Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Washington G.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; David Easterwood, Acting
Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration
and Customs Enforcement;
Respondents.
File No. 26-CV-250 (JMB/LIB)
ORDER
Cameron Lane Youngs Giebink, Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis, MN, for Washington
G.
Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Pamela
Bondi, Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security, Todd M. Lyons, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and David Easterwood.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Washington G.’s1 Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Petition) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(Doc. No. 1 [hereinafter, “Pet.”].)
Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security, Todd M.
Lyons, 	Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement, 	and 	David 	Easterwood 	(together,
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in immigration cases.
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Respondents) oppose the Petition. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the
Petition in part and orders Washington G.’s immediate release.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	Washington G. is a native and citizen of Ecuador who entered the United
States without inspection around September 2021. (Pet. ¶¶ 28–29.)
2. 	Washington G. was apprehended at the border and released on recognizance
shortly thereafter. (Id. ¶ 30.)
3. 	Washington G.’s removal proceedings were administratively closed on
November 29, 2023, based on the pendency of his U-visa application before United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). (Id. ¶ 33.)
4. 	Respondents took Washington G. into custody on January 12, 2026. 	(Id.
¶ 35.) 	Respondents did not provide, produce, or show Washington G. a warrant for his
arrest at the time of his arrest. (Id. ¶ 36.)
5. 	On January 13, 2026, Washington G. filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet.) Washington G. seeks immediate release or a
bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 	(Id. at 28.) 	Washington G. also seeks a
variety of additional relief from the Court, including a declaration that Respondents’ action
is arbitrary and capricious, that Respondents failed to adhere to their regulations, and that
Washington G.’s detention absent a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, as well as an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act. (Id. at 28.) Washington G. separately argues that he is entitled to
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immediate release on the grounds that Respondents lack the requisite administrative
warrant of arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 69, 83–85.)
DISCUSSION
Respondents generally 	oppose Washington 	G.’s Petition, explaining that the
Petition “raises legal and factual issues similar to those in prior habeas petitions this Court
has decided” and that Respondents have appealed one such petition (see Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3248 (8th Cir.)). (Doc. No. 4.) Respondents then incorporate by reference all of
the arguments raised in the Avila appeal and request denial of the petition. (Id.) In this
way, Respondents reiterate their argument that the detention of petitioners similarly
situated to Washington G. is mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). As this Court has
previously concluded, however, Respondents’ interpretation lacks merit. 	Furthermore,
Respondents do not address whether they have the requisite administrative warrant of arrest
to justify detaining Washington G. Because Respondents continue to rely on an incorrect
interpretation of sections 1225 and 1226, and because the portion of the Petition
challenging Washington G.’s warrantless arrest is not directly opposed, the Court grants
the Petition in part and orders immediate release.2
2 The transfer of Washington G. does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction over the Petition.
Weeks v. Wyrick, 638 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, the Government does
not challenge the Court’s jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 4 at 1-2.)
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A. 	Constitutional Guarantee of Habeas Review
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted
to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to
every individual detained within the United States” (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2));
Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025). For most of the nation’s
history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it
does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” 	Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525
(quotation omitted). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “extends to . . . immigration-related detention.” Deng
Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citation omitted). 	The
petitioner bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal by a preponderance of
evidence. 	Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670, at *5
(D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H., 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
B. 	Interpretation of Section 1225
Courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ interpretation that section
1225(b)(2) requires the mandatory detention of all noncitizens living in the country who
are “inadmissible” because they entered the United States without inspection. 	See, e.g.,
Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 & n.22
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that this interpretation had been rejected in 350 cases
“decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across
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the United States” and collecting cases in an Appendix A); Jose Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No.
25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025)
(collecting cases); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL
2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 	This Court also finds
Respondents’ interpretation unpersuasive.
When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word of a statute should have
meaning.” 	United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883)). 	Noncitizens who have been residing in the United States but who entered
without inspection have not, historically, been considered to still be “arriving” under
section 1225(b). 	This is because the statute itself states that, in order to apply, several
conditions must be met; specifically, an immigration officer must determine that the
noncitizen “is an applicant for admission . . . seeking admission . . . [and] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Determining the plain
meaning of the statute requires consideration of the tense of the verb “is” and the present
participle “seeking.” 	Here, section 1225(b)(2) applies to persons who presently are
applicants for admission and who presently are seeking admission at the time of their
detention. 	To be seeking admission means to be seeking entry, which “by its own force
implies a coming from outside.” United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401
(1929). In this case, Washington G. has been residing in the United States since 2017 and
is, therefore, not currently “seeking admission” into the United States.
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In addition, Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other
immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens
who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the
country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section
1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject
to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens
lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain
crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section
1225 were correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these
additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have
not 	been 	admitted 	would 	have 	already 	been 	ineligible 	for 	bond 	under 	section
1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also agrees with those courts that have found that Respondents’
interpretation of section 1225(b) is “at odds with both the relevant legislative history and
longstanding agency practice.” Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *7; see, e.g., Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025) (discussing the longstanding practice
of treating noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had entered without
inspection, as being subject to section 1226(a)).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Washington G.’s detention is governed by
section 1226(a), and he is not subject to section 1225(b)’s mandatory detention.
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C. 	Independent Grounds for Relief
Washington G. also alleges that Respondents are improperly detaining him without
the required administrative warrant to do so. (Pet. ¶ 2.) He seeks immediate release unless
Respondents can produce an administrative warrant of arrest. (Id. ¶ 69.) The Court agrees
with other judges in this District who have concluded that an arrest warrant is a prerequisite
to detention under section 1226(a). See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25‐CV‐4711 (ECT/SGE),
2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026); Juan S.R. v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-5 (PJS/LIB),
Doc. No. 8 at 3–4 (D. Minn. Jan. 1, 2026). 	See also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant
issued by the Attorney General, [a noncitizen] may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” (emphasis
added)). Washington G. alleged in his Petition that his arrest was warrantless (Pet. ¶ 36),
and Respondents have not presented evidence to the contrary. 	Consequently, the Court
grants the Petition and orders Washington G.’s immediate release.3
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, as follows:
3 Given its decision to grant the Petition, the Court need not address the remaining counts
in the Petition. The Court also does not address the Petition’s request for an award of fees
and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act; Washington G. may move separately for
such relief within 30 days of final judgment in this action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
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1. 	Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner Washington G. from
custody immediately in Minnesota, and in any event no later than 4:00 p.m.
CST on January 20, 2026.
2. 	On or before 11:00 a.m. CT on January 21, 2026, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update affirming that Petitioner was released from
custody in accordance with this Order.
3. 	To the extent Petitioner seeks relief beyond an order requiring release or an
order requiring a bond hearing, the Petition is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 16, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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