Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
ST. JOSEPH DIVISION
DERRICK ASHLEY, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 5:24-cv-06173-MDH
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of 	)
the Social Security Administration, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Derrick Ashley’s appeal of Defendant Social Security
Administration Commissioner’s (“Commissioner”) denial of his application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff has
exhausted his administrative remedies and the matter is now ripe for judicial review. 	After
carefully reviewing the record, the Court AFFIRMS the ALJ decision in part and REVERSES
and REMANDS in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his application for a period of disability and disability insurance on April 7,
2022. (Tr. 18). Plaintiff was born on May 5, 1984, and alleged disability beginning on January 30,
2019. (Tr. 18 and 29). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: cervical
degenerative disc disease; history of left upper extremity radiculopathy also diagnosed as
unspecified neuralgia and neuritis; history of posttraumatic stress disorder; antisocial personality
disorder; recurrent severe major depressive disorder; other specified anxiety disorder; and
unspecified alcohol, cocaine, cannabis and opioid use disorder. (Tr. 20). The ALJ additionally
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found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in or
medically equal to one contained in 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 21). The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) for:
Lifting, carrying, pushing or pulling 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently. The claimant [could] stand and/or walk up to four hours in an eight-
hour workday and sit up to six hours total in an eight-hour workday. The claimant
could occasionally climb ramps and stairs and never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. The claimant could occasionally stoop and never kneel, crouch, or crawl.
The claimant needed to avoid exposure to extreme cold weather, excessive
vibrations, operational control of moving machinery, unprotected heights, and
hazardous machinery. The claimant need[s] to avoid overhead reaching with the
left upper extremity but could frequently reach in all other directions with the left
upper extremity. The claimant could frequently handle and finger bilaterally. The
claimant had the ability to concentrate, persist, and remain on task and pace to
perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks which may have involved multiple
non-complex simple, routine and repetitive steps, tasks or instructions. The
claimant could concentrate, persist and remain on task and pace to adapt to work in
an environment that was free of fast paced production requirements and involved
only simple, work-related decisions with not more than occasional workplace
changes. The claimant could have no public interaction but could work around
coworkers but with only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors.
(Tr. 23). The ALJ found that the Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work as a
delivery driver. (Tr. 28). Relying on the vocational expert testimony, the ALJ concluded that there
were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the Plaintiff could have
performed, 	considering 	Plaintiff’s 	age, 	education, 	work 	experience, 	and 	RFC. 	(Tr. 	29).
Consequently, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 30).
STANDARD
The Court’s role in reviewing an ALJ’s decision is to determine whether the “findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1042-
43 (8th Cir. 2007), citing Haggard v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir.1999). 	“Substantial
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the
Commissioner’s conclusion.” Id. “The fact that some evidence may support a conclusion opposite
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from that reached by the Commissioner does not alone permit our reversal of the Commissioner’s
decision.” Id., citing Kelley v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir.2004); Travis v. Astrue, 477
F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2007). 	If the record contains substantial evidence to support the
Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse the decision simply because substantial
evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome. 	Krogmeier v.
Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002). In other words, the Court cannot reverse simply
because it would have decided the case differently. Id., citing Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213
(8th Cir. 1993). Further, the Court defers to the ALJ's determinations of the credibility of witness
testimony, as long as the ALJ’s determinations are supported by good reasons and substantial
evidence. Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 2006).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues four points on appeal. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not comply with
Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 00-4p; the Vocational Expert (“VE”) testimony about job
incidence data does not sustain the Commissioner’s burden; the Appeals Council has impeded the
production of a complete administrative record; and that the Defendant committed legal errors
relating to Midwest CES’s Psychological Consultative Examination (“CE”). The Court will take
each argument in turn.
I. 	SSR 00-4p
At step five, the Commissioner has the burden to “identify the types of jobs [a claimant]
could perform notwithstanding his disabilities” and to “ascertain whether those kinds of jobs
‘existed in significant numbers in the national economy.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,
1152 (2019) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(1), 416.960(c)(1)). See also Pearsall v. Massanari,
274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001). “The Commissioner may rely on a vocational expert's
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response to a properly formulated hypothetical question to show that jobs that a person with the
claimant's RFC can perform exist in significant numbers.” Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798,
804 (8th Cir. 2005). The ALJ, however, cannot rely on testimony that conflicts or appears to
conflict with information in the DOT without addressing and resolving the conflict. SSR 00-4p,
2000 WL 1898704, at *2-*4; Stanton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 899 F.3d 555, 558 (8th Cir.
2018). If the ALJ does not identify and resolve the apparent conflict, “the vocational expert's
testimony is not substantial evidence to support the denial of benefits.” Stanton, 899 F.3d at 558.
