Bettridge v. Deringer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Matthew David Bettridge,
Plaintiff,
v.
Sean Deringer, in his official capacity as the
Wright County Sheriff,
Defendant.
File No. 26-cv-01254 (ECT/ECW)
OPINION AND ORDER
Bradford W. Colbert, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, Mitchell Hamline School
of Law, St. Paul, MN, for Plaintiff Matthew David Bettridge.
Ashley Marie Ramstad and Stephanie A. Angolkar, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, MN,
for Defendant Sean Deringer.
The Wright County Jail1 charged Matthew Bettridge a fee2 for his confinement.
Bettridge is indigent and alleges that the County failed to consider his indigence when it
assessed the fee. Bettridge claims the County’s actions violated the federal and Minnesota
Constitutions and a Minnesota statute. He seeks damages, a declaration that the County’s
policies are unconstitutional, and a permanent injunction prohibiting the County from
1 	Bettridge brings this suit against Wright County Sheriff Sean Deringer in his official
capacity. “A suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against
the entity for which the official is an agent.” 	Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986
(8th Cir. 2006) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). 	Therefore,
Defendant Deringer is referred to as “the County” throughout.
2 	These fees are known as “pay to stay” fees. See In re Milan, 556 B.R. 922 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 2016) (referring to the fees as such).
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 1 of 21

2
collecting the fee. 	The County has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), and the motion will be granted. Bettridge’s federal
claims will be dismissed with prejudice because he has failed to state a plausible claim for
relief, and his state-law claims will be remanded.
I
Bettridge was arrested in October 2021 and was subsequently held at the Wright
County Jail. Am. Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 6. He pled guilty to a felony firearm offense. Id.
¶ 10. Bettridge is indigent and “was unable to make bail, so he remained incarcerated in
Wright County Jail until his sentencing” in March 2022, after which he was transferred to
the Rush City Correctional Facility. 	Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 10–11.3 	After his transfer, Bettridge
“received an invoice in the amount of $3,163 from Wright Country [sic],” charged pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 641.12.4 Id. ¶ 11. Bettridge then “sought a waiver of the fees and submitted
3 	Page citations are to the pagination assigned by the court’s CM/ECF system
appearing in a document’s upper right corner, not to a document’s original pagination.
4 	Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subdiv. 3(a) reads in relevant part “[a] county board may
require that a person convicted of a crime and confined in the county jail . . . pay the cost
of the person’s room, board, clothing, medical, dental, and other correctional services.”
The statute authorizes the “use [of] any available civil means of debt collection in collecting
costs.” 	Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subdiv. 3(a). 	The statute also contains a provision stating
that payment “shall” be waived
if the officer or sheriff determines that the person does not have
the ability to pay the costs, payment of the costs would create
undue hardship for the person or the person’s immediate
family, the prospects for payment are poor, or there are
extenuating circumstances justifying waiver of the costs.
Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subdiv. 3(b).
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 2 of 21

3
an ability-to-pay questionnaire in support of his request for a waiver.” Id. ¶ 12; ECF No.
20-1 at 6–8. 	On the ability-to-pay questionnaire, Bettridge wrote that his “assets totaled
$358” and that “he was earning an hourly income of 50 cents through Chemical
Dependency Treatment.” 	Am. Compl. ¶ 12; ECF No. 20-1 at 6–7. 	The County denied
Bettridge’s waiver request. Am. Compl. ¶ 13; ECF No. 20-2. Bettridge explains that “[t]he
imposition and continued existence of the . . . debt caused [him] significant stress and
anxiety.” Am. Compl. ¶ 14. He suffered from “ongoing worry about his inability to satisfy
the debt, uncertainty about potential collection action upon his release, and concern about
the debt’s effect on financial stability and ability to reintegrate into the community.” Id.
Bettridge filed this lawsuit in Minnesota state court [ECF No. 1-1], and the County
removed the suit to this court [ECF No. 1]. 	Bettridge alleges that it is the County’s
“standard practice and custom . . . to assess and collect confinement fees under Minn. Stat.
§ 641.12 without conducting a meaningful inquiry into a confined person’s ability to pay
prior to imposing the fee.” Am. Compl. ¶ 15. Bettridge further alleges that the County has
a “practice and custom of . . . deny[ing] requests for waiver of confinement fees without
conducting a genuine assessment of the person’s financial circumstances.” 	Id. ¶ 16.
Bettridge claims that the fee is an excessive fine and that its imposition violates the equal
protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process protections of the
Minnesota and United States Constitutions. 	Id. at 4–6. 	Bettridge also alleges that the
County violated Minn. Stat. § 641.12, which “requires waiver of confinement fees when a
person lacks the ability to pay.” Id. at 5. These are official-capacity claims, Am. Compl.
at 1, ¶ 3, brought under Monell, see Hoel v. Prouse, No. 25-cv-2342 (ECT/LIB), 2025 WL
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 3 of 21

