State of Minnesota et al v. Mullin et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
STATE OF MINNESOTA, by and through
its Attorney General Keith Ellison; CITY
OF MINNEAPOLIS; and CITY OF ST.
PAUL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; JOHN CONDON, in
his official capacity as Acting Executive
Associate Director of Homeland Security;
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; TODD LYONS, in his
official capacity as Acting Director of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
MARCOS CHARLES, in his official
capacity as Acting Executive Associate
Director, Enforcement and Removal
Operations; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; RODNEY
SCOTT, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection; U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION; GREGORY
BOVINO, in his official capacity as
Commander of the U.S. Border Patrol;
DAVID EASTERWOOD, in his official
capacity as Acting Director, Saint Paul
Field Office, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement,
Defendants.
No. 26-cv-190 (KMM/DJF)
ORDER
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In recent weeks, several thousand federal agents have arrived in Minnesota and its
two largest cities as part of “Operation Metro Surge,” an immigration enforcement
campaign. The flood of federal agents has had profound effects on Minnesotans, requiring
the State and the cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul to respond in many ways. In this
case, Plaintiffs (the State of Minnesota, Minneapolis, and Saint Paul), ask the Court to
declare that the unprecedented surge of Defendants’ agents in Minnesota is unconstitutional
and unlawful, and enter an injunction halting Operation Metro Surge. (Dkt. 1 at 76–77.1)
To that end, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 7), which
the Court converted to a motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. 21).
The Court pauses to observe what it is not deciding. At this stage, the Court makes
no final determination on the merits of any claims asserted by Plaintiffs. Nor does the Court
offer any opinion about the wisdom of Operation Metro Surge. And the legality of many
of the specific actions taken by federal agents during the operation is not before the Court
in this case. Instead, the Court only decides whether to grant the extraordinary remedy of
a preliminary injunction halting a federal law enforcement operation based upon the Tenth
Amendment. In answering this question, the Court must view Plaintiffs’ claims through the
lens of the specific legal framework they invoke, and, having done so, finds that Plaintiffs
have not met their burden. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied.
1 Unless otherwise noted, the Court cites to page numbers found in the headers
generated by the CM/ECF filing system.
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BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are largely undisputed at this stage. In their respective evidentiary
submissions, each side understandably emphasizes the reality that supports their position.
Plaintiffs describe the costs and consequences of what they characterize as an excessive
and extreme law enforcement operation that is causing harm to the Twin Cities and State
themselves, as well as to their residents. Defendants do not submit evidence directly
contradicting 	these 	accounts, 	but 	instead 	highlight 	the 	importance 	of 	immigration
enforcement and the number of undocumented people that have been arrested, including
people with serious criminal histories. Defendants also present evidence broadly discussing
how immigration enforcement agents have been met with resistance and, in some cases,
threats and violence by protestors. Because the outcome in this case depends more on the
relevant law than the granular facts, the Court provides a high-level summary of the
extensive record before turning to the analysis.
Operation Metro Surge – Defendants’ Perspective
In early December 2025, the federal government launched Operation Metro Surge,
an “exclusive federal operation” designed “to significantly increase ‘at-large’ arrests of
illegal aliens in the Twin Cities metropolitan area, focusing on individuals with executable
final orders.” (Dkt. 35-2 (“Olson Decl.”) ¶¶ 14, 16, 19.) According to Defendants, there are
“approximately 66,000 aliens in Minnesota [who] appear to be or may be subject to
enforcement actions under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)” (id. ¶ 17), though
they do not specify how many of those noncitizens have either final orders of removal or
criminal histories. Described as “a joint effort between ICE ERO and ICE HSI, with
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assistance 	from 	other 	federal 	components,”2 	Operation 	Metro 	Surge 	entailed
“approximately 2,000 additional ERO officers and HSI agents [being] detailed to the St.
Paul Field Office . . . at different times and for varying lengths of time.” (Id. ¶¶ 15–16.) By
Defendants’ own estimate, as of January 26, 2026, there were about 3,000 federal officers
in Minnesota as part of the operation, in contrast to the 80 officers that “[t]ypically” cover
ICE’s operations in the Twin Cities. (Id. ¶ 15; Dkt. 120 at 2.)
