Pets A Lone Sanctuary of Lincoln County, Missouri v. Roberts

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
In re:
EDNA JEWELL ROBERTS,
Debtor.
Case No. 26-40048-357
Chapter 13
PETS A LONE SANCTUARY OF
LINCOLN COUNTY, MISSOURI, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
EDNA JEWELL ROBERTS,
Defendant.
Adv. Proc. No. 26-04015-357
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Debtor Edna Jewell Roberts has been engaged in litigation with Plaintiffs Pets A Lone
Sanctuary of Lincoln County, Missouri (“PALS”) and Jennifer Raeker-Bickel for years. The
parties settled several disputes in 2021, but another controversy soon erupted. It led Plaintiffs
to file another lawsuit against the Debtor in 2022, resulting in a default judgment in their favor
for approximately $235,000.
Collection efforts prompted the Debtor to commence a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on
January 6, 2026. Plaintiffs, the only creditors that have filed proofs of claim in the case,
responded by commencing this adversary proceeding, in which they seek to have the Debtor’s
debt excepted from discharge pursuant to Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code as arising
from a “willful and malicious” injury. However, Section 523(a)(6) does not apply in a Chapter
13 case unless a debtor seeks a so-called hardship discharge under Section 1328(b). See 11
U.S.C. § 1328(c)(2) (establishing exceptions to discharge under § 1328(b)). Nevertheless,
Section 1328(a)(4)—which is applicable in all Chapter 13 cases—is similar to Section 523(a)(6)
and may apply to some of Plaintiffs’ claims.
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In anticipation of the initial pre-trial conference in this matter, and recognizing my
obligation to review questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, I instructed the parties to be
prepared to discuss whether Plaintiffs’ claims under Section 523(a)(6) are ripe, along with
certain issues related to whether the claims are cognizable under Section 1328(a)(4). The parties
submitted supplemental briefs on these issues following the pre-trial conference.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims, as presently pleaded under
Section 523(a)(6), must be dismissed without prejudice as unripe. PALS cannot state a claim
under Section 1328(a)(4), but Raeker-Bickel may be able to state a claim with regard to certain
of the allegations in the complaint. I will thus permit her to file an amended complaint.
I. 	Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction of this adversary proceeding, which arises under Title 11 and
relates to the Debtor’s bankruptcy case, under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This is a core proceeding
under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).1
II. 	Background
The Debtor’s debt to Plaintiffs is embodied in a judgment entered on August 2, 2024 by
the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Missouri (the “Judgment”). During the underlying
litigation, the court struck the Debtor’s pleadings “for gross and repeated discovery violations
and refusal to comply with discovery orders of the Court.” The court thus found “all the
allegations of the Petition filed by Plaintiffs . . . to be true.”
For purposes of the issues addressed in this Opinion, I will assume that Plaintiffs’
allegations in state court, like the allegations in the complaint in this adversary proceeding, are
true, much as I would if the issues were presented in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted. But I note that the allegations in the state-court petition
most likely are binding on the Debtor and are not just presumptively true. Although a panel of
the Missouri Court of Appeals stated as recently as 1989 that “[n]either the parties nor our
research has disclosed any Missouri case defining the preclusive effect of a default judgment,”
Hernandez v. Westoak Realty & Investment, Inc., 771 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1989),
there does not appear to be any such uncertainty when the default arises because the court
1 One or more of the claims underlying this adversary proceeding may qualify as a
“personal injury tort,” as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B) and (b)(5). But, as
explained below, the state court has already liquidated these claims. I am not being called upon
to liquidate the claims for purposes of allowance, which would implicate the complex
procedures set forth in Sections 157(b)(2)(B) and (b)(5).
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strikes the defendant’s answer for misconduct. In that situation, the judgment is on the merits,
and collateral estoppel precludes the defendant from re-litigating the issues. See In re Maxey, 395
B.R. 665, 671 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008); Treetop Village Property Owners Association v. Miller, 139
S.W.3d 595, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2004); In re Marriage of DeWitt, 946 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Mo.
Ct. App. W.D. 1997); In re Marriage of Dickey, 553 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Mo. App. W.D. 1977).
And issue preclusion applies in exception-from-discharge proceedings. See Brown v. Felsen, 442
U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979).
