Calderon-Rodriguez v. Molis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Janny Calderon-Rodriguez,
Petitioner,
v.
L. Molis, Warden, FCI Waseca,
Respondent.
Case No. 26-cv-00711 (NEB/ECW)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Janny Calderon-Rodriguez’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1) (“Petititon”) and
Motion to Expedite Consideration (Dkt. 3). This case has been referred to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
recommends the Petition be dismissed and that the Motion to Expedite Consideration be
denied as moot.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Janny Calderon-Rodriguez (“Petitioner” or “Calderon-Rodriguez”) was
convicted in the United States District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania for
the Distribution and Possession with the Intent to Distribute Fentanyl, and Aiding and
Abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(c) and 18 U.S.C § 2, and
is serving a 24-month sentence, to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. (Dkt. 7
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¶ 3; Dkt. 7-1 at 2.) At the time Petitioner filed her Petition, she was incarcerated at
Federal Correctional Institution-Waseca (“FCI-Waseca”). (Dkt. 1 at 1.) As of February
3, 2026, Petitioner was projected to be released from custody on June 19, 2026, via a
First Step Act Release. (Dkt. 7-1 at 3.)
While Petitioner was incarcerated, on March 27, 2025, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued an Immigration Detainer – Notice of Action
(“Detainer”). (Dkt. 7-6.) The Detainer was issued because DHS found probable cause
the Petitioner, a citizen of Dominican Republic, is removable and requested the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) to maintain custody of Petitioner at the end of her term of
imprisonment, for a period not to exceed 48 hours, to allow DHS to assume custody. (Id.
at 1; Dkt. 1-1 at 11.) The Detainer was not a final order of removal against the Petitioner,
but rather a notice of pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against her. (Dkt. 7-6 at
1.)
Calderon-Rodriguez filed the Petition on January 27, 2026. (Dkt. 1.) Petitioner
argues the Detainer is improperly preventing her consideration for Residential Reentry
Center (“RRC”) placement, and other pre-release custody benefits. (Dkt. 2 at 1.) In her
request for relief, Petitioner alleges her rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment
are being violated, and seeks immediate release from the Detainer, and immediate
reconsideration of RRC placement. (Dkt. 1 at 6-7.)
On February 2, 2026, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring
Respondent to file documentary evidence showing whether Petitioner is subject to a final
order of removal, and if she is not, file an answer to the Petition within 21 days showing
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cause why the writ should not be granted in this case. (Dkt. 4.) On February 23, 2026,
Respondent filed its Response to the Petititon with no mention of a Petitioner being
subject to a final order of removal and no evidence to that effect. (Dkt. 6.) Petitioner
filed her reply on March 2, 2026 (Dkt. 9), making this matter ripe for decision.
II. 	ANALYSIS1
The issues in this case involve the Second Chance Act of 2007 (“SCA”) and the
First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”). The FSA established incentives for prisoners to
successfully participate in the “evidence-based recidivism reduction programs or
productive activities” recommended by their individualized “risk and needs assessments.”
See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a). One of incentives is the ability to earn FSA time credits
(“FTCs”) towards the inmate’s supervised release and prerelease custody dates. See 18
U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). Pursuant to the FSA, eligible federal prisoners sentenced to a term
of supervised release following their term of imprisonment can earn up to 365 days of
FTCs towards their sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3). Further, the FSA allows the
BOP to transfer otherwise eligible inmates who have “earned [FTCs] in an amount that is
1 	Petitioner asks the Court to waive the exhaustion of remedies threshold
requirement in considering this writ of habeas corpus. (Dkt. 2 at 3-4.) Respondent does
not argue that the Petititon should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Two exceptions to the judicially created requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies before bringing a § 2241 habeas petition include: (1) where
administrative remedies would be futile and serve no purpose; and (2) in cases involving
time-sensitive, potentially moot issues. See Flynn v. Eischen, No. 22-cv-1265
(ECT/LIB), 2022 WL 18461620, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2022), R. & R. adopted, 2023
WL 415162 (D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2023); O’Hara v. Rios, No. 8-cv-5160 (JRT/JJK), 2009
WL 3164724, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2009). Given the timing of the request and the
legal nature of the arguments by both sides, the Court finds that both exceptions apply,
and it therefore excuses the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
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equal to the remainder of the prisoner’s imposed term of imprisonment” to prerelease
custody, where such prerelease custody could entail an RRC or home confinement. 18
U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A), (g)(2)(A)-(B).
Here, Calderon-Rodriguez began earning FTCs on April 11, 2025, the same day
she was committed to BOP custody, and as of January 12, 2026, Calderon-Rodriguez has
earned 120 days of time credits toward an early release and 0 days of time credits towards
a pre-release RRC or home confinement. (Dkt. 7 ¶¶ 9-11; Dkt. 7-1 at 2; Dkt. 7-2 at 1.)