Defendants maintain that Operation Metro Surge has “execute[d] federal law
through immigration enforcement” without any participation from Minnesota’s state,
county, or municipal officials. (Olson Decl. ¶ 14.) According to Defendants, Operation
Metro Surge “has led to the successful arrest and apprehension of” over “3,000 illegal
aliens,” including an unspecified number of people with a variety of criminal convictions.
(Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.)
To carry out Operation Metro Surge, agents from ICE, HSI, U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol (“CBP”), and other federal agencies have “participate[d] in a variety of
different law enforcement actions in and around Minneapolis.” (Dkt. 35-1 (“Harvick
Decl.”) 	¶ 6.) 	Defendants’ 	enforcement 	activities 	include 	engaging 	in 	“consensual
encounters, investigative detentions, warrantless arrests, and arrests pursuant to both
immigration and criminal judicial warrants.” (Id.) According to Defendants, federal agents
involved in Operation Metro Surge have faced “threats, violence, aggression, attacks,
2 “ICE” refers to United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “ERO”
refers to the Enforcement and Removal Operations division of ICE, and “HSI” refers to
Homeland Security Investigations.
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vehicle block-ins, and obstruction of immigration enforcement operations.” (Id. ¶¶ 10–12;
Olson Decl. ¶ 19.) Defendants also describe “routine, if not daily . . . ad hoc protest[s]”
that coalesce into 	“public interference” when officers are attempting 	to carry 	out
enforcement operations. (Harvick Decl. ¶ 22.)
Operation Metro Surge – Plaintiffs’ Perspective
Through a robust evidentiary record, Plaintiffs present a far different picture of how
Operation Metro Surge has unfolded and its effect on Plaintiffs and their communities. The
chief feature of the operation, according to Plaintiffs, is the rampant disregard for the law
by the federal officers carrying it out. For example, ICE agents have engaged in racial
profiling, appearing to question people about their citizenship status based on their
perceived race or ethnicity, and in some cases placing them under arrest without a legal
basis. (See, e.g., Dkt. 13 at 2; Decl. 90-1 (“R.M. Decl.”) at 2–3.) According to Plaintiffs,
Defendants’ indiscriminate, arbitrary, and unlawfully forceful methods of carrying out their
stated law enforcement objectives and responding to anti-ICE observers and protesters
have resulted in widespread fear across the state. Examples include, among many incidents,
the fatal federal-officer-involved shootings of Renee Good and Alex Pretti; DHS agents
ramming vehicles; agents throwing explosive cannisters of chemical irritants under family
vehicles; and leaving undetonated chemical munitions and live ammunition behind on the
scene of enforcement efforts. (Dkt. 106 ¶¶ 4, 6; Dkt. 105-2 at 5; see generally Dkt. 105;
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Dkt. 86, Exs. 1–64.3) Plaintiffs also point out that many DHS agents have switched license
plates on their vehicles and worn face coverings that conceal their identities, though
Minnesota law prohibits such behavior.4 (Dkt. 8 at 14 (citing Minn. Stat. §§ 168.36 and
609.735).)
The presence of so many agents and the methods by which they have carried out
Operation Metro Surge has profoundly impacted the education system in the State and in
the Twin Cities, disrupted the healthcare industry, caused religious observers to forego
attending services and other programming at houses of worship, and affected local business
communities. In the education sphere, reports of students and parents being subjected to
federal officers’ use of force and being detained on their way to and from school have had
“negative impacts on attendance and student focus[.]” (Dkt. 75 (“Graff Decl.”) ¶¶ 19–20.)
It has also affected school staff members. (Dkt. 77 (“Lewis Decl.”) ¶ 10.) As a result,
multiple school districts have temporarily closed or “fe[lt] compelled to offer online
learning tools or hybrid models” to accommodate students and families that “feel[] unsafe
leaving their homes to bring children to and from school.” (Graff Decl. ¶¶ 17, 19; see, e.g.,
Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 5–8.) And, “to the extent the impacts of Operation Metro Surge fall
3 The Declaration of Lindsey Middlecamp can be found at docket entry 86. Exhibits
1 through 68 to Ms. Middlecamp’s declaration are included in docket entries 86, 88, and
89.