With that lead-in, the essential facts are as follows:
In October 2021, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that resolved several
underlying lawsuits (the “Settlement Agreement”). Plaintiffs paid the Debtor $215,000, and an
insurer contributed an additional $10,000 on behalf of Plaintiffs, for a total payment to the
Debtor of $225,000. In return, the Debtor agreed to release Plaintiffs from the claims, counts,
and allegations contained in the settled lawsuits and arising from the same underlying events.
The parties agreed to jointly dismiss those lawsuits with prejudice.
The parties also agreed not to “make any communications or engage in any conduct
designed to disparage each other . . . regarding any of the alleged conduct or facts at issue in
the [underlying lawsuits]” and that “for one (1) year . . . [ending] September 21, 2022[,] they
will not make any communications or engage in conduct designed to disparage each other . . .
[in] any matter whatsoever.” The Settlement Agreement further prohibited the parties, as well
as “anyone acting on their behalves,” from entering “any property owned by each other
without [the respective property owner’s] prior written consent.” The Debtor also “agree[d]
and acknowledge[d] that she would not have any communications regarding [the Plaintiffs]
with any of PALS’ corporate donors, vendors, or sponsors” and that she would not “interfere
or attempt to interfere with PALS’ business relationships with them.”
PALS partners with and receives donations from another non-profit animal shelter,
named Dogwood Sanctuary. The Debtor, as of April 2022, was aware of the relationship
between PALS and Dogwood. On April 18, 2022, a dispute arose between Dogwood and an
individual named Michael Bruner regarding a stray dog, allegedly owned by Bruner, which
had been turned in to Dogwood by Bruner’s neighbor. During this dispute, Bruner verbally
berated the shelter and its owner and cursed Dogwood’s owner. The Debtor had been
communicating with Bruner and began her own pressure campaign against Dogwood
regarding Bruner’s dispute. This included the posting of false statements on social media
regarding the dispute and her own direct communications with Dogwood’s personnel
regarding these false statements.
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As a result of Bruner’s conduct—as encouraged by the Debtor—Dogwood’s personnel
were fearful of the potential for physical harm if they were to allow Bruner on Dogwood’s
property to retrieve the dog. On April 19, 2022, Dogwood transferred the dog to PALS via a
shelter-to-shelter transfer and informed Bruner that he could retrieve the dog from PALS by
going to their location and by paying Raeker-Bickel $50, which is PALS’s customary recovery
fee. Bruner relayed this information to the Debtor, who responded, “No don’t. Don’t pay her
anything.”
That evening, Bruner went to PALS’s shelter to inquire about the dog and, “in a
menacing and violent manner,” confronted Raeker-Bickel by “screaming profanities at her[,]
threaten[ing] her[,]” and “direct[ing] false allegations . . . at PALS and Raeker-Bickel, including
that he had been told that PALS and Raeker-Bickel steal animals from their owners for
money.” He added that he had never even heard of PALS or Raeker-Bickel prior to losing his
dog and his communications with the Debtor, which included her informing him that PALS
and Raeker-Bickel stole animals from their owners. Bruner ultimately agreed to pay the $50
recovery fee and was given the dog, but during that conversation, and while Bruner was
leaving, he threatened Plaintiffs and Dogwood’s owner by alluding to getting revenge against
Plaintiffs, expressing his intention to run over Dogwood’s owner with his truck if he were to
see her again, violently handling the dog, and intimating that he wished he would have instead
just shot the dog. Bruner’s behavior intimidated and frightened Raeker-Bickel and a PALS
volunteer who was present.
On August 16, 2022, PALS and Raeker-Bickel filed the Lincoln County suit against the
Debtor, alleging unjust enrichment and that through her role in Bruner’s dispute with PALS,
Raeker-Bickel, and Dogwood, the Debtor breached the Settlement Agreement. As previously
discussed, the court struck the Debtor’s pleadings and, on August 2, 2024, entered judgment in
favor of Plaintiffs, specifically finding that the Debtor willfully breached the Settlement
Agreement. The court awarded Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $215,000, together with
pre-judgment interest of $37,957.81 and the costs of the action, plus post-judgment interest at
9%. Plaintiffs also were awarded $19,040.06 as a sanction for discovery abuses, less any
sanctions previously paid by the Debtor.
The Debtor disclosed on her Schedule E/F that PALS holds a $271,997.81 unsecured
claim, which represents the vast majority of the Debtor’s unsecured debts. PALS and Raeker-
Bickel filed proofs of claim in the amount of $328,848.96.
