USA v. Tyler

4:24-cr-00654Moed11 feb 2026

Testo completo

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	) 	No. 4:24-cr-00654-SEP
)
DARIUS TYLER, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Government’s Motion in Limine, Doc. [82], which seeks to
exclude two exhibits added to Defendant’s Exhibit List, Doc. [80], after the Court’s ruling, Doc.
[79], on the Government’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Statements Made by Witness Montrell
Palmer, Doc. [60]. After hearing argument on the motion, the Court indicated on the oral record
that it would be granted. This Order follows, modifying that preliminary ruling in part.
The Government argues that the statements should be excluded as hearsay. The Court
agrees that they are out-of-court statements but notes that at least a portion of each challenged
exhibit would likely qualify for a hearsay exception under appropriate circumstances. Mr.
Palmer’s statements immediately after being apprehended (including the claim that he did not
have a firearm) could be admitted as excited utterances, and one line of the objected-to dialogue
between Officers Kelly Smith and Ryan Napoli (“He didn’t toss nothing. I didn’t see nothing.”)
could be admitted as a present sense impression. But that only matters if Defendant wants to
introduce the statements for the truth of the matter asserted.
Responding to the motion on the oral record, Defense counsel denied that either exhibit
was being introduced for the truth of the out-of-court statements contained therein. Asked about
their relevance to the case against Mr. Tyler, defense counsel argued that they cast doubt on the
“credibility” of the investigation and the choices made by officers to pursue prosecution of Mr.
Tyler rather than Mr. Palmer and that they support Mr. Palmer as an alternative perpetrator.
In response, the Government conceded that evidence of an alternative perpetrator would
be relevant to Mr. Tyler’s case, but it denied that Mr. Palmer’s statements immediately after
being taken into custody provided any such evidence. And it maintained that the Defense should
not be permitted to introduce the exchange between Officers Smith and Napoli about whether
Case: 4:24-cr-00654-SEP Doc. #: 84 Filed: 02/11/26 Page: 1 of 3 PageID #:
<pageID>
2
and where Mr. Palmer might have tossed his gun because those would be impermissible hearsay,
and even if they were not, at least one of them would pose an intolerable risk of confusing the
jury under Rule 403.
In its initial ruling on the oral record, the Court focused on Defendant’s argument that the
exhibits are not being introduced for their truth but as they reflect on the credibility of the overall
investigation. The Court noted the distinction it had observed in the available case law between
the credibility of specific evidence and the merits of an investigation overall. See, e.g., United
States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1192 (10th Cir. 1998) (quality of the investigation was not
material to a defense where Defendant had “failed to establish the requisite connection between
the allegedly ‘shoddy’ and ‘slanted’ investigation and any evidence introduced at trial”); United
States v. Veal, 23 F.3d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding a district court’s exclusion of
evidence that an investigation was “sloppy” on grounds that “the jury would not be called upon
to determine whether the government’s investigation had been good or bad”). Finding that Mr.
Tyler had not (yet) drawn a connection between the challenged exhibits and the credibility of any
specific piece of evidence anticipated in this matter, the Court was not persuaded that the
exhibits tended to make any fact of consequence in this matter more or less probable. See FED.
R. EVID. 401. And it granted the Government’s motion to exclude the exhibits on those grounds.
The Court issues this Order to elaborate on and make one modification to its oral ruling.
Revisiting the parties’ arguments on the oral record with the benefit of time and a transcript, the
Court finds that Mr. Tyler has sufficiently shown the relevance of Defendant’s Exhibit B to its
theory of Mr. Palmer as an alternative perpetrator. Defendant does not seek to introduce Mr.
Palmer’s spontaneous statements about having a CCW permit and not possessing a firearm for
their truth but as evidence of Mr. Palmer’s own consciousness of guilt. Evidence that has “any
tendency” to make it more probable that someone else committed the crime of which Mr. Tyler
stands accused does meet Rule 401’s threshold for relevance.
The Court does not alter its ruling with respect to Defendant’s proposed Exhibit E. If
they were being offered for their truth, all but one of the statements of Officers Smith and Napoli
would be excluded as hearsay. The Court is doubtful that Defendant would seek to admit the one
statement that might qualify as a present sense impression—“He didn’t toss nothing. I didn’t see
nothing.”—for its truth, but it will consider the question if it is posed. Taking the Defense at its
word that the statements are being offered to cast doubt on the credibility of the overall
Case: 4:24-cr-00654-SEP Doc. #: 84 Filed: 02/11/26 Page: 2 of 3 PageID #:
<pageID>
3
investigation, the Court fails (so far) to see their relevance, as noted herein and on the oral
record. To the extent that those particular out-of-court statements of Officers Smith and Napoli
may be shown to be relevant to any issue that is properly before the jury, their probative value
would still have to be weighed against the danger they pose of confusing the issues or misleading
the jury, which—given the content of these particular statements—appears to be significant. See
F ED . R. CIV P. 403.
The Court remains open to reconsidering this ruling in light of developments in the case,
particularly if the Defense can connect proposed Exhibit E to the credibility of specific evidence
or testimony presented by the Government.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion in Limine, Doc. [82] is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth above.
Dated this 11 th day of February, 2026.
SARAH E. PITLYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 4:24-cr-00654-SEP Doc. #: 84 Filed: 02/11/26 Page: 3 of 3 PageID #:
<pageID>

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.