Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Kou Lor,
Petitioner,
v.
Troy Schilling, in his capacity as Warden,
Crow Wing County Jail; David
Easterwood, in his capacity as Acting
Director of St. Paul Field Office; Kristi
Noem, in her capacity as Secretary of the
United States Department of Homeland
Security; Pamela Bondi, in her official
capacity as Attorney General of the
United States; Todd M. Lyons, in his
official capacity as Acting Director of the
United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-1672 (ECT/DLM)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Kou Lor’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) In his Petition, Mr. Lor argues that his detention
since 	January 	5, 	2026, 	by 	the 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	(“DHS”) 	U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is unlawful under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), and the Accardi doctrine. Accordingly, Mr. Lor demands his
immediate release. Respondents object and contend that Mr. Lor’s detainment is lawful
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (Doc. 4).
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Mr. Lor’s Petition comes before the Court for review under Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court.1 The case has been
referred 	to 	the 	undersigned 	United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judge 	for 	a 	Report 	and
Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1.
For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends that Mr. Lor’s Petition (Doc. 1)
be granted.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Lor was born in Laos. (Doc. 1 ¶ 3.) Fleeing persecution of their Hmong
community, he and his family left Laos and, after spending several years in a Thai refugee
camp, arrived in the United States in 1979. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 3, 64) Mr. Lor has lived in the United
States since then. (Id. ¶ 3.) On December 10, 1981, Mr. Lor became a Lawful Permanent
Resident (“LPR”). (Doc. 7 ¶ 5.) In 1993, Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
encountered Mr. Lor at a Minnesota state prison where he was serving concurrent sentences
for several criminal convictions. (Doc. 7 ¶ 6.) Soon after, INS served Mr. Lor an Order to
Show Cause Form, charging removability under § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA. (Doc. 7 ¶
7; see Doc. 5 at 2-8) On August 16, 1996, Mr. Lor received an Order of Removal from an
immigration judge. (Doc. 7 ¶ 11; see Doc. 5 at 10.) That order became final one month
later. (Doc. 7 ¶ 12.) Upon his release from prison in 2003, Mr. Lor was detained by ICE
for ten months. (Doc. 1 ¶ 68; Doc. 7 ¶ 13.) On July 20, 2004, Mr. Lor was released from
immigration detention on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”) because Laos did not issue
1 Although Mr. Lor’s Petition is not filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Court may apply the
rules governing that section per Rule 1(b).
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travel documents for Mr. Lor. (Doc. 7 ¶ 14; see Doc. 5 at 11-13.) At the time of Mr. Lor’s
removal order and at time of his release from detention, Mr. Lor was not a citizen of Laos.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 66.) In fact, in 2004, Laos implemented a new law that stripped Laotian
citizenship from any national who had left the country for more than seven years.
Accordingly, Laos did not issue the necessary travel documents. (Doc. 7 ¶ 14.) Because
Mr. Lor could not return to the country of his birth on lawful travel documents, immigration
agents found there to be no reasonably foreseeable likelihood of removal and placed Mr.
Lor on supervised release. (Doc. 1 ¶ 4; Doc. 7 ¶ 14.).
Since 2004, Mr. Lor has complied with the requirements of his supervised release,
including regular check-ins with immigration officials. (Doc. 1 ¶ 69.) Mr. Lor has never
violated the terms of his release. (Id.) And up until December 2025, Mr. Lor worked in the
United States through a work permit; he stopped when a new federal policy forbade his
renewal of that permit. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 66.) Mr. Lor has not lived in Laos since his infancy.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 64.) His life is American: he is a husband to a U.S. citizen and father to five U.S.
citizen children. (Doc. 1 ¶ 2.)
On January 5, 2026—after close to fifty years of residence in the United States and
twenty-two years of lawful supervised release—Mr. Lor was arrested by ICE without a
warrant following his appearance at a supervised release check-in. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7, 70.)
Initially, Mr. Lor was detained at the Henry Bishop Whipple Federal Building. (Doc. 1 ¶
70.) On January 7, 2026, ICE placed Mr. Lor on a plane headed to El Paso, but officials
removed him at the last moment and instead transported him to Crow Wing County Jail,
where he has since been detained. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 8, 70.) On January 9, 2026, ICE served
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Petitioner with a Notice of OSUP Revocation (“Notice”). (Doc. 7 ¶ 15, see Doc. 5 at 16.)
By way of explanation for the revocation, the Notice states simply that “changed
circumstances” merit the revocation of Mr. Lor’s release. (Doc. 5 at 15.) Mr. Lor
represents, however, that he has not received any document notifying him of his release
revocation, and that he has not been afforded an informal interview to contest that
revocation. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 9, 70, 102, 109.) On January 18, 2026, immigration officials
submitted a travel document request to “HQ Removals International Operation,” and the
country of Laos issued a travel document for Mr. Lor. (Doc. 7 ¶ 16.) Petitioner is now
“manifested” on an upcoming charter flight to Laos, a country he has not known since the
age of two. (Id.)