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III. 	Analysis
A. 	Section 523(a)(6) Claims in Chapter 13
1. 	Application of Section 523(a)(6)
The exception to discharge for willful and malicious injuries in Section 523(a)(6) does
not apply in an ordinary Chapter 13 case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (listing exceptions); In re
LeMaire, 898 F.2d 1346, 1348 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“[A] debt which falls within the scope
of section 523(a)(6) . . . which may not be discharged under Chapter 7, may nevertheless be
discharged if the debtor meets the requirements of Chapter 13.”). The exception becomes
relevant only if the debtor moves for a hardship discharge under Section 1328(b). See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(c)(2).
The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are consistent with the Code. Rule 4007(d)
requires that “[w]hen a debtor files a motion for a discharge under § 1328(b), the court must set
the time to file a complaint under § 523(a)(6) to determine whether a debt is dischargeable.” In
other words, a Chapter 13 debtor must first move for a hardship discharge under Section
1328(b) before the process to determine whether a debt is dischargeable under Section 523(a)(6)
in a Chapter 13 case gets underway. And if a Chapter 13 case is converted to Chapter 7, a
creditor has an additional 60 days from the first date set for the new Section 341(a) meeting of
creditors to file a complaint to determine whether a specific debt may be discharged. See Fed.
R. 	Bankr. 	P. 	1019(b), 	4007(c). 	The 	Rules 	thus 	expressly 	contemplate—and 	provide
mechanisms for—creditors to pursue Section 523(a)(6) non-dischargeability claims against
current and former Chapter 13 debtors if, and when, appropriate.
The foregoing demonstrates that it was not necessary for Plaintiffs to file their adversary
proceeding under Section 523(a)(6) when they did. Perhaps I may resolve it anyway; that is a
question of ripeness.
2. 	Ripeness of the claim
“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296,
300 (1998) (cleaned up); Parrish v. Dayton, 761 F.3d 873, 875-876 (8th Cir. 2014) (same). In
addition, “the question of ripeness may be considered on a court’s own motion.” National Park
Hospitality Association v. Department of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003). If a claim is not ripe for
adjudication, a court should dismiss it. Texas, 523 U.S. at 302 (affirming dismissal of case as
unripe).
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Courts have thus recognized that “[w]hether a Section 523(a)(6) claim in a Chapter 13
case is ripe for decision is a question of constitutional ripeness since resolution of the issue has
no meaningful effect until and unless the debtor moves for a hardship discharge, a contingency
that occurs in only a small percentage of Chapter 13 cases.” In re Liescheidt, 404 B.R. 499, 505
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2009); see also In re Young, 425 B.R. 811, 816 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2010) (“Unless
and until the debtor seeks a discharge pursuant to § 1328(b), there is no reason to litigate
whether the debt at issue is one for willful and malicious injury.”); In re Ang, 589 B.R. 165, 172
n.6 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2018) (collecting cases).
Courts in the Eighth Circuit have not always been consistent in their handling of Section
523(a)(6) claims in Chapter 13 cases. Some courts have dismissed or declined to consider them.
See In re Thompson, 581 B.R. 300, 311 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2017) (“[B]ecause § 523(a)(6) is not
applicable in chapter 13 cases, the Court finds that the bank is not entitled to relief under
subsection (a)(6) and denies that portion of the bank’s complaint.”); In re Parrish, No. A08-
8014, 2009 WL 6338568, at *5 (Bankr. D. Neb. Dec. 1, 2009) (“[B]ecause a § 523(a)(6) debt
generally is dischargeable in Chapter 13 . . . this portion of the plaintiff's complaint will not be
addressed.”). Others have elected to recharacterize them as Section 1328(a)(4) claims. See In re
Shaw, No. 08-43336, 2009 WL 3208585, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 7, 2009) (determining
that because “[a] discharge in Chapter 13 is broader than a discharge in Chapter 7 . . . it is
appropriate to determine whether the debt at issue is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328
rather than 11 U.S.C. § 523”); In re Jones, No. A19-8027, 2020 WL 908445, at *1-2 (Bankr. D.