4 	Defendants 	present 	testimonial 	evidence 	that 	“the 	rise 	of 	doxxing, 	the
advancement of facial recognition technologies, and the proliferation of bad actors on
social media, has created an unprecedented operational risk for federal law enforcement
officers that necessitates appropriate protective steps such as wearing masks in public to
protect their identities.” (Harvick Decl. ¶ 20.)
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disproportionately on low-income or multilingual households, . . . addressing disruptions
could require even more” state resources. (Graff Decl. ¶ 21.)
Similarly, Operation Metro Surge has impacted the provision of healthcare, as
patients have canceled or delayed critical appointments out of fear of leaving their homes,
resulting in preventable medical complications. (See, e.g., Dkt. 79 (“Boschee Decl. 1”) at
3–9.) It has also impacted places of worship, including one where congregants “witnessed
ICE agents in the church parking lot during church services” (id. ¶ 17), which have faced
significant decreases in attendance over the last few months (id. at 10–13). Operation Metro
Surge has also resulted in cancelations of large events that would have generated
substantial revenue for Plaintiffs. (Dkt. 64 ¶¶ 3–5, 7–13 (noting that the cancelation of one
such event resulted in a loss of “several thousand dollars in tax revenue for” Minneapolis);
Dkt. 65 ¶¶ 6–7, 10.) And, many Twin Cities businesses have reported numerous adverse
impacts, including “significant decreases in customer traffic . . . because their customer
base [is] not comfortable to go out and go shopping” (Dkt. 12 ¶ 4), decreases in revenue of
up to 80 percent (id.), and staffing issues because “[e]mployees [are] not feeling
comfortable coming to work . . . or [are] requesting reduced hours” (id. ¶ 5). (See also
Dkt. 70 at 10–14; Dkt. 16, Exs. 9–10; Dkt. 70, Exs. 12–21; Dkt. 72 ¶ 3; Dkt. 73 ¶¶ 9–11;
Dkt. 74 ¶¶ 9–18.)
Plaintiffs also allege that the way Defendants have carried out Operation Metro
Surge has caused them to divert significant resources that otherwise would be used to
advance important priorities of their own. For example, Minnesota’s Department of Public
Safety has expended significant additional resources to run the State’s Emergency
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Operations Center (“SEOC”) in the wake of the fatal shooting of Renee Good on January
7, 2026. (Dkt. 14 ¶ 5.) And members of the State Patrol have been placed on alert to
respond to public unrest that could result from DHS’s activities. (Id. ¶ 7.) The Minnesota
Department of Transportation has also reallocated resources away from ordinary duties in
response to Operation Metro Surge, making it less available to address safety conditions
on Minnesota roads and highways. (Dkt. 15 ¶¶ 6, 12–15, 16–21, 26–28.)
The immigration enforcement surge has similarly affected the resources and
operations of the City of Minneapolis. Because the City has received a high volume of 911
emergency calls related to Defendants’ immigration enforcement actions, which have
triggered 	“community 	tensions” 	and 	large-scale 	protests, 	the 	Minneapolis 	Police
Department (“MPD”) has had to increase supervisor hours, pay more overtime, cancel
scheduled leave for officers, keep its specialized units on paid on-call status, and provide
increased mental health and other support to its staff. (Dkt. 9 (“Frey Decl.”) ¶¶ 8–16; see
also Dkt. 11 ¶¶ 2–15.) The need to respond to the effects of Operation Metro Surge has
meant that MPD officers are not available to respond to other 911 emergency calls or public
safety needs and has required significant additional work for other components of the
Minneapolis government and its mayor’s office. (See, e.g., Dkts. 62–63, 67, 106.)
Saint Paul has experienced similar challenges. It has also had to devote resources to
educate the public on distinguishing city officers from federal immigration officers, to
enact temporary policies to counteract common public hazards arising from Operation
Metro Surge, and to communicate with Defendants about violations of local ordinances in
furtherance of their federal law enforcement purposes. (Dkt. 70 ¶¶ 5–29; Dkt. 70, Exs. 1,
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3, 10; Dkt. 16-5.) Moreover, Plaintiffs allege unquantifiable harm from Operation Metro
Surge, including the erosion of community trust that Plaintiffs have worked to rebuild over
the last few years, which in turn had lowered crime rates in the Twin Cities. This decline
in trust is attributable to federal agents’ practices of failing to identify themselves, masking,
and wearing inconsistent uniforms with inconsistent identification. (Frey Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5; Dkt.
