Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Guadalupe O. G.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 26-cv-820 (KMM/DLM)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by
Petitioner Guadalupe O. G. (Dkt. 1.) Petitioner asks the Court to order his immediate
release from his current detention by federal immigration authorities or, in the alternative,
to require those officials to grant him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Respondents argue that the Court should dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction or
transfer venue to the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, because Guadalupe
O. G. was not in custody in Minnesota when he filed his petition, or to deny the petition on
its merits. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ requests to dismiss or transfer are denied
and the Petition is granted.
BACKGROUND
Guadalupe O. G. is a citizen of Mexico who resides in St. Cloud, Minnesota. (Dkt. 1
¶ 12.) He has lived in the United States since September 2001. (Id.) He is a father of four
children and the step-father to his wife’s adult daughter, whom he has raised since she was
two years old. All of these children and his wife are U.S. citizens. (Id. ¶ 14.) Guadalupe O.
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G. filed an application for asylum in December 2023, which remains pending. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.)
He has a pending petition for lawful permanent residency based on his relationship to his
U.S. citizen family members. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15 (referencing an “I-130 application” and
“paperwork”).)
On January 27, 2026, agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested
Petitioner without a warrant. (Id. ¶ 15, 54.) Following his arrest, ICE transferred Guadalupe
O. G. to El Paso East Montana Camp in El Paso, Texas. (Id. ¶ 7 (stating on information and
belief that Guadalupe O.G. was transferred to Texas “less than 48 hours after his arrest”);
Dkt. 7 at 2 (stating that ICE transferred Guadalupe O. G. to El Paso on January 28, 2026).)
However, for much of the time between his arrest and the Petition’s filing, O. G.’s counsel
believed Petitioner to be in Minnesota. (Dkt. 8 ¶ 2 (stating that the ICE detainee locator
showed Petitioner’s location to be in Minnesota on January 28, 2026).) Only “[s]hortly
before filing” the Petition on January 29, 2026 was the ICE detainee locator updated to
reflect Guadalupe O. G.’s location in El Paso. (Id.; see Dkt. 1.) Counsel states that the
Petition was filed in this District in part because he was unable to communicate with
Guadalupe O. G. to, amongst other things, verify his location. (Dkt. 8 ¶ 2.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Respondents first challenge the Court’s jurisdiction to address this matter because
ICE transferred Guadalupe O. G. to the Western District of Texas before he filed the
petition. Relying on Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), Respondents argue
Guadalupe O. G.’s pre-filing transfer to Texas creates a “jurisdictional defect.” (Dkt. 7 at
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2–3.) To the extent Respondents suggest that Guadalupe O. G.’s transfer deprives the Court
of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court disagrees.
In Padilla, the Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner, who the federal
government transferred into military custody at a naval brig in South Carolina prior to his
filing of a habeas petition, properly filed his petition in the Southern District of New York.
542 U.S. at 430–32. The Court held that the proper respondent in a habeas case challenging
physical custody is the petitioner’s “immediate custodian.” Id. at 439, 442. Further, based
on the language in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), the Court concluded that “jurisdiction over [the]
habeas petition lies in [a particular district court] only if it has jurisdiction over [the
immediate custodian].” Id. at 442. But in explaining these rules, the Court was clear that it
was not addressing subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 434 n.7 (“The word ‘jurisdiction,’ of
course, is capable of different interpretations. We use it in the sense that it is used in the
habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and not in the sense of subject-matter jurisdiction of
the District Court.”); see also id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the
“immediate custodian” and “territorial jurisdiction” rules “are not jurisdictional in the sense
of a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction”).1
Although the Supreme Court has not subsequently clarified whether the immediate-
custodian and territorial-jurisdiction rules are matters of personal jurisdiction or venue,
nothing in Padilla suggests that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because a
1 Although the Court did not ultimately resolve precisely the doctrine to which these
rules belong, the Padilla concurrence indicates that they are “best understood as a question
of personal jurisdiction or venue.” 542 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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petition is filed in this District after a petitioner has already been transferred outside of
Minnesota. The Court, therefore, declines Respondents’ invitation to dismiss this matter
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Mathena v. United States, 577 F.3d 943, 946 n.3 (8th
Cir. 2009) (stating that even though petitioner did not file his habeas in the district where
he 	was 	confined 	that 	“defect 	did 	not 	deprive 	the 	district 	court 	of 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction”).