4
3033945, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2025) (explaining that a municipality may be held liable
“under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief” if “the action that is alleged
to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers” or if the municipality
acted unconstitutionally with respect to its “custom” (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)).
Bettridge seeks retrospective and prospective relief. 	He requests “a permanent
injunction prohibiting further attempts [by the County] to collect the $3,163 assessment”
and “compensatory damages for the stress, hardship, and financial harm caused by the
unlawful imposition of the $3,163 confinement fee, and nominal damages . . . in the event
compensatory damages cannot be established.” Am. Compl. at 6. Bettridge also seeks a
declaration that “[the County’s] policies are unconstitutional under the Minnesota and
United States Constitutions.” 	Id. 	Bettridge further requests “the return of any collected
funds,” 	a 	declaration 	that 	“Defendant’s 	procedures 	violate 	Minn. 	Stat. 	§ 	641.12,”
“reasonable attorney’s fees and costs,” and “all other just and equitable relief.” 	Id.
Bettridge does not allege that he has paid the fee or that payment has otherwise been
collected. See Am. Compl.
II
Begin with issues of standing. Article III of the Constitution limits the federal
judicial power (or jurisdiction) to adjudicating “Cases” and “Controversies.” The general
rules governing Article III standing are settled:
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 4 of 21

5
Federal jurisdiction is limited by Article III, § 2, of the U.S.
Constitution to actual cases and controversies. Therefore, the
plaintiff’s standing to sue “is the threshold question in every
federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the
suit.” 	Warth [v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)]. 	To
show Article III standing, a plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(1) that he or she suffered an “injury-in-fact,” (2) a causal
relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct,
and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable
decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–
61 (1992).
Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000). An injury-in-fact is the “invasion
of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citation modified).
Standing “must exist not only at the time the complaint is filed, but through all
stages 	of 	the 	litigation.” Already, 	LLC 	v. 	Nike, 	Inc., 	568 	U.S. 	85 	(2013) (citation
modified); Twin Cities Safety, LLC v. Moe, 139 F.4th 1015, 1019 (8th Cir. 2025) (per
curiam). 	“A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a Case or Controversy for
purposes of Article III—when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91 (citation
modified). A case may be mooted by a defendant’s voluntary conduct only “if subsequent
events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably
be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393
U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
The County argues that Bettridge lacks standing and that his claims are moot
because the fees he contests “were never collected or sent to collections” and because “the
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 5 of 21

6
County . . . subsequently canceled [Bettridge’s] invoice and fees.” ECF. No. 24 at 10, 13.
The County also argues that Bettridge’s claim “that the County did not conduct a
meaningful ability-to-pay assessment before invoicing for fees” is moot because the
County revised its fee waiver procedures. Id. at 13–14. Finally, the County contends that
Bettridge fails to establish standing because Bettridge’s allegations of emotional harm are
“conclusory.” 	Id. at 10–12; ECF No. 32 at 5–6.
Begin 	with 	the 	County’s 	fee-cancellation 	and 	procedure-revision 	arguments.
Whether construed as standing or mootness issues, the facts supporting these arguments
are not alleged or referenced in Bettridge’s Amended Complaint. 	See Am. Compl. 	And
considering “matters outside the pleadings” generally transforms a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
into one for summary judgment. Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th
Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 	When, however, the relevant materials are “necessarily
embraced” by the pleadings, this transformation does not occur. Id. The pertinent question
is, therefore, whether the County’s fee cancellation and procedure revision are “necessarily
embraced” by the pleadings. I conclude that they are not.
Materials embraced by the pleadings include “matters incorporated by reference or
integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items
appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose
authenticity is unquestioned.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab'y, Inc., 688
F.3d 928, 931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012)). 	Materials embraced by the complaint include
“documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party
questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading.” 	Kushner v. Beverly
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 6 of 21

