Bird v. United States of America

1:23-cv-00148Mtd10 feb 2026

Testo completo

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION
Plaintiffs Kaneisha Bird and her son O.M. (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action
against the United States alleging claims for negligence, negligence per se, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The case arises from an incident wherein
O.M. was struck by a vehicle driven by a Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) officer
on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation during the 2022 Northern Cheyenne
Chief’s Powwow.
Judge Watters has referred the case to the undersigned under 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B). (Doc. 11.) Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 45), and the United States’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 51). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for the Court’s review.
Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court RECOMMENDS
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED in part and DENIED
KANEISHA BIRD; O.M. (a minor),
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
acting by and through the Bureau of
Indian Affairs,
Defendant.
CV 23-148-BLG-SPW-TJC
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF
UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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in part, and the United States’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be
GRANTED, as set forth below.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
The Northern Cheyenne Chief’s Powwow is an annual multi-day community
event held at the Kenneth Beartusk Memorial Powwow Grounds, located
approximately five miles south of Lame Deer, Montana. In 2022, the Powwow
was scheduled from Thursday, June 30, through Tuesday, July 5. The event draws
large crowds of tourists, families, and tribal members, and includes activities such
as a rodeo, hand game tournament, 1-mile walk/5k run, peewee basketball and
volleyball tournaments, and a kids’ parade.
The BIA Northern Cheyenne Police Department traditionally provides law
enforcement services at the Powwow, including traffic control, crowd
management, and community policing. The Powwow is one of the busiest
weekends of the year on the Reservation, and it requires additional BIA staffing to
cover both the event as well as regular patrol duties.
On Friday, July 1, 2022, Plaintiffs arrived at the Powwow at approximately
6:00 p.m. Kaneisha testified that they planned to camp overnight in a tent on the
powwow grounds. O.M. was three years old at the time.
1 The background facts set forth here are relevant to the Court’s determination of
the pending motions and are taken from the parties’ submissions.
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BIA Officer Richard Selva was scheduled to work the night shift on July 1,
2022, from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the following morning. After beginning his
shift, he drove to the Powwow grounds sometime between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m.
Officer Selva was driving a BIA-owned, 2021 Chevrolet Silverado pickup that was
equipped with a forward-facing dash camera that recorded the events that evening.
The dash camera video begins with Officer Selva driving down the highway
to the Powwow location. After turning off the highway, Powwow security
personnel opened an access road to allow Officer Selva to drive his BIA vehicle
onto the Powwow grounds. The access road was narrow and was lined with
vehicles on both sides of the roadway for most of its length.
The dash camera video shows Officer Selva encountering several
pedestrians while traveling on the access road. Officer Selva first passed two
unaccompanied children walking along the road. He then encountered three more
children walking down the center of the road. The three children moved to the
right, and Officer Selva passed them.
During this time frame, O.M. first became visible on the dash camera video.
He was standing ahead of the BIA vehicle near a square fabric tent several feet to
the right side of the access road.
As Officer Selva continued driving forward, an adult woman stepped onto
the left side of the access road in front of his vehicle, with another adult walking on
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the same side of the road in the opposite direction. Officer Selva steered slightly
right to navigate around these pedestrians.
During this time, O.M. began running away from the tent toward the access
road. At least initially, O.M. remained visible on the dash camera video in front,
and to the right of the patrol vehicle. O.M. then passed behind a parked Cadillac
automobile on the right side of the road for approximately 2 seconds. When O.M.
emerged from behind the Cadillac, he can again be seen on the dash camera video
moving toward the access road in front, and to the right of Officer Selva’s patrol
vehicle. As he approached the roadway, O.M. briefly paused before moving onto
the roadway in the path of Officer Silva’s vehicle.
Officer Silva hit O.M. with the front of his patrol vehicle, driving over O.M.
with both the front and rear right-side tires. Officer Selva stopped the vehicle
approximately three seconds after the initial impact when he felt two bumps from
his vehicle’s right tires driving over O.M.’s body.
O.M.’s mother, Kaneisha is visible on the dash camera video in the
background with her other child. Kaneisha turned and witnessed the vehicle strike
O.M. with its front grill guard, and then continue forward, running over O.M.