8 U.S.C. § 1231
The statutory framework codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 provides that the Attorney
General shall remove a person present unlawfully in the United States “within a period of
90 days” after a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). When the government
fails to remove someone within that 90-day window, any enduring detention may be
unlawful unless there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700-01 (2001). A period of detention for more
than six months in these circumstances is presumptively unreasonable. Id.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)
8 C.F.R. § 241.13 outlines the conditions that must be met for the government to
revoke the release of a noncitizen subject to an order of supervision. Release may be
revoked where the noncitizen violates the conditions of his release. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1).
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Revocation 	and 	return 	to 	custody 	may 	also 	occur, 	“if, 	on 	account 	of 	changed
circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien
may be removed in 	the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	Id. § 	241.13(i)(2). “Upon
revocation,” the noncitizen must be notified of the reasons for revocation of his release. Id.
§ 241.13(i)(3). “Promptly” after the noncitizen returns to custody upon revocation,
immigration officials must conduct an interview to afford the noncitizen “an opportunity
to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” Id. At that point, the
noncitizen may submit evidence to show that there is no significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. The subsequent revocation custody review must
include an evaluation of contested facts and a “determination whether the facts as
determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.” Id.
Mr. Lor’s Petition Challenging Detainment
Mr. Lor challenges his detainment on the grounds that the government failed to
follow its own procedure. He argues that the government failed to follow the mandates of
8 C.F.R. § 241.13 when it detained him before issuance of the Notice; when it failed to
provide adequate grounds within the Notice; and when it denied him an opportunity to
contest the Notice. Mr. Lor argues that the Respondents’ subsequent briefing also fails to
allege “changed circumstances” such to justify the revocation of his release. Overall, says
Petitioner, these procedural blunders violate agency regulation codified at 8 C.F.R. §
241.13, as well as the INA, the APA, and the Accardi doctrine. Accordingly, he demands
his immediate release.
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Respondents, for their part, sidestep Mr. Lor’s § 241.13 arguments and instead
contend Petitioner has not established the illegality of his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
Leaning on Zadvydas, they argue that changed circumstances exist, leading to a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future because immigration officials
have obtained Laotian travel documents and because Mr. Lor is scheduled for a charter
flight to Laos at an undisclosed time in the near future.
LEGAL STANDARD
The writ of habeas corpus is a procedure available to prisoners to create government
accountability for unlawful detention. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968); Ex parte
McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867). That right extends to “persons
challenging the lawfulness of immigration-related detention. Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F.
Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003)
and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001)). In such cases, it is the Petitioner who
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that their detention is
unlawful. See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286–87 (1941); see also Bradin v. U.S.
Prob. & Pretrial Servs., No. 22-3032, 2022 WL 1154622, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 19, 2022)
(collecting cases).
ANALYSIS
The government’s authority to re-detain noncitizens on supervised release is not
without limit. It is bounded by those rights to which all are entitled under the Constitution,
and by the government’s own regulations codified at 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. These regulations
are not advisory. They bind the government to act in accordance with their substance and
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procedure. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954). In
this case, Respondents did not follow their own rules. The Court recommends that Mr.
Lor’s Petition be granted.
At the outset, the Court observes that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 is relevant to Mr. Lor but
Zadvydas is not. Courts across the country, including those in this District, differentiate
Petitioners released subject to OSUP where a final removal order determination has already
been made from “typical Zadvydas Petitioners” who are detained continuously from the
time of their order for final removal. Vang v. Bondi. 26-CV-1381 (JMG/DLM), 2026 WL
458195, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026) (“But Zadvydas does not apply to noncitizens
subject to an order of supervision, where there has already been a determination that a
noncitizen is not likely to be removed.).2 Respondents’ insistence on the applicability of
2 See also Zavvar v. Scott, No. 25-2104-TDC, 2025 WL 2592543, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 8,
2025) (“Zadvydas contemplated only the situation in which a noncitizen was continuously
detained from the issuance of the removal order while efforts to execute the removal were
ongoing ... and did not directly address the situation presented here, where a noncitizen
was not detained upon the issuance of the removal order, remained on release for over 17
years, and only then was subjected to post-removal order detention for the first time.”);
Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D. Mass. 2025) (“This case is not about ICE's
authority to detain in the first place upon an issuance of a final order of removal as in
Zadvydas. This case is about ICE's authority to re-detain Mr. Nguyen after he was issued
a final order of removal, detained, and subsequently released on an OSUP. The DHS
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), applies to non-citizens in Petitioner's situation.”); Nguyen
v. Bondi, No. EP-25-CV-323-KC, 2025 WL 3120516, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2025)
(“Unlike a typical Zadvydas petitioner, who is detained continuously from the time of their
final removal order, Nguyen was released pursuant to an OSUP and lived at liberty in the
United States for nearly thirteen years.”); Trejo v. Warden of ERO El Paso E. Mont., 25-
cv-401, 	2025 	WL 	2992187, 	at 	*6-7 	(W.D. 	Tex. 	Oct. 	24, 	2025) 	(same).
