Johnson v. Kansas City Public Schools

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
TRACY JOHNSON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 26-00016-CV-W-JAM
)
KANSAS CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 30) For the reasons stated below the Motion will be granted in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On March 12, 2026, the Court entered an Order granting in part, Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and ordered Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint detailing the
claim or claims that she asserts have been administratively exhausted, including sufficient factual
allegations to support those claims. 	(Doc. 23) 	Plaintiff subsequently filed her First Amended
Complaint, asserting eight counts: (1) race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”); (2) age discrimination under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and MHRA; (3) disability discrimination
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and MHRA; (4) failure to accommodate under
ADA and MHRA; (5) retaliation under Title VII, ADA, ADEA, and MHRA; (6) hostile work
environment under Title VII, ADA, ADEA, and MHRA; (7) failure to promote under Title VII
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and MHRA; and (8) constructive discharge under Title VII, ADA, ADEA, and MHRA. (Doc. 29,
¶¶ 80–121) 1
Plaintiff dually filed her first Charge of Discrimination with the Missouri Commission on
Human Rights (“MCHR”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on
March 17, 2024. (Doc. 30-1) Plaintiff filed her second Charge of Discrimination on February 10,
2025. (Doc. 30-2) As to her first Charge, Plaintiff received a Determination of No Violation from
the MCHR on August 1, 2025 (Doc. 30-3), and a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC on August
27, 2025 (Doc. 29-1, p. 4). As to her second Charge, Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue
from the MCHR on August 11, 2025, (Doc. 29-1, p. 7), and from the EEOC on September 3, 2025,
(Doc. 29-1, p. 2).
In its Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because Plaintiff
failed to plead sufficient facts to support plausible claims for each count. (Doc. 30) Defendant
specifically argues that claims under the MHRA should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to
obtain a valid right-to-sue notice from the MCHR and improperly split her administrative claims
by filing a second Charge while the first one remained pending. (Doc. 30, pp. 2-5) With respect
to Plaintiff’s federal claims, Defendant contends that the Amended Complaint contains conclusory
allegations, fails to adequately allege discriminatory intent or causation, and does not plead facts
sufficient to establish retaliation, hostile work environment, or constructive discharge claims.
(Doc. 30, pp. 5-9) 	Plaintiff filed suggestions in opposition2 (Doc. 31), Defendant filed a reply
(Doc. 32), and the motion is now ripe for review.
1 The First Amended Complaint at Doc. 29 consists of 21 pages and 21 attachments, totaling 186 pages.
2 Plaintiff argues in her suggestions in opposition that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is untimely. Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint was electronically filed on March 31, 2026, (Doc. 29), and Defendant’s motion filed April 14, 2026, (Doc.
30) is timely.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-87 (2009). To survive
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege facts sufficient to “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court “must
liberally construe [the] complaint in favor of the plaintiff.” Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 862 (8th Cir. 2010). In doing so, the Court will “accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint, and review the complaint to determine whether its
allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517
F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55). However, the Court need not
accept as true legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint. See Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014); see
also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) 	A pro se
plaintiff must nonetheless “allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Sandknop v.
Mo. Dep’t. of Corr., 932 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 2019).