Petitioner’s sole ground for relief in her Petititon is as follows “Due Process Fifth
Amendment Violation - Improper Immigration Detainer Hold by I.C.E. - Ineligibility for
halfway house.” (Dkt. 1 at 6.) The relief sought by her is as follows: “order Respondent
to cease reliance on the ICE detainer for custody classification purposes, and direct
proper verification of Petitioner’s immigration status so that she may be considered for
RRC placement without unlawful restriction.” (Dkt. 2 at 4; see also Dkt. 1 at 7; Dkt. 9 at
3.)
A. 	RRC Placement
Respondent argues that because Petitioner is seeking RRC placement under the
pre-release community placement portion of the FSA and SCA, the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the Petition, as it addresses conditions of confinement as opposed
to the confinement itself, which “is not cognizable in habeas, because even if it were,
Calderon-Rodriguez would not spend a minute less in BOP custody”; Congress has given
the BOP the discretionary authority to decide where to incarcerate federal inmates; and
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that Petitioner has no constitutional right to RRC or home confinement placement. (Dkt.
6 at 10-17.)
This Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the placement of a prisoner during her
incarceration. A habeas petitioner may challenge only the fact or duration of her
confinement. Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469-70 (8th Cir. 2014); Kruger v.
Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). “If the prisoner is not
challenging the validity of his conviction or the length of his detention, such as loss of
good time, then a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy.” Kruger, 77 F.3d at
1073. An RRC is a type of prerelease custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2)(B). The
Eighth Circuit considers a prisoner’s request for transfer to prerelease custody as a
challenge to the prisoner’s place of confinement. See United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th
1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2021) (discussing home confinement as a place of confinement); see
also Williams v. Birkholz, No. 20-CV-2190 (ECT/LIB), 2021 WL 4155614, at *6 (D.
Minn. July 20, 2021) (“Being transferred to home confinement is not a ‘release’ for
incarceration.”), R. & R. adopted, 2021 WL 4155013 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2021). Here,
Petitioner filed her writ of habeas corpus asking the Court to “Release immigration
detainer using supportive documentation and have BOP change in Sentry and submit my
halfway house packet.” (Dkt. 1 at 7.) The Petitioner is asking the Court to transfer her
from prison to a halfway house through the “change in Sentry” and submission of her
halfway house packet. (Dkt. 1 at 7.) This is a transfer to prerelease custody, a challenge
to the placement and conditions of her confinement, and not to the fact or duration of her
confinement. Thus, because Calderon-Rodriguez is not challenging the legality of her
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detention—that is, the fact or duration of her confinement—a writ of habeas corpus is not
the correct vehicle for seeking relief for the alleged violation of her rights. See Jorgensen
v. Birkholz, No. 20-CV-2349 (NEB/DTS), 2021 WL 2935641, at *1 (D. Minn. July 13,
2021) (concluding that court lacks jurisdiction over federal habeas claim requesting
transfer to home confinement) (collecting cases).
In addition, courts in this District have repeatedly held that the BOP has exclusive
statutory authority to determine the placement of prisoners. See Garcia v. Eischen, No.
22-CV-444 (SRN/BRT), 2022 WL 4084185, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 16, 2022) (collecting
cases). “[I]t is the BOP—not the courts—who decides whether home detention is
appropriate.” Williams, 2021 WL 4155614, at *3 (citation modified). While the SCA
increased the maximum permitted RRC designation to twelve months, Hewitt v. Jett, No.
09-CV-1676 (RHK/RLE), 2010 WL 1417654, at * 2 (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2010), R. & R.
adopted, 2010 WL 1416890 (D. Minn. Apr. 6, 2010), nothing in the SCA or the FSA
abrogates the BOP’s authority to designate the placement of prisoners, see, e.g., United
States v. Kluge, No. 17-CR-61, 2020 WL 209287, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2020)
(explaining that the FSA did not change the statutory language providing that the BOP
makes placement determinations). Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 3621, gives the BOP, and not the
courts, the authority to designate an inmate’s place of confinement. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(b) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of
imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.”). Further, the FSA,
18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(4), provides: “No limitations.—Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to limit or restrict the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons under
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section 3621.” See also Brown v. Kallis, No. 21-CV-920 (PJS/ECW), 2022 WL 1652933,
at *9 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2022), R. & R. adopted, 2022 WL 1645666 (D. Minn. May 24,
2022).2
Moreover, Calderon-Rodriguez has no constitutional right to be considered for
RRC placement. Courts in this District have routinely held that prisoners do not have a
“constitutionally protected liberty interest in serving [their] sentence at a particular
institution.” Khdeer v. Paul, No. 18-CV-2112 (ECT/BRT), 2018 WL 6919637, at *5 (D.
Minn. Nov. 29, 2018) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Moorman v.
Thalacker, 83 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1996)), R. & R. adopted, 2019 WL 79318 (D. Minn.
