Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
MIRYAN R. Q-S.,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, United
States Department of Justice; et al.,
Respondents.
No. 26-cv-1681 (KMM/JFD)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed
by Petitioner Miryan R. Q-S. (hereafter “Miryan RQS” or “Petitioner”). (Dkt. 1.) On February
27, 2026, the Court Ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
(Dkt. 3.) Respondents argue that this case should be dismissed or transferred to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas because Miryan RQS was detained in Karnes
City, Texas at the time the petition was filed. (Dkt. 5.) Having reviewed the petition, the
response, and Petitioner’s reply (Dkt. 6), the Court transfers this case to the Western District of
Texas.
BACKGROUND
Miryan RQS is a citizen of Ecuador. She entered the United States without inspection in
late October 2024 and was released on her own recognizance. On January 13, 2026, agents from
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Miryan RQS in Bloomington, Minnesota
after she attended her regularly scheduled appointment for an ICE supervision program. When
she arrived for her meeting, “she was instructed to leave her phone and was brought to a separate
room. Federal agents in full tactical gear then entered that room, handcuffed [Petitioner],
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blindfolded her, escorted her out of the building, and then took her to [the Bishop Henry Whipple
Federal Building at Fort Snelling, Minnesota].” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 30.) After her arrest, ICE “transferred
[Miryan RQS] to Karnes County Immigration Processing Center in Karnes City, Texas,” where
she was detained at the time the petition was filed on February 27, 2026. (Id. ¶ 5.) Indeed, she
was transferred to the ICE facility in Karnes City on January 13, 2026 “due to bed space
constraints in Minnesota,” and she “has been detained at the Karnes City facility continuously
since February 5, 2026, and was there on the day … the petition in this case was filed on
February 27, 2026.” (Minner Decl. ¶ 7 (Dkt. 5-1).)
DISCUSSION
Respondents challenge the Court’s jurisdiction to address this matter because ICE
transferred Petitioners to the Western District of Texas more than two weeks before they
filed the petition. Relying on Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), Respondents
argue Miryan RQS’s pre-filing transfer to Texas prevents this Court from adjudicating her
petition.1 (Dkt. 5.) The Court agrees.
In Padilla, the Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner, who the federal
government transferred into military custody at a naval brig in South Carolina prior to his
filing of a habeas petition, properly filed his petition in the Western District of New York.
542 U.S. at 430–32. The Court held that the proper respondent in a habeas case
challenging physical custody is the petitioner’s “immediate custodian.” Id. at 439, 442.
Further, based on the 	language in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), the Court concluded that
“jurisdiction over [the] habeas petition lies in [a particular district court] only if it has
1 Respondents acknowledge that Padilla’s use of the term “jurisdiction” does not
relate to the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. 5 at 3 n.1.)
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jurisdiction over [the immediate custodian].” Id. at 442. But in explaining these rules, the
Court was clear that it was not addressing subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 434 n.7 (“The
word ‘jurisdiction,’ of course, is capable of different interpretations. We use it in the sense
that it is used in the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and not in the sense of subject-
matter jurisdiction of the District Court.”); see also id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(explaining that the “immediate custodian” and “territorial jurisdiction” rules “are not
jurisdictional in the sense of a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction”).2 The Court,
therefore, finds that Petitioner’s pre-filing transfer does not deprive the court of subject-
matter jurisdiction. See Mathena v. United States, 577 F.3d 943, 946 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009)
(stating that even though petitioner did not file his habeas in the district where he was
confined that “defect did not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction”).
Even though the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, that conclusion does not
end the inquiry regarding the proper forum for Miryan RQS’s challenge to her current
confinement. Respondents argue that the Court should transfer the petition to the Western
District of Texas. Padilla states that the proper forum for a habeas petition challenging
physical detention is in the district where the petitioner is confined. 542 U.S. at 443
(“[F]or core habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies
in only one district: the district of confinement.”); id. at 442 (“Accordingly, with respect
to habeas petitions ‘designed to relieve an individual from oppressive confinement,’ the
traditional rule has always been that the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of
2 Although the Court did not ultimately resolve precisely the doctrine to which
these rules belong, the Padilla concurrence indicates that they are “best understood as a
question of personal jurisdiction or venue.” 542 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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confinement.’” (quoting Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961)). The district
of confinement in this case is the Western District of Texas. The Western District of Texas
was also the district of confinement when Miryan RQS’s counsel filed the verified habeas
petition in this District. Accordingly, the proper forum for the petition in this case is in the
Western District of Texas, not this Court.
“An exception [to the district-of-confinement rule] is recognized, however, where
the petitioner’s location is unknown at the time of filing—such as when the petitioner is
in transit—or where immigration authorities have not disclosed where the petitioner is
being detained or by whom, and circumstances have prevented or precluded contact with
counsel.” Adriana M.Y.M. v. Easterwood, No. 26‐cv-213 (JWB/JFD), 2026 WL 184721,
at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 24, 2026); Aleksander B. v. Trump, No. 26-cv-170, 2026 WL
172435, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2026) (collecting cases that recognized this exception).3
But this exception does not apply here because the allegations in the petition show that
Petitioner’s counsel knew she was located in Texas at the time the petition was filed, and
that they had been there for some time. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 5.) Under these circumstances, the Court
finds that transfer to the district of confinement is the appropriate result. E.g., Jonnathan
X.D.B. v. Kristi Noem, No. 26-cv-588 (DWF/DJF), 2026 WL 222189, at *1 (D. Minn.
3 	This 	case 	differs 	materially 	from 	the 	undersigned’s 	recent 	decision 	in
Aleksander B. There, the petitioner’s whereabouts were not known to counsel when the
petition was filed and the respondents were not forthcoming with information when the
petitioner’s counsel asked them about his location for several days. 2026 WL 172435, at
*3. Here, Miryan RQS was transferred out of this District several weeks before the
petition was filed and the petition itself shows that her counsel knew she was not detained
in Minnesota at that time.
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Jan. 28, 2026) (finding that exception to district-of-confinement rule did not apply where
counsel knew about petitioner’s location in another district when the petition was filed
but transferring to the place of confinement rather than dismissing based on the court’s
concerns that petitioner’s detention was unlawful).4
ORDER
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT this matter
is TRANSFERRED to the Western District of Texas. The Clerk of Court is directed to
effectuate the transfer without delay.
Date: March 9, 2026 	s/Katherine Menendez
Katherine Menendez
United States District Judge
4 The Court might reach a different decision if it appeared that transfers were
being made specifically to obscure a petitioner’s location, or to deprive a petitioner of
accessing his counsel. There is nothing in the record before the Court to support either
suggestion. And Respondents have presented evidence that the reason for the transfer
here was a lack of available bed space in Minnesota. (Minner Decl. ¶ 7.)
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