investigate that traffic infraction.” United States v. Ramirez, 98 F.4th 1141, 1143-
44 (9th Cir, 2024),

If a stop exceeds the time needed to “handle the matter for which the stop
was made,” then it violates the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350.
“Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or

reasonably should have been—completed.” /d. at 354. There is no “de minimis”

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 14 of 28

exception; any time added to a traffic stop that is unrelated to the mission is
unlawful. Landeros, 913 F.3d at 867. Even so, police “may conduct certain
unrelated checks” during a traffic stop, but they “may not do so in a way that
prolongs the stop absent reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify
detaining an individual.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. The Fourth Amendment
thus tolerates investigations unrelated to the purpose of the stop, as long as it is
done “within the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s mission.”
Gorman, 859 F.3d at 715 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355) (emphasis in
original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101
(2005) (no additional Fourth Amendment justification was required because the
unrelated inquiries did not extend the length of the detention). The critical
question is whether the check “prolongs—i.e. adds time to—the stop.” Rodriguez,
575 U.S. at 357.

Nevertheless, if police have reasonable suspicion of an independent offense,
the traffic stop may be extended to investigate those matters. Landeros, 913 F.3d
at 867. “Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific,
articulable facts which, when considered with objective and reasonable inferences,
form a basis for particularized suspicion.” Jd. at 868 (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis in original). This determination is based on the totality of

circumstances, with appropriate deference to the inferences drawn by the officer on

i4

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 15 of 28

the scene. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); United States v.
Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1077-79 (9th Cir, 2013) (en banc).

Reasonable suspicion “is not a particularly high threshold to reach and is
less than probable cause or a preponderance of evidence.” United States v. Taylor,
60 F.4th 1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Despite the low threshold, reasonable suspicion cannot be based on “prefabricated
or recycled profile[s] of specific behavior very likely to sweep many citizens into a
generality of suspicious appearance merely by a hunch.” United States v.
Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96 (9th Cir, 1992). However, officers may make
“commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior,” and “draw on
their own experience and specialized training to arrive at conclusions that might
well elude an untrained person.” Taylor, 60 F.4th at 1241 (internal quotations and
citations omitted),

Here, the traffic stop’s mission concluded after 17 minutes when Sergeant
Kilpela issued Ms. Conchas the warning. Applying these rules, the Court
concludes that: (1) all of the actions taken by Sergeant Kilpela up until that point
were within the stop’s legitimate mission and did not prolong it; and (2) by the
time the stop’s mission concluded, Sergeant Kilpela had formed a reasonable

suspicion of an independent offense to extend their interaction and her seizure

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 16 of 28

sufficient to justify prolonging the stop long enough to request for consent to
search her vehicle.
1. Mission of the Stop

To support her argument that the mission of the stop was unlawfully
prolonged, Ms. Conchas argues that Sergeant Kilpela’s EPIC check lacked
reasonable suspicion and “exacerbate[ed] the unconstitutional nature of the
encounter.” (Doc. 29 at 18). Supporting her assertion that an EPIC check is “an
unrelated inquiry that requires reasonable suspicion,” Ms. Conchas cites to United
States v. Funk, CR 22-121-BLG-SPW, 2023 WL 4268900 (D. Mont. June 29,
2023) and Gorman, 859 F.3d at 711. (Doc. 29 at 18). However, her analysis is
incomplete.

Consistent with Landeros and the prevailing case law, Gorman clarifies that
independent reasonable suspicion is required only if the officer’s unrelated
inquiries actually prolong or add time to the stop. 859 F.3d at 715. In Gorman, the
officer conducted a routine records and criminal history check as part of a traffic
stop. 7d, at 711. Upon learning that Gorman had no prior arrests and no
outstanding warrants, he requested an EPIC check. Jd. The Ninth Circuit
determined that because nothing in the officer’s initial questioning of Gorman

provided independent reasonable suspicion, and because the EPIC check added

16

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 17 of 28

time to the stop beyond what was necessary to for the stop’s mission, the additional
search violated the Fourth Amendment. /d. at 715.

Likewise, in Funk, the Court found that the mission of the traffic stop
concluded after the officer received the results of the criminal history check and
validated his information. 2023 WL 4268900, at *5. Thus, when the officer
conducted an EPIC check after the initial criminal history check, without
independent reasonable suspicion, it unlawfully prolonged the stop. Jd. at *6.

