Mayhew et al v. Sadovyh et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
BETH MAYHEW and MATTHEW
MAYHEW,
)
)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:26-CV-04029-WJE
)
VLADIMIR SADOVYH, et al., 	)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Beth and Matthew Mayhew and Defendants Nova
First, LLC (“Nova First”), Globex Transport, Inc. (“Globex”), and Vladimir Sadoyvh (collectively
“Movants”) Joint Motion to Remand to State Court.1 (Doc. 18). Defendants Indemnity Insurance
Company of North America (“Chubb”), Mohave Transportation Insurance Company (“Mohave”),
and EMA Risk Services (“EMA”) have filed suggestions in opposition to the motion (Docs. 28,
29, 30), to which Movants have filed a reply (Doc. 42). For the reasons set forth below, the
Movants’ Joint Motion to Remand to State Court is GRANTED. Because the motion to remand is
granted, all other pending motions are DENIED as MOOT.
I. 	Background
This action arises from a trailer-truck accident between Beth Mayhew and Mr. Sadoyvh on
February 24, 2023. (Doc. 1-2 at 3). At the time of the accident, Mr. Sadoyvh was employed by
Nova First and Globex. (Id. at 4). Nova First and Globex owned the tractor-trailer. (Id.). Chubb
1 With the consent of the parties, this case was assigned to the Chief United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
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and Mohave jointly issued the insurance policy that afforded coverage to Nova First, Globex, and
Mr. Sadovyh for the claims resulting from the accident. (Id. at 4-5). EMA is a third-party insurance
administrator. (Id. at 5). Chubb and Mohave investigated the claims arising from the accident
through EMA. (Id. at 6).
On July 19, 2023, Ms. Mayhew brought suit in the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri
against Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh for negligence in causing the injuries she sustained
during the accident. (Id. at 7). Ms. Mayhew’s husband, Matthew Mayhew, joined the action and
alleged claims of loss and suffering resulting from his wife’s inability to perform household and
family tasks, chores, activities, and services. (Id. at 4). On November 26, 2025, following a jury
trial, the Honorable Cotton Walker entered judgment for the Mayhews against Nova First, Globex,
and Mr. Sadovyh in the total amount of $92,117,375.34, plus costs in the amount of $11,682.12.
(Id. at 13-16).
II. 	Discussion
On January 7, 2026, Mr. and Mrs. Mayhew filed a Petition in the Circuit Court of Cole
County, Missouri for equitable garnishment and alleged a violation of Missouri Revised Statute §
379.200. (Doc. 1-2). The Petition names Mr. Sadovyh, Nova First, Globex, Chubb, Mohave, and
EMA as defendants. (Id.). On February 5, 2026, EMA filed a timely notice of removal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. (Doc 1). Defendants Chubb and Mohave consented to
removal. (Docs. 19, 27). Defendants Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh do not consent to
removal. (See Doc. 18).
On February 18, 2026, the Movants filed the instant Joint Motion to Remand to State Court
claiming that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because those three defendants do not
consent to removal. (Doc. 18). Chubb, Mohave, and EMA filed suggestions in opposition to the
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Joint Motion to Remand. (Docs. 28, 29, 30). The Movants filed a reply reasserting the arguments
raised in the Joint Motion to Remand. (Doc. 43). Also pending before the Court is the Movants’
Motion for Sanctions against EMA (Doc. 43), to which EMA has filed suggestions in opposition
(Doc. 49). Finally, Defendants Chubb, Mohave, and EMA have filed Motions to Dismiss and
suggestions in support, (Docs. 6, 7, 31, 32, 33, 34), to which Plaintiffs have filed replies (Docs.
40, 41). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that remand is required and denies all other
pending motions as moot.
A. Legal Standard
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Little
Rock Cardiology Clinic, P.A., 551 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir 2009). A federal district court may
exercise removal jurisdiction only when the court would have had original jurisdiction had the
action initially been filed there. Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 922 (8th Cir.
2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)). A plaintiff may move to remand the case if the district court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Federal district courts have original diversity jurisdiction over cases “between . . . citizens
of different states” when “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive
of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction asserted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 may be maintained only where there is complete diversity, that is “where no defendant
holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.” In re Prempro Prods.
Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010). If the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are
met, a defendant may remove a case filed in state court to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The
removing 	party 	has 	the 	burden 	of 	establishing 	federal 	subject-matter 	jurisdiction 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence. In re Prempro, 591 F.3d at 620. If there are any doubts about
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whether removal is proper, the federal court must remand the case to state court. Bradley
Timberland Res. v. Bradley Lumber Co., 712 F.3d 401, 405 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilkinson v.
Shackelford, 478 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 2007)).
In a civil action removed under section 1441(a), all defendants must join in or consent to
removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(a); see Christiansen v. West Bank Cmty. School Dist., 674 F.3d
927, 933 (8th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that the unanimity requirement prevents duplicative litigation
and prevents one defendant from imposing his choice of forum on his co-defendants). If any
properly joined defendant fails to consent, removal is defective and the case must be remanded to
state court. Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Chicago, R.I. &
P. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900)).
B. Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh are not nominal parties.
There is no dispute that this case has complete diversity of citizenship and meets the
amount-in-controversy requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Rather, the Movants argue that remand
is appropriate because all defendants must consent to removal, and Nova First, Globex, and Mr.
Sadovyh do not consent to the removal of this action. (See Doc. 18). Chubb and EMA argue that
Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh are nominal parties, so their consent is not required. (Doc.
28 at 2-7; Doc. 29 at 6-8). Mohave concurs with Chubb’s arguments. (Doc. 30). The Court finds
that Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh are not nominal parties. Therefore, their lack of consent
makes removal defective and necessitates remand to state court.
A nominal party is a defendant against whom no real relief is sought. Thorn v. Amalgamated
Transit Union, 305 F.3d 826, 833 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Percherski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 636
F.2d 1156, 1161 (8th Cir. 1981)). A nominal party’s consent to removal is not required. Thorn, 305
F.3d at 833; see also Bradley v. Md. Cas. Co., 382 F.2d 415, 419 (8th Cir. 1967) (“[T]he presence
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of nominal or formal or unnecessary parties has no controlling significance for removal
purposes.”).
The equitable garnishment statute at issue, Missouri Revised Statute § 379.200, provides
Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any person, firm or corporation . . .
the judgment creditor shall be entitled to have the insurance money, provided for in
the contract of insurance between the insurance company . . . and the defendant,
applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, and if the judgment is not satisfied
within thirty days after the date when it is rendered, the judgment creditor may
proceed in equity against the defendant and the insurance company to reach and
apply the insurance money to the satisfaction of the judgment.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 379.200 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit has held that the text of § 379.200
makes judgment debtors statutorily necessary parties. Glover v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 984
F.2d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1993). Because this statute requires judgment creditors to proceed against
both the insured judgment debtor and the insurer, federal courts throughout this Circuit have
rejected the argument that the insured judgment debtor is a nominal defendant to an equitable
garnishment proceeding for diversity purposes. See, e.g., Roughton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
No. 20-CV-00238-W-SRB, 2020 WL 4283921, at *2-3 (W.D. Mo. July 27, 2020) (collecting
cases).
Chubb and Mohave argue that Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh need not consent to
removal of this § 379.200 action because they are “improperly-joined, [sic] nominal parties” and
the Petition seeks no relief from them. (Doc. 28 at 6-7; Doc. 30 at 1-2). EMA asserts the same.
(Doc. 29 at 6-8). As judgment debtors, Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadvoyh are not nominal
parties. By its express terms, § 379.200 requires that plaintiffs name both the judgment debtor and
the insurance company as defendants in an equitable garnishment action. Courts in the Eighth
Circuit have routinely held that a judgment creditor is required to join both the judgment debtor
and the insurance company in actions under § 379.200. Reed v. ASSURANT, INC., No. 13-01183-
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CV-W-GAF, 2014 WL 12607826, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 2014). The fact that insurance may
ultimately fund the judgment does not change who is legally liable or suggest that no meaningful
relief is sought from Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh. Accordingly, Nova First, Globex, and
Mr. Sadovyh are statutorily necessary parties. See Glover, 984 F.2d at 261 (holding that judgment
debtors must be joined in actions brought under § 379.200).
The Court rejects Chubb, Mohave, and EMA’s argument that Nova First, Globex, and Mr.
Sadovyh are merely nominal defendants. They are necessary and indispensable parties under the
text of § 379.200 and supporting case law. Because Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh are not
nominal parties, their consent is required for removal.
C. Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh are not fraudulently joined.