Jan. 2, 2019)); see also United States v. James, 15-CR-255 (SRN), 2020 WL 1922568, at
*2 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2020) (“It is . . . well-established that prisoners do not have a
2 	The Court in Brown held as follows:
Congress enacted the FSA into law on December 21, 2018, which in pertinent
part, revised the Second Chance Act of 2007 as to early releases of inmates
to halfway houses or home confinement. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1)(2); see also
Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5210. Specifically, Section 3624 authorized
the BOP to place prisoners in home confinement for 10 percent of the term
of the prisoner’s imprisonment or six months. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). The
FSA amended that Section by adding that “to the extent practicable, [the BOP
shall] place prisoners with lower risk levels and lower needs on home
confinement 	for 	the 	maximum 	amount 	of 	time 	permitted 	under 	this
paragraph.” Id. The FSA did not, however, change the language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(c)(4), which provides that “[n]othing in this subsection shall be
construed to limit or restrict the authority of the Director of the [BOP] under
section 3621,” which in turn provides that the BOP “shall designate the place
of the prisoner’s imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(4); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(b).
2022 WL 1652933, at *9 (alterations in original).
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constitutional right to placement in a particular facility or place of confinement.”) . To
the extent that Calderon-Rodriguez contends that she is entitled to be granted an RRC
designation, the courts have held that a prisoner “has no legal right or entitlement to any
period of RRC placement.” McCarthy v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 10-CV-745
(PJS/SRN), 2010 WL 4320507, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2010) (listing cases), R. & R.
adopted, 2010 WL 4312851 (D. Minn. Oct. 22, 2010). Even to the extent that the
Detainer affects Petitioner’s eligibility to RRC placement, she again fails to state a claim
because an inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in receiving or retaining a
certain custody classification.3 See Saint Louis v. Bondi, No. 5:25-HC-02139-M, 2025
WL 2845619, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2025) (collecting cases).
3 	To the extent that Petitioner’s argument that the BOP is improperly relying on the
Detainer because the Detainer is itself improper, she is not in ICE custody, and as a result,
she cannot meet the “in custody” requirement necessary to challenge that Detainer
(issued by DHS) pursuant to § 2241. See Belasco v. Snyder, 208 F.3d 217 (8th Cir. 2000)
(“We conclude that the filing of an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
detainer with federal prison officials, merely notifying them that the INS will in the future
make a decision regarding Mr. Belasco’s deportation, does not create custody supporting
habeas corpus jurisdiction; and, without deciding whether the INS detainer adversely
affected Mr. Belasco’s custody and security classifications, we note that prison officials
may consider an INS detainer in assessing such classifications. Mr. Belasco’s apparent
argument that the INS has no authority to deport him because he did not commit an
aggravated felony is not ripe for judicial review, as a final removal order has not been
issued.” (citations omitted)); see also Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989) (“Campillo may not challenge the detainer by
way of habeas corpus until he is placed in the custody of the INS, an event which will not
occur until Campillo is released from his present term of confinement. The filing of an
INS detainer, standing alone, does not cause a sentenced offender to come within the
custody of the INS for purposes of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”); Bahena
Escobar v. Holder, No. CIV.09-3717 PAM/JJK, 2010 WL 1389606, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar.
31, 2010) (“Petitioner cannot, at least by habeas petition, challenge the immigration
detainer or the underlying deportation order until he is taken into actual custody by ICE
at a future date.”). The petitioner in Campillo, incarcerated in Minnesota for drug related
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For all of the reasons stated above, Calderon-Rodriguez’s Petititon should be
denied with respect to her request for relief related to RRC placement.
B. 	Evidentiary Hearing
Because the Court can resolve the Petition by relying on the record, an evidentiary
hearing is not necessary. See Wallace v. Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1983)
(“[D]ismissal of the habeas petition without a hearing is proper where . . . the dispute can
be resolved on the basis of the record.”).
III. 	RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Petitioner Janny Calderon-Rodriguez’s request for habeas corpus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be DENIED;
2. 	Petitioner Janny Calderon-Rodriguez’s Motion to Expedite Consideration
(Dkt. 3) be DENIED as moot; and
offenses, filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging “his security and custody classification
had been adversely affected by the [Immigration and Natural Services] detainer.” 853
F.2d at 594. The detainer in Campillo was “issued ‘for notification purposes only,’ and
advised that an investigation had been initiated to determine whether Campillo was
subject to exclusion or deportation from the United States.” Id. The Eighth Circuit held
that the filing of a detainer alone does not cause an inmate to come within the custody of
the filing agency for purposes of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 595.
Finally, the Eighth Circuit held that absent a final order of deportation, or a threat of such
an order without being issued without opportunity for a full and fair hearing prior to
deportation, INS had not taken custody of petitioner and the petitioner had no standing to
challenge the filing of a detainer. Id. at 596. The Court also notes that neither ICE nor
DHS are a party to this action.
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3. 	This matter be DISMISSED without prejudice.
Dated: March 16, 2026 	s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright
ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits
set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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