Anderson v Hernandez, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
JEFFERY L. ANDERSON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	) 	Case No. 1:23-cv-00201-SNLJ
)
JOSEPH T. HERNANDEZ, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court to determine whether the issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies must be submitted to a jury or may be resolved by the Court
following an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes
that a jury trial is not required.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jeffery Anderson, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights lawsuit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Scott County Sheriff and Jail Administrator exhibited
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while he was a pretrial detainee at the
Scott County Jail in Benton, Missouri. After discovery was completed, the defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative defenses of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and qualified immunity. [Doc. 57]. A review of the
briefing and evidence submitted with the motion revealed factual disputes that precluded
summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion. [Doc. 65]. The motion was denied on the
issue of exhaustion, and a ruling on the issue of qualified immunity was deferred. [Id.].
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In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460
(2025), the Court directed the parties to submit briefs on whether the factual disputes
regarding exhaustion should be resolved by a jury or determined by the Court following
an evidentiary hearing. Defendants argue that the factual disputes regarding exhaustion
are not intertwined with the merits and can be resolved by the Court. Their primary
argument, however, focuses on the Court’s authority to rule on the motion for summary
judgment on the issue of qualified immunity without making a determination on
exhaustion. Plaintiff did not respond, and the deadline to do so has passed.
II. DISCUSSION
The Court initially addresses defendants’ argument that it should dispense with the
issue of exhaustion and proceed to rule on the issue of qualified immunity. [Doc. 66].
Defendants acknowledge that the Eighth Circuit has, on several occasions, held that a
district court errs by adjudicating the merits without first determining whether a prisoner
has exhausted administrative remedies. [Id.]. They claim, however, that these decisions
do not constitute binding precedent, as they fall into two categories: (1) cases that do not
directly address the order of considering exhaustion and the merits; and (2) unpublished
cases. [Id. at 5].
Although unpublished opinions do not establish binding precedent, see Eighth
Circuit Rule 32.1A, the Eighth Circuit’s recognition of its own circuit precedent in
unpublished cases is authoritative and binding on this Court. In Benjamin v. Ward
County, the Eighth Circuit vacated a judgment on the merits and remanded the case for
the district court to determine whether the plaintiff had exhausted administrative
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remedies. 632 F.App’x 301, 302 (2016). The Court acknowledged “the inefficiency of
remanding a case already resolved on the merits for an evidentiary hearing on
exhaustion” but concluded it was “bound by [its] own precedent to do so.” Id. at 301.
Similarly, in Pinder v. McDowell, the Eighth Circuit held that “circuit precedent requires
us to vacate that portion of the district court’s judgment [on the merits] and remand the
case for a ruling” on whether the plaintiff exhausted available administrative remedies.
714 F.App’x 612, 613 (2018).
Next, defendants argue that the Perttu court recognized a district court’s discretion
to consider the merits of claims before addressing exhaustion. In support, they cite the
following statement from Perttu:
As we said in Woodford, PLRA exhaustion is not jurisdictional, which is why a
district court [is allowed] to dismiss plainly meritless claims without first
addressing the often more complex question of exhaustion.
Perttu, 605 U.S. at 469 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 101 (2006) (cleaned up).
It is clear, however, that the Woodford court was referring to the dismissal of claims
allowed during the initial screening of prisoner complaints required by the PLRA.
Specifically, § 1997e(c)(2) provides:
In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief, the court may dismiss the underlying claim without
first requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The cited statement from Perttu and Woodford has no relevance at the summary
judgment stage, nor does it supersede the Eighth Circuit precedent discussed supra.
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Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that binding Eighth Circuit precedent
requires a ruling on the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to addressing the merits. The Court must now determine whether the issue of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a question for the jury or if it can be resolved by
the Court after an evidentiary hearing.