Kaneisha immediately picked up O.M. and carried him to the EMT tent. O.M. was
bleeding from his head, and his clothing had to be cut away to assess his lower
body injuries. Due to the unavailability of a helicopter, O.M. was transported by
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ambulance to Indian Health Services (“IHS”) in Lame Deer. He was later
transported to another IHS facility in Crow Agency, Montana, and then to a
hospital in Billings, Montana.
Fortunately, O.M. did not sustain life-threatening injuries. Nevertheless,
O.M. was hospitalized for approximately 4 days, and underwent imaging,
treatment, and surgical repair of a laceration to his right groin/thigh. After his
discharge, however, O.M.’s wound became infected, requiring skin graft surgery
and subsequent hospitalization for an additional 16 days.
Officer Selva testified that he was driving around 4-5 miles per hour prior to
the accident, and that he did not see O.M. at any point prior to striking him with his
patrol vehicle. 	He stated that to his best recollection, he was looking at the road
ahead while he was driving. He stated he was not on his cell phone, and he was
not looking at other screens in his vehicle.
Plaintiffs’ expert, Greg Gravesen, provided an expert report opining that the
cause of the collision was Officer Selva’s failure to maintain a proper lookout and
failure to yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian. (Doc. 49-9.) Mr. Gravesen
conducted a frame-by-frame video analysis of the dash camera footage, and
concluded that O.M. was able to be seen from the BIA vehicle for approximately
11.7 seconds before he was struck by the vehicle. (Id. at 4, 6.) He further
concluded that 3.93 seconds elapsed from the point where O.M. reappeared from
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behind the parked Cadillac to impact. (Id. at 4.) Based on this analysis, Mr.
Gravesen stated that “there is nothing that would have prevented the driver of the
Chevrolet from seeing [O.M.] prior to the collision.” (Id.)
Mr. Gravesen further reports that Officer Selva was alerted to the presence
of both pedestrians and children on the service road, and thus he should have
increased his attentiveness for detecting children and driven in a manner consistent
with driving in a school zone. (Id. at 6.) He concluded that Officer Selva’s driving
conduct was not consistent with safe driving practices outlined in the Montana
Driver’s Manual and violated basic visual scanning and hazard detection standards.
(Id.)
The United States’ expert, Carla Werder, provided an expert report in which
she likewise analyzed the dash camera video. (Doc. 49-10 at 5-6.) Ms. Werder
also included information in her report about the BIA vehicle Officer Selva was
driving. (Id. at 6-7.) Ms. Werder reports that the view of the dash camera video
from the BIA vehicle is not the same as the view of the driver of the BIA vehicle.
(Id. at 9.) She explained that the dash camera in the BIA vehicle was mounted to
right of the rearview mirror and was positioned further forward than the driver.
(Id.) She also states that the dash camera’s view was not blocked by A-pillars or
the dashboard of the vehicle. (Id.) In her rebuttal report, Ms. Werder further
explained that a typical dash camera’s field of vision is significantly wider than a
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driver’s field of vision. Doc. 59-1 at 6.) 	Therefore, she concludes that the dash
camera’s field of view, unobstructed by the dash and other interior features, shows
substantially more of the area in front of and to the right of the vehicle, than the
driver’s view. (Id. at 7.) Ms. Werder also said that Officer Selva’s view of O.M.
outside the right front of his vehicle would have been at least partially blocked by
the right A-pillar. (Doc. 49-10 at 9.) She, therefore, concludes that Officer Selva’s
statement that he never saw O.M. before the accident was consistent with his view
of the child being blocked by the A-pillar. (Id.)
Ms. Werder’s also analyzed whether Officer Selva could have avoided the
impact with O.M. (Id.) In this regard, Ms. Werder agreed that Officer Selva
“could have detected the child as soon as the child appeared from behind the
Cadillac.” (Id.) Nevertheless, she does not believe that O.M. became a
“conspicuous hazard” until he either started running toward the access road or until
he crossed onto the road. (Id.) Based on the video analysis, “Driver Response
Time” research and simulation data, and the use of “Interactive Driver Response
Research” software, Ms. Werder concluded that Officer Selva had less than 1
second to perceive the running child as a hazard and begin responding. (Id. at 10-
11.) She opined that this indicates Officer Selva did not have enough time to
perceive and respond to O.M. running onto the road and into the path of his
vehicle. (Id. at 11.)
