Newman v. Lyft, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LISA NEWMAN individually,
and as the wrongful death
beneficiary of ELIJAH NEWMAN,
deceased,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 4:23-cv-00853-MAL
LYFT, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Lisa Newman’s Amended Motion for
Leave to File Sixth Amended Complaint (Doc. 66). Defendant Lyft, Inc.
has filed a memorandum in opposition to her motion. Doc. 67. By order
of the Court, Newman was not permitted to file a reply in support of her
motion. Doc. 62.1 The Motion is GRANTED for the following reasons.
1 The Court’s June 3, 2025 Order (Doc. 62) also struck Newman’s so-called “Fifth Amended Complaint”
for being filed without leave of Court after Newman attempted to file a different complaint than the
one the Court granted leave to file in its May 21, 2025 Order (Doc. 58). The Court reminds Newman
that failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or an order from this Court may result
in the dismissal of her case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Parties before the Court have a responsibility to
know and comply with applicable rules and orders. The Court will not hesitate to take appropriate
action if a party fails to do so.
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BACKGROUND
Newman brought this action against Lyft seeking to hold the company
liable for the death of her husband, Elijiah Newman. Newman alleges
that carjacker Torian Wilson shot and killed her husband after
requesting a ride using a fake account on Lyft’s rideshare app to attempt
another carjacking. Doc. 63, ¶¶ 12-15. After Lyft removed the case to
this Court in May 2023, Newman filed her Third Amended Complaint,
asserting claims for negligence, negligent undertaking, and wrongful
death. Doc. 11.
When Lyft moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Newman
sought leave to file her Fourth Amended Complaint, adding a claim
under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, a vicarious liability
claim, and allegations that Mr. Newman’s killer previously used the Lyft
app to carjack a different Lyft driver near the same location. Doc. 19. The
Court granted Newman leave to file the Fourth Amended Complaint
(Doc. 28) and denied Lyft’s motion to dismiss as moot in light of the
amended complaint. Doc. 30.
Lyft again moved to dismiss all counts under Rule 12(b)(6), which
Newman opposed. Docs. 31-33. A few weeks later, Newman voluntarily
dismissed her Missouri Merchandising Practices Act and vicarious
liability claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Docs. 35, 37. Newman then
filed another motion for leave to file a new amended complaint—this
time, Newman’s Fifth Amended Complaint. Doc. 38. The proposed Fifth
Amended Complaint was attached as Exhibit A to the motion for leave.
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The Court again granted Newman leave to file the amended
complaint in its May 21, 2025 Order. But instead of filing the amended
complaint attached as Exhibit A, Plaintiff filed a different pleading. Doc.
61. The Court struck Newman’s so-called “Fifth Amended Complaint” for
being filed without leave of Court (Doc. 62), and Newman subsequently
sought leave to properly file it in her Motion for Leave to File Sixth
Amended Complaint. Doc. 64.
Newman failed to comply with Local Rule 4.01 when filing her Motion
for Leave to File Sixth Amended Complaint because she filed it without
a supporting memorandum. She also failed to comply with Local Rule
4.07 because the same motion was filed without showing the textual
differences between the proposed amended complaint and the operative
complaint. On June 6, 2025, after the Court entered a Notice of Filing
Deficiency, Newman filed this Amended Motion for Leave to File Sixth
Amended Complaint (Doc. 66), in compliance with the Local Rules.
Lyft opposes Newman’s latest motion. Lyft argues that Newman
should not be allowed to amend because she has had ample opportunity
to plead her claims, she doesn’t provide any persuasive grounds for
further amendment, her motion for leave relies on inaccurate assertions
and mischaracterizations, she unduly delayed seeking the amendment,
the amendment would prejudice Lyft, and the amendment would be
futile. Doc. 67. Newman was not allowed to file a reply in support of her
motion pursuant to the Court’s May 21, 2025 order (Doc. 62). No other
motions are currently pending before the Court.
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LEGAL STANDARD
After a party amends its pleading once as a matter of course, “a
party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Newman requests
the Court’s leave here, which “[t]he court should freely give . . . when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Leave “should normally be granted absent good reason for denial.