Neb. Feb. 25, 2020) (stating that § 523(a)(6) does not apply in Chapter 13 and permitting
plaintiff to pursue an alternative theory under § 1328(a)(4)). And still others have decided these
claims on the merits. See In re Davenport, 491 B.R. 911, 922 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2013) (resolving
merits of creditor’s § 523(a)(6) claim); In re Hopkins, 469 B.R. 319, 324 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2012)
(same); In re Clevenger, No. 19-42680, 2020 WL 7753313, at *8 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Dec. 29,
2020) 	(addressing 	claim 	on 	merits 	because 	neither 	party 	argued 	that 	§ 523(a)(6) 	was
inapplicable, and claim was not meritorious anyway).
The Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of ripeness in a related Chapter 13 context,
specifically as it relates to the exception to discharge for student loans in Section 1328(a)(2).
See In re Bender, 368 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2004). In Bender, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a
Chapter 13 debtor’s adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of her student loan
debts, under the “undue hardship” standard, was not ripe for adjudication more than three
years before she was expected to receive a discharge. Id. at 847-48. The court reasoned that
because the key issue for the court to resolve is “whether there is undue hardship at the time of
discharge . . . such proceedings should take place relatively close to that date.” Id. at 848.
Bender is not on all fours with the present proceeding. Whether the Debtor’s actions
were willful and malicious depends on what happened in the past, not what may happen in the
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future. But the Court of Appeals also recognized that “the ripeness doctrine allows the federal
courts to avoid wasting scarce judicial resources in attempts to resolve speculative or
indeterminate factual issues.” Id. The Debtor may not receive a discharge in this case at all. If
she does, it is likely to be a standard discharge, considering the rarity of hardship discharges.
And so the efforts that will be required of the parties and the court to decide the Section
523(a)(6) question in this adversary proceeding are likely to be for naught.2
I thus conclude that until a Chapter 13 debtor seeks a hardship discharge under Section
1328(b), a creditor’s claim of non-dischargeability under Section 523(a)(6) is not ripe for
adjudication because “it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated,
or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas, 523 U.S. at 300 (cleaned up). Such an action must,
therefore, be dismissed without prejudice.
Nevertheless, Section 1328(a)(4), which is applicable in every Chapter 13 case, includes
a subset of Section 523(a)(6) claims. 3 There also is precedent, as previously discussed, for
treating pleaded Section 523(a)(6) claims as Section 1328(a)(4) claims. See Shaw, 2009 WL
3208585, at *2; Jones, 2020 WL 908445, at *1-2. Accordingly, to determine whether and to
what extent Plaintiffs should be permitted to re-plead, I must determine whether their
allegations state a claim on which relief may be granted under Section 1328(a)(4).
B. 	Section 1328(a)(4) Claims in Chapter 13
Section 1328(a)(4) provides that a Chapter 13 debtor’s discharge does not apply to any
debt “for restitution, or damages, awarded in a civil action against the debtor as a result of
willful or malicious injury by the debtor that caused personal injury to an individual or the
death of an individual.” Plaintiffs must establish five elements to succeed under Section
1328(a)(4), each of which I will address in turn.
2 Some cases also suggest that a court evaluating ripeness should consider “the hardship
to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Parrish, 761 F.3d at 875 (cleaned up). The
parties have not suggested any such hardship, and for the reasons stated here, I perceive none.
3 As discussed below, Section 1328(a)(4) is broader than Section 523(a)(6) in one respect
because of its treatment of the “willful” and “malicious” elements. I use the term “subset” as a
form of shorthand, but it is not completely accurate.
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1. 	Restitution or damages awarded in a civil action against the debtor
For purposes of this analysis, this element is not disputed. Plaintiffs hold the Judgment
against the Debtor. It was awarded in a civil action and is for damages.4
2. 	Willful or malicious injury
Section 1328(a)(4) requires that a debtor’s conduct have been “willful or malicious,”
which differs from Section 523(a)(6)’s standard of “willful and malicious.” 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523(a)(6), 1328(a)(4) (emphasis added). In other words, any finding that a debtor’s conduct
was willful and malicious, as contemplated by Section 523(a)(6), or that a debtor’s conduct was
willful or malicious, will meet Section 1328(a)(4)’s standard. See generally Waag, 418 B.R. at 377
(discussing Congress’s decision not to harmonize language of § 1328(a)(4), in this respect, with
§ 523(a)(6)). Despite the different structure of Section 1328(a)(4), the familiar meanings given
to the terms “willful” and “malicious” in the context of Section 523(a)(6) actions are applicable
here. See In re Grossman, 538 B.R. 34, 39 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015) (“Nothing suggests that
Congress intended that the terms ‘willful’ and ‘malicious’ should have different meanings
within the same statute.”); Jones, 2020 WL 908445, at *2 (“The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has defined those terms for purposes of § 523(a)(6), and the definitions are applicable in § 1328
as well.”).
