Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Gilton A.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Daren K.
Margolin, Director for Executive Office for
Immigration Review; Executive Office for
Immigration Review; Kristi Noem,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Department of Homeland Security;
Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
David Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-558 (ECT/ECW)
OPINION AND ORDER
Cameron Lane Youngs Giebink and David L. Wilson, Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis,
MN, for Petitioner Gilton A.
Ana H. Voss and Friedrich A.P. Siekert, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis,
MN, for Respondents Pamela Bondi, Daren K. Margolin, Executive Office for Immigration
Review, Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security, Todd M. Lyons, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, and David Easterwood.
Petitioner Gilton A. is a Honduran citizen who entered the United States in June
2005 without inspection. 	Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 13, 26–27. Gilton “was not encountered by
federal law enforcement at or near his time of entry into the United States.” 	Id. ¶ 28.
Gilton was arrested and detained by Respondents—or their agents—on January 22, 2026.
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Id. ¶ 39. “Respondents provided no warrant for [Gilton’s] arrest.” Id. ¶ 31. Gilton “has
no criminal history of the sort that would subject him to mandatory custody under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c).” Pet. ¶ 29. Gilton “is presently detained at Fort Snelling, in Minnesota.” 	Id.
¶ 33.1
Gilton challenges his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. ¶ 8. He claims he has
been wrongly classified as an 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is
mandatory) rather than an 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) detainee (whose detention is discretionary
and who is entitled to a bond hearing). Pet. ¶¶ 2–4, 34–59; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797
F. Supp. 3d 957, 961–62 (D. Minn. 2025) (explaining legal framework). 	According to
Gilton, that misclassification and denial of a bond hearing violate his right to due process
under the Fifth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement, and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a); and 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and
1003.19. See Pet. ¶¶ 78–110. Gilton seeks his immediate release or, alternatively, an order
requiring Respondents to hold a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); a declaration
that Respondents’ action is arbitrary and capricious; a declaration that Respondents failed
to adhere to their regulations; a declaration that his detention absent a bond hearing violates
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; a declaration that his warrantless arrest
violates the Fourth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); an order enjoining Respondents
1 	Neither party provided the Court with Gilton’s Notice to Appear or the other
paperwork we’ve usually received in these cases. In this case, it doesn’t matter. In their
response to Gilton’s habeas petition, Respondents did not contest any of the facts alleged
in the Petition. See ECF No. 5 at 1–2.
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from moving him from the District of Minnesota during the pendency of this Petition;
attorneys’ fees and costs; and “all further relief this Court deems just and proper.” 	Pet. at
27–28.
Acknowledging this case “presents similar legal and factual issues to prior habeas
petitions,” Respondents argue that the Gilton’s detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 and thus that he is not eligible for a bond hearing. ECF No. 5 at 7–18. This raises
an issue of statutory interpretation2 that courts in this District have repeatedly considered
and rejected, and it will be rejected here as well.
Gilton has shown he has been misclassified under § 1225(b)(2) rather than § 1226.
As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants “seeking admission,” and
the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c)); see
Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn. 2025); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi,
--- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6–7 (D. Minn.
Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025
WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741 (JRT/SGE),
2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-3248 (8th Cir.
Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312,
2 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Gilton’s Petition, consistent with previous rulings on this issue, I find that the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not apply to “the narrow
question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226
or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” 	Fernando F.P.D. v. Brott, No. 25-cv-4455
(ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) (citing cases).
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at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem, 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL
3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4264
(PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2025). As of this writing, only
one federal court of appeals has ruled on the question, and it reached the same conclusion.
See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025). Gilton
has lived in the United States for more than 20 years. 	See Pet. ¶ 27. 	His detention falls
under § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2).
The final issue is the appropriate remedy. 	Section 1226 provides that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to
justify 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Chogllo 	Chafla 	v.
Scott, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-cv-00437, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (D. Me. Sep. 21,
2025), appeal filed (Nov. 7, 2025). 	“[I]t follows that absent a warrant a noncitizen may
not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a).” 	Id. (emphasis in original); accord
Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-00479, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me.
Sep. 30, 2025); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354, 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); see also Florida v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D.
Fla. 2023) (stating § 1226 “is not even triggered unless an arrest warrant is issued” and that
“[i]f [an] alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then the subsequent provisions giving
the Attorney General discretion to detain or release ‘the arrested alien’ are likewise not
triggered”), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir. July 11, 2023). Here, Gilton
alleged 	that “Respondents provided no warrant for [Gilton’s] arrest.” 	Pet. ¶ 31.
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Respondents have not produced a warrant, nor have they advanced any specific argument
that Gilton’s release is an unwarranted remedy given the apparent absence of a warrant.3
See ECF No. 5. 	Rather, Respondents argue that the failure to produce a warrant can be
addressed by the Immigration Court. 	See ECF No. 5 at 18 (“If the lack of a warrant is
important, than [sic] Petitioner can bring that issue up with the Immigration Court.”). This
argument is not persuasive. As discussed above, the “issuance of a warrant is a necessary
condition to justify discretionary detention under section 1226(a),” see Chogllo Chafla,
2025 WL 2688541, at *11, and here, that condition was not met.
“[R]elease is an available and appropriate remedy” for “detention that lacks a lawful
predicate.” 	Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Vedat C. v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS) (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 9 (citing Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)). 	“Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a
valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through
further proceedings.” 	Id.; see Chogllo Chafla, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2688541, at
*11 (“Since the Government did not comply with the plain language of section 1226(a),
[petitioners’] immediate release is justified.”); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (same);
Chiliquinga Yumbillo, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (reaching same conclusion); see also
3 	Respondents do not argue that Gilton is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693 (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.
The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” (citation modified)).4
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner Gilton A’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
[ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, but
not later than 48 hours after entry of this Order.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 25, 2026, at 4:55 p.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
4 	The resolution of this statutory-interpretation question in Gilton’s favor makes it
unnecessary to address the Petition’s remaining grounds.
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