Winterbauer v. City of St. Louis, Missouri et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CHRISTINA WINTERBAUER., 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:25-cv-00390-MAL
)
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court are two motions to file documents out of time, Doc. 14, and one motion
to substitute a party under Rule 25, Doc. 8. In this case, Plaintiff Christina Winterbauer claims
that the City of St. Louis (City) and the Civil Service Commission of the City of St. Louis (Civil
Service Commission) violated her free speech rights when she was fired her from her job as a
civilian employee at the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Division, Department of Public Safety, for
making certain Facebook comments. Doc. 1. Winterbauer sued the Civil Service Commission by
its members Dean Kpere-Daibo, Bettye Battle Turner, and Steven M. Barney (“Civil Service
Commission Members”) and the City. Doc. 1.
On March 26, 2025, the City filed a motion to dismiss. The court did not send an electronic
notice to Winterbauer regarding the motion to dismiss. 	Doc. 3. 	The City claims it sent
Winterbauer a copy, Doc. 3, but Winterbauer asserts she never received one. Doc. 14. The court
believes both parties acted in good faith and have a reasonable basis for their respective
understandings.
On July 29, 2025, several nonparties — the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners and
its individual board members (Brad Arteaga, Sonya Jenkins-Gray, Edward McVey, Chris
Saracino, and Mayor Cara Spencer)—moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c) to substitute themselves
as the only named defendants in this matter (as opposed to the City and the Civil Service
Commission members). Doc. 8. Winterbauer responded on October 22, 2025—71 days after the
deadline had passed. Doc 12. The Court issued a show cause order as to why the Court should not
strike the response as untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).
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On October 24, 2025, Winterbauer responded to the Show Cause order. 	Doc. 14. 	Her
response also included requests to file both her opposition to the motion to dismiss and her
opposition to the Rule 25 motion out of time. Doc. 14.
This Court takes up both motions for leave to file out of time, Doc. 14, and the motion to
substitute party Doc. 8. 	For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to file the
response to the motion to dismiss out of time. The Court DENIES the motion to file the response
to the Rule 25 motion out of time. 	The Rule 25 motion to substitute parties is HELD IN
ABEYANCE until the movants follow the requirements of Rule 25 and serve a notice of hearing.
I. 	Motions for Extension of Time
A. Legal Standard for Extensions of Time After Time Expires
Rule 6(b) states in relevant part that “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified
time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time” on a party’s motion “after the time has
expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). 	“The
determination of whether neglect is excusable is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all
relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission.” 	Chorosevic v. MetLife Choices, 600
F.3d 934, 947 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Relevant considerations include
the danger of prejudice to the opposing party, the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and
whether the movant acted in good faith.” Spirit Lake Tribe v. Jaeger, 5 F.4th 849 (8th Cir. 2021).
B. Application of Law to Facts
1. 	Winterbauer’s delay in responding to the motion to dismiss was due
to excusable neglect.
With respect to the first element, prejudice, the Court finds that any prejudice to the City
is minimal. With respect to the second element—the length of the delay—was fairly long (more
than seven months), but not so long that it is prejudicial to the City. 	With respect to the third
element—the reason for the delay—Winterbauer states that she did not respond to the motion to
dismiss because she was not served with it. If true, this would have been at least understandable.
With respect to the fourth element, the Court believes that Winterbauer acted in good faith.
Though the City claims that it served Winterbauer, the Court believes that both parties honestly
believe their side of the story and have reasons for their beliefs. The dispute is based on an honest
mistake by one party, and both parties are acting in good faith.
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For these reasons, this Court grants Winterbauer’s motion for extension of time to file an
opposition to the motion to dismiss and directs that she do so by November 26.
2. 	The delay in responding to the motion to substitute parties was not
due to excusable neglect.
Winterbauer asserts that she did not respond to the Motion to Substitute party, Doc. 8,
because at the time it was filed, she did not oppose it, and she did not believe that she had to
respond. Since that time, Winterbauer asserts that she has changed her mind. But changing one’s
mind about whether one opposes a motion is not “excusable neglect.” See Huggins v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2010) (making an intentional decision not
to do something is not “excusable neglect”).
II. 	Motion to Substitute Party
A. Legal Standard for Substituting Parties
Rule 25(c) states that “[i]f an interest is transferred, the action may be continued by or
against the original party unless the court, on motion, orders the transferee to be substituted in the
action or joined with the original party. The motion must be served as provided in Rule 25(a)(3).”
Rule 25(a)(3) states, in relevant part: “A motion to substitute, together with a notice of hearing,
must be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and on nonparties as provided in Rule 4.”
“The decision whether to substitute parties lies within the discretion of the trial judge and
he may refuse to substitute parties in an action even if one of the parties so moves.” Froning’s,
Inc. v. Johnston Feed Serv., Inc., 568 F.2d 108, 110 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978).
B. Application of Law to Facts
Here, the nonparties who filed the motion to intervene did not serve a notice of hearing as
Rule 25(a)(3) requires. This Court would like to have a hearing before ruling on this motion. Its
rationale is as follows:
(1) 	Mo. Rev. Stat. § 84.325.2 requires the St. Louis municipal police department to
“transfer to the [St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners] title and ownership of
all indebtedness and assets,”
(2) 	It is also clear that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 84.325.3 requires “the state [to] accept
responsibility, ownership, and liability as successor-in-interest for contractual
obligations and other lawful obligations of the [St. Louis] municipal police
department.”
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(3) 	But here, Winterbauer sued the City of St. Louis and its Civil Service Commission
(through its Members), not St. Louis’s municipal police department. So it is unclear
why the State would have to accept responsibility for the suit against the City and
the Civil Service Commission.
(4) 	Further, case law suggests that police departments “are simply departments or
subdivisions of cities” and so “are not juridical entities suable as such.” Ketchum
v. City of West Memphis, Arkansas, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992); El-Alamin v.
Radke, 369 Fed. Appx. 770, at *1 (8th Cir. 2010). And if police departments can
never be sued, this raises the question whether § 84.325.3 transfers liabilities
stemming from lawsuits relating to police departments to the State.
(5) 	And finally, the doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that States do not
voluntarily take on liabilities (as the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners and
its individual board members allege is happening here) absent an unequivocally
clear statement of intent to do so. 	McNeill Trucking Co. v. Missouri State Hwy.
and Transp. Comm’n, 35 S.W.3d 846, 848 (Mo. 2001) (because “the sovereign
cannot be sued without its consent,” “statutory provisions that waive sovereign
immunity must be strictly construed”).
* 	* 	*
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Respond to the Motion to Dismiss
(contained in Doc. 14) is GRANTED, and the Motion to Respond to the Motion to Substitute
Parties (contained in Doc. 14), is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Substitute Party, Doc. 8, is HELD IN
ABEYANCE until the movants follow the requirements of Rule 25 and serve a notice of hearing.
If the notice of hearing is not filed by November 25, 2025, the Court will deny this motion without
prejudice.
Dated this 18 th day of November 2025.
MARIA A. LANAHAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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