7
Enters., Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95
F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Here, the County attached several documents to its answer, including Bettridge’s
ability-to-pay questionnaire and the County’s waiver denial [ECF Nos. 20-1–20-2], as well
as documents demonstrating that the County waived Bettridge’s invoice and fees [ECF No.
20-3] and revised its ability-to-pay procedures [ECF Nos. 20-9–20-11]. 	I conclude that
Bettridge’s ability-to-pay questionnaire [ECF No. 20-1] and waiver denial [ECF No. 20-2]
are both “embraced” by the Amended Complaint because the pleading includes allegations
referencing these materials and the events associated with them. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12–
13 (detailing that Bettridge “sought a waiver of the fees and submitted an ability-to-pay
questionnaire” and that the County “denied [Bettridge’s] request for a waiver”). Because
the questionnaire and waiver denial are embraced by the Complaint, these documents may
be properly considered in the Rule 12(c) determination to the extent they are relevant. The
County’s fee cancellation and procedure revision, however, are not embraced by the
Amended Complaint; they are not mentioned in the pleading and, while these materials
may be relevant to defenses the County wishes to assert, they are not relevant to Bettridge’s
claims. 	See Am. Compl. 	This evidence will not be considered in the Rule 12(c)
determination.5 The County has therefore not shown that Bettridge lacks standing (or that
Bettridge’s claims are moot) due to the fee cancellation and procedure revision.
5 	Even if I considered the documents, the general rule is that “a defendant’s voluntary
cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine
the legality of the practice.” City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 288–
89 (1982). W hen cessation is voluntary, “[a] case might become moot if subsequent events
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 7 of 21

8
Turn to the County’s argument that Bettridge’s emotional harm “does not establish
an injury-in-fact to create standing.” ECF No. 24 at 10. The Eighth Circuit has examined
whether emotional harm is sufficiently concrete to constitute an injury for standing. 	See
Hekel v. Hunter Warfield, Inc., 118 F.4th 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2024); Ojogwu v. Rodenburg
L. Firm, 26 F.4th 457, 463 (8th Cir. 2022). In Hekel, a plaintiff received a collection letter
and claimed the letter caused emotional injury, including “confus[ion],” “worry,” and
“sleeplessness.” 	Hekel, 118 F.4th at 941, 943. 	The Eighth Circuit considered whether
emotional harm “suffice[s] for Article III purposes,” id. at 943 (quoting TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 436 n.7 (2021)), and explained that
[i]n Ojogwu v. Rodenburg Law Firm, we concluded that being
in 	a 	“state 	of 	confusion 	is 	not 	itself 	an 	injury,” 	and
“nervousness, restlessness, irritability, amongst other negative
emotions” are not either. 26 F.4th at 463 (first quoting Pennell
v. Glob. Tr. Mgmt., LLC, 990 F.3d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 2021)
and then quoting Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA, 946 F.3d
855, 864 (6th Cir. 2020)). 	[Plaintiff’s] complaint substitutes
some words––“sleeplessness” for “restlessness” and “worry”
for “nervousness”––but the “negative emotions” they describe
are basically the same. Id. at 463. 	And under Ojogwu, none
gives rise to standing. 	Id.; see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Elgin Warehouse & Equip., 4 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1993)
(“In this circuit[,] only an en banc court may overrule a panel
decision . . .”).
ma[k]e it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur.” 	Prowse v. Payne, 984 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 2021) (alterations in
original) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 189). 	“The burden of showing
that the challenged conduct is unlikely to recur rests on the party asserting mootness.”
Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2012). This burden is “formidable.” FBI
v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 241 (2024) (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190). The
materials the County submitted regarding this issue do not on their face meet this
formidable burden.
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 8 of 21