III. 	ANALYSIS
For the purposes of the present motion, the following allegations from Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint are deemed true. 	Plaintiff, a 62-year-old African American woman, worked for
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Defendant for more than thirty years, including over twenty years as a Head Start Family
Advocate. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 2, 14–20) Plaintiff had a strong work history with positive evaluations
and no prior discipline. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff suffered permanent injuries from a 2007 automobile
accident and Defendant was aware of her medical restrictions, and that her position historically
did not require physically demanding labor. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 21–29)
Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 2023, after reporting discrimination, safety concerns, and
alleged policy violations, Defendant subjected her to hostility, retaliation and increased scrutiny,
excluded her from meetings and workplace communications, failed to timely implement approved
accommodations, and assigned her duties outside her medical restrictions. 	(Doc. 29, ¶¶ 30–45,
60–79) Plaintiff further alleges that supervisors routinely ignored and excluded her, omitted her
from meetings and team communications, spoke to her in a demeaning manner, and isolated her
from coworkers, creating a hostile work environment. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 38, 60–62, 74) Plaintiff also
alleges 	that 	similarly 	situated 	white 	employees 	received 	more 	favorable 	treatment 	and
accommodations. 	(Doc. 29, ¶¶ 44, 52-59, 83-85), and that Defendant denied her promotional
opportunities in favor of less qualified white candidates and subjected her to unwarranted
investigations and discipline (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 46–59). 	Plaintiff alleges the working conditions
ultimately forced her to retire on December 31, 2024. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 63–79)
A. MHRA Claims
In each count of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, she alleges violations of the MHRA. (See
Doc. 29, ¶¶ 80–121) 	Defendant argues that each MHRA claim must be dismissed because the
MCHR dismissed Plaintiff’s first Charge and issued a determination of no violation, and that the
Notice of Right to Sue issued by the MCHR with respect to Plaintiff’s second Charge is invalid.
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To initiate a claim under the MHRA, a party must exhaust administrative remedies such
that they “file an administrative complaint with MCHR and either adjudicate the claim through the
MCHR or obtain a right-to-sue letter.” Stuart v. Gen. Motors. Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 630 (8th Cir.
2000).
As an initial matter, Defendant argues that the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s second
Charge constitute impermissible claim-splitting because they are related to or growing out of the
same subject matter as the first Charge. 	Here, however, the subject matter of Plaintiff’s two
charges is distinguishable, at least to some degree. 	In the first Charge, Plaintiff alleges
discrimination that occurred from July 24, 2023, to February 15, 2024, and specifically alleges
age, disability, and race discrimination, as well as retaliation. 	(Doc. 30-1) 	While the second
Charge also alleges age, disability, and race discrimination, as well as retaliation, the second
Charge is based on allegations from July 15, 2024, until December 31, 2024. 	(Doc. 30-2)
Although the bases for alleged discrimination are the same in both charges, and some of the issues
appear to be a continuation of the alleged discrimination Plaintiff identified in the first Charge, the
second Charge concerns a later time range as to some or all events, and includes some different
alleged events and allegations of constructive discharge and failure to promote. Since the second
Charge is premised fully, or in large part, on separate alleged actions occurring after the conduct
identified in the first Charge, the Court cannot conclude at this juncture that the second Charge
constitutes impermissible claim-splitting for purposes of this motion.
That said, in order to bring a lawsuit, Plaintiff must file her change with the appropriate
administrative agency and receive a Notice of Right to Sue. Stuart, 217 F.3d at 630. 	The MCHR
issued a “Determination of No Violation,” rather than a Notice of Right to Sue, stating that the
Executive Director of the Commission was “unable to conclude that there were any violations of
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the MHRA” and informing Plaintiff of her right to appeal the decision in Missouri state circuit
court. (Doc. 30-3) Based on the information before the Court, Plaintiff has not filed an appeal of
the MCHR decision and therefore has not satisfied the prerequisite steps to bring a lawsuit with
respect to the allegations in her first Charge. Accordingly, any MHRA claims in Counts I through
VIII based on conduct alleged between July 24, 2023, to February 15, 2024, in the first Charge are
dismissed. Allen v. Fam. Counseling Ctr., No. 1:09-CV-0064-CDP, 2010 WL 254925, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 19, 2010) (dismissing a plaintiff’s MHRA claims where she received a “no probable
cause” letter from the MCHR, finding that the appropriate remedy was to appeal the decision to
the MCHR). At this stage, Plaintiff may proceed only with MHRA claims arising from the second
Charge.
B. Federal Claims
With respect to Plaintiff’s federal claims, Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not
adequately allege race, age, and disability discrimination, and that she has not adequately pleaded
retaliation, hostile work environment claims, failure to promote, and constructive discharge
theories. 	At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not plead facts establishing a prima facie case
because the prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. Wilson v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 850 F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002)). 	A plaintiff need only allege facts sufficient to raise a reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 371. However, “elements
of the prima facie case are [not] irrelevant to a plausibility determination in a discrimination suit.