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Zadvydas misses the mark. Mr. Lor is a noncitizen who was released from immigration
detention on supervised release after a final removal order twenty-odd years ago who now
faces revocation of that release: this is the precise circumstance contemplated by § 241.13.
See Levkovich v. Trump, 26-cv-938 (SHL/DLM) (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2026.) (“Petitioner was
released more than twenty years ago in exactly the manner contemplated by 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h). There was a final order of removal against him, but his
native country would not allow him to be returned.”). Though Respondents make scarce
mention of § 241.13 and never once discuss its requirements for release of revocation (see
Doc. 4 at 5, 6, 11), the Court finds it—not Zadvydas—to be the proper framework by which
to consider Mr. Lor’s claims.
I. 	IMPROPER NOTICE
Petitioner contends that the first issue arose when Respondents detained Mr. Lor for
four days before his supervised release was revoked, and without a warrant that stated any
grounds for his arrest.3 Respondents do not contest this timeline, nor do they provide any
legal basis to justify Mr. Lor’s arrest and detainment before the revocation. Accordingly,
the Court agrees with Petitioner that his detainment prior to the issuance of the Notice
violated 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 and merits his release.
3 As other Courts in this District have noted, the warrantless nature of Petitioner’s arrest
raises the troubling possibility his arrest was motivated by unlawful purposes. See Pham v.
Noem, No. 26-cv-1445 (ECT/DJF) (D. Minn. March 3, 2026) (“Respondents’ failure to
produce a warrant or any legal authorization to detain [Petitioner] at the time of his arrest
raises the possibility that they arrested him for arbitrary, discriminatory or other unlawful
reasons and then revoked his supervised release later to justify it.”).
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Consistent with the safeguards of due process, the purpose of a notice is to provide
advance warning to a person whose liberty may be impinged by government action. A
notice after a detainment is no notice at all. Accordingly, and as other Courts in this District
and across the country have held, the issuance of a Notice of Revocation after detainment
of a noncitizen on supervised release is impermissible. Pham v. Noem, No. 26-cv-1445
(ECT/DJF) (D. Minn. March 3, 2026) (concluding six-day detainment before revocation
of supervised release violated immigration regulation); see also M.S.L. v. Bostock, No.
6:25-cv-1204 (AA), 2025 WL 2430267, at *10, 12 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025) (same). In this
case, Respondents issued the Notice four days after Mr. Lor’s detainment, though Mr. Lor
in fact contests ever receiving the Notice. (Doc. 1 ¶ 9.)Either way, the record shows that
Respondents failed to provide timely notice of revocation to Mr. Lor in violation of 8
C.F.R. § 241.13.
Second, the Notice itself, like the notice in Pham, is unduly vague and void of
reasons that explain the revocation of Mr. Lor’s release. It states only that “[t]his decision
[the revocation] has been made based on a review of your file and/or your personal
interview on account of changed circumstances in your case.” (See Doc. 5 at 15.) But under
agency regulation, a noncitizen must be provided reasons for the revocation under
government regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Here, the Notice makes no such
reasons apparent. At most, the Notice slaps on boilerplate legal conclusions that mimic 8
C.F.R. § 241.13’s language but fall short of its substantive requirements. This matters:
without reasons for the revocation, Mr. Lor is foreclosed from challenging the decision and
presenting rebuttal evidence and argument at the subsequent interview, as is his right under
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8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). See Sarail A. v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 775, 781 (D. Minn. Sept.
3, 2025) (“notification ‘of the reasons for revocation’ requires ICE to do more than state
that circumstances have changed.”). The record of Mr. Lor’s January 9 ‘interview’ (which
he denies having received (see Doc. 1 ¶ 9)) further confirms Respondents’ failure to
provide meaningful information and opportunity to contest to Mr. Lor. (See Doc. 5 at 17.)
Respondents’ failure to provide adequate notice of the revocation of release is reason alone
to grant Mr. Lor’s Petition. See Sarail A., 803 F. Supp. 3d at 781-84 (granting habeas
petition based party on government’s failure to provide adequate notice of the reasons for
revocation); Pham v. Noem, No. 26-cv-1445 (ECT/DJF) (D. Minn. March 3, 2026) (same);
Dusan C. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-620 (JRT/ECW), 2026 WL 458128, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb.
13, 2026) (same); Xayakesone v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2995 (JES/BJW), 2025 WL 3229102,
at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, CASE 0:26-cv-01445-ECT-DJF (same). Accordingly, the Court
recommends that Mr. Lor’s Petition is granted.