In Perttu, the Supreme Court held that the issue of exhaustion must be determined
by a jury if the contested facts on exhaustion are “intertwined” with contested facts on the
merits. There, the defendant was accused of acts of retaliation that involved the
destruction of grievances regarding his own conduct. Id. at 464. Thus, the factual
analysis about the availability of remedies was the same for the issues of exhaustion and
the merits. As a result, the Perttu court held that a jury trial on the issue of exhaustion
was required. Id. at 469.
For intertwinement to exist, resolution of the exhaustion issue must also resolve a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive case.
Perttu, 605 U.S. at 467-468. This is a fact-intensive inquiry.1 On the issue of
1 District courts have offered varying interpretations of intertwinement. Some courts have
interpreted Perttu narrowly, applying it only if the complaint raises a First Amendment claim
alleging a violation of an inmate’s right to file a grievance, while others take a broader view. See
e.g., Lipscomb v. Connor, 2025 WL 2105864 (S.D. Ill. July 28, 2025) (finding there was no
intertwinement regarding access to the grievance process and plaintiff’s claims regarding
conduct during a strip search); Marsh v. Reckert, 2025 WL 1928608 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2025)
(finding no common issues regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies and an excessive
force claim); Haynie v. Clarke, 2025 WL 2017881 (W.D. Va. July 14, 2025) (holding the
exhaustion and merits issues were intertwined “[b]ecause the defendants’ treatment of [plaintiff]
regarding the grievance process is central to [plaintiff’s] claims, a ruling on exhaustion would
require [the court] to make determinations about credibility and the merits of [plaintiff’s]
constitutional claims.”); Hill v. Tisch, 2025 WL 1871142, at *7–8 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2025)
(holding there was no intertwinement between the exhaustion issue and plaintiff’s claims of
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exhaustion, plaintiff testified that he was unaware of the existence of the grievance
process and that, even if he had known about it, he would have been unable to file a
grievance due to mental incapacity. [Doc. 59-1, Ex. A at 68:25-70:17, 69:17-22]. On the
merits, plaintiff testified that he filed his lawsuit against the defendants solely on the
basis of their supervisory roles as sheriff and jail administrator. [Doc. 59-1, Ex. A at
83:8-18, 126:12-23]. He admitted that he did not have any communication with the
defendants during the relevant time, and there is no evidence that they had any
knowledge or involvement in the alleged delay of his medication. [Id. at 70:18-71:8,
71:9–20; 80:6–81:10, 83:15-18; 110:6-15].
Considering the facts and issues before the Court, there is no intertwinement. It is
evident that plaintiff’s claim against the sheriff and jail administrator fails regardless of
any finding on the availability of the grievance process. In other words, the resolution of
the exhaustion issue will not impact the merits. As a result, the exhaustion issue may be
resolved by the Court after an evidentiary hearing. The Court acknowledges the
inefficiency of holding an evidentiary hearing on the exhaustion issue under the
circumstances presented, but is bound by precedent to do so.
Finally, defendants request that this matter be certified for immediate appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) if the Court finds it cannot rule on the qualified immunity issue
without first making a determination on exhaustion. An order may be certified under
excessive force, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference to medical care); Murphy v. Bailey,
794 F.Supp.3d 556, 575 (C.D. Ill. 2025) (holding “that it is sufficient for exhaustion and merits
issues to be intertwined when a fact-finder must make a credibility determination regarding the
testimony of the plaintiff, a defendant, and the same non-party witnesses”).
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§ 1292(b):
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
Motions to certify “must be granted sparingly, and the movant bears the heavy burden of
demonstrating that the case is an exceptional one in which immediate appeal is
warranted.” White v. Nix, 43 F.3d 374, 376 (8th Cir. 1994). Because there is binding
Eighth Circuit precedent, the Court finds no grounds to certify this matter for immediate
appeal. The request is, therefore, denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter will be scheduled for an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of exhaustion by separate order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a ruling on the motion for summary judgment
on qualified immunity continues to be DEFERRED until the issue of exhaustion is
resolved.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the request for certification for immediate
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 17th day of February, 2026.
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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