Here, Sergeant Kilpela’s request for an EPIC check did not prolong or add
time to the stop. At the time Sergeant Kilpela requested dispatch to conduct an
EPIC check and routine criminal history check, he was actively searching for the
rental contract. It is unquestionably within the mission of a traffic stop for an
officer to check a vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance. See Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 355. Likewise, a criminal history check “stems from the mission of the
stop itself’ and does not need to be supported by independent reasonable suspicion.
Taylor, 60 F.4th at 1241 (citing United States v. Hylton, 30 F 4th 842, 848 (9th Cir.
2022)). The request for the EPIC check did not add time to the stop because
during the pendency of the request, Sergeant Kilpela was attempting to verify the
Defendant’s entitlement to drive the vehicle through verification of the existence of
arental agreement. Unfortunately for Ms. Conchas, the time necessary for the

“ordinary inquiries” during the mission of a traffic stop contemplated in Rodriguez

17

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 18 of 28

took longer than usual because Ms. Conchas misplaced the rental car contract and
Sergeant Kilpela could not locate information on the rental car through electronic
searching. During that time, Sergeant Kilpela was able to learn where
Ms. Conchas was going, where she caine from, and form independent reasonable
suspicion based on his observations and her answers. Therefore, in accordance
with Rodriguez, the EPIC check does not need to be supported by reasonable
suspicion.
2. Request for Consent

Ms. Conchas next argues that Sergeant Kilpela’s request for consent to
search her vehicle and the subsequent search unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop.
The mission of the stop was completed when Sergeant Kilpela issued the traffic
warning, Thus, pursuant to Rodriguez, any action thereafter that prolongs the
traffic stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion to avoid violating the
Fourth Amendment. By the time Sergeant Kilpela issued the traffic warning, he
had formed sufficient independent reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking to
prolong the stop to ask Ms. Conchas for consent to search her vehicle and receive
consent.

Through the exhibits admitted at the evidentiary hearing and Sergeant
Kilpela’s testimony, the government points to several factors that it posits led

Sergeant Kilpela to develop reasonable suspicion. First, Ms. Conchas was driving

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 19 of 28

a rental vehicle, and they are commonly used to transport illegal drugs. Sergeant
Kilpela testified that rental vehicles are popular for drug smuggling because they
are difficult to track and surveil, given they are not attached to a certain individual.
(Hearing Transcript, 30:19-31:5). Additionally, individuals engaged in drug
trafficking do not run the risk of their vehicles being seized or forfeited because the
rental vehicles do not belong to them. (/d. at 59:8-59:10).

Second, Ms. Conchas provided conflicting and suspicious information about
her trip. Initially, Ms. Conchas told Sergeant Kilpela that she was driving from
Los Angeles to Rockford. When Sergeant Kilpela asked why she would be
coming through Montana, she said that she was actually coming from Sacramento
where she attended a funeral. Ms. Conchas then asked if Sacramento and Los
Angeles were the same place. Sergeant Kilpela testified that Los Angeles and
Sacramento are at least five hours apart. (/d. at 22:11). Sergeant Kilpela flagged
the response as suspicious, noting it was unlikely that Ms, Conchas—having
purportedly completed the drive just two days prior—would be unaware of the
significant distance between the two cities. He noted in his report and testified at
the hearing that this was the point where he became suspicious that she was either
lost or lying. (Doc. 35-1 at 15; Hearing Transcript, 22:20-22:22), Additionally,
the Defendant’s inability to explain why she was off-route, apart from blaming her

GPS, contributed to further suspicion. Sergeant Kilpela testified that if

19

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 20 of 28

Ms. Conchas was traveling to Illinois, she was at least five or six hours off-route
and continuing even further off-route if she were to stay on Interstate 94. (Hearing
Transcript, 22:12-22:16). Sergeant Kilpela testified that based on his experience
in interdicting drugs, she may have been off-route because she was asked to make
a drop, or she was attempting to avoid law enforcement by driving through less
populated areas with a smaller law enforcement presence. (/d. at 58:5—60:3).

Third, Ms. Conchas was not wearing funeral attire and had no luggage with
her, despite claiming to have flown from Chicago to Los Angeles, rented a car to
drive from Los Angeles to Sacramento, and attended a funeral in Sacramento
before driving to Rockford, via Billings, which would have required more than
2,200 miles in the vehicle. When Sergeant Kilpela asked if she had anything in the
trunk, she said she did not and had not even been in the trunk. This was
additionally suspicious to Sergeant Kilpela because her lack of luggage indicated
that Ms. Conchas was trying to drive a long distance with minimal stops, a habit
common among drug couriers. (Doc. 36 at 14; see also Doc. 35-1 at 15).