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With respect to the claim that Officer Selva did not exercise due caution for
pedestrians, Ms. Werder opined that her analysis of the dash camera video shows
Officer Selva was aware of pedestrians and was exercising caution because he
slowed as he passed the pedestrians. (Id. at 9.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome
of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute
as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact-
finder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 	Id.
The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to
the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually
does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). When making this determination, the Court must view all inferences
drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
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party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. “Credibility determinations, the weighing
of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
B. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that Officer
Selva was negligent per se under Montana law; and (2) that O.M., as a three-year-
old child, cannot be found negligent as a matter of law. (Doc. 45.)
The United States counters that the undisputed facts prove Officer Selva was
not negligent per se. But even if Officer Selva was negligence, the United States
argues that Kaneisha’s share of negligence in failing to supervise O.M. was more
than fifty percent, barring Plaintiffs’ recovery. The United States, therefore,
asserts the Court should grant summary judgment in its favor.
1. 	Whether Officer Selva was Negligent Per Se
Plaintiffs argue the undisputed facts demonstrate that O.M. was in plain
view, and Officer Selva was negligent per se for failing to maintain a proper
lookout as required by Montana law and avoid hitting him. Plaintiffs further assert
that Officer Selva was negligent per se for failure to use proper precautions for
pedestrians, including using proper precaution upon observing a child on a
roadway, as required by Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-504.
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The United States counters that Officer Selva exercised due care. The
United States argues that its expert opinion testimony shows Officer Selva had less
than one second to recognize that O.M. was a threat and respond, and therefore, he
was not negligent as a matter of law.
Summary judgment is generally inappropriate in negligence cases because of
the prevalence of factual issues. Peterson v. Eichhorn, 189 P.3d 615, 621 (2008).
“However, summary judgment may be appropriate when reasonable minds ‘could
not draw different conclusions from the evidence.’” Walden v. Yellowstone Elec.
Co., 487 P.3d 1, 6 (2021) (citing Larchick v. Diocese of Great Falls-Billings, 208
P.3d 836, 857 (2009)).
“Negligence per se is simply ‘[n]egligence established as a matter of law,’
and it usually ‘arises from a statutory violation.’” Giambra v. Kelsey, 162 P.3d
134, 144 (Mont. 2007). The effect of negligence per se “is to stamp the
defendant’s conduct as negligence, with all the effects of common law negligence,
but with no greater effect.” Id. Thus, questions such as “the causal relationship
between the violation and the harm to the plaintiff, and in the ordinary case the
defenses of contributory negligence, and assumption of the risk” remain open. Id.
(emphasis in original).
Plaintiffs argue Officer Selva was negligent per se because O.M. was clearly
visible for numerous seconds before impact, and if Officer Selva had maintained a
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proper lookout, he would not have struck O.M. Plaintiffs assert that “[a]nyone
watching the dashcam video will agree that O.M. was readily visible and
detectable as a matter of commons sense.” (Doc. 46 at 15.)
The United States does not dispute that O.M. can be seen on the dash camera
video. The United States contends, however, that the configuration of the BIA
vehicle and dash camera supports its theory that Officer Selva did not see O.M.
until it was too late to respond. The United States cites Ms. Werder’s expert report
that explains the dash camera view is not the same as the driver’s view, and the A-
pillar and dashboard would have obstructed the driver’s view. The United States
also relies on Ms. Werder’s opinion Officer Selva did not have sufficient response
time to avoid striking O.M.
The parties also dispute whether Officer Selva was exercising due care for
pedestrians. Plaintiffs’ expert indicates Officer Selva was on notice that
unaccompanied children were present, which triggered a heightened duty to
anticipate erratic behavior by children, and his failure to yield the right-of-way to
the pedestrian was a direct cause of the collision.
