Doe v. Bisignano, et al.

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
JANE DOE, 	*
*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Case No. SAG-25-02813
*
FRANK J. BISIGNANO, et al., 	*
*
Defendants. 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Jane Doe filed this employment discrimination action against her former
employer, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) and two of its officers in their official
capacities (collectively, “SSA”). ECF 1. SSA has filed a motion to dismiss, citing a variety of
grounds, including improper venue. ECF 20. Plaintiff has opposed the motion, ECF 29, and no
reply has been filed. This Court has reviewed the filings and no hearing is necessary. See Loc.
R.105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons stated below, this Court will GRANT IN PART SSA’s
motion, in that the case will be transferred to the Western District of Missouri for further
proceedings, including resolution of the remainder of SSA’s motion.
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that she worked as a Benefits Analyst Trainee (“BAT”) at the
Mid-America Program Service Center in Kansas City, Missouri. ECF 1-2 ¶ 7. Prior to her hiring,
she informed her contacts that she would need accommodations for a disability, including a
reserved parking space on “the federal lot.”1 Id. ¶¶ 8, 11. The Complaint details Plaintiff’s
1 	While 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	appears 	to 	make 	cursory 	reference 	to 	other 	requested
accommodations, the nature of those accommodations is not disclosed. Only the parking
accommodation is discussed.
Case 4:26-cv-00227-LMC Document 32 Filed 03/18/26 Page 1 of 4

2
unsuccessful communications with local SSA officials regarding her parking requests. Id. ¶¶ 12–
19. Plaintiff “heard reports” that a senior employee, David Marshall, provided a parking space for
his daughter in the federal lot even before she began employment. Id. ¶ 16. In late 2023, BATs
were offered an overtime opportunity that Plaintiff was unable to accept because she did not have
a parking space on the federal lot. Id. ¶ 18. In early 2024, Plaintiff received an email stating that
her manager had recommended that her requested accommodation for a parking space in the
federal lot be denied. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff decided to accept an alternative accommodation, and she
also reported the denial to her local union representative. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22. In Spring, 2024, Plaintiff
received a Notice of Probationary Termination. Id. ¶¶ 23, 24. Despite her receipt of a letter stating
that she could park in the federal lot east of the building to return items after termination, the
security guard at the lot prohibited her from parking there. Id.
B. Legal Standards
Where a defendant contests venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), the plaintiff bears the burden
to make a prima facie showing that venue is proper in the district in which the case was filed. See
Mitrano v. Hawes, 377 F.3d 402, 405 (4th Cir. 2004); Jones v. Koons Auto., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d
670, 679–80 (D. Md. 2010). In assessing the plaintiff’s showing, the court may consider evidence
outside the pleadings and must view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., Ltd., 675 F.3d 355, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2012). More specifically,
the Court must accept the facts alleged in the Complaint as true unless the defendant submits
evidence by affidavit to the contrary, and where there is discrepant information submitted in
parties’ affidavits, must give greater weight to the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. See Delong
Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 845 (11th Cir. 1988), overruled on
other grounds by, Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620
Case 4:26-cv-00227-LMC Document 32 Filed 03/18/26 Page 2 of 4

3
S.E. 2d 352 (Ga. 2005). If venue is lacking, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides, “The district court of a
district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it
be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have
been brought.”
C. Analysis
SSA contends that venue in the District of Maryland is lacking, because Plaintiff, who is
asserting a claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”) along with other
statutes, is subject to the venue provision governing that statute. Rehabilitation Act claims are
subject to the venue provision in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). See Doyle v. McDonough,
Civ. No. ELH-20-3478, 2021 WL 4846938, at *18 (D. Md. Oct. 15, 2021). Under that provision,
venue lies:
in any judicial district in the State [1] in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged
to have been committed, [2] in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant
to such practice are maintained and administered, or [3] in the judicial district in which the
aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but
[4] if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought
within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (numbering added). The Title VII venue provision provides a more
limited scope of venue as compared with the more general civil venue provision in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(1) (allowing venue in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides”).
Plaintiff argues that the second clause of Title VII’s venue provision applies in this case,
because SSA headquarters are in Maryland and she received a tax document from SSA’s Maryland
address. ECF 29 at 1–2. Those facts, however, do not establish that any records relevant to the
alleged unlawful employment practice (the denial of an opportunity or accommodation to park in
a particular parking lot in Kansas City, Missouri) are maintained and administered in Maryland.
Case 4:26-cv-00227-LMC Document 32 Filed 03/18/26 Page 3 of 4

4
Plaintiff cites Williams v. American College of Education, Inc., Civ. No. 16-11746, 2017
WL 2424227 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2017), for the proposition that “it is likely” that relevant records
about employment practices would be located at the employer’s headquarters. ECF 29 at 2. In
Williams, however, the pertinent alleged employment practices included a demand that the plaintiff
work at the headquarters in Indianapolis instead of the remote employment the plaintiff had
contracted to perform. Id. at *1. In those circumstances, unlike a dispute about which local parking
lot an employee could use, the likelihood that records would be found at headquarters is far
greater.2
Essentially, Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence for this Court to find that she has
made the required prima facie showing of proper venue for her Rehabilitation Act claim. While
venue may lie in the District of Maryland as to her other claims, it would make little sense for her
claims to proceed in two districts simultaneously, nor would it be practical for this Court to dismiss
her Rehabilitation Act claim and permit the other claims to proceed here.3 Accordingly, in the
interest of justice and judicial economy, this Court will transfer this case in its entirety to the
Western District of Missouri pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which permits transfer in cases filed
in an improper venue. This Court will decline to address the remainder of SSA’s arguments for
dismissal, as they should be resolved in the transferee court.
A separate Order follows.
Dated: March 18, 2026 	/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
2 Plaintiff also cites a Third Circuit case, Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22 (1970), regarding
the plaintiff’s choice of forum. That inquiry is relevant where a court is balancing factors to decide
whether to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 and not where a court is assessing whether
Title VII’s restrictive venue provisions have been satisfied.
3 Also, four of Plaintiff’s claims are premised on Missouri law.
Case 4:26-cv-00227-LMC Document 32 Filed 03/18/26 Page 4 of 4