Fourth, Ms. Conchas did not have a plausible reason for driving back to
Illinois, rather than flying, and appeared to Sergeant Kilpela to be deceptive in her
explanation. Sergeant Kilpela testified that in his experience, when individuals are
being deceptive, they will create a “think space.” (Hearing Transcript, 28:16). He

explained that individuals will ask him to repeat a question or restate the question

20

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 21 of 28

back to him in an attempt to create more time to come up with a response. (/d.).
Sergeant Kilpela found it suspicious when Ms. Conchas said, “Huh?,” repeated his
question back to him, and then did not come up with a logical answer. (/d. at
28:13-29:10). Additionally, Sergeant Kilpela pointed out that although Ms.
Conchas said it was cheaper to drive back, by the time the cost of gas is factored
into the numbers she provided, driving a rental car home was not cheaper.
(Hearing Transcript, 57:18-57:21).

Lastly, from his electronic searches of Enterprise records, Sergeant Kilpela
found several car rental contracts under Defendant’s name from earlier in the year.
When Sergeant Kilpela asked her about a car she rented in Beloit, Wisconsin, and
returned to Logan International Airport in Boston—a trip of 1,106 miles within a
twenty-four hour period—Ms. Conchas claimed that she could not remember
where she went with the car. Sergeant Kilpela thought it was suspicious to put a
significant number of miles on a rental car in twenty-four hours but be incapable of
remembering where she went. (/d. at 31:12-31:18; see also Doc. 35-1 at 9). To
Sergeant Kilpela, this further supported his suspicion that she was transporting
drugs as it is common to rent vehicles in different cities across the country for short
periods of time and return them with high numbers of miles driven. (Hearing

Transcript, at 31:6-31:11).

2]

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 22 of 28

Any one of these factors, standing alone, would be insufficient to support
reasonable suspicion. In isolation, no single fact is dispositive of wrongdoing.
However, when they are considered together, as required by the totality of the
circumstances test, reasonable suspicion is met. Specifically, it was reasonable
that Sergeant Kilpela suspected Ms. Conchas was trafficking narcotics. Thus,
although the mission of the traffic stop had concluded when Sergeant Kilpela
requested her consent to search the vehicle, it did not violate the Fourth
Amendment to extend the seizure.

B. Consent to the Search

“Tt is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable. . .
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
A search conducted pursuant to consent is one of the specifically established
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirement. /d. However, consent
must be voluntary, unequivocal, and specific. Taylor, 60 F.4th at 1242-43 (internal
citations and quotations omitted),

1, Voluntariness
Whether consent was given voluntarily is analyzed based on the totality of

the circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. Additionally, it is the

22

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 23 of 28

government’s burden to prove that consent was freely and voluntarily given.
United States v. Rodriguez, 464 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court will
focus on five non-exclusive factors: “(1) whether the defendant was in custody;
(2) whether the arresting officers had their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda
warnings were given; (4) whether the defendant was notified that they had a right
not to consent; and (5) whether the defendant had been told a search warrant could
be obtained.” Taylor, 60 F.4th at 1243 (internal citations omitted).

No single factor is determinative of voluntariness. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
232-33. Rather, “if under all the circumstances, it has appeared that the consent
was not given voluntarily—that it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only
in submission to a claim of lawful authority,” then the consent is invalid, and the
search is unreasonable. /d. at 233. It weighs in favor of a finding of that a
defendant’s will was not overborne, and that the consent was voluntary, if the
interaction is “calm” and “friendly.” Tay/or, 60 F.4th at 1243.

a. In Custody

Ms. Conchas asserts that she was “in custody for the purpose of evaluating
whether she provided lawful consent.” (Doc. 29 at 22). However, Ms. Conchas
conflates “custody” for purposes of Miranda, and “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment. A person is “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if

a reasonable person in their circumstances would not have felt free to terminate the

23

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 24 of 28

encounter and leave. United States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 775 (9th Cir.
2007). And while the Supreme Court has defined “custody” for purposes of
triggering Miranda protections in a similar manner, it has clarified that “a person
detained as a result of a traffic stop is not in Miranda custody.” Howes v. Fields,
565 U.S. 499, 510 (2012) (internal citations omitted); see also Maryland v.
Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 (the “temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention
involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody.”).
While Ms. Conchas was seized at the time Sergeant Kilpela requested
consent to search her vehicle, she was not in custody. Ms. Conchas was sitting in
Sergeant Kilpela’s patrol car, in the front seat, and not handcuffed or restrained.
The fact that Ms. Conchas was not in custody at the time Sergeant Kilpela
requested consent weighs in favor of the conclusion that her consent was given
voluntarily.
b, Guns Drawn
Sergeant Kilpela never drew his gun or otherwise displayed it in a
threatening manner, (Doc. 30). This too weighs in favor of the conclusion that her
consent was given voluntarily.
C. Miranda Warning
Because Ms. Conchas was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, Sergeant