The United States counters with its expert testimony that a time and distance
analysis of the dash camera video shows Officer Selva slowed as he passed the
first pedestrians, indicating he was exercising caution and due care.
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In responding to the United States’ arguments, Plaintiffs argue that the
opinion of the United States’ expert does not create a genuine issue of material
fact. Plaintiffs assert several arguments attacking the credibility of Ms. Werder’s
opinions, such as the fact she did not inspect the BIA vehicle or visit the scene of
the accident, and that she speculates where Officer Selva was looking as he was
driving. The trier of fact may ultimately find these arguments persuasive, but they
go to the weight of the testimony, not to its admissibility.
The trial court acts as a gatekeeper by excluding expert evidence that does
not meet standards of relevance and reliability. Messick v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.,
747 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2014). “The relevancy bar is low, demanding only
that the evidence ‘logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party’s
case.’” Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.
1995)). 	Expert opinion testimony “is reliable if the knowledge underlying it has a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.”
Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court should screen out
“unreliable nonsense opinions, but not exclude opinions merely because they are
impeachable.” Alaska Rent-A-Car Inv. v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 738 F.3d 960,
969 (9th Cir. 2013). “Shaky but admissible evidence is to be attacked by cross
examination, contrary evidence, and attention to the burden of proof, not
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exclusion.” Primiano, 598 F.3d at 564. See also Hangarter v. Provident Life &
Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1017 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2004).
Here, Plaintiffs have not directly sought to exclude the testimony of Ms.
Werder, and the Court cannot conclude based on the record presented that her
proposed testimony does not meet the threshold requirements of relevance and
reliability. Ms. Werder reached her conclusions regarding the accident after
conducting an analysis of the dash camera video, reviewing photographs,
considering an exemplar vehicle, reading official investigation reports and witness
statements, and analyzing the accident using “Driver Response Time” research and
“Interactive Driver Response Research” software. Therefore, whether the factual
basis for Ms. Werder’s opinions is supported by the evidence, and whether the
assumptions she relied upon to form her opinions are valid, are proper subjects for
cross-examination. See Alaska Rent -A-Car Inv., 738 F.3d at 969.
The Court finds this case, like most negligence cases, should be assessed by
the trier of fact. Plaintiffs will offer the dash camera video that provides
compelling evidence as to how this accident occurred. The United States, in turn,
will offer testimony that may provide additional context to the dash camera video –
namely that it does not necessarily reflect the same view that the driver would have
had.
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Additionally, whether the accident could have been avoided is disputed by
the parties’ experts. Plaintiffs’ expert is expected to testify that Officer Selva had
adequate opportunity to see O.M. and avoid striking him if he had kept a proper
lookout, and the United States’ expert will offer the opposite conclusion. These
are factual disputes that are for the trier of fact to resolve. See Wood v. Old
Trapper Taxi, 952 P.2d 1375, 1381 (Mont. 1997) (“Juries have an uncanny ability
to evaluate the credibility of a witness, especially an expert. Problems presented in
a case such as this, namely conflicting expert testimony . . . are best solved by
juries.”) Judge Watters, as the trier of fact, is certainly in the best position to make
those evaluations at trial.
Accordingly, the Court finds there are genuine disputes of material fact as to
whether Officer Selva was negligent per se. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment on the basis of negligence per se should be denied.
2. 	Comparative Negligence of O.M.
Plaintiffs next argue that O.M., as a three-year-old child, is legally incapable
of being held negligent, citing Graham v. Rolandson, 435 P.2d 263, 267 (Mont.
1967) (“It has long been the law of Montana that a child under seven years of age
cannot be contributorily negligent as a matter of law.”). The United States
concedes that O.M. cannot be held comparatively negligent for his own conduct as
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a matter of law. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment should be
granted as to the United States’ defense of comparative negligence as to O.M.
The United States argues, however, that O.M.’s mother, Kaneisha, was more
than fifty percent negligent in failing to supervise and care for O.M. Therefore, the
United States maintains, without explanation, that neither plaintiff can recover
against the United States. It appears that the United States assumes that
Kaneisha’s negligence, if any, will be imputed to O.M. The United States cites no
authority to support that proposition, and it is not an accurate application of
Montana law.