Instead, such elements are part of the background against which a plausibility determination should
be made.” 	Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal citations and
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quotations omitted). This issue at this stage is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether the plaintiff is entitled to pursue her claims further. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
1. 	Title VII Race Discrimination – Count I
To establish a race discrimination claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must show that: (1)
she belongs to a protected class; (2) she met her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of
discrimination. 	Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2014). 	Defendant
specifically argues that Plaintiff merely alleges she was treated differently than Caucasian
employees without alleging facts to support discriminatory animus, and that Plaintiff’s allegations
regarding the preselection of white employees for promotion are conclusory and do not give rise
to an inference of discrimination.
Plaintiff, however, does not rely solely on a generalized assertion that she was treated
differently than employees of another race. Instead, she alleges that she had decades of satisfactory
employment and qualifications, yet was denied promotions, and that Defendant preselected less-
qualified white employees for the positions for which Plaintiff applied. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 14–20, 50–
59, 80–85) 	Plaintiff also alleges there was disparate treatment with respect to race in the
implementation of ADA accommodations and enforcement of discipline. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 44, 71–72,
83–85) 	At the pleading stage, these allegations plausibly support an inference of race
discrimination sufficient to survive dismissal. 	Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is
denied as to the Title VII claim alleged in Count I.
2. 	ADEA - Count II
In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under ADEA, Plaintiff must
show: (1) she is at least forty years of age; (2) she was qualified for her position and met her
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employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action(s); and (4)
“that the circumstances of these actions g[i]ve rise to an inference of discrimination.” Smothers v.
Rowley Masonic Assisted Living Cmty., LLC, 63 F.4th 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2023); see Hester v. Dep’t
of Treas., 137 F.4th 684, 689 (8th Cir. 2025). 	Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations
regarding “younger employees” are generalized, conclusory, and fail to plausibly support an
inference of age discrimination. 	Defendant further asserts that the alleged conduct, such as
assignment of duties, workplace scrutiny, and alleged hostility, does not constitute an adverse
employment action, and that Plaintiff has not exhausted her age-based theories of disparate
treatment.
Plaintiff’s charges, however, expressly identified age discrimination. Although Plaintiff’s
charges did not specifically include allegations that she was described as “too slow” or unable to
“keep[] up like the younger staff,” that she was assigned “tasks inconsistent with her job
description and medical restrictions, while younger and non-disabled employees were not required
to perform similar tasks,” or that “[y]ounger employees were not assigned physically demanding
tasks or subjected to the same scrutiny,” (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 76, 89, 90), Plaintiff alleged in both charges
that younger employees were treated more favorably than she was (see Docs. 30-1, 30-2).
Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that she was not allowed to work in the front office while younger
employees were, and that she believed that she was not interviewed for positions for which she
applied and was qualified because of her age. 	(Docs. 30-1, 30-2) 	The allegations of disparate
treatment in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are reasonably expected to arise from these
allegations in her charges. See Stuart, 217 F.3d at 631. For purposes of assessing this motion to
dismiss, Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to her federal age
discrimination claim.
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Moreover, at the pleading stage, Plaintiff is not required to prove her case; she must only
plead sufficient facts to establish a plausible cause of action. 	Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. at 511.
Plaintiff alleges that she was sixty-two years old, had more than thirty years of service with
Defendant, and was qualified for her position and for promotional opportunities. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 2,
14–20, 50–53) Plaintiff contends that she suffered adverse employment actions, including denial
of promotional opportunities in favor of younger employees. (Doc. 29, ¶ 91) See McKay v. U.S.
Dept. of Transp., 340 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A myriad of cases have recognized that a
failure to promote, like a failure to hire, is an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII
or the ADEA.”); see also Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024) (for an adverse
employment action in the Title VII context, a plaintiff is only required to show they suffered “some
harm” with respect to “an identifiable term or condition of employment.”); Palmer as Tr. of Robert
L. Palmer and Tamara C. Palmer v. Union P. R.R. Co., 139 F.4th 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2025)
(applying “some harm” standard in the ADA context); Milczak v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 102 F.4th
772, 787 (6th Cir. 2024) (applying “some harm” standard in the ADEA context). Plaintiff further
alleges age-related comments that she was “too slow” and not “keeping up like the younger staff.”