70 ¶ 17; Dkt. 70-2.)
Motivations for Operation Metro Surge
The parties offer differing characterizations of the motivation behind Operation
Metro Surge. Plaintiffs allege that it is not motivated by a legitimate law-enforcement
purpose. According to Plaintiffs, the surge serves as a pretext for leveraging demands and
punishing political leaders within the State and the Twin Cities who oppose Defendants’
immigration policies, in part by enacting so-called “sanctuary” laws and ordinances that
prohibit 	participation 	in 	federal 	immigration 	enforcement.5 	(See 	Dkt. 	8 	at 	34–35
(“Defendants’ conduct has and will continue to require Minnesota and its political
subdivisions to take actions they would not take but for Defendants’ conduct.”).) Further,
Plaintiffs assert that Operation Metro Surge is what Defendants have resorted to because
their initial attempts “to coerce Plaintiffs ‘the easy way’ by trying to tie all federal funding”
were enjoined and ultimately unsuccessful. (Dkt. 60 at 13.) Based in part on a letter from
5 Defendants have generally referred to Plaintiffs’ laws, ordinances, and policies that
restrict cooperation with federal immigration enforcement as “sanctuary” laws, which, in
turn, leads to Plaintiffs being called “sanctuary” jurisdictions. Plaintiffs have generally
referred to those same cooperation-limiting measures as “separation” laws or polices. The
Court takes no side in the debate underlying this difference in terminology but uses the
term “sanctuary” because it seems well understood in common usage.
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United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi to Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, Plaintiffs
assert that among Defendants’ true objectives in executing Operation Metro Surge are
gaining access to Minnesota’s voter rolls and pressuring the State and Twin Cities to
cooperate with the federal government in its purported immigration enforcement efforts,
including by sharing state records and “repeal[ing] . . . sanctuary policies[.]” (Dkt. 114-1
at 3–4; Dkt. 60 at 10–13 (citing statements by Defendants).) And, to achieve those coercive
ends, Defendants have allegedly engaged in a pattern of misconduct designed to pressure
Plaintiffs into enforcing federal immigration law.
On the other hand, Defendants claim that Operation Metro Surge was launched “to
address the dangers arising from the presence of illegal aliens in the Twin Cities area,
including dangerous criminal aliens engaged in violent crimes and drug trafficking.” (Dkt.
33 at 9.) According to Defendants, those dangers are “exacerbated” by Plaintiffs’
“sanctuary laws and policies that limit the cooperation of some state and local officials with
federal immigration officials, which has hindered the federal government’s ability to
enforce immigration laws in Minnesota[.]” (Id.) They further maintain that all aspects of
Operation Metro Surge have strictly been in furtherance of “the enforcement of federal
law,” in line with President Trump’s campaign promises to more strictly enforce federal
immigration laws. (Id. at 1 (emphasis omitted), 5–7.)
Claims and Procedural History
On January 12, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint (Dkt. 1), seeking both
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and they moved for a temporary restraining
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order (TRO) that same day (Dkt. 5).6 In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert ten Causes of
Action7:
1. 	Count I claims that Defendants have violated the “Tenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution” through “Infringement on Plaintiffs’ Police Power” and “Unlawful
Coercion and Commandeering” (Dkt. 1 at 53–55);
2. 	Count II, brought by the State, claims that Defendants have violated “Equal
Sovereignty Under the U.S. Constitution” based on disparate treatment of
Minnesota relative to other states (id. at 58–60);
3. 	Counts III through VII claim that Defendants have violated the Administrative
Procedure Act in a variety of ways, including by violating state and local laws
(id. at 60–71);
4. 	Counts VIII and IX claim that Defendants have violated the First Amendment
through unlawful retaliation and viewpoint discrimination (id. at 71–74); and
5. 	Count XI8 claims that Defendants have engaged in “Ultra Vires Executive
Action in Excess of Constitutional and Statutory Authority Conferred on the
Executive” (id. at 75–76).