If, as the United States argues, Kaneisha is found to have been negligent, her
recovery will either be proportionately reduced or barred under Montana’s
comparative negligence statute. See Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-702. Additionally,
the apportionment of negligence between Kaneisha and the United States may
determine whether the United States is jointly and severally liable, or only
severally liable, under Montana’s apportionment statute. See Mont. Code Ann. §
27-1-703(2). But there is no provision under either Montana’s comparative
negligence or apportionment statutes that would operate to impute Kaneisha’s
negligence to O.M. Therefore, even if Kaneisha is determined to have been
negligent, her negligence would not preclude recovery by O.M.
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Further, the determination of any negligence on the part of Kaneisha
presents a question for the trier of fact. See Pierce v. ALSC Architects, P.S., 890
P.2d 1254, 1260 (1995) (“[E]ven when a defendant is negligent as a matter of law,
the issue of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff and the degree of
comparative negligence, if any, is normally an issue for the jury or fact finder to
resolve.”); Okland v. Wolf, 258 Mont. 35, 42, 850 P.2d 302, 306-07 (1993)
(holding that “where there was evidence of negligence on the part of both parties, it
was for the fact finder to determine the comparative degree of negligence.”). Here,
the parties have presented evidence of negligence on the part of both Officer Selva
and Kaneisha. The determination of negligence and the apportionment of
negligence should be determined by Judge Watters as the trier of fact.
In sum, the Court finds there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Officer Selva was negligent per se and whether Kaneisha was also
negligent. The parties do not dispute, however, that O.M. may not be negligent
under Montana law. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
should be denied as to Officer Selva’s negligence per se, and granted as to the
contributory negligence of O.M. Further, to the extent the United States requests
summary judgment as the non-moving party, the request should be denied.
/ / /
/ / /
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C. 	The United States’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
The United States moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ standalone
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Count Three of the Second
Amended Complaint. The United States argues the claim fails because there is no
evidence Kaneisha or O.M. experienced the degree of serious or severe emotional
distress necessary to support such a claim.
The seminal case under Montana law establishing an independent cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is Sacco v. High Country Ind.
Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 426 (Mont. 1995). Sacco recognized an independent
cause of action for infliction of emotional distress “under circumstances where
serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or omission[.]” Id. at 426. “To
constitute ‘serious’ or ‘severe,’ the emotional distress must be ‘so severe no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.’” Feller v. First Interstate
Bancsystem, Inc., 299 P.3d 338, 344 (Mont. 2013). The question of whether the
threshold level of emotional distress can be found is for the Court to determine.
Sacco, 896 P.2d at 425 (“It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence
severe [serious] emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine
whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 46, comment j at 78).
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The Montana Supreme Court has pointed to several factors for determining
whether there is sufficient evidence of severe emotional distress, including: (1)
whether the plaintiff had any physical manifestations of emotional distress; (2)
whether counseling was sought or recommended; (3) whether the plaintiff took
medication or the use of medication dramatically increased; (4) whether the
plaintiff had continuous nights of sleeplessness or days without appetite; (5)
whether the plaintiff maintained close relationships with family members and
friends; (6) the intensity and duration of the emotional distress; and (7) the
circumstances under which the infliction incurred, including whether the plaintiff
witnessed a distressing event. Feller, 299 P.3d at 345.
Whether the emotional distress was the reasonably foreseeable consequence
of the defendant’s negligence is determined by considering factors such as: (1) the
closeness of the relationship between the plaintiff and victim; (2) age of the victim;
(3) the severity of the injury to the victim; and (4) whether the plaintiff was a
bystander to the accident. Wages v. First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am., 79 P.3d 1095, 1100
(Mont. 2003). To reach the foreseeability question, however, it must be
established that the emotional distress is serious or severe. Schurg v. United
States, 584 F.Supp.3d 893, 913 (D. Mont. 2022).
