Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION
SUMMER ROSE BENNETT, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 3:25-cv-05014-MDH
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of 	)
the Social Security Administration, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Summer Rose Bennett’s appeal of Defendant Social Security
Administration Commissioner’s (“Commissioner”) denial of her application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II and supplemental security income under
Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies, and the
matter is now ripe for judicial review. After carefully reviewing the record, the Court finds that
the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision is AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II on July 1, 2020,
and for supplemental security income (“SSI”) payments under Title XVI on August 10, 2021.
Plaintiff was born on May 30, 1981, and amended her alleged onset date of disability as of August
8, 2019. (Tr. 86 and 99). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
fibromyalgia syndrome, cervical spine degenerative changes, thoracic spine degenerative changes,
lumbar degenerative changes, degenerative changes of the knees (status-post right knee meniscus
repair), chronic ulcer, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), depressive disorder, generalized
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anxiety disorder, borderline personality disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Tr.
89). The ALJ additionally found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments listed in or medically equal to one contained in 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. (Tr. 91). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except
lift, carry, push, and pull 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds
frequently; stand and walk in combination for approximately 2 hours total in an 8-
hour workday with normal breaks; and sit for approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour
workday. She is able to occasionally climb ramps and stairs; occasionally climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The
claimant is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; able to
sustain attention and concentration to carry out simple tasks for 2 hours at a time
with customary breaks throughout an 8-hour workday; occasionally interact with
the public, coworkers, and supervisors; and respond appropriately to occasional
changes in work-related tasks and station.
(Tr. 93). The ALJ found that the Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work as a home
health attendant and salesclerk. (Tr. 99). Relying on the vocational expert testimony, the ALJ
concluded that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the
Plaintiff could have performed, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC.
Id. Consequently, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 100).
STANDARD
The Court’s role in reviewing an ALJ’s decision is to determine whether the “findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1042-
43 (8th Cir. 2007), citing Haggard v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir.1999). 	“Substantial
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the
Commissioner’s conclusion.” Id. “The fact that some evidence may support a conclusion opposite
from that reached by the Commissioner does not alone permit our reversal of the Commissioner’s
decision.” Id., citing Kelley v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir.2004); Travis v. Astrue, 477
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F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2007). 	If the record contains substantial evidence to support the
Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse the decision simply because substantial
evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome. 	Krogmeier v.
Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002). In other words, the Court cannot reverse simply
because it would have decided the case differently. Id., citing Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213
(8th Cir. 1993). Further, the Court defers to the ALJ's determinations of the credibility of witness
testimony, as long as the ALJ’s determinations are supported by good reasons and substantial
evidence. Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 2006).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues one point on appeal. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ identified no medical
evidence regarding the ability to function in the workplace that supported the ALJ’s RFC findings,
and instead determined the RFC based upon his own interpretation of the medical evidence.
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ provided a narrative discussion but did not provide an
explanation of how the medical and other evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC. In support Plaintiff
states that the record did not contain a medical opinion regarding physical functional capacity from
a treating provider nor did it include a medical opinion from any consultative examiner regarding
physical or mental functioning as no such exams were obtained by the ALJ or other agency
personnel. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not obtain the opinion of a reviewing medical expert
during or after the hearing. Plaintiff also argues that the non-examining reviewing medical
consultants at the initial and reconsideration levels of the administrative process were no able to
provide an opinion on functioning due to “insufficient evidence” at the time of their review.
The Defendant argues that there is substantial evidence that supports the ALJ’s RFC
finding in light of the ALJ’s assessment of the objective evidence, the medical opinions, and
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Plaintiff’s self-reports. The Defendant argues that the ALJ considered radiographic studies and
objective observations of muscle strength, range of motion, and gait that provided some medical
evidence supporting the ALJ’s physical RFC findings. The Defendant also argues the ALJ
considered the many normal mental status findings and medical observations of concentration and
cooperation providing some medical evidence supporting the ALJ’s mental RFC findings. As the
Defendant states that some medical evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, Plaintiff’s argument for
greater articulation and development should be rejected.
Ultimately, the RFC determination is a “medical question,” that “must be supported by
some medical evidence of [Plaintiff’s] ability to function in the workplace.” Combs v. Berryhill,
878 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 2008)).
But, the RFC is a decision reserved to the agency such that it is neither delegated to medical
professionals nor determined exclusively based on the contents of medical records. Noerper v.
Saul, 964 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2020); see also Ellis v. Barnhart, 392 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir.
2005) (“A medical source opinion that an applicant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work,’ however, ...
is not the type of ‘medical opinion’ to which the Commissioner gives controlling weight.”).