The Commissioner adopted this rule in SSR 00-4p, stating “[w]hen a [vocational expert]
... provides evidence about the requirements of a job or occupation, the adjudicator has an
affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict between that [vocational expert] ...
evidence and information provided in the DOT.” SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *4. If there is
an apparent conflict between the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT, the ALJ “will obtain
a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict.” Id. The ALJ must resolve the conflict before
relying on the expert's testimony in support of its determination, and must explain in the decision
how the ALJ resolved the conflict. Id. Thus, “[w]hether the vocational expert's testimony is
substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's decision depends on whether the expert's testimony
appears to conflict with the DOT, and if so, whether the ALJ resolved the conflict.” Stanton, 899
F.3d at 558.
Plaintiff argues that the VE identified three unskilled occupations, each of which requires
level two reasoning. Plaintiff argues that this reasoning level requires the ability to apply
commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions and
to deal with problems involving a few concrete variable in or from standardized situations. Plaintiff
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asserts that this conflicts with the RFC to which the ALJ failed to recognize or resolve the conflict.
Further, Plaintiff argues that the record does not establish that he could perform detailed work.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s reliance on the job classification as reasoning level 2 in
the DOT is insufficient to invalidate the VE’s testimony. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
representative asked if there was a conflict, the vocation expert testified as to why the jobs could
still be performed, and the ALJ credited that testimony. Thus, Defendant asserts that the ALJ
satisfied SSR 00-4p, and remand is not required even if Plaintiff, or the Court, would have resolved
the issue differently.
The DOT includes a “reasoning level” between one and six for each listed job, and includes
the following definitions for reasoning levels one through three:
01 Level Reasoning Development
Applying commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step
instructions. Deal with standardized situations with occasional or no variable in or
from these situations encountered on the job.
02 Level Reasoning Development
Applying commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written
or oral instructions. Deal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or
from standardized situations.
03 Level Reasoning Development
Applying commonsense understanding to carry out instructions furnished in
written, oral, or diagrammatic form. Deal with problems involving several concrete
variables in or from standardized situations.
See DOT Appendix C.
The Court finds remand is warranted on this issue. During the cross-examination of the
VE, Plaintiff’s representative and the VE had the following exchange:
Atty: 	I was asking for the GED code for the jobs that [the VE] identified that
[Ashley] could do with the limitations that the Judge had set forth.
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VE: 	What kind of code?
Atty: 	It’s – I want to make sure. Do you have a GED reasoning scale code?
VE: 	The – are you talking about reasoning?
Atty: 	Yes.
VE: 	Yeah, that’ll take just a little while. Let’s see. The – well, just – I’ll have to
look them up. Just one second. The office helper has a reasoning of two. The
verification clerk has a reasoning level of two, and the routing clerk has a reasoning
level of two.
Atty: 	And so that reasoning level requires that a person be able to handle detailed
instructions?
VE: 	No.
Atty: 	No? I thought that reasoning level of two required the ability to carry out
detailed but uninvolved instructions?
VE: 	Well, I’m – you’re looking at the definition, and I agree. It says apply
commons sense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral
instructions. I don’t consider – I consider from a vocational standpoint detailed
instructions to be above the SVP 2 level.
Atty: 	Okay. But these jobs would require the ability to carry out detailed but
uninvolved instructions? Am I understanding that?
VE: 	Well, yeah, by applying common sense understanding.
(Tr. 79–80) (emphasis added).1 The ALJ then proceeded to ask the VE if their testimony has been
consistent with the DOT and its companion publication to which the VE responded “[i]t has”. (Tr.
80). In the ALJ’s decision, she stated:
The vocational expert testified that given all of these factors the individual would
be able to perform the requirements or representative light unskilled (SVP 2)
occupations such as an office helper (DOT # 239.567-010 and 260,000 jobs
nationally); verification clerk (DOT # 222.687-010 and 64,000 jobs nationally); and
routing clerk (DOT # 222.687-022 and 220,000 jobs nationally). Pursuant to SSR
1 The VE stated that “I consider from a vocational standpoint detailed instruction to be above the SVP 2 level.” As the
transcript in the record demonstrates the representative and VE were talking about GED reasoning scale code, the
Court will interpret the VE to have meant a GED reasoning level of 2 rather than an SVP level of 2.
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00-4p, the vocational expert’s testimony is consistent with the information
contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and Selected Characteristics of
Occupations. … Furthermore, the claimant’s representative did not object to the
qualifications of the vocational expert or to the testimony provided at the
administrative hearing.