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Here, the United States does not dispute the foreseeability requirement of the
Sacco analysis. Rather, the United States argues Plaintiffs cannot establish the
required seriousness or severity of their alleged emotional distress.
Upon consideration of the Feller factors, the Court finds Plaintiffs’
emotional distress does not rise to the level where severe emotional distress may be
found. Neither Kaneisha nor O.M. have any documented physical manifestations
of emotional distress. Kaniesha states in her declaration that O.M. was fearful of
cars after the accident, and that he developed behavioral changes and often acted
“mean.” (Doc. 63 at ¶¶ 9, 11.) There is no evidence, however, that O.M. has
needed counseling or that it was ever recommended. Likewise, Kaneisha has not
sought counseling. Kaneisha testified at her deposition that she never talked to a
counselor or therapist because, in her own words, “I know one of these days I was
going to be okay. I was going to – I know I was going to be okay. As long as I
didn’t talk about it or nobody didn’t bring it up, I know I was going to be okay.”
(Doc. 64-2 at 20.) Kaneisha’s statements that she knew she would “be okay”
reveal “a philosophical strength that would likely be absent in a case of severe
emotional distress.” Renville v. Fredrickson, 101 P.3d 773, 777 (Mont. 2004).
Further, neither Kaneisha nor O.M. have required any medications beyond
Kaneisha giving O.M. a children’s Tylenol on occasion. (Doc. 64-2 at 20.) There
is no indication O.M. suffered sleeplessness or lack of appetite. Kaneisha did
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testify, however, that after the accident she “couldn’t sleep because, like it’s just,
like, a flashback like it just happened.” (Id.) In her declaration she states her
sleeplessness and flashbacks continued for at least six months. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 5.)
With regard to Plaintiffs’ ability to maintain relationships, there is evidence
their family relationships were impacted for a time following the accident.
Kaneisha stated in her declaration that she used alcohol in unhealthy ways, both
before and after the accident, and was arrested for DUI in November 2022. (Doc.
63 at ¶ 7.) As a result, she was incarcerated for approximately 4 months and lost
custody of her children. (Doc. 64-2 at 19.) Nevertheless, following her
incarceration, Plaintiff completed alcohol classes, a 15-day recovery program,
parenting classes, and has maintained sobriety. (Doc. 64-2 at 2, 20-21.) Plaintiff
also regained custody of her children and has since remarried. (Id. at 3; Doc. 53-1
at 3.)
As to the circumstances under which the emotional infliction incurred,
Kaneisha directly witnessed seeing her child hit by Officer Selva’s vehicle. There
is little question that Kaneisha would have experienced distress as a result.
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the evidence does not show that her emotional
distress was so serious or severe that “no reasonable person could be expected to
endure it.” Feller, 299 P.3d at 344. As this district has noted, a parent’s feelings
of being worried, concerned, and emotional upon thinking their child’s accident
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“are reactions ‘experienced by countless parents every year’ when their child is
injured.” Stamey v. Winter Sports, Inc., 2006 WL 8435861, *4 (D. Mont. Dec. 5,
2006) (citing Renville, 101 P.3d 777). The Court, therefore, finds that there is
insufficient evidence of serious or severity to support Plaintiffs’ independent claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiffs argue at length, however, that they are not required to satisfy
Sacco’s serious or severe emotional distress requirement. Plaintiffs rely instead on
Versland v. Caron Transport, 671 P.2d 583 (1983), a case decided by the Montana
Supreme Court 12 years prior to its decision in Sacco. In Versland, the Montana
Supreme Court recognized an independent action for infliction of emotional
distress based on a bystander theory of recovery. Under Versland, a claim for
negligence infliction of emotional distress could be established by showing:
1. The shock must result from a direct emotional impact upon the
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous perception of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after
its occurrence.
2. The plaintiff and victim must be closely related, as contrasted with
an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship.
3. Either death or serious physical injury of the victim must have
occurred as a result of the defendant’s negligence.
Versland, 671 P.2d at 588.
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Plaintiffs argue that Kaneisha’s claim is squarely within the Versland rule.