As the Supreme Court observed in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, “[t]he word ‘willful’ in (a)(6)
modifies the word ‘injury,’ indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional
injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.” 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998);
see also In re Luebbert, 987 F.3d 771, 780 (8th Cir. 2021) (“To meet the willfulness requirement,
there must be proof that the debtor desired to bring about the injury or was, in fact, substantially
certain that his conduct would result in the injury that occurred.”) (cleaned up). “Malicious”
4 Courts initially disagreed about whether Section 1328(a)(4)’s “awarded in a civil action
against the debtor” element required a pre-petition judgment. Compare In re Byrd, 388 B.R. 875,
877 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007) (“[A] pre-petition award of restitution or damages for willful or
malicious injury is a prerequisite to a finding of non-dischargeability under § 1328(a)(4).”), with
In re Taylor, 388 B.R. 115, 122 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008) (“[I]f § 1328(a)(4) is interpreted as
discriminating between creditors who have obtained a judgment before a petition is filed and
those who have not, the provision is absurd and cannot be construed literally.”). In recent years,
courts have consistently adopted the approach outlined in Taylor, concluding that a pre-petition
award of restitution or damages is not required. See, e.g., In re Waag, 418 B.R. 373, 381 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2009); In re Grosso, 512 B.R. 768, 773 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014); In re Liukonen, 670 B.R.
335, 343 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2025). Because the Judgment was rendered pre-petition, I need not
discuss this element further.
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also modifies “injury” and evokes malice, meaning that the conduct must have been “targeted
at the creditor at least in the sense that the conduct is certain or almost certain to cause harm.”
Luebbert, 987 F.3d at 780 (cleaned up). And “[m]alice is only implicated by conduct more
culpable than that which is in reckless disregard of creditors’ economic interests and
expectancies.” Id. (cleaned up). Therefore, either the relevant conduct must “deliberately or
intentionally” cause injury or it must be specifically “targeted at the creditor” and be at least
“almost certain to cause harm.” Id. (cleaned up).
Plaintiffs allege a variety of actions by the Debtor. Depending on their factual
development at trial, any or all of them may qualify as “willful or malicious injury.” Claims of
defamation, threats, aiding and abetting trespass, aiding and abetting criminal assault, and
breach of settlement agreement are all alleged in the complaint. For the purposes of Section
1328(a)(4), the Debtor could have had the requisite willful or malicious intent to cause harm
with respect to any of this alleged conduct. Therefore, the second element of Plaintiffs’ Section
1328(a)(4) claim is met insofar as Plaintiffs may be able to prove at trial that the Debtor acted
with the requisite intent.
3. 	By the debtor
Section 1328(a)(4) expressly requires that the relevant personal injury (or death) have
been caused “by the debtor.” The Supreme Court has recently considered congressional intent
in distinguishing between non-dischargeable debts that arise from conduct or harm directly
committed or caused “by the debtor” and those committed or caused by a third party. See
Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69 (2023). The Court in Bartenwerfer interpreted Congress’s use
of the passive voice in Section 523(a)(2)(A) to indicate that the relevant actor need not be the
debtor. Id. at 72 (“Written in the passive voice, § 523(a)(2)(A) turns on how the money was
obtained, not who committed fraud to obtain it.”). Accordingly, it is possible for a debt to be
non-dischargeable under Section 523(a)(2)(A) even if the debtor did not commit the fraud, and
it was instead committed by a third party (e.g., an agent or partner of the debtor).
In considering the passive construction of Section 523(a)(2)(A), the Court contrasted
the active language in of Sections 523(a)(2)(B) and 523(a)(2)(C). Id. at 77-78. One of the
necessary elements for a debt to be non-dischargeable under Section 523(a)(2)(B) is that “the
debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive” the relevant written statement.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B). The language of Section 523(a)(2)(C) also specifically identifies the
necessary actor, the debtor, as being the beneficiary of the relevant luxury goods or cash
advances that are at issue. See Bartenwerfer, 598 U.S. at 77-78 (Ҥ 523(a)(2)(C) presumptively
bars the discharge of recently acquired consumer debts owed to a single creditor and
aggregating more than $500 for luxury goods or services incurred by an individual debtor and cash
advances aggregating more than $750 obtained by an individual debtor.”) (cleaned up). Thus, we
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can infer from Congress’s use of the passive and active voice in the context of Section 523(a)(2)
that subsection “(A) excludes debtor culpability from consideration given that [subsections] (B)
and (C) expressly hinge on it.” Id. at 78.
