Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Omar E.F.G.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and David
Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-451 (DWF/DLM)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Omar E.F.G.’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution and laws of
the United States (the “Petition”). (Doc. No. 1.) Respondents oppose. (Doc. No. 4.) For
the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Petition and orders Respondents to
immediately release Petitioner.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of El Salvador who has lived in the United States since May
of 2023. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 12.) Petitioner has never been given an order for removal and has
a pending application for asylum. (Id.) Petitioner lives with his brothers and recently
attended high school in Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 13.)
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On January 14, 2026, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Petitioner was detained by
agents of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) who were wearing tactical
garb and had their faces covered. (Id. ¶ 14.) The agents did not provide a warrant. (Id.)
The arrest was part of “Operation Metro Surge,” an ongoing immigration-law
enforcement effort in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties that has led to an unprecedented
increase in federal law enforcement presence in Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 15; see also Tincher v.
Noem, No. 25-cv-4669, 2026 WL 125375, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2026).)
After his arrest, Petitioner was initially brought to Crow Wing County Jail in
Brainerd, Minnesota. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 18.) As of the morning of January 20, 2026, counsel
for Petitioner checked ICE’s online detainee locator and saw that Petitioner’s detention
location indicated “Call ICE for Details,” which counsel believed indicated that ICE was
planning to imminently move Petitioner to another detention facility. (Id.)
Petitioner filed the Petition on January 20, 2026. (Id. at 14.) Petitioner asserts that
he is entitled to consideration for release on bond and that his detention violates his due
process rights. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 41, 45.) He requests release from detention or an order
requiring Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing within seven days. (Id.
¶¶ 45-51.) On January 20, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition
on or before January 22, 2026 at 12:00 p.m. CT, and enjoined Respondents from moving
Petitioner from this District pending further order. (Doc. No. 3.) Respondents timely
filed a response, arguing that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225. (Doc. No. 4.)
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Legal Standard
A district court may provide habeas relief to a person who is being detained in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). For
most of the nation’s history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the
Executive, ensuring that it does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.”
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004.) That authority includes jurisdiction to
hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 687 (2001); Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900-01 (D. Minn. 2020).
The burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1154 (D. Minn. 2025).
II. 	Analysis
A. 	Detention
Within federal immigration law, two statutes govern the detention of noncitizens
pending removal proceedings—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1225 applies to
“applicants for admission”—noncitizens who are either “present in the United States who
ha[ve] not been admitted” or who “arrive[] in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
Under that section, “if the examining immigration officer determines that a[] [noncitizen]
seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the
noncitizen must be detained during the pendency of their removal proceedings. Id.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1226 applies where § 1225 is inapplicable and provides
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immigration judges with the discretion to grant release on bond to noncitizens subject to
removal proceedings. See id. § 1226(a).
Respondents argue that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” because he was
never lawfully admitted to the United States and is therefore still “seeking admission.”
As the Court explained in Victor S.M. v. Noem, the plain language of the statute dictates
otherwise. No. 26-cv-400, 2026 WL 161445, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 21, 2026). Petitioner
has been in the United States for nearly three years—he is not “arriving,” he is already
here. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (noting that § 1226(a) applies
to “certain aliens already in the country”); Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4711, 2026 WL
25627, at * 3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (finding that § 1226(a) applied to a noncitizen who
had been in the country for less than two years). Petitioner is therefore subject to the
discretionary bond provisions of § 1226(a), not the mandatory bond provisions of
§ 1225(b)(2).
In their response, Respondents rely in part on arguments that are now before the
Eighth Circuit in Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248. In Victor S.M. v. Noem, the Court
considered the Avila appeal and found the arguments unpersuasive. In addition,
Respondents submit additional authority that they claim supports their interpretation of
§ 1225. (Doc. No. 4 at 3-5.) Specifically, Respondents cite to cases outside of this
Circuit, or, if in this Circuit, outside of the District of Minnesota. Respondents also
acknowledge that the decisions reflect a minority position. (Id. at 4.) The Court
respectfully disagrees with the decisions in those cases and continues to find that § 1226
applies to Petitioner here as a noncitizen already present in the country.
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Respondents also argue that the Court’s reading of § 1225 and § 1226 would read
§ 1225 completely out of existence. The Court disagrees. Respondents suggest that
under the Court’s interpretation, any noncitizen who barely makes it across the border
and is immediately arrested would be subject to detention only under § 1226. That
argument, however, fails to acknowledge that Petitioner in this case was not just over the
border—he has been here for nearly three years. In fact, it appears more likely that
§ 1226 would be rendered meaningless under Respondents’ reading because it would
seemingly apply § 1225 to any noncitizen without status.1
Finally, the fact that Petitioner has applied for asylum does not change the Court’s
conclusion here. The definition of “admission” here means “the lawful entry of the
[noncitizen] into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A); see also Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-cv-
6582, 2025 WL 3295903, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that a petitioner
who had been living in the United States for three years was not “seeking admission” to
the country). Even by applying for asylum, “[a] noncitizen who already has entered the
United States illegally and is living here cannot be said to be actively seeking
1 	In addition, the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”) added new categories of noncitizens
subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). For
example, under the LRA, mandatory detention would apply to noncitizens lacking valid
documentation who have also been charged or convicted of certain serious crimes. See
id. If Respondent’s interpretation of § 1225 were correct, there would have been no need
for the LRA to add the new categories.
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lawful entry into the United States. The entry, whether lawful or unlawful, occurred
years ago.” Barco Mercado; 2025 WL 3295903, at *5.
B. 	Remedy
Having found that Petitioner is being detained unlawfully, the question becomes
the correct remedy. A detainee being held pursuant to § 1226(a), as Petitioner is here,
must have been served an arrest warrant prior to detainment. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also
Ahmed M., 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (collecting cases). Petitioner alleged he was arrested
without a warrant. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 14.) The Court gave Respondents the opportunity to
explain the true cause of Petitioner’s detainment and provide documentation of such.
(Doc. No. 3.) Respondents failed to do so. (See Doc. No. 4 (addressing only the legality
of Petitioner’s continued confinement, not the legality of his arrest).) The Court therefore
concludes that Petitioner was arrested without a warrant. The remedy for a warrantless
arrest is immediate release. Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (“Habeas is at its
core a remedy for unlawful executive detention. The typical remedy for such detention
is, of course, release.” (citation omitted)).
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:
1. 	Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. [1]) is GRANTED.
a. 	The Court DECLARES that Petitioner is not subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and is instead subject to detention, if at all,
pursuant to the discretionary provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
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b. 	Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from
detention.
c. 	Within three (3) days of the date of this Order, Respondents shall
provide the Court with a status update concerning Petitioner’s release.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 23, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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