She witnessed O.M.’s accident, O.M. is her son, and he sustained serious physical
injury. The United States responds that Versland was abrogated by the Court’s
subsequent decision in Sacco, and it no longer provides a viable claim for relief.
The Court agrees with the United States.
The Montana Supreme Court in Sacco traced the development of the claim
of negligent infliction of emotional distress in Montana from 1885 through its
decision in 1995. Sacco, 896 P.2d at 419-25. This included a discussion of the
bystander rule and its decision in Versland. Id. at 422-23. The Court concluded
that the course of its decisions “demonstrates that negligent infliction of emotional
distress as an independent tort action is a thorny issue with which this Court has
struggled.” Id. at 424. The Court thus concluded that it was “appropriate to clarify
the existing law” and to “delineate a better approach to such claims” Id. at 425. In
doing so, the Court expressly recognized that the “narrow Versland analysis is
archaic and does not fully address all plaintiffs who are deserving of relief.” Id.
Accordingly, the Court adopted the requirements discussed above, and recognized
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress where (1) serious or
severe emotional distress exists, and (2) it was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or omission. Id.
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Also, contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the Montana Supreme Court has
made it clear that it intended to chart a new course in Sacco and did not intend to
leave Versland and other previous avenues of relief intact. Soon after the Sacco
decision, the Court provided clarification of this issue in Treichel v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 661 (Mont. 1997). There, in seeking an insurance
coverage determination, the parties stipulated that the plaintiff met all the elements
of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Versland. Id. at 663.
On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, however, the Court made clear that
Versland was not controlling. The Court said its intention in Sacco was “to
simplify and clarify the elements of claims for negligent and intentional infliction
of emotional distress, not to further complicate this body of law by adding yet
another theory to those already in existence.” Id. at 664. The Court went on to say
that “in clarifying the elements of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress in Sacco, we eliminated the other various sorts of theories by which
independent torts of negligent infliction of emotional distress came into Montana
law such as the Versland bystander analysis.” Id.
Later, in Wages v. First Nat. Ins. Co. of Am., 79 P.3d 1095 (Mont. 2003), the
defendant attempted to assert the Versland bystander requirement as a prerequisite
to recovery in a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. But the Court
repeated its statement in Sacco that the Versland analysis was “archaic,” and said
Case 1:23-cv-00148-SPW Document 74 Filed 02/10/26 Page 23 of 25
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“we expressly overruled Versland and other ‘prior cases dealing with independent
causes of action involving negligent of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
to the extent [such cases are] inconsistent with this opinion.’” Id. at 1098 (quoting
Sacco, 896 P.2d at 429).
Therefore, it is clear that the Sacco analysis of claims for negligent infliction
of emotional distress applies here, not the antiquated bystander analysis in
Versland. Since Plaintiffs cannot establish the serious or severe emotional distress
requirement of Sacco, summary judgment as to Count Three of the Second
Amended Complaint should be granted.
The Court notes, however, that this conclusion does not necessarily prevent
Plaintiffs from seeking emotional distress damages associated with their
negligence claims. See Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 215 P.3d 649, 664 (Mont.
2009). The heightened standard of proof established in Sacco “applies only to
independent causes of action for infliction of emotional distress, and not to
emotional distress claimed as an element of damage arising from a different cause
of action (sometimes called ‘parasitic claims’ for emotional distress).” White v.
Longley, 244 P.3d 753, 762-63 (Mont. 2010) (explaining that for parasitic
emotional distress damages, “the severity of the distress affects the amount of
damages recovered but not the underlying entitlement to recover”).
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Accordingly, the United States’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to
Count Three should be granted.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 45) be GRANTED
in part, and DENIED in part.
2. 	The United States’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 51)
be GRANTED.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy
of the Findings and Recommendations of United States Magistrate Judge upon the
parties. The parties are advised that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, any objections to
the findings and recommendations must be filed with the Clerk of Court and copies
served on opposing counsel within fourteen (14) days after service hereof, or
objection is waived.
IT IS ORDERED.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2026.
_______________________________
TIMOTHY J. CAVAN
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:23-cv-00148-SPW Document 74 Filed 02/10/26 Page 25 of 25

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