Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Sandra C.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; David Easterwood, Acting
Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration
and Customs,
Respondents.
File No. 26-CV-283 (JMB/JFD)
ORDER
Claire Glenn, Climate Defense Project, Minneapolis, MN, for Sandra C.
Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Pamela
Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and David Easterwood.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Sandra C.’s1 Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(Doc. No. 1 [hereinafter, “Pet.”].)
Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and David Easterwood
(together, “Respondents”) were named in the Petition. 	The Court grants the Petition in
part.
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in immigration cases.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	Sandra C. is a citizen of Ecuador who entered the United States without
inspection more than twenty years ago. (Pet. ¶¶ 7, 12–13.)
2. 	She has applied for permanent residence and for status pursuant to the
Violence Against Women Act. (Id. ¶ 13.)
3. 	She has no criminal record, with only a minor traffic violation in 2014. (Id.
¶ 15.)
4. 	Respondents took Sandra C. into custody on January 14, 2026. (Id. ¶ 16.)
5. 	On January 14, 2026, Sandra C. filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet.) She seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a bond
hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Id. at 16.)
6. 	On January 14, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to file a response to the
Petition by January 16, 2026, at 11:00 a.m. CT. 	(Doc. No. 3.) 	That deadline has now
passed, and Respondents did not timely respond.
DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted
to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to
every individual detained within the United States” (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2));
Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025). For most of the nation’s
history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it
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does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” 	Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525
(quotation omitted). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “extends to . . . immigration-related detention.” Deng
Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citation omitted). 	The
petitioner bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal by a preponderance of
evidence. 	Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670, at *5
(D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H., 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
Because Respondents failed to timely respond to the Petition, the Court considers
the relief in the Petition to be unopposed. For this reason, the Court grants the Petition.
As a separate and independent basis for granting the Petition, the Court finds for
Sandra C. on the merits. 	In other cases, Respondents have argued that petitioners like
Sandra C. are subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 	For the
reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that because section 1225(b) is not applicable
to her, Sandra C. is entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a)(1).2
Courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ interpretation that section
1225(b)(2) requires the mandatory detention of all noncitizens living in the country who
are “inadmissible” because they entered the United States without inspection. 	See, e.g.,
Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 & n.22
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that this interpretation had been rejected in 350 cases
“decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across
2 Because a bond hearing is the primary relief available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Court
declines to address the remaining claims and relief requested.
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the United States” and collecting cases in an Appendix A); Jose Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No.
25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025)
(collecting cases); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL
2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 	This Court also finds
Respondents’ interpretation unpersuasive.
When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word of a statute should have
meaning.” 	United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883)). 	Noncitizens who have been residing in the United States but who entered
without inspection have not, historically, been considered to still be “arriving” under
section 1225(b). 	This is because the statute itself states that, in order to apply, several
conditions must be met; specifically, an immigration officer must determine that the
noncitizen “is an applicant for admission . . . seeking admission . . . [and] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Determining the plain
meaning of the statute requires consideration of the tense of the verb “is” and the present
participle “seeking.” 	Here, section 1225(b)(2) applies to persons who presently are
applicants for admission and who presently are seeking admission at the time of their
detention. 	To be seeking admission means to be seeking entry, which “by its own force
implies a coming from outside.” United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401
(1929). In this case, Sandra C. has been residing in the United States and is, therefore, not
currently “seeking admission” into the United States.
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In addition, Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other
immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens
who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the
country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section
1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject
to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens
lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain
crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section
1225 were correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these
additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have
not 	been 	admitted 	would 	have 	already 	been 	ineligible 	for 	bond 	under 	section
1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also agrees with those courts that have found that Respondents’
interpretation of section 1225(b) is “at odds with both the relevant legislative history and
longstanding agency practice.” Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *7; see, e.g., Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025) (discussing the longstanding practice
of treating noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had entered without
inspection, as being subject to section 1226(a)).
Therefore, because section 1225(b) is inapplicable to Sandra C., she is subject to the
provisions of section 1226, which “sets forth a discretionary process for the apprehension
and detention of aliens who are already present in the United States and eligible for
removal.” Selvin Adonay E.M. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL 3157839,
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at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025). 	Pursuant to section 1226(a), Sandra C. is entitled to a
bond hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)(2); see also Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–6;
Jose Andres R.E., 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2. 	For these reasons, the Court finds that
Sandra 	C.’s 	detention 	is 	governed 	by 	section 1226(a), 	and 	she 	is 	not 	subject 	to
section 1225(b)’s mandatory detention. 	Accordingly, the Court grants the Petition to the
extent it seeks a bond hearing.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, as follows:
1. 	Respondents must immediately provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and in any event, on or before 5:00 p.m. CT on January
20, 2026.
2. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately released from
detention.
3. 	On or before 11:00 a.m. CT on January 21, 2026, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update concerning the results of any bond hearing
conducted pursuant to this Order, or if no bond hearing was held, advise the
Court regarding Petitioner’s release.
4. 	Respondents shall not remove, transfer, or otherwise facilitate the removal
of Petitioner from the District of Minnesota prior to compliance with
Paragraphs 1–3 of this Order.
5. 	To the extent Petitioner seeks additional relief, the Petition is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
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Dated: January 16, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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