Section 1328(a)(4) similarly employs an active construction rather than a passive one.
In other words, the theory of derivative liability endorsed in Bartenwerfer in the context of
Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not apply to Section 1328(a)(4) because the language of Section
1328(a)(4) clearly focuses on who caused the personal injury (or death) and not merely who
may be liable for it. In Bartenwerfer’s wake, courts have begun to apply this reasoning to Section
523(a)(6)’s “by the debtor” requirement. See, e.g., In re Del Rosario, 668 B.R. 618, 626-27 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2025) (applying the reasoning of Bartenwerfer to conclude that “by the debtor” in §
523(a)(6) precludes a theory of vicarious liability).
As previously discussed, Section 1328(a)(4) provides an analogue to Section 523(a)(6)
in Chapter 13 cases, but with key alterations. The omission of the “by the debtor” requirement
is not one of those alterations. See Waag, 418 B.R. at 377 (discussing Congress’s intent in
enacting § 1328(a)(4) and three significant differences between the two discharge exceptions,
of which the “by the debtor” requirement is not one).5 In light of these post-Bartenwerfer
developments in the case law, which I view as particularly relevant to this discussion of Section
1328(a)(4) because of the parallels and history of the two exceptions, I conclude that
Bartenwerfer’s reasoning similarly forecloses a theory of interpersonal vicarious or derivative
liability in the context of Section 1328(a)(4).6
Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ theories of liability that rely on Bruner’s conduct—and not the
conduct of the Debtor—do not fall within Section 1328(a)(4). For instance, Bruner’s alleged
trespass on PALS’s property and assault of PALS’s personnel was not a “willful or malicious
5 Although both statutes refer to “injury by the debtor,” Section 1328(a)(4) arguably goes
further than Section 523(a)(6). It requires “willful or malicious injury by the debtor that caused
personal injury.” 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(4). This double reference to “injury” leaves no doubt that
the debtor must be responsible for it.
6 Bartenwerfer and related principles present more challenging interpretive questions in
the relatively rare situations in which a non-individual debtor is subject to the Section 523(a)
discharge exceptions. See generally In re ETG Fire, LLC, 670 B.R. 884, 910-11 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2025) (concluding that “a corporate entity’s intent may be determined by imputing to the entity
the acts and intentions of [its] management and senior employees” and recognizing that the
alternative is “the wrongheaded proposition that corporations cannot have intent at all”). I
need not address this issue here.
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injury by the debtor,” even if it may have been at the urging of the Debtor. However, to the
extent that Plaintiffs are alleging a willful or malicious injury by the Debtor—which some of
Plaintiffs’ allegations appear to support—such an injury could be actionable under Section
1328(a)(4) if it meets the statute’s other requirements, including that it “caused personal
injury.”
4. 	That caused personal injury
“Personal injury” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, but “most courts interpreting
the scope of § 1328(a)(4)’s ‘personal injury’ limitation have concluded that § 1328(a)(4)’s use
of ‘personal injury’ includes nonphysical harms.” Liukonen, 670 B.R. at 345 (collecting cases);
see also Jones, 2020 WL 908445, at *2 (holding that invasion of privacy is “personal injury”
under § 1328(a)(4)). I agree with this majority view.
At first blush, Section 1328(a)(4)’s reference to “personal injury to an individual or the
death of an individual” seems to invoke the same subject matter as 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5), which
requires that “[t]he district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims
shall be tried in the district court.” Section 157(b)(2)(B) similarly requires that the liquidation
or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims
against the estate for purposes of distribution be handled by the district court.
The scope of “personal injury tort” under Section 157(b) is unsettled. See Stern v.