“[A]lthough medical source opinions are considered in assessing RFC, the final determination of
RFC is left to the Commissioner,” id., “based on all the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own description of [her]
limitations,” Combs, 878 F.3d at 646 (citation omitted) (alteration in original). Similarly, the
underlying determination as to the severity of impairments is not based exclusively on medical
evidence or subjective complaints. Rather, regulations set forth assorted categories of evidence
that may help shed light on the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms. Similar
factors guide the analysis of whether a claimant's subjective complaints are consistent with the
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medical evidence. Noerper v. Saul, 964 F.3d 738, 745 (8th Cir. 2020); see also Polaski v. Heckler,
739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984) (listing factors such as: “the claimant's daily activities,” “the
duration, frequency and intensity of the pain,” “precipitating and aggravating factors,” “dosage,
effectiveness and side effects of medication,” and “functional restrictions”).
I. 	Physical Medical Findings in the RFC
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s RFC. Regarding the
objective findings relating to Plaintiff’s physical impairments the ALJ took into account the
Plaintiff’s magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) results, her lumbar x-ray and MRI results,
cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine computed tomography (“CT”), physical examinations,
bilateral knee x-ray, gastrointestinal endoscopy, and physical examinations. (Tr. 95–96). The ALJ
used these findings, in conjunction with other information in the record, to find that Plaintiff could:
Perform sedentary work except lift, carry, push, and pull 10 pounds occasionally
and 	less 	than 	10 	pounds 	frequently; 	stand 	and 	walk 	in 	combination 	for
approximately 2 hours total in an 8-hour workday with normal breaks; and sit for
approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She is able to occasionally climb
ramps and stars; occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and occasionally
stoop, kneel, crouch, and craw.
(Tr. 97). The Court finds that the ALJ’s review and ultimate findings of Plaintiff’s physical
limitations in the RFC were based on substantial evidence in the record based in part on Plaintiff’s
medical records. While the Plaintiff may wish for a medical provider to opine on Plaintiff’s
residual capacity or for a more detailed articulation on how the medical records tie into the ultimate
findings of physical limitations, they are not necessary for the ALJ to determine Plaintiff’s RFC.
In review of the ALJ’s physical RFC, it is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
II. 	Mental Medical Findings in the RFC
The ALJ’s decision as to the Plaintiff’s mental impairments for purposes of disability
determination stated:
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Overall, the record as a whole contains some objective findings related to the
claimant’s impairments, but not to the level of severity alleged. While there was
evidence that she had some abnormal mental status findings as noted above, these
symptoms were infrequent (Exs. C6F/7, 17, 19, 26, 34, 51, 57; C19F/14, 17;
C23F/9; C38F). The claimant was treated conservatively with therapy and
medication (Exs. C6F/3, 6, 8; C19/10). She reported things were going well and/or
pretty good (Ex. C6F/3 5, 9, 30, 41, 43). The claimant was noted as stable (Ex.
C27F/3, 4). In April 2023, it was noted that the claimant was not following with
any behavioral health (Ex. C31F/34). In addition, she often had normal mental
status evaluations (Exs. C2F/12, 15, 30, 43, 49, 55, 61, 63, 141; C3F/10; C4F; C5F;
C6F/7, 15, 51, 57, 66; C17/3, 8, 24; C23F/9; C30F/8).
Therefore, to accommodate the claimant’s objective findings and her treatment
history, I find that the claimant is able to understand, remember, and carry out
simple instructions; able to sustain attention and concentration to carry out simple
tasks for 2 hours at a time with customary breaks throughout an 8-hour workday;
occasionally interact with the public, coworkers, and supervisors; and respond
appropriately to occasional changes in work-related tasks and station.
The medical record contains no objective medical findings to support any further
restrictions in the residual functional capacity. Subjective complaints alone are
insufficient. The record does not contain any non-conclusory opinions, supported
by clinical or laboratory evidence, from treating or examining physicians indicating
that the claimant is currently disabled. The objective medical evidence of record
simply does not support the severity of limitation alleged by the claimant.
(Tr. 97–98). The Court finds that the ALJ’s review and ultimate findings of Plaintiff’s mental
limitation in the RFC were based on substantial evidence in the record, based in part on Plaintiff’s
medical records. Here, the ALJ explicitly stated that there was evidence of some abnormal mental
status findings, they were infrequent and Plaintiff was being treated with therapy and medication.
The ALJ reviewed the mental status evaluations and made his determinations about Plaintiff’s
mental limitations in the RFC. Further, the ALJ explicitly noted that the medical record contained
no objective medical findings to support further restrictions, not that there was insufficient medical
evidence to support the limitation already in place. In sum, the ALJ’s mental RFC is supported by
substantial evidence in the record. For the reasons stated, the ALJ’s RFC is affirmed.
CONCLUSION
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For the reasons set forth, the ALJ’s final determination is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 12, 2026
/s/ Douglas Harpool ________________
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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