In the alternative, Chubb and Mohave argue that Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh are
fraudulently joined parties because Plaintiffs’ Petition for Damages is not a proper petition for
equitable garnishment under § 379.200 as a matter of law. (See Docs. 28, 30). They contend that
the Petition is improper because (1) the Petition contains allegations irrelevant to an equitable
garnishment action; (2) the state court judgment is not final; and (3) EMA is a third-party claim
administrator, not an insurance company, so claims against a party who cannot be in possession of
the insurance money do not actually allege equitable garnishment. (Doc. 28 at 3-6; Doc. 30 at 1-
2). EMA raises the same arguments and asserts that there is no cognizable claim against it in the
Petition. (Doc. 29 at 4-5). The Movants maintain that Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh are
not fraudulently joined, and contend that the arguments raised by Chubb, Mohave, and EMA
improperly ask the Court to determine the merits of a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 42 at 2-7). The
Court finds that Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh are not fraudulently joined.
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A party is fraudulently joined when the claim against them is frivolous or otherwise
illegitimate. Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003). A fraudulently joined
party’s consent is not needed for removal. See Couzens v. Donohue, 854 F.3d 508, 513 (8th Cir.
2017). When evaluating whether a party is fraudulently joined, “‘the district court’s task is limited
to determining whether there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might
impose liability based upon the facts involved.’” Junk v. Terminix Int’l Co., 628 F.3d 439, 445 (8th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Filla, 336 F.3d at 811). If there is a “reasonable basis in fact and law supporting
the claim, the joinder is not fraudulent.” Filla, 336 F.3d at 810.
As discussed previously, Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh are judgment debtors and
are therefore statutorily necessary parties to this equitable garnishment action. There is a
reasonable basis in both fact and law supporting the equitable garnishment claims against them.
The claims against them are not fraudulent or otherwise illegitimate. See Kendall v. N. Assur. Co.
of Am., No. 09-0539-CV-W-GAF, 2009 WL 2632757, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2009) (“[I]t cannot
be said that such joinder [of judgment debtors] is fraudulent as a reasonable basis in fact and law
is present.”). Therefore, they are not fraudulently joined defendants.
Chubb, Mohave, and EMA’s remaining arguments concern the legal sufficiency of the
Plaintiffs’ Petition. (Doc. 28 at 3-6; Doc. 29 at 4-5; Doc. 30 at 1-2). But the Eighth Circuit “requires
the defendant to do more than merely prove that the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed pursuant
to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion” to show that a party has been fraudulently joined. Palmer v. Nash, No.
4:25-CV-392-ZMB, 2025 WL 2959226, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2025). It is not for this Court to
decide the validity of the underlying judgment or sufficiency of the pleadings. There is a reasonable
basis for predicting that state law might impose liability upon Nova First, Globex, and Mr.
Sadovyh. See Junk, 628 F.3d at 445; Filla, 336 F.3d at 911. Section 379.200 requires that they be
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named as defendants. Glover, 984 F.2d at 261. Accordingly, the Court finds that Nova First,
Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh have not been fraudulently joined.
D. Without consent to removal from Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh, the case must
be remanded.
If a civil action is removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), all defendants must join in the
removal or consent to it. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(a). If any properly joined defendant fails to
consent to removal, then removal is defective. Pritchett, 512 F.3d at 1062.
This case was removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §ֻ§ 1332, 1441(a), and 1446(b).
(Doc. 1 at 1). Nova First, Globex, and Mr. Sadovyh are properly joined defendants whose consent
is necessary for removal. See Pritchett, 512 F.3d at 1062. Because they do not consent, the removal
is defective and remand is required.
III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Joint Motion to Remand to State Court
(Doc. 18) should be GRANTED. Further, the outstanding Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 6, 31, 33)
are DENIED as MOOT. Finally, the outstanding Motion for Sanctions is DENIED as MOOT.
(Doc. 43). Accordingly,
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ and Defendants Nova First, Globex, and
Vladimir Sadovyh’s Joint Motion to Remand to State Court is GRANTED as set forth herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be remanded to the Circuit Court of Cole
County, Missouri.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant EMA Risk Services, LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss, Defendant Indemnity Insurance Company of North America’s Motion to Dismiss, and
Defendant Mohave Transportation Insurance Company’s Motion to Dismiss are DENIED as
MOOT.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ and Defendants Nova First, Globex, and
Vladimir Sadovyh’s Motion for Sanctions is DENIED as MOOT.
Dated this 6th day of April, 2026, at Jefferson City, Missouri.
Willie J. Epps, Jr.
Willie J. Epps, Jr.
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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