(Tr. 30). Here, the record shows that the VE originally did not believe that a reasoning level of 2
requires that a person be able to handle detailed instructions and then, after further inquiry, stated
that “I consider from a vocational standpoint detailed instructions to be above the SVP 2 level.”
(Tr. 79–80). The testimony from the VE raises an apparent unresolved conflict between the VE
and DOT. Although the ALJ judge stated that the VE’s testimony is consistent with the information
contained in the DOT, the Court finds there was not substantial evidence in the record to support
the ALJ’s determination on this point. The ALJ did not provide a reasonable explanation for the
conflict before relying on the VE’s testimony within her decision. In sum, because the ALJ did not
recognize or resolve the inconsistency between the VE’s testimony and the DOT with respect to
whether level 2 reasoning development requires detailed but uninvolved instructions and if
Plaintiff would be suited to those roles based on the RFC, the Court orders remand on this issue.
II. 	The VE’s Testimony Regarding Job Incidence Data
Plaintiff next argues that the VE’s testimony about the availability of jobs directly conflicts
with the Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) data and does not support the Commissioner’s
burden.2 Plaintiff argues that the VE stated that work as an office helper has approximately
260,000 positions nationwide, work as a verification clerk has approximately 64,000 positions
nationwide, and work as a routing clerk as approximately 220,000 positions nationwide. In
contrast, Plaintiff states that the BLS data shows the Standard Occupation Classification (“SOC”)
groupings showing work as couriers & messengers, which encompasses officer helper, had 47,754
2 The BLS collects data by occupation by SOC groupings. The SOC system is a federal statistical standard used by
agencies to classify workers. See https://www.bls.gov/soc/.
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jobs nationwide;3 weighers, measurers, checkers, samplers & recordkeeping, which encompasses
verification clerk, had 44,719 jobs nationwide;4 and shipping, receiving, & inventory clerks, which
encompasses routing clerk, had 844,120 jobs nationwide.5 Plaintiff asserts that the VE’s testimony
is implausible for the office helper and verification clerk roles. Plaintiff argues that the VE’s
testimony about the office helper and verification clerk jobs is not substantial evidence and cannot
support the Commissioner’s burden at step five.
Defendant argues that the agency’s regulations do not mandate a precise count of job
numbers and VEs are not expected to formulate opinions with more confidence than imperfect
data allows. Defendant states that the VE had been vetted and approved as a qualified expert with
the knowledge, education, and experience required to testify and that Plaintiff’s representative did
not object to the VE giving her testimony. Defendant further argues that the VE affirmatively
stated that she did not use a computer software or job browser pro, or anything of that nature to
derive the numbers but instead used the information from the BLS. Defendant argues that even if
the Court accepted Plaintiff’s challenge to the job numbers of office helper and verification clerk,
a significant number of jobs would remain.
The disability determination is made after the ALJ goes through a five-step sequential
analysis. At step five, if the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, “the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform.” Wilson v. Berryhill, No. 417CV00389MDHSSA, 2018 WL 3345297, at *2 (W.D. Mo.
July 9, 2018) (quoting Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998).
3 This SOC group had seven DOTs, including office helper, within the SOC group.
4 This SOC group had thirty-three DOTs, including verification clerk, within the SOC group.
5 This SOC group had twenty DOTs, including routing clerk, within the SOC group.
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Here, the court finds the discrepancy in the VE’s testimony regarding the availably of jobs
in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform was a harmless error. To show an error was not
harmless, the Plaintiff must provide some indication that the ALJ would have decided differently
if the error had not occurred. Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Van Vickle
v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 2008) (“There is no indication that the ALJ would have
decided differently … and any error by the ALJ was therefore harmless.”). Plaintiff has failed to
show any indication that but for the error, the ALJ would have decided differently regarding
Plaintiff’s disability determination. The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ made no finding that, in the
absence of the office helper and verification checker jobs, the routing clerk job existed in
significant numbers. This argument alone is not enough to show but for the error, the ALJ would
have decided differently. Further, Plaintiff shows that jobs exist within the national economy.
While the numbers do differentiate significantly, Plaintiff’s data confirms that there exist jobs
within the national economy that would support the VE’s finding. 	For these reasons, the Court
finds that the discrepancy in the VE’s testimony was a harmless error and that substantial evidence
exists in the record to support the ALJ’s decision.
