Hicks v. Taney County Sheriff's Office et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
COLT A. HICKS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Case No. 6:26-cv-03106-MDH
)
TANEY COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al., )
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Socorro McManis, Robert Rivera, and Mark Shinn’s
(“Deputy Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Party for Improper Service (Doc. 11) and Defendant
Taney County Sheriff’s Office’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. 13).
Defendants have filed Suggestions in Support (Docs. 12 & 14). Plaintiff, acting pro se, did not
file Reply Suggestions. On June 25, 2026, this Court entered an order giving Plaintiff an extra
fourteen (14) days to file responses to the motions. Plaintiff still did not do so, and this extension
has expired. The motions are now ripe for adjudication on the merits, and the Court rules without
the benefit of Plaintiff’s input. For the reasons stated herein, Deputy Defendants’ Joint Motion to
Dismiss for Improper Service is GRANTED and Defendant Taney County Sheriff’s Office’s
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from a traffic stop involving Plaintiff, his wife, and the named Defendants.
Plaintiff Colt A. Hicks is a resident of the State of Missouri. Deputy Defendants Shinn, McManis,
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and Rivera are all employees of the Taney County Sheriff’s Department and are being sued in their
individual capacities only.
Plaintiff’s Pro Se Complaint (Doc. 3) states that on September 29, 2025, he and his wife
were pulled over by Defendant Rivera while on their way home from their wedding. Defendants
McManis and Shinn later arrived on scene. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Rivera issued him a
citation for an offense Defendant Rivera knew did not occur. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants
ordered him and his wife to exit the vehicle and then performed a canine search without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ search resulted in
significant property damage to the vehicle. Plaintiff brings his Complaint against Defendants
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging violation of the Fourth Amendment for the search of
his vehicle.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Deputy Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Party for Improper Service (Doc. 11)
Deputy Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims against them in their individual
capacities must be dismissed because they have not been properly served. Specifically, they state
that Deputy Barker, to whom Plaintiff directed service of process to as to Deputy Defendants, is
not designated to accept service on behalf of the individual Defendants. Further, Deputy
Defendants state that there is no evidence that they ever appointed Deputy Barker to accept service
on their behalf. Plaintiff failed to file a response to Defendants’ motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) allows for a pre-answer motion to dismiss for
insufficient service of process. “If a defendant is improperly served, a federal court lacks
jurisdiction over the defendant.” Printed Media Servs., Inc. v. Solna Web, Inc., 11 F.3d 838, 843
(8th Cir. 1993); see also Dodco, Inc. v. American Bonding Co., 7 F.3d 1387 (8th Cir. 1993); Sieg
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v. Karnes, 693 F.2d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1982). Once a plausible challenge to the sufficiency of
service of process is made, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to make a prima facie showing
that service was valid under governing law. Cheeks v. Belmar, 331 F.R.D. 499, 504 (E.D. Mo.
2019). A pro se litigant must still comply with court rules and procedures. Jackson v. Yellen, 744
F. Supp. 3d 905, 909 (W.D. Mo. 2024) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285,
50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) establishes the means by which individuals, like
Deputy Defendants, can be served. It states:
Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an
incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a
judicial district of the United States by:
(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where
service is made; or
(2) doing any of the following:
(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual
personally;
(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode
with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or
(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
The Court agrees with Deputy Defendants and finds that service was improper as to
Defendants McManis, Rivera, and Shinn. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he served any of the
Deputy Defendants personally, nor that he left a copy of the summons and complaint at their
residences with someone of suitable age and discretion. Plaintiff’s Returns of Service show that
service to Defendants McManis, Rivera, and Shinn was instructed to be served at “266 Main St.,
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Forsyth, MO 65653.” (Docs. 7, 8, & 9). That address corresponds to the street address of
Defendant Taney County Sheriff’s Office. That is not the residential address for any of the Deputy
Defendants. Further, Plaintiff has not shown that Deputy Barker, who received service for the
three Deputy Defendants, was authorized to do so as an appointed agent or by law. Plaintiff has
failed to carry his burden to show that Deputy Defendants were properly served in this case. Thus,
the Court finds that Defendants McManis, Rivera, and Shinn’s Motion to Dismiss Party for
Improper Service should be GRANTED. Defendants McManis, Rivera, and Shinn are hereby
DISMISSED from the case without prejudice.
II. 	Defendant Taney County Sheriff’s Office’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim (Doc. 13)
Plaintiff contends that the officers’ allegedly illegal search of his vehicle was the result of
“a pattern, practice, or custom within the Taney County Sheriff’s Office.” (Doc. 3, p. 5). To hold
a government entity liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for a constitutional violation, the violation
must have “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a
deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th
Cir. 2018) (citing Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo., 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotations omitted). To allege that a governmental entity maintained an unconstitutional unofficial
custom, “a complaint must set forth factual allegations plausibly suggesting (1) the existence of a
continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the [governmental
entity’s] employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the
governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and
(3) an injury by acts pursuant to the [governmental entity’s] custom.” Woods v. City of St. Louis,
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2025 WL 2096679, at *4 (citing Watkins v. City of St. Louis, 102 F.4th 947, 954 (8th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th 888, 899 (2022).
A complaint must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, are sufficient to
state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face. Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The complaint’s factual allegations must be
sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and the motion to dismiss must be
granted if the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Further, “the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not make any allegations specifically pertaining to any action,
policy, or custom by Defendant Taney County Sheriff’s Office. It merely makes one conclusory
statement that Plaintiff believes the Defendant Deputies’ conduct is “reflective of a pattern,
practice, or custom” maintained by Defendant Taney County Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff has failed
to raise a right to relief above a speculative level. Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations against
Defendant Taney County Sheriff’s Office fall short of the pleading standard set by Iqbal, even
considering the liberal pleading standard afforded to pro se plaintiffs. See Barnett v. Short, 129
F.4th 534, 539 (8th Cir. 2025) (“Courts must liberally construe pro se complaints.”). For the
reasons stated, Defendant Freeman’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
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For the reasons stated, Defendants McManis, Rivera, and Shinn’s Motion to Dismiss Party
for Improper Service is GRANTED; and Defendant Taney County Sheriff’s Office’s Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is GRANTED.
As all the Defendants in Plaintiff’s Complaint have been dismissed from the case, the Court
hereby DISMISSES the action in its entirety without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 14, 2026
/s/ Douglas Harpool______________
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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