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 479 (2011) (“We need not determine what constitutes a ‘personal injury
tort.’”). Indeed, courts have adopted three different tests for evaluating whether a claim is a
“personal injury tort.” See In re Smith, 673 B.R. 1, 7 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2025) (summarizing the
three tests but declining to decide which to adopt). There is the “narrow” test, which holds that
the term includes bodily injuries only; the “broad” test, which allows for any non-physical
harms to be included; and the “middle view,” which provides that torts for non-bodily injuries
can be a “personal injury tort,” but financial or business injuries cannot. See In re Gawker Media
LLC, 571 B.R. 612, 620 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (summarizing three approaches and collecting
cases); Liukonen, 670 B.R. at 345-46 (similar); In re Interco, Inc., 135 B.R. 359, 362 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1991) (adopting narrow test).
I conclude, however, that regardless of which interpretation of Section 157(b) I might
adopt in an appropriate case, it would not determine the meaning of “personal injury” under
Section 1328(a)(4). The two statutes concern entirely different issues—the allocation of
responsibility among federal courts versus the scope of debts that may be discharged in a
Chapter 13 case—and there is nothing in the language of either statute indicating that the words
“personal injury” should refer to the same types of claims. See Liukonen, 670 B.R. at 345 (“There
is no convincing textual reason to equate the type of personal injury for which an award of
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damages may be excepted from discharge under § 1328(a)(4) of title 11 with Congress’s use of
‘personal injury’ to qualify the types of torts to be heard by the district court, rather than the
bankruptcy court, under § 157(b)(5) of title 28.”).
Moreover, the phrase “personal bodily injury,” as used in Section 522(d)(11)(D) of the
Bankruptcy Code, contrasts with Section 1328(a)(4)’s wording. Congress’s selective use of the
qualifier “bodily”—in the only other provision of the Bankruptcy Code where personal-injury
claims are discussed—further supports the interpretation that “personal injury,” as used in
Section 1328(a)(4), is intended to include non-bodily harms.
For these reasons, I conclude that “personal injury” as used in Section 1328(a)(4) is not
strictly limited to bodily injuries. Nevertheless, a purely financial injury does not qualify.
“Personal injury in § 1328(a)(4) should be defined in contradistinction to injury to property; the
emphasis in § 1328(a)(4) is on injury to an individual.” In re Adams, 478 B.R. 476, 486 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2012) (cleaned up). Indeed, “personal” modifies “injury,” which “distinguishes
injuries to an individual from injuries to property.” Id. at 487; see also Ang, 589 B.R. at 179-80
(“[T]he court is unaware of any case where a property injury was a sufficient basis for recovery
under § 1328(a)(4).”); In re Deluty, 540 B.R. 41, 47 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that
“personal injury” in the context of Section 1328(a)(4) “excludes financial injury, but includes
non-physical injuries, not just bodily injury.”); Liukonen, 670 B.R. at 344-45 (same).
Accordingly, those of Plaintiffs’ claims that allege bodily as well as non-bodily personal
injuries may proceed; but any claim that involves solely financial injury, or an injury to
property, cannot. This means that Plaintiffs’ theories of liability sounding in trespass to
property, breach of settlement agreement, and litigation misconduct are not ripe.7 However,
7 In their supplemental brief, Plaintiffs also advance a theory of prima facie tort, which,
under Missouri law, “provide[s] a remedy for tortious conduct that does not fit under any
traditional theories.” In re President Casinos, Inc., 419 B.R. 394, 401 (E.D. Mo. 2009). I conclude,
however, that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for prima facie tort. It is not intended as “a
duplicative remedy for claims that can be sounded in other traditionally recognized tort
theories, or a catchall remedy of last resort for claims that are not otherwise salvageable under
traditional causes of action.” Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 315 (Mo. 1993).
In this case, Plaintiffs have alleged several traditional torts as well as non-tort causes of action
(e.g., breach of the Settlement Agreement). Therefore, traditionally recognized causes of action
are already squarely at issue in this proceeding and are fully equipped to provide Plaintiffs with
a remedy—in fact, they have already provided the Plaintiffs with a remedy in state court. See
Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Mo. 1996) (where there is a recognized tort available to
remedy an alleged wrong, Missouri law discourages the invocation of prima facie tort); Tamko
(footnote continued)
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Plaintiffs’ theories of personal injury based on defamation and threats alleged to have been
committed by the Debtor remain viable.