II. 	District of Confinement
Respondents argue in the alternative that the Court should transfer Guadalupe O.
G.’s petition to the Western District of Texas.2 (Dkt. 7 at 2–3.) The Supreme Court has
stated that “the general rule” for habeas petitions is that “jurisdiction lies in only one
district: the district of confinement.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443. But the high court has also
recognized that when “a prisoner is held in an undisclosed location by an unknown
custodian, it is impossible to apply the . . . district of confinement rules.” Id. at 450 n.18.
In those instances and others similar, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor,
“acknowledge[d] an exception” to the district of confinement rule: “if there is an indication
that the Government’s purpose in removing a prisoner were to make it difficult for his
lawyer to know where the habeas petition should be filed, or where the Government was
not forthcoming with respect to the identity of the custodian and the place of detention . . .
2 Respondents cite 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to support their alternative transfer request.
(Dkt. 7 at 2.) Under § 1406(a), “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case
laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”
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habeas jurisdiction would be in the district court from whose territory the petitioner had
been removed.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 454 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
While a Supreme Court majority has not formally accepted such an exception,
courts nationwide have recognized its existence. See Ozturk v. Trump, 777 F. Supp. 3d 26,
37–38 (D. Mass. 2025) (collecting cases); Suri v. Trump, 785 F. Supp. 3d 128, 144–45
(E.D. Va. 2025) (recognizing and applying the exception), aff’d, No. 25-1560, 2025 WL
1806692, at *4 (4th Cir. July 1, 2025) (same) (noting the Fourth Circuit’s previous
application of the exception in United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004));
Tacuri ex rel. Guanoluisa v. Francis, No. 25-CV-07012 (JAV), 2025 WL 3459377, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2025) (recognizing and applying the exception); Munoz-Saucedo v.
Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 392 (D.N.J. 2025) (same). Courts in this District have as
well. See Aleksander B. v. Trump, No. 26-cv-170 (KMM/DJF), 2026 WL 172435, at *2 (D.
Minn. Jan. 22, 2026) (collecting cases). In applying this carve out, courts have considered
the diligence of a petitioner’s counsel in locating their client when filing a habeas petition.
See Suri, 785 F. Supp. 3d at 143–44, aff’d, 2025 WL 1806692, at *5; Francis, 2025 WL
3459377, at *4; Adriana M.Y.M. v. Easterwood, No. 26‐cv-213 (JWB/JFD), 2026 WL
184721, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 24, 2026).
The exception to the district of confinement rule applies in this case. Here, counsel
states that he was introduced to Guadalupe O. G.’s family and received the requisite
information of his arrest and detention on January 28, 2026. Counsel moved exceedingly
swiftly and, within a day, had prepared this Petition and was able to file it. For most of that
time, counsel was operating with the understanding that Guadalupe O. G. remained in
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Minnesota, unable to communicate with him and relying solely on the ICE detainee locator
for O. G.’s whereabouts. Despite this diligence, counsel did not learn that O. G.’s location
had changed until “[s]hortly before” the filing of the Petition. This information, held only
by Respondents, was not made available until a day after O. G. was moved to Texas.
Respondents also did not provide counsel any alternative opportunity to track O. G.’s
location.
While this case is a close call, this set of circumstances presents the type of scenario
that the district of confinement exception envisions: Respondents’ ongoing shell game
hides detainees’ locations and leaves their counsel and families to chase ghosts at the whims
of Respondents’ detention decisions. So, despite the eleventh-hour disclosure of Guadalupe
O. G. updated location, the Court concludes that this District is the correct venue for this
Petition, thanks in part to counsel’s diligence.