The classic ‘good reasons’ for rejecting an amendment are: ‘undue delay,
bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving
party, or futility of amendment.’” Popp Telcom v. Am. Sharecom, Inc., 210
F.3d 928, 943 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
The party opposing amendment bears the burden of proving that
some reason exists to deny leave to amend. Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep’t,
241 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2001). “[W]hether to allow a party to amend
her complaint is left to the sound discretion of the district court[.]”
Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008).
Discussion
Lyft argues that Newman shouldn’t be allowed to amend because
(1) her motion for leave to amend does not provide any persuasive
grounds for further amendment and relies on inaccurate assertions and
mischaracterizations, (2) she has already had “ample opportunity” to
amend, (3) she unduly delayed seeking this amendment, and the
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amendment would prejudice Lyft, and (4) the amendment would be futile.
None of these arguments carry Lyft’s burden.
1. Lyft has the burden of proving that some reason exists to
deny leave to amend.
To start, Lyft must demonstrate compelling reasons to deny leave
(rather than Newman demonstrating compelling reasons to grant leave)
under Rule 15(a). Leave “should normally be granted absent good
reason for denial.” Popp Telcom, 210 F.3d at 943 (emphasis added).
The question is not whether Newman has provided persuasive grounds
for amendment; it is whether there is good reason to deny the
amendment. See Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep’t, 241 F.3d 992, 995 (8th
Cir. 2001). For this reason, the Court will not deny the requested leave
because of the unpersuasiveness of Newman’s briefing—even if it relies
on inaccurate assertions and mischaracterizations.2
2. Previous opportunity to amend is not reason alone to
deny leave to amend again.
Lyft appears to suggest that having “ample opportunity” to plead
claims is reason enough to deny leave to amend. Not so. The fact that a
plaintiff has had previous opportunities to amend their complaint is not
a good reason, standing alone, to deny leave. The “classic ‘good reasons’
for rejecting an amendment are: ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of
2 This does not excuse inaccuracies in a party’s brief. Misrepresentations undermine a party’s
credibility and could potentially lead to sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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amendment.’” Popp Telcom, 210 F.3d at 943 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal
citations omitted). Previous amendment opportunity is not among them.
Lyft points to no precedent holding that previous amendment
opportunity is reason alone to deny leave to further amend. The only
Eighth Circuit case Lyft cites in support of this proposition, Moses.com
Securities, Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Systems, Inc., 406 F.3d 1052,
1066 (8th Cir. 2005), upheld a district court’s denial of leave, in relevant
part, because the plaintiff failed to resolve the deficiencies that caused
his previously amended complaint to be dismissed. As such, the district
court “was not required to allow [the plaintiff] a further opportunity” to
amend. That case is inapplicable here. No version of Newman’s
complaint has been dismissed by this Court, so no deficiencies have been
identified yet. It is immaterial that Lyft believes that Newman’s previous
complaints should have been dismissed. The Court has yet to decide that
question.
The district court decisions Lyft cites do not support this
proposition either. In Hubbard v. St. Louis Psychiatric Rehabilitation
Center, 2013 WL 1351435, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 2, 2013), the court denied
leave not just because plaintiff had previously amended, but because “it
would be futile to provide [the plaintiff] another attempt to plead his
claim” and to prevent further delay in deciding the pending motion to
dismiss. In Siepel v. Bank of America, N.A., 239 F.R.D. 558 (E.D. Mo.
2006), the district court denied leave to file a second amended complaint
because “[t]he amendment [was] futile[,]” and nothing more than an
improper attempt at “present[ing] theories of recovery seriatim to the
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court” as the plaintiffs’ previously amended complaint, along with five
other complaints in other actions, had already been dismissed. Id. at 571.
Similarly, the court in Murrin v. Avidigm Captial Group, Inc., 2008 WL
11463462, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 26, 2008), denied a plaintiff leave to
amend because of the plaintiff’s repeated failure to cure the deficiencies
in his previously dismissed complaints.