(Doc. 29, ¶ 89) These allegations plausibly support an inference of age-based animus sufficient to
survive dismissal. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is denied as to the ADEA claim in Count II.
3. 	ADA – Counts III and IV
Plaintiff alleges two separate ADA claims: (1) disability discrimination and (2) failure to
accommodate. To establish a claim of disability discrimination under ADA, “an employee must
show that she (1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is a qualified individual under
the ADA, and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.” Hill v.
Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Huber v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d
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480, 482 (8th Cir. 2007). 	In ADA failure-to-accommodate cases, a plaintiff must ultimately
“establish both a prima facie case of discrimination based on disability and a failure to
accommodate it.” Hopman v. Union Pac. R.R., 68 F.4th 394, 396 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Moses
v. Dassault Falcon Jet-Wilmington Corp., 894 F.3d 911,923 (8th Cir. 2018)).
Defendant argues that both ADA claims must be dismissed because the Amended
Complaint does not adequately plead that she has an actionable disability under the ADA.
Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff fails to identify with sufficient specificity the nature of her
impairment, how it substantially limits a major life activity, or what she is unable to do as a result
and therefore has not plausibly alleged a disability.
“The ADA defines a disabled person as an individual with a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of that person’s major life activities, an individual who has a
record of such an impairment, or an individual who is regarded as having such an impairment.”
Scheffler v. Dohman, 785 F.3d 1260, 1261 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). “[M]ajor
life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working,” as well as operations of major
bodily functions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Plaintiff alleges she suffered permanent injuries to her back and neck and suffered mobility
issues following a serious automobile accident. (Doc. 29, ¶ 21) Plaintiff further alleges Defendant
received medical documentation identifying restrictions on lifting, bending, pushing, pulling, and
prolonged standing. 	(Doc. 29, ¶ 23) 	These alleged limitations implicate major life activities
expressly recognized under the ADA, including lifting, bending, standing, and working. See 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 	Plaintiff also alleges Defendant was aware of her restrictions for many
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years and historically accommodated them. 	(Doc. 29, ¶¶ 22–29) 	Plaintiff contends Defendant
approved accommodations including a chair and grabber tool but failed to provide them for more
than six months. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 42, 44) Plaintiff further alleges Defendant assigned her physically
demanding duties outside her restrictions despite knowledge of her limitations. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 39–
45, 64, 76) At the pleading stage, these allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege both disability
discrimination and failure to accommodate. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is denied as to the
ADA claims in Counts III and IV.
4. 	Retaliation – Count V
To establish a retaliation claim under Title VII, an employee must show that (1) they
engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) that they suffered an adverse employment action, and
(3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Hester,
137 F.4th at 690. The prima facie elements of retaliation under ADEA and ADA mirror the Title
VII elements. See Moses v. Dassault Falcon Jet-Wilmington Corp, 894 F.3d 911, 924 (8th Cir.
2018) (elements of prima facie case of retaliation under ADA); Calder v. TCI Cablevision of Mo.,
Inc., 298 F.3d 723, 731 (8th Cir. 2002) (elements of prima facie case of retaliation under ADEA).
Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to allege causation and instead relies only on temporal
proximity. 	Plaintiff, however, alleges that she repeatedly reported discrimination, retaliation,
ADA violations, and policy concerns to her supervisors and Human Resources throughout 2023
and 2024. 	(Doc. 29, ¶¶ 30–38, 103–104) Plaintiff further alleges that after engaging in this
protected activity, Defendant initiated allegedly false complaints against her, subjected her to
heightened 	scrutiny 	and 	investigations, 	excluded 	her 	from 	meetings 	and 	workplace
communications, denied promotional opportunities, and intensified hostile treatment. 	(Doc. 29,
¶¶ 38, 46–49, 60, 74–78, 105–106)
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At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not establish a causal connection, however they must
allege facts sufficient to support a plausible inference of retaliatory motive. Wilson, 850 F.3d at
371–72. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding treatment following her protected activity are sufficient
to plausibly state a retaliation claim under Title VII, ADEA, and ADA. Accordingly, Defendant’s
motion is denied as to the Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims of retaliation in Count V.