9
Id. at 943. 	The Eighth Circuit then concluded that, “even if emotional injuries counted,
[Plaintiff’s] conclusory allegations would not.” 	Id. (citation modified). 	The court
explained that plaintiff’s allegations of confusion, worry, and sleeplessness were “naked
assertion[s] of emotional harm, devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (citing Auer v.
TransUnion, LLC, 902 F.3d 873, 878 (8th Cir. 2018)). 	The court further opined that
“[w]ithout supporting facts, [the assertions] are just labels that fall short of plausibly
establishing injury.” Id. (citation modified).
Here, as in Hekel, “even if emotional injuries counted,” Bettridge has failed to allege
facts demonstrating that he suffered an emotional injury. 	Bettridge claims that the debt
caused “significant stress and anxiety,” “ongoing worry about his inability to satisfy the
debt, uncertainty about potential collection action upon his release, and concern about the
debt’s effect on financial stability” and reintegration. 	Am. Compl. 	¶ 14. 	But these
allegations are conclusory. 	Without “supporting facts,” Bettridge has not “plausibly
establish[ed] injury.” Hekel, 118 F.4th at 943 (quoting Auer, 902 F.3d at 878).
Although Bettridge has not sufficiently alleged an emotional injury, he has plausibly
alleged an injury in the form of his unpaid debt. See Am. Compl. ¶ 11 (“Plaintiff received
an invoice in the amount of $3,163. . . .”). After he received the fee invoice, injury through
either payment or collection action was imminent. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (explaining
that an injury-in-fact is the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and
particularized” 	and 	“actual 	or 	imminent, 	not 	conjectural 	or 	hypothetical” 	(citation
modified)). 	Bettridge therefore has standing to seek retrospective relief, which includes
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 9 of 21

10
the “permanent injunction prohibiting further attempts [by Wright County] to collect the
$3,163 assessment” and damages associated with this injury. Am. Compl. at 6.
Finally, Bettridge seeks prospective relief in the form of a declaration that
“Defendant’s policies [are] unconstitutional under the Minnesota and United States
Constitutions.” Id. A plaintiff requesting prospective relief must show that he is likely to
suffer future injury by the defendant and that the sought-after relief will prevent that future
injury. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–03 (1983). 	“In future injury
cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the threatened injury is certainly impending, or
there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763,
769 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation modified); see Lujan, 504 	U.S. at 	564 n.2 (“Although
imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its
purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article
III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” (citation modified)). 	“Allegations
of possible future injury are not sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398,
409 (2013) (citation modified). And when a plaintiff seeks forward-looking declaratory or
injunctive relief, “past injuries are relevant only for their predictive value.” 	Murthy v.
Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 59 (2024). In other words, past injuries do not by themselves show
a plaintiff's standing to seek prospective relief, but 	they 	may 	“serve as 	evidence of
threatened future injury.” Id.; see Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806, 816 (8th Cir
2006) (“It is well settled that ‘[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a
present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects.’” (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 10 of 21

11
(1974))). 	Bettridge has alleged no facts indicating that he is likely to receive another
invoice soon or in the foreseeable future. 	See Am. Compl. 	Bettridge therefore does not
have standing with respect to his prospective declaratory relief claim.
III
A
Moving to the merits, a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is assessed
under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 	Ashley County v. Pfizer,
Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). 	In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept a complaint’s well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Gorog v. Best
Buy Co., 760 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2014). Although the factual allegations need not be
detailed, they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 	The complaint must “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Id. at 570. 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). 	“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id.
B
1
Bettridge claims the fee constitutes an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 	Am. Compl. at 5. 	The Eighth Amendment declares that “[e]xcessive bail
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 11 of 21

12
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The “nor excessive fines imposed” mandate “limits
the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment
for some offense.’” Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 151 (2019) (quoting United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327–28 (1998)). The Eighth Amendment “is addressed to bail,
fines, and punishments, and [Supreme Court] cases long have understood it to apply
primarily, and perhaps exclusively, to criminal prosecutions and punishments.” Browning-
Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989).
The County argues that the fee is not a punishment and is therefore not a fine under
the Eighth Amendment. 	ECF No. 24 at 16–18 (citing In re Milan, 556 B.R. 922, 924
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2016); Tillman v. Lebanon Co. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir.
2000)). 	Bettridge contends that the fee is a punishment and constitutes a “fine” because
only “convicted inmates” are subject to the fee. ECF No. 29 at 19–20.
The Eighth Circuit has considered similar confinement fees in nonprecedential
decisions and has determined that these fees are not punitive. See Walters v. Kautzky, 187
F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (agreeing with the district court that
an Iowa pay-to-stay fee was not an ex post facto law where “it did not impose additional
punishment for past criminal acts” and “was collected to defray Iowa’s costs for
incarceration,” rather than for punitive purposes); Blaise v. McKinney, 187 F.3d 640 (8th
Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (determining that an Iowa pay-to-stay and
incarceration fee was not an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment “[a]bsent a
showing that [the pay-to-stay statute] was enacted for punitive purposes”). Cf. In re Milan,
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 12 of 21