Kilpela was not required to provide Miranda warnings. See United States v. Ritter,

24

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 25 of 28

752 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1985) (“It would ... make little sense to require that
Miranda warnings, which advise one of the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel, be given by police before requesting consent.”). This factor neither
weighs in favor of a finding of voluntariness nor against it.
d. _— Notified of the Right to Refuse Consent

“Knowledge of the right to refuse consent is highly relevant in determining
whether consent is valid.” United States v. Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 504 (9th Cir.
2004) (internal citations omitted). However, in Schneckloth, the Supreme Court
refused to require the government to prove the defendant had knowledge of their
right to refuse consent as a prerequisite showing of voluntariness. 412 U.S. at 232-
33 (“[N]either this Court’s prior cases, nor the traditional definition of
‘voluntariness’ requires proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non
of an effective consent to search.”). Rather, the Court held that it must analyze all
the circumstances, in a “careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of
each case.” Id. at 233; see also Taylor, 60 F.4th at 1243 (finding Taylor’s consent
to be given voluntarily despite no direct proof that Taylor knew he had the right to
refuse to consent).

Here, Ms. Conchas was notified of her right to refuse to consent. While she
was not verbally told she had the right to refuse, she read and signed a waiver that

gave her actual notice. The waiver stated, “I am giving this written permission to

25

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 26 of 28

these officers .. . after having been informed by said officer that I have a right to
refuse this search and or seizure, and to stop such search at any time.” (Doc. 35-1
at 7). Likewise, Sergeant Kilpela told Ms. Conchas to honk the patrol car’s horn if
she wanted him to stop searching her vehicle, a clear indication of her right to
withdraw consent that she had just granted. This too weighs in favor of the
conclusion that her consent was given voluntarily.

é. Told That a Search Warrant Could be Obtained

Any threat that a search warrant could be obtained if an individual does not
consent to a search weighs against a finding of voluntariness. See Taylor, 60 F.4th
at 1243. Here, Sergeant Kilpela did not make any suggestion that he could obtain a
search warrant in the absence of Defendant’s consent. This fact weighs in favor of
the conclusion that her consent was given voluntarily.

In sum, at the time Ms. Conchas gave Sergeant Kilpela consent to search her
vehicle, she was not in custody and therefore did not need Miranda warnings,
Sergeant Kilpela’s gun was not drawn, she was notified of her right to refuse and
withdraw consent, and she was not told that a search warrant could be obtained
regardless of her consent. All of these factors, analyzed together, clearly indicate

that her will was not overborne and her consent was given voluntarily.

26

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 27 of 28

2. Unequivocal and Specific

“A suspect may unequivocally and specifically consent by giving express
permission, or consent can be inferred from conduct, such as a head nod.” Taylor,
60 F.4th at 1243 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Ultimately, the test
‘is that of objective reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person
have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?’” /d. at
1243-44 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).

In Taylor, the defendant’s consent to search was held unequivocal and
specific when Taylor responded to the officer’s request for consent with, “it don’t
matter to me.” 60 F.4th at 1244. The Ninth Circuit determined that “in context, a
reasonable person would have understood Taylor to be consenting to a search of
the car.” Id.

Here, Ms. Conchas gave express consent to Sergeant Kilpela to search her
car. Her consent was even more unequivocal and specific than in Taylor.

Ms. Conchas verbally indicated that she did not have an issue with him searching
the car, read the written waiver which clearly indicated that she was consenting to
a search and seizure of any contraband discovered, and signed the consent form.
A reasonable person would understand these facts to indicate that Ms. Conchas

was consenting to a search of her car.

27

Case 1:25-cr-00047-WWM Document 43 Filed 01/27/26 Page 28 of 28

Accordingly, Defendant’s consent was given voluntarily, unequivocally, and
specifically. Sergeant Kilpela’s search of Defendant’s vehicle was valid under the
consent exception to the warrant requirement.

IV. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
(Doc. 29) is DENIED.

The Clerk of Court is directed to notify the parties of the making of this
Order.

DATED this 27th day of January, 2

WILLIAM W. MERCER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

28

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.