5. 	To an individual
It is undisputed that Raeker-Bickel is an individual, but PALS is not. As previously
discussed, the word “personal” in “personal injury” forecloses claims based on injuries to
property. The phrase “to an individual” serves a similar function in foreclosing the possibility
that anyone other than a natural person may pursue a Section 1328(a)(4) claim. This contrasts
with the language of Section 523(a)(6), which expressly provides that a debt for a “willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity” cannot be
discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (emphasis added). This omission in Section 1328(a)(4) is
dispositive, and, as a result, Section 1328(a)(4) contemplates a different scope of creditors and
excepts a more limited range of debts from discharge than Section 523(a)(6) does. See Adams,
478 B.R. at 486 (concluding that Congress intended this distinction). Indeed, “where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (cleaned up).
When courts have addressed Section 1328(a)(4) claims, the analysis of the “to an
individual” requirement has often been subsumed within the analysis of the “personal injury”
element. See, e.g., Ang, 589 B.R. at 179-80; Adams, 478 B.R. at 486; Waag, 418 B.R. at 377;
Liukonen, 670 B.R. at 344. Where the word “personal” forecloses injuries to property, it will
also always foreclose injuries sustained by a corporate entity such as PALS. However, the
converse may not always be true. That is, an individual may suffer an injury to his or her
property. The “to an individual” requirement would not operate to bar such a claim, but rather
the “personal injury” element would play that role. Thus, these are different, albeit overlapping,
requirements. Nevertheless, it is clear that PALS is not an individual and cannot pursue its
Section 1328(a)(4) claims on its own behalf. Raeker-Bickel may do so, assuming that she meets
the other requirements of Section 1328(a)(4).
However, it is less clear whether a non-individual such as PALS may prosecute a claim
arising from a personal injury to an individual. In their supplemental brief, Plaintiffs advance
the theory that the Judgment in favor of PALS includes compensation for Bruner’s verbal
assault of PALS’s volunteer and of Raeker-Bickel. Does this alleged personal injury to
individuals 	associated 	with 	PALS 	permit 	PALS 	to 	overcome 	the 	“to 	an 	individual”
Roofing Products, Inc. v. Smith Engineering Co., 450 F.3d 822, 830 (8th Cir. 2006) (making the
same observation about prima facie tort under Misouri law).
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requirement in Section 1328(a)(4)? Does PALS have standing to pursue such a claim to the
extent it is derived from an injury to an individual?
PALS clearly would not have Article III standing to litigate a claim in federal court on
behalf of its volunteer or Raeker-Bickel. See Mercy Health Network v. Mercy Hospital, Iowa City,
IA, 178 F.4th 449, 456 (8th Cir. 2026) (Stras, J., concurring) (“The prohibition on third-party
standing . . . requires parties to generally assert their own legal rights and interests, not those
belonging to others.”) (cleaned up). But if PALS is correct that the Judgment awarded it
damages based on harm suffered by someone else, what authority does a federal court have to
determine that the Judgment did not include such an award, or that the state court should not
have made such an award, or that the award should not be enforceable in federal court?
Because Section 1328(a)(4) is a relatively recent addition to the Bankruptcy Code, and
this question involves language not present in the older Section 523(a)(6), the case law provides
little guidance on this rare and complicated question at the intersection of standing, full faith
and credit, preclusion, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. And the parties have not directly raised
these questions or briefed this specific issue.
Ultimately, I conclude that I need not answer this question, because all of PALS’s
claims are insufficient for other reasons. In particular, the verbal assaults at issue were acts of
Bruner, not of the Debtor, and thus PALS cannot satisfy Section 1328(a)(4)’s “by the debtor”
requirement. Accordingly, I need not reach the question whether PALS may pursue its claim
arising from the alleged harm to its personnel.
IV. 	Conclusion
For these reasons, I will enter an order that does the following: (1) dismisses all of
Plaintiffs’ claims under Section 523(a)(6) as unripe; (2) denies PALS leave to re-plead under
Section 1328(a)(4), because PALS is not an individual and because, to the extent PALS
advances claims that derive from a personal injury to Raeker-Bickel or to an individual who is
not a party to this proceeding, that injury was caused by a person other than the Debtor; and
(3) grants Raeker-Bickel leave to re-plead under Section 1328(a)4), but only to the extent that
her claims involve a personal injury, as opposed to a financial injury or an injury to property,
that was caused by the Debtor, as opposed to by Bruner or any other person.
Dated: August 28, 2026 	_______
St. Louis, Missouri
cjs 	United States Bankruptcy Judge
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