III. 	Complete Administrative Record
Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council has impeded the production of a complete
administrative record. Plaintiff states that his claim contains a physical CE report from the
Commissioner’s vendor, Midwest CES. Plaintiff asserts that the report bore the name of
moonlighting nurse practitioner Amanda Cavolvic, FNP-C. Plaintiff further states that after the
ALJ’s denial, Plaintiff submitted evidence supporting allegations of fraud or similar fault in a CE
that did not serve its purpose. Plaintiff states he specifically asked for the documents to be
exhibited, to which the Appeals Counsil failed to exhibit documents material to the integrity of the
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CE, stating that the evidence relates solely to the adjudication of another person whose claim is
not properly before the Appeals Council. Plaintiff argues this is mistaken and evades judicial
review warranting remand with instructions to evaluate the evidence.
Defendant argues that the Appeals Council associated Plaintiff’s briefs with the record, but
did not associate any of the supporting information attached to the briefs because it related solely
to the adjudication of another person whose claims were not before the Appeals Council and thus
was not evidence as defined by the agency. Defendant states that the Appeals Council explicitly
stated that Plaintiff had failed to present any evidence that related to the adjudication of his claim.
20 C.F.R. § 404.976 governs the procedure before the Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. §
404.976(b) details the evidence the Appeals Council will exhibit and states:
The Appeals Council will evaluate all additional evidence it receives, but will only
mark as an exhibit and make part of the official record additional evidence that it
determines meets the requirements of § 404.970(a)(5) and (b). If we need to file a
certified administrative record in Federal court, we will include in that record all
additional evidence the Appeals Council received during the administrative review
process, including additional evidence that the Appeals Council received but did
not exhibit or make part of the official record.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1513 governs the categories of evidence used in determining disability. This
regulation states “evidence is anything you or anyone else submits to us or that we obtain that
relates to your claim.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff has provided a summary of excluded evidence he has attached to his Brief
detailing what he submitted to the Appeals Council. (Doc. 9-2). The summary provides 19
documents 	ranging 	from 	declarations 	and 	depositions 	from 	nine different 	Midwest 	CES
physicians, deposition testimony from Midwest CES owner Jacob Johnsen and other reports,
pleadings, and affidavits regarding Midwest CES. Id. The record shows that the Appeals Council
reviewed the information submitted by Plaintiff and declined to associate it with his file because
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“it relates solely to the adjudication of another person whose claim is not properly before the
Appeals Court.” (Tr. 1). The Court agrees. While Plaintiff has provided evidence regarding issues
with Midwest CES, nothing submitted had anything to do with Plaintiff’s specific case nor Ms.
Cavlovich, the examiner who performed Plaintiff’s CE. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)
evidence is anything that is submitted or obtained by the Appeals Council that relates to Plaintiff’s
claim. While Plaintiff attempts to tie these deficiencies to his claim, he has failed to show any
discrepancies that directly affected his CE or those done by Ms. Cavlovich. For these reasons, the
Court finds that Appeals Court did not err in excluding Plaintiff’s evidence and that there was
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.
IV. 	Midwest CES’s PCE
Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner committed legal errors related to the Midwest
CES’s CE. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council failed to address allegations of
fraud or similar fault and that the CE did not satisfy its purpose. The Court will take each of these
arguments in turn.
A. 	Allegations of Fraud or Similar Fault
Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council failed to address allegations of fraud or similar
fault. Plaintiff states he specifically alleged fraud or similar fault, describing various Midwest CES
practices, including the assembly of CE reports that were not seen or authorized by the examiner.
Plaintiff states that he submitted statements and testimony from Midwest CES examiners that
indicated that the examiners contributed only to a portion of the report before Midwest CES
submitted them to Defendant. These reports would then be affixed with an image of the examiner’s
signature to the report in contravention to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519n(e). Plaintiff argues that the
Appeals Council did not address the allegations of fraud or similar fault and did not evaluate
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whether the CE involved fraud or similar fault such that it must be disregarded under the
Commissioner’s directives.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has provided no evidence that Ms. Cavlovich had an intent
to defraud or that she knowingly made or concealed an incorrect or incomplete statement about a
material fact. Defendant further argues that even if Plaintiff had made such a showing it would not
be to his benefit as the CE report had probative findings to support the restrictions in the RFC.
Defendant states that if the report were excluded, the ALJ would be required to assess Plaintiff’s
RFC based on the remaining evidence during the relevant period between January 2021 and
December 2022, and there would be less evidence on which to base restrictions. Defendant states
that the inclusion of the Midwest CE report benefited Plaintiff and its exclusion would not change
the outcome of the ALJ’s decision.
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) is required to “disregard evidence if there is
reason to believe that fraud or similar fault was involved in the providing of evidence. Soc. Sec.