13
556 B.R. at 924–25 (noting that Minnesota’s confinement fee statute is housed in the civil
administrative code and stating that the decisions of “whether to impose the Incarceration
Costs, and in what amount, are left to the discretion of the correction agency; and these
charges may be waived if it would constitute an undue hardship on an inmate or the
inmate’s immediately family” (citing Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subdiv. 3(b))). And the Third
Circuit considered an Eighth Amendment challenge to confinement fees in Tillman v.
Lebanon Co. The Tillman court held that a daily charge intended to cover prisoner housing
expenses was not an excessive fine. 	Tillman, 221 F.3d at 414, 420–21. The court noted
that a failure to pay the fee would not result in incarceration, explained that the “fees do
not vary with the gravity of the offense,” and found it significant that the fee “merely
represent[ed] partial reimbursement of the prisoner’s daily cost of maintenance, something
he or she would be expected to pay on the outside.” Id. at 420. The Third Circuit further
concluded that, even if there was a factual question as to whether the fees constituted
“fines,” the fees were not excessive, and plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim would fail
on that basis. Id.
Here, although application of the Minnesota statute is limited to convicted inmates,
the fee is housed in the civil administrative code, is intended to “pay the cost of the person’s
room, board, clothing, medical, dental, and other correctional services,” and may be
enforced through “any available civil means of debt collection.” 	Minn. Stat. § 641.12,
subdiv. 3(a). As with the Tillman fees, the Minnesota fees appear to be charged for daily
maintenance. 	The fee is not a punishment and is therefore not a “fine” under the Eighth
Amendment.
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 13 of 21

14
Further, as in Tillman, even if the fee constituted a “fine” under the Eighth
Amendment, Bettridge’s claim would still fail, as he has not sufficiently alleged that the
fee is excessive. “The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines
Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some
relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” 	United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). A fine is “excessive” “if it is grossly disproportional
to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” Id. In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court considered
the penalties available for the offense committed, including the length of the sentence and
maximum fine, as well as the parties harmed by the criminal act, when examining a fine’s
excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment. 524 U.S. at 337–339; see also Tillman, 221
F.3d at 420–21 (holding that the pay-to-stay fee at issue was not excessive and stating that
“[h]ere, the plaintiff accumulated [pay-to-stay] debt of roughly $4,000.00” and that “[i]t
can hardly be said that a sum that is less than one-twentieth the legally permissible fine is
grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense” (citation modified)).
Here, Bettridge claims the fee is “grossly disproportional” because the County failed
to consider his indigent status and because the fee “consumes the limited funds of a person
who cannot pay it.” ECF No. 29 at 20. But the relevant question in the Eighth Amendment
analysis is not whether the County followed the proper procedure or whether the individual
fined is indigent. The question is whether the fee is proportional to one’s offense. While
Bettridge explains that he was convicted of “felony possession of a firearm” and that he
was “committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections” and describes his bail,
he does not discuss the punishment imposed in any detail or the harm caused to others as
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 14 of 21

15
a result of his offense, nor does he tie the Eighth Amendment excessive fines violation to
his offense. 	Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–10. 	Bettridge has not plausibly stated an excessive-fines
claim.
2
Bettridge claims that the County’s fee policy violates equal protection. Am. Compl.
at 5. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no [s]tate
shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982)). The “first step” when evaluating an equal-protection claim is to decide
“whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that [he] was treated differently than others who
were similarly situated to [him].” Adam & Eve Jonesboro, LLC v. Perrin, 933 F.3d 951,
959 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 909 (8th Cir. 2018)). “The Supreme
Court has made clear that disparate impact alone is insufficient to show an equal protection
violation; instead, proof of discriminatory intent or purpose is required.” United States v.
Ronning, 6 F.4th 851, 853 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 272 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); City of Cuyahoga Falls v.
Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 194 (2003); United States v. Farmer. 73 F.3d
836, 841 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that he has been treated differently than others who
were similarly situated, the next step is to apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the
challenged law. See True v. Nebraska, 612 F.3d 676, 683–84 (8th Cir. 2010). The rational
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 15 of 21