5. 	Hostile Work Environment – Count VI
To state a prima facie case for hostile work environment, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) she
belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) a causal nexus
exists between the harassment and the protected group status; (4) the harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) her employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take proper action.” Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minnesota,
998 F.3d 789, 799 (8th Cir. 2021) (prima facie elements under Title VII); see also Rickard v.
Swedish Match N.A., Inc., 773 F.3d 181, 184 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting same analysis under Title VII
and ADEA); Ryan v. Capital Contractors, Inc., 679 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 2012) (prima facie
elements under ADA, including that “that [plaintiff] is a member of the class of people protected
by the statute, that [s]he was subject to unwelcome harassment, that the harassment resulted from
[her] membership in the protected class, and that the harassment was severe enough to affect the
terms, conditions, or privileges of [her] employment.”); Stewart v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 196, 481
F.3d 1034, 1042-1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (elements for a claim of retaliatory hostile work environment
under Title VII).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to identify the protected characteristic motivating the
alleged harassment and that the Amended Complaint describes only general workplace conflict,
retaliation, and management decisions insufficient to meet the bar for severity or pervasiveness.
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Here, although Plaintiff does not explicitly allege a causal nexus between her protected
group status and the harassment she received in the five paragraphs under the heading of hostile
work environment (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 108-112), reading the Amended Complaint as a whole, Plaintiff
plausibly alleges that she was subject to harassment and a hostile working environment in various
contexts, and that the hostility she experienced was connected to her race, age, disability, and
protected activity (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 1, 3, 7, 31, 33, 36, 45, 60, 62, 63, 65, 74-79, 82, 89-91, 105, 108-
112, 119). For example, Plaintiff alleges that she is a 62-year-old African-American with a known
disability and asserts throughout the Amended Complaint that Defendant treated similarly situated
employees outside her protected classes more favorably. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 8, 21–25, 42–44, 52-59, 60–
62, 76, 82-85, 88–91, 94–96) She further alleges that Defendant’s conduct constituted a hostile
work environment. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 45, 82, 105)
Against that backdrop, Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to daily hostility, exclusion
from meetings, isolation from coworkers, withholding of information, public humiliation during
the ADA accommodation process, and false accusations of misconduct. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 30-33, 38,
44, 46–49, 60–62, 65) 	Further, Plaintiff alleges that the hostility intensified after she reported
discrimination, ADA violations, and policy concerns to management and Human Resources.
(Doc. 29, ¶¶ 30, 34–38, 49, 62, 104–106) Within weeks of her complaints, Defendant allegedly
initiated multiple false or exaggerated complaints against her and subjected her to increased
scrutiny and investigations. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 46–49)
At the pleading stage, Plaintiff need only allege facts permitting a reasonable inference that
Defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Ash v. Anderson Merchs., LLC, 799 F.3d 957,
960 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotations omitted). Taken together,
these allegations plausibly support a hostile work environment claim at this juncture. Accordingly,
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Defendant’s motion is denied as to the hostile work environment claims in Count VI and to the
extent they arise under other counts, including Count V.
6. 	Failure to Promote – Count VII
Defendant argues that failure to promote (Count VII) is not a stand-alone claim and should
be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot establish discrimination, retaliation, or adverse action.