These decisions did not deny leave to amend simply because
previous amendments had been allowed. The proposed amendments at
issue were futile, or otherwise failed to make up for the shortcomings of
previously dismissed complaints. The fact that the plaintiffs in those
cases had the opportunity to amend their complaints before lessened the
prejudicial effect of denying their requests to amend again, but it was not
an independent reason that justified denying their requests.
Amending a complaint more than once does not impermissibly
“present[ ] theories of recovery seriatim to the court.” Siepel, 239 F.R.D.
at 571. Siepel’s prohibition on seriatim pleading deals with litigants who
launch complaints again and again after being dismissed again and
again. Courts faced with that scenario are not required to play pleading
ping pong “in which plaintiffs file a complaint and then volley it over a
rhetorical net with the court until a viable complaint emerges.” Id.
Courts may properly deny leave to amend because of “repeated failure to
cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed[.]” Popp Telcom, 21
F.3d at 943. But that is not the scenario here. The Court has not
dismissed any complaint in this action. Lyft’s belief that Newman’s
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previous complaints should have been dismissed is insufficient to bar
Newman from amending her complaint.
3. Regardless of Newman’s delay, Lyft has not shown that
amendment would result in unfair prejudice.
Next, Lyft argues that Newman’s motion to amend should be denied
because she unduly delayed seeking this amendment, and the
amendment would prejudice Lyft. But “[d]elay alone is not a reason in
and of itself to deny leave to amend; the delay must have resulted in
unfair prejudice to the party opposing amendment.” Roberson, 241 F.3d
at 995 (citing Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 217 (8th Cir.
1987)). “‘The burden of proof of prejudice is on the party opposing the
amendment.’” Id. (quoting Sanders, 823 F.3d at 217). Here, Lyft fails to
demonstrate that the amendment unfairly prejudices it.
Lyft argues that Newman’s delay in seeking her latest amendment
prejudices Lyft because it has already “briefed two motions to dismiss;”
has “briefed another two motions for leave to amend,” and has “been
engaged in discovery on [Newman’s] Fifth Amended Complaint since
September 2024.” Doc. 67, p. 12. But that does not explain what about
this is unfairly prejudicial. There is no motion to dismiss currently
pending before the Court; no motions to dismiss have been ruled on; and
the prejudicial effect of having to brief a future motion for leave to amend
(should this amendment be granted) is minimal. This case is also early
in its procedural posture, with no case management order entered or trial
date set. At this relatively early juncture, the fact that discovery has
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been ongoing does not, without more, mean that unfair prejudice will
result from the proposed amendment.
Lyft also argues that the proposed amendment will unfairly
prejudice it because the proposed Sixth Amended Complaint includes
new theories of recovery which will invariably result in the burdens of
additional discovery and delay to the proceedings. However, “[w]here the
facts on which a previously unasserted claim is based are all known or
available to all parties, there is no prejudice in allowing an amended
complaint.” Buder v. Merill Lynch, Peive, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d
690, 694 (8th Cir. 1981). The new claims in the proposed amendment
arise out of the same occurrence giving rise to those in the previous
complaints. Much of the discovery already conducted will likely remain
relevant under the proposed amendment, and there is adequate time to
engage in any additional discovery necessary before trial. “Importantly,
there is nothing in the record or the parties’ briefs to indicate that the
defendants are less able to conduct any necessary additional discovery at
this time than they would have been if the plaintiff[’s] motion to amend
had been filed earlier.” Buder, 644 F.2d at 694.
The Court concludes that any delay by Newman in seeking this
amendment will not result in unfair prejudice to Lyft if this Court grants
leave to amend. As such, neither undue delay nor unfair prejudice are
reasons to deny the amendment requested here.
4. Lyft failed to show amendment is futile.
Finally, Lyft argues that leave to amend should be denied because
amendment would be futile. The futility test is identical to the test
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applied when considering a motion to dismiss a complaint under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 850 (8th Cir. 2010). To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead sufficient facts,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
Id. at 848. Likewise, a proposed amended complaint that fails to state a
plausible cause of action may be denied as futile. Id. at 805-51.
a. The Court declines to find that Newman’s negligence
claims are futile.