16
basis standard applies in the absence of a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. Gallagher
v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 2012). Under the rational basis standard,
a challenged state law will be upheld so long as it is “rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.” Id. Courts may conduct the rational basis inquiry at the motion to
dismiss stage, see id. at 1019–20; Gilmore v. Cnty. of Douglas, 406 F.3d 935, 938 (8th Cir.
2005), and to prevail, a plaintiff’s allegations must plausibly show that no “reasonably
conceivable state of facts” could support the challenged law, F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
Bettridge fails to state an equal protection claim for two reasons. 	First, Bettridge
alleges that “[the County’s] fee policies discriminate on the basis of wealth, burdening
indigent detainees while those who can post bail pay nothing.” 	Am. Compl. at 5. 	But
Bettridge has not demonstrated that he was treated differently than others similarly situated.
While Bettridge claims that the fee policies discriminate on the basis of wealth, the fee
statute applies equally to all convicted inmates, regardless of wealth status. And Bettridge
does not allege facts suggesting any intentional discrimination by the County. 	See Am.
Compl. 	Although indigent prisoners may ultimately pay more in fees than non-indigent
prisoners due to their inability to post bail, disparate impact alone does not establish an
equal protection violation. See Ronning, 6 F.4th at 853.
Second, even if Bettridge had identified a group of similarly-situated individuals
treated differently, he has not alleged facts demonstrating that the County’s fee policy
“lacks any rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Am. Compl. at 5.
To the contrary, the fee policy was enacted pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subdiv. 3,
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 16 of 21

17
which authorizes counties to collect fees to pay costs associated with housing inmates.
Collecting fees from inmates appears to be rationally related to the County’s interest in
paying for costs associated with housing these inmates. 	See Tillman, 221 F.3d at 423
(holding that a pay-to-stay policy was rationally related to a legitimate government interest
where the statute was “designed to teach fiscal responsibility to inmates” and “[a]nother
conceivable purpose is to reimburse the state for the expenses of incarceration”).6
3
Bettridge claims that the County violated his substantive due process rights when it
“deemed [him] able to pay despite clear evidence of indigence.” Am. Compl. at 5–6. As
the Eighth Circuit has explained:
In addition to its procedural protections, the Due Process
Clause protects individual liberties from government action
“regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
6 	Plaintiffs rely on Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) to support their equal-
protection argument, but Bearden is inapt. Bearden concerned an indigent inmate whose
parole was revoked when he was unable to make restitution payments required as a
condition of his probation. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 663–64. The Court considered “whether
a sentencing court can revoke a defendant’s probation for failure to pay the imposed fine
and restitution.” Id. at 665. In Bearden, “there [was] no doubt that the State ha[d] treated
the petitioner differently from a person who did not fail to pay the imposed fine and
therefore did not violate probation.” 	Id. at 665. 	The Court opined that “[b]y sentencing
petitioner to imprisonment simply because he could not pay the fine, without considering
the reasons for the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or extending the
time for payments or making alternative orders, the court automatically turned a fine into
a prison sentence.” Id. at 674. Bearden was fundamentally about a restraint on an indigent
defendant’s liberty, whereas here, Bettridge’s liberty is not at risk. Bettridge challenges a
fee statute that applies equally to all those who are convicted and “confined in the county
jail.” See Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subdiv. 3(a). A defendant’s failure to pay a fee assessed
pursuant to the statute can result only in civil debt collection. 	See Minn. Stat. § 641.12,
subdiv. 3(a) (authorizing the use of “any available civil means of debt collection in
collecting costs”).
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 17 of 21