III. 	Merits
Finally, the Court considers the merits of the Petition. This case is one of many filed
in recent months in this district challenging the application of § 1225(b)(2) to aliens who
are already in the United States, either having entered without inspection or having been
previously released pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 or another statute. This Court has
previously held that, because such people are not “seeking admission,” as set forth in §
1225(b)(2), that provision—which mandates detention—does not apply to them. See, e.g.,
Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-03682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947 (D. Minn. Oct. 1,
2025). The same legal conclusion has been adopted by countless district courts around the
country in similar cases, by the only Court of Appeals to have decided the issue, and by
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many courts in this district. The Respondents’ position is that Belsai D.S. and the many
other cases reaching the same conclusion were wrongly decided. The government points
out, correctly, that other courts have ruled differently and that the issue is currently pending
before the Eighth Circuit, and asks this Court to reconsider its previous decision.
Although the Court has considered the arguments raised by the government, and
reviewed the authority cited, the Court declines to repudiate its analysis from Belsai D.S.
and instead continues to follow the analysis of the strong majority of courts to have
considered the matter. Of course, these issues are complex, and the government’s
arguments are not frivolous. But the Court continues to believe that the better reading of
the relevant statutory scheme is that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to Guadalupe O. G. or
others who are similarly situated, and his mandatory detention under that provision is not
supported by the law.
The Court also notes that Guadalupe O. G.’s pending asylum petition does not alter
the Court’s conclusion that detention under § 1225(b)(2) is not appropriate. As U.S. District
Court Judge Eric Tostrud recently noted in Ahmed M. v. Bondi et. Al, No. 25-cv-4711
(ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25627, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) that “several courts have
determined that asylum applications filed in like circumstances do not change the
outcome.” Id. (collecting cases). The reasoning in Judge Tostrud’s opinion, and those of
the cases he references, is sound, and the Court declines to find that Guadalupe O. G.’s
application for asylum triggers mandatory detention under § 1225(b).
Guadalupe O. G. alleges that he should be immediately released or, at minimum,
granted a bond hearing. The Court concludes that immediate release is appropriate in this
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case. The government has not claimed to have a “warrant issued by the Attorney General”
supporting his recent arrest, nor has the government produced one to the Court. As Judge
Tostrud also explained, “[s]ection 1226 provides that ‘[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.’” Id. Judge Tostrud concluded
that the issuance of a warrant is a necessary prerequisite to even discretionary detention
under § 1226(a), citing several decisions from other districts. Id. In Ahmed M., like here,
the petitioner had been rearrested with no warrant, and there were no allegations of a
violation of the conditions of his previous release. Therefore, the appropriate remedy in
Ahmed M. was immediate release rather than a detention hearing. See also Juan S.R. v.
Bondi, 26-cv-05 (PJS/LIB) (Order, Dkt. 8, Jan. 12, 2026) (same). And although Ahmed M.
was specifically cited in Guadalupe O. G.’s Verified Petition, Respondents do not grapple
with this argument for immediate release rather than a bond hearing. Similarly, because the
Court here has before it neither the administrative warrant contemplated by § 1226, nor a
suggestion that Guadalupe O. G. has done something that justifies revoking his prior
release, release is the correct remedy.
ORDER
Based on the above, and on the full record before the Court, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Petitioner Guadalupe O. G.’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) is
GRANTED.
2. 	The Court DECLARES that Guadalupe O. G. is not subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and ENJOINS Respondents from
denying release or other relief on the basis that he is subject to such mandatory
detention.
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3. 	Because the Court ordered Guadalupe O. G.’s return to Minnesota on January
29, 2026 (Dkt. 4), the Court assumes that he is currently in the District. The
Court ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Guadalupe O. G. in
Minnesota, with all of his personal effects seized during his arrest, including
but not limited to immigration paperwork, and without conditions.
4. 	Further, the Court ORDERS Respondents file a notice on ECF by no later than
5:00 PM on Thursday, February 5, 2026, certifying that Guadalupe O. G. has
been returned to Minnesota and released. If Guadalupe O. G. has not been
returned to Minnesota and released by that time, then Respondents shall advise
the Court about the reasons his return and release has not occurred, and the
specific steps Respondents are undertaking to ensure his immediate return and
release in Minnesota.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: February 4, 2026
s/Katherine Menendez
Katherine Menendez
United States District Judge
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