Plaintiff however can bring a claim for failure to promote under different statutes, if she establishes
that: (1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified and applied for a promotion
to a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) she was not promoted; and (4)
similarly situated employees, not part of the protected group, were promoted instead.” Dougherty
v. Leidos, No. 4:21-CV-01163-MTS, 2023 WL 4864541, at *9 (E.D. Mo. July 31, 2023) (citing
Rose-Maston v. NME Hosps., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 1998)) (failure to promote
elements under Title VII); Avina v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 72 F.4th 839, 843–44 (8th Cir. 2023)
(failure to promote elements under ADEA) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges she was not promoted based on race, age, and retaliation, and that
she applied for multiple promotional opportunities for which she was qualified based on her
decades of experience and positive employment record. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 2, 14–20, 50–53, 114–115,
116) 	Plaintiff further alleges that she was not selected for these positions, despite her
qualifications, and that less qualified employees were selected instead. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 52–54, 57,
84–85, 115) 	These allegations, taken as true, and for purposes of this motion, plausibly state a
failure to promote claim and support a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was denied promotion
due to discriminatory or retaliatory motives. Defendant’s motion is denied as to Count VII.
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7. 	Constructive Discharge – Count VIII
Defendant argues Count VIII should also be dismissed because: (1) it is not a stand-alone
claim; (2) Plaintiff fails to identify the protected characteristic underlying the constructive
discharge theory; and (3) Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that Defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to correct any intolerable working conditions. To state a claim for constructive
discharge, Plaintiff must show that 	“(1) a reasonable person in her situation would find the
working conditions intolerable, and (2) the employer intended to force her to quit. An employee
must, however, grant her employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the intolerable condition
before she terminates her employment.” Bell v. Baptist Health, 60 F.4th 1198, 1203 (8th Cir.
2023) (Title VII constructive discharge elements); see also Betz v. Chertoff, 578 F.3d 929, 936
(8th Cir. 2009) (citing Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2003)
(constructive discharge elements under ADEA); Garrison v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 939 F.3d 937, 943
(8th Cir. 2019) (constructive discharge elements under ADA).
Defendant’s “stand-alone claim” argument is unavailing. Plaintiff specifically references
Title VII, ADA, ADEA, and MHRA in the constructive discharge section of her Amended
Complaint and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of the Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 29, ¶¶ 118–121) If anything, Plaintiff elected to plead in a different section of her Amended
Complaint allegations that otherwise could have been brought under other counts or headings. The
organization of the pleading is not fatal to the allegation. 	Defendant’s argument regarding the
absence of a specifically identified protected characteristic is also unpersuasive at this juncture,
because Plaintiff cross references and incorporates other allegations identifying various protected
classes. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 118-119)
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Plaintiff alleges a continuing course of retaliatory and discriminatory conduct spanning
approximately two years, including repeated assignment of duties outside her medical restrictions,
prolonged failure to implement approved ADA accommodations, false and escalating disciplinary
accusations, exclusion from workplace communications and meetings, and sustained supervisory
hostility and humiliation. 	(Doc. 29, ¶¶ 31–38, 39–45, 46–49, 60–65, 71-72, 74–79, 119–121)
Plaintiff further alleges that these conditions persisted even after HR intervention and internal
complaints, claiming Defendant had notice of the conduct and failed to remedy it, and that she was
forced to retire on December 31, 2024, because no reasonable employee could remain under such
conditions. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 36–38, 62–66, 74-79, 120) 	Plaintiff states that she ultimately resigned
only after the conditions escalated and remained unresolved. (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 7, 63–66, 120)
Taken as true, these allegations support an inference, at this stage, that a reasonable
employee in Plaintiff’s position could have found the working conditions intolerable and that
Defendant had an opportunity to correct the conduct but did not do so. Accordingly, Defendant’s
motion is denied as to Count VIII.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
After careful consideration and for the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 30) the MHRA claim(s) is granted with respect to the factual allegations contained
in Plaintiff’s first Charge covering the date range of July 24, 2023, to February 15, 2024, for which
Plaintiff did not receive a Notice of Right to Sue. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s MHRA claims from her first Charge of Discrimination are
dismissed. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in all other respects. 	It is
further
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ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Order to Plaintiff
via regular mail and a separate copy by certified mail, return receipt requested.
/s/ Jill A. Morris
JILL A. MORRIS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 4:26-cv-00016-JAM Document 36 Filed 06/27/26 Page 17 of 17