Ruling 22-2p; Titles II & Xvi: Evaluation of Claims Involving the Issue of Similar Fault in the
Providing of Evidence, SSR 22-2P (S.S.A. May 17, 2022). The SSA must disregard evidence due
to similar fault “if there is reason to believe, meaning reasonable grounds to suspect, that the person
knew the evidence provided was false or incomplete or that the information that was material to
the determination was knowingly concealed.” Id. “Even if [the SSA] disregard evidence, [the SSA]
will evaluate the remaining evidence of record and determine whether that evidence supports a
finding of entitlement to benefits or eligibility for payments. Id
The Court finds that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination. As
discussed earlier, the Appeals Council reviewed the submission from Plaintiff and found that
Plaintiff’s evidence related solely to the adjudication of another person whose claims were not
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before the Appeals Council and thus was not evidence as defined by the agency. Plaintiff has not
shown there is reason to believe that fraud or similar fault was involved in the providing of
evidence with his case. Further, even if Plaintiff did meet this burden, there is substantial evidence
in the record that would support the ALJ’s decision. For this reason the Court finds the Appeals
Council did not err regarding Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud or similar fault.
B. 	The CE’s Purpose
Plaintiff argues that the CE did not satisfy its purpose. Plaintiff argues that MS. Cavlovich’s
CV does not appear in the record and there is not substantial evidence that she was properly trained,
nor did she have a good understanding of the programs and requirements. Further, Plaintiff argues
that the CE findings specific to Plaintiff were often abnormal. Specifically, Plaintiff states that Ms.
Cavlovich’s diagnoses were genal categories based on symptoms and that the CE did not contain
an opinion with work-related limitations.6 Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the state agency’s
pre-authorized medical file (“PAMF”) relied in part on the CE. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ found
these PAMF persuasive even though the CE did not adequately inform the PAMF or the ALJ about
Plaintiff’s limitations and thus the CE did not serve its purpose.
Defendant argues that the purpose of the CE was to give Plaintiff another opportunity to
get medical evidence to support his claim and that goal was accomplished as the ALJ used positive
findings from the exam to support reducing Plaintiff’s RFC to a range of light work with additional
exertional, postural, manipulative, environmental, and mental restrictions. Defendant also argues
that Plaintiff has made no showing that Ms. Cavlovich did not meet the agency’s requirements for
consultative examiners and that none of the tests performed by Ms. Cavlovich would require
specialized training beyond what is learned in her training and education as a certified family nurse
6 Plaintiff does concede that the ALJ recognized that the CE lacked an opinion. (Tr. 28).
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practitioner. Lastly, Defendant argues that state agency doctors based their findings on the record
as whole and did not assess restrictions beyond what the ALJ included in the RFC, and did not cite
the mental status examination findings in the Midwest CES report.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1519g governs the selection of who performs a CE. The regulation states:
The medial source must be currently licensed in the State and have the training and
experience to perform the type of examination or test we will request; the medical
source must not be barred from participation in our programs under the provisions
of § 404.1503a. The medical source must also have the equipment required to
provide an adequate assessment and record of the existence and level of severity of
your alleged impairments.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1519g(b).
Here, Ms. Cavlovich signed the CE as a FNP-C indicating she has received a family nurse
practitioner certification. While no CV is attached, this certification is sufficient to show that Ms.
Cavlovich was qualified to perform a CE. (Tr. 1115). Further, the results of the CE showed a
diagnosis of (1) unsteadiness on feet; (2) left side numbness; (3) generalized body pain; (4) right
arm numbness; (5) left-sided weakness; and (6) limited range of motion of cervical spine. Id. As
discussed earlier, Plaintiff has failed to show any deficiencies with his specific CE and that his
findings concerning Midwest’s practices were not relied on by the Appeals Council nor the ALJ.
Additionally, the results of the CE show support for the RFC the ALJ formulated, along with the
record as a whole. For these reasons, the Court finds that the CE satisfied its purpose and that there
is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination regarding the RFC.
CONCLUSION
With respect to the Appeals Council exclusion of evidence from Plaintiff’s file and the
allegations of fraud and similar fault, the Court finds there was no error. Further, to the ALJ’s
reliance on the VE regarding the number of jobs in the national economy, the Court finds this to
be a harmless error. Regarding the CE’s purpose, the Court finds there is substantial evidence in
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the record to support the ALJ’s findings. As such, the Court AFFIRMS the decision with respect
to those findings.
With respect to SSR 00-4p and the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony that detailed
instructions are above level 2 reasoning, the Court finds that the ALJ erred and the ALJ’s decision
that Plaintiff can perform “other work” under step five is hereby REVERSED and REMANDED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 12, 2026
/s/ Douglas Harpool ________________
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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