18
them.” Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	To state a
substantive due process claim against a state official, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that a fundamental right was violated and
that the official’s conduct shocks the conscience. Folkerts v.
City of Waverly, 707 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2013). Whether
conduct shocks the conscience is a question of law. 	Id.
Conscience shocking conduct only includes “the most severe
violations of individual rights that result from the brutal and
inhumane abuse of official power.” 	White v. Smith, 696 F.3d
740, 757–58 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). “Only
a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of
the government action in question will satisfy the element of
arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a
due process violation.” Folkerts, 707 F.3d at 981 (cleaned up).
Mitchell v. Dakota Cnty. Soc. Servs., 959 F.3d 887, 898 (8th Cir. 2020). 	A fundamental
right 	is 	one 	that 	is 	“objectively, 	‘deeply 	rooted 	in 	this 	Nation’s 	history 	and
tradition.’” 	Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
Bettridge 	does 	not 	allege 	facts 	plausibly 	demonstrating 	the 	violation 	of 	a
fundamental right or conscience-shocking conduct. He alleges no facts addressing whether
he has a fundamental right to be free from confinement fees, nor does he identify another
right deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition. See Am. Compl. Bettridge also
fails to address or identify how a violation of this asserted right might amount to
conscience-shocking conduct. See id. Bettridge does not state a plausible substantive due
process claim.
4
Bettridge claims that the County violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural
due process protections when it “imposed fees before conducting any meaningful ability-
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 18 of 21

19
to-pay assessment.” 	Id. at 6. 	To succeed on a procedural due process claim, Bettridge
must demonstrate: “(1) the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty or property
interest; and (2) that the defendant deprived him of that interest without constitutionally
adequate process.” Raymond v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 140 F. Supp. 3d 807, 815
(D. Minn. 2015) (citations omitted). If a plaintiff cannot identify any protected liberty or
property interest of which he was deprived, “any procedural due process claim necessarily
fails.” 	Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1047 (8th Cir. 2012); Senty-Haugen v.
Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that courts do not consider what
process is due unless a plaintiff has a protected liberty or property interest).
While Bettridge has a protected property interest in his money, the problem here is
that Bettridge alleges his property interest is the “assess[ment of] confinement fees” [ECF
No. 29 at 22] or his enforceable debt, Rough Tr. But Bettridge cites no cases standing for
the proposition that indebtedness or its enforcement constitutes a property interest. 	See
ECF No. 29 at 22. And, assuming that Bettridge’s property interest is his money and not
his indebtedness, the mere receipt of an invoice does not constitute a property deprivation.
The invoice notified Bettridge of his obligation to pay the fee. Cf. Radenberg v. Lincoln
County, No. 4:21-CV-04062, 2021 WL 2314851, at *2 (D.S.D. June 7, 2021) (determining,
when screening a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, that “[plaintiff’s] Due Process
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment fails because [the county] has not deprived
[plaintiff] of property by sending him an invoice –– the invoice is notice to [plaintiff] that
he owes a confinement fee”). 	Bettridge does not allege that he actually paid the fee, see
Am. Compl., and Bettridge has therefore not yet been deprived of his property. 	The
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 19 of 21

20
County’s fee waiver procedures and subsequent events, including this litigation, constitute
ongoing opportunities for Bettridge “to contest the fee” before deprivation. 	See id. at 6.
Bettridge therefore does not allege a plausible procedural due process claim.
IV
Having concluded that Bettridge fails to state a claim for relief under federal law,
only Bettridge’s state-law claims remain, including his claims under the Minnesota
Constitution. 	A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims
are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point
toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Barstad v.
Murray County, 420 F.3d 880, 888 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). And the Eighth Circuit has instructed district courts
not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when, as here, all federal
claims are dismissed well before trial. 	See Hervey v. County of Koochiching, 527 F.3d
711, 726–27 (8th Cir. 2008). 	Thus, supplemental jurisdiction over Bettridge’s state-law
claims will not be exercised here, and Bettridge’s state-law claims will be remanded.7 See
Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025, 1033 (8th Cir. 2014).
7 	The County requests attorney’s fees [ECF No. 34] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),
which states that “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any
actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” This request
does not fit the removal-fee-shifting statute’s text. 	The County’s fees and costs resulted
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 20 of 21

21
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Defendant Sean Deringer’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No.
21] is GRANTED;
2. 	Plaintiff Matthew Bettridge’s federal claims, Counts 6–9, are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE; and
3. 	Plaintiff 	Matthew 	Bettridge’s 	state-law 	claims, 	Counts 	1–5, 	are
REMANDED to Wright County District Court.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: October 13, 2026 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
Chief Judge, United States District Court
from the need to seek judgment on the pleadings against Betteridge’s claims, not “as a
result of the removal.”
CASE 0:26-cv-01254-ECT-ECW Doc. 36 Filed 10/13/26 Page 21 of 21