II. 	INADEQUATE GROUNDS
Next, Petitioner contests Respondents’ grounds for revocation. Petitioner argues
that the fact that DHS has purchased a plane ticket and secured travel documents to Laos
is alone insufficient to establish changed circumstances that lead to the reasonably
foreseeable likelihood of removal under agency regulation. Respondents contend that it is.
Although the inadequate notice of Mr. Lor’s revocation alone merit his release, the Court
finds that the reasons proffered by Respondents for revocation likewise prove inadequate.
Eight 	C.F.R. 	§ 	241.13 	requires 	immigration 	officials 	to 	identify 	“changed
circumstances” upon revocation that lead them to conclude that a noncitizen on supervised
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release may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. Based on the statutory
language “upon revocation,” courts across the country have held that the changed
circumstances finding must be made before a noncitizen’s supervised release is revoked,
not after. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Post-hoc rationalizations are impermissible, and support
petitioners’ release. Pham v. Noem, No. 26-cv-1445 (ECT/DJF) (D. Minn. March 3, 2026);
Vang v. Bondi, 26-CV-1381, 2026 WL 458195, at *3, (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026) (“it is the
government’s burden to show a change in circumstance before revoking an order of
supervision and detaining a person indefinitely.”); see also Tran v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-
02391-BTM-BLM, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (Ҥ 241.13(i)(2)
requires that [the changed circumstances] determination is made before the removable alien
has had his release revoked”); Munagi v. McDonald, No. 25-13175-NMG, 2025 WL
3688023, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2025) (“The question before the Court is not whether
petitioner's deportation is now likely in the reasonably foreseeable future but whether such
likelihood existed at the time his OSUP was revoked.”).
In this case, Respondents have failed to demonstrate the changed circumstances that
existed upon revocation. Accordingly, the Court finds inadequate grounds for revocation.
For twenty-two years, Mr. Lor complied in full with the requirements of his supervised
release. That remained true upon his detainment on January 5, 2026 when he appeared
before immigration officials in compliance with the terms of his OSUP. At that time,
immigration officials identified no changed circumstances in Mr. Lor’s case. On January
9, 2026, when the Notice was issued, they also identified no changed circumstances. Now,
in their March 2026 briefing—two months after Mr. Lor’s detainment—Respondents
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summon-up changed circumstances that create a reasonably foreseeable likelihood of Mr.
Lor’s removal, namely, the travel documents to Laos. But clearly Respondents had not
identified those circumstances “upon” the revocation of Mr. Lor’s release as required under
Respondents’ 	own 	regulations. 	This 	fact 	makes 	the 	stated 	grounds 	for 	revocation
inadequate.
So, although the government went through the motions of C.F.R. § 241.13 by
issuing 	a 	Notice 	of 	Revocation, 	interviewing 	Mr. 	Lor, 	and 	identifying 	changed
circumstances, it did so incompletely and inadequately. The government is bound to
respect the statutory and constitutional rights of noncitizens. Here, it did not. The Court
recommends that Mr. Lor’s Petition be granted and that he be released from detention
immediately.
III. 	NO EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS REQUIRED
An evidentiary hearing is appropriate only when material facts are in dispute. Ruiz
v. Norris, 71 F.3d 1404, 1406 (8th Cir. 1995). An evidentiary hearing is not required when
a conclusion can be reached on the issue with the undisputed facts. United States v. Winters,
411 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2005). This matter can be resolved based on the existing record,
and thus the Court finds no evidentiary hearing is necessary.
IV. 	OBJECTIONS
Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the Court exercises its discretion
to alter the standard timelines for Respondents to file objections to this Report and
Recommendation. See L.R. 72.2(b)(1) (“A party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days
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after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, unless the court sets a
different deadline.”) (emphasis added). Respondents must file any objection to this Report
and Recommendation on or before March 17, 2026. Mr. Lor may file a response to any
objections on or before March 19, 2026.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings in this case, IT IS
RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Petitioner Kou Lor’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be
GRANTED; and;
2. 	Respondents be ordered to release Petitioner Lor from custody:
a. 	Immediately;
b. 	Inside the State of Minnesota;
c. 	At a safe time and place communicated in advance to counsel;
d. 	And with all of Petitioner’s personal effects in Respondents’ possession or
control, including, but not limited to, Mr. Lor’s driver’s license, immigration
paperwork, work authorization, cell phone, keys, clothing, personal effects.
Date: March 13, 2026 	s/Douglas L. Micko
DOUGLAS L. MICKO
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), a party may typically file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days
after being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation; and a party may
respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See
Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). However, as noted above, the Court has altered the deadlines
for objections and responses: all objections are due no later than March 17, 2026; all
responses are due no later than March 19, 2026. All objections and responses must
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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