At the outset, Lyft argues that Newman’s proposed negligence
claims in her proposed Sixth Amended Complaint are futile because
(1) she abandoned those claims when she omitted them from her
operative complaint and (2) rather than respond to Lyft’s arguments in
its now-moot motion to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, she
chose to amend her complaint. But nothing in Rule 15(a) prohibits
reinstatement of claims absent bad faith or unfair prejudice to the non-
moving party. Here, Lyft demonstrates neither bad faith nor unfair
prejudice.
“If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff
may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity
to test his claim on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The negligence claims are based on the same basic operative facts and
circumstances consistently alleged by Newman. Instead of showing why
these allegations are not legally sufficient, Lyft attempts to “incorporate
by reference” its arguments in an earlier motion to dismiss ordered moot.
Doc. 67, p. 12. These arguments are not properly before the Court. See
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E.D.Mo. L.R. 4.01(B) (“each party opposing a motion . . . must file . . . a
single memorandum containing any relevant argument and
citations to authorities on which the party relies.”) (emphasis
added), 4.01(D). That so, the Court is faced with no argument that
Newman’s proposed negligence claims are not “a proper subject of relief.”
Therefore, Newman should be allowed to test her claims on the merits.
The Court declines to use its discretion to find that adding the
negligence claims in Newman’s Sixth Amended Complaint would be
futile.
b. The Court declines to find the products liability
claims futile.
Lyft argues that Newman’s product liability claims are futile
because the proposed amendment does not show that “the Lyft
application is a ‘product’ for the purposes of a products liability claim” or
“has any similarities to the tangible products that fall within the scope of
Missouri’s products liability regime.” Doc. 67, p. 13. Lyft levies this
argument without further elaboration. The Court is not persuaded by
this conclusory argument. 	Newman’s proposed products liability
allegations are similar to those in a Missouri case establishing that the
Lyft App is sufficiently similar to a tangible product to fall under
Missouri products liability law. See Ameer v. Lyft, Inc., 711 S.W.3d 534,
546 (Mo. Ct. App. 2025), transfer denied (May 27, 2025).
Lyft focuses instead on its argument that the proposed complaint
does not “plausibly allege that [Elijah Newman’s] death resulted from a
defect in the app itself[.]” Doc. 67, p. 13. According to Lyft, “the crux of
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the products claims is the allegation that Lyft did not sufficiently ‘verify’
the identity or ‘determine the trustworthiness’ of Mr. Wilson” and
“[n]owhere do the products claims plausibly allege that a ‘failure … to
verify Wilson’s identity’ was the proximate cause of Mr. Newman’s
death.” Id.
Though not a model of clarity, Newman’s proposed complaint does
allege that “Lyft had the data in its possession to ensure the shooting of
Decedent never occurred” (Doc. 66, Exhibit A ¶ 33), yet “Lyft’s own rider
and driver information brought Torian Wilson and Decedent together.”
Doc. 66, Exhibit A ¶ 36. The proposed complaint appears to go on to
allege that Torian Wilson, Mr. Newman’s murderer, took advantage of
the App’s defects to fraudulently request a ride he never should have been
allowed to request, ultimately causing Mr. Newman’s death. In the face
of Lyft’s conclusory arguments, Newman’s proposed Amended Sixth
Complaint is not obviously futile.
The Court declines to use its discretion to find Newman’s product
liability claims futile.
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* 	* 	*
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Lisa Newman’s
Amended Motion for Leave to File Sixth Amended Complaint (Doc. 66) is
GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Lisa Newman
file a clean copy of the proposed Sixth Amended Complaint, attached as
Exhibit A to her Amended Motion for Leave to File Sixth Amended
Complaint.
Additionally, because no case management order is currently
entered in this case, the Court will set a conference with the parties
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 by separate order.
SO ORDERED,
This 5th day of November, 2025.
___________________________
Hon. Maria A. Lanahan
United States District Judge
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