In moving for a TRO, Plaintiffs raised only their Tenth Amendment and Equal Sovereignty
claims. (Dkt. 8.)
With respect to their Tenth Amendment claims, Plaintiffs focus their arguments on
how Operation Metro Surge has caused them to divert significant financial and other
resources away from other pressing state and local matters toward addressing the
consequences of Operation Metro Surge. (Id. at 34–41.) Plaintiffs also describe the impact
of the surge on essential services they provide to their citizens, including education,
healthcare, and policing. (Id. at 38–41.) And, in support of injunctive relief on their Equal
6 Plaintiffs filed several declarations in support of their motion. (See, e.g., Dkts. 6,
9–16.)
7 Unless stated otherwise, the claims are brought by all Plaintiffs.
8 The Complaint does not include a “Count X.”
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Sovereignty claim, they allege that Minnesota has been singled out and targeted by ICE in
a way that no other state has experienced.
On January 14, 2026, the Court held a status conference, during which the Court
“declined to grant an ex parte TRO without giving Defendants an opportunity to respond
to the motion for injunctive relief,” converted the motion to one for a preliminary
injunction,9 	and 	set 	expedited 	briefing 	deadlines. 	(Dkt. 21.) 	Defendants 	filed 	their
Response to the motion (Dkt. 33) on January 19, and Plaintiffs submitted their Reply (Dkt.
60) on January 22, with additional evidence in support of their motion.10 Plaintiffs’ Reply
addressed public statements made by Defendants and other members of the federal
government concerning Operation Metro Surge and its purpose between the filing of
Plaintiffs’ motion and their Reply. (Dkt. 60 at 10–12 (citing statements).) Plaintiffs argue
that their request for preliminary injunctive relief was strengthened by these developments,
which showed that Defendants’ “early claims regarding their purposes in conducting
[Operation Metro Surge] (political retribution and fighting fraud) have largely given way
9 Since the status conference, Plaintiffs have twice asked the Court to reconsider its
decision to convert the motion for a temporary restraining order into a motion for a
preliminary injunction. (Dkts. 31, 107.) To the extent that any further ruling on these
requests is necessary, they are denied. The Court would not have found a likelihood of
success on the merits necessary for granting a TRO when the case was filed, and it does
not find that the factors support issuance of a preliminary injunction now.
Plaintiffs have also alleged that, had they understood the Court was going to convert
the motion, they would have sought injunctive relief as to other claims in the Complaint,
and not just the two sets of claims that were the focus of their initial filing. If, considering
the Court’s analysis here, Plaintiffs believe injunctive relief is appropriate as to other
claims, they may file another motion.
10 Dkts. 62–67, 70, 72–83, 86, 88–91, 105–06, 113–14.
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to the purpose of compelling Plaintiffs to abandon their separation laws.” (Id. at 18; see id.
at 16–19.)
On January 26, 2026, the Court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs’ motion.
(Dkt. 119.) Following the hearing, the Court issued an Order for Supplemental Briefing
(Dkt. 118), instructing Defendants to address the statements and arguments raised in
Plaintiffs’ Reply. Defendants filed their supplemental response on January 28. (Dkt. 129.)
DISCUSSION11
I. 	Legal Standard
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); Choreo, LLC v. Lors, No. 25-
1706, 2026 WL 82841, at *3 (8th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026) (quoting id. at 22). “The party seeking
a preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing the necessity of” the remedy. Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 316 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Sleep
Number Corp. v. Young, 33 F.4th 1012, 1016 (8th Cir. 2022).
When a party moves for preliminary injunctive relief, courts consider four factors:
“(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between this
harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on the other parties . . . ; (3) the
probability that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Missouri
11 Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ assertion that they have standing to bring
these claims or to seek prospective injunctive relief. In any event, because the Court finds
Plaintiffs’ arguments on standing to be well-supported and ultimately denies the motion for
a preliminary injunction, the Court finds it unnecessary to engage in any lengthy discussion
of standing in this Order.
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v. Trump, 128 F.4th 979, 990 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting Wilbur-Ellis Co., LLC v. Erikson, 103
F.4th 1352, 1355–56 (8th Cir. 2024). None of these factors is dispositive. Ng v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 64 F.4th 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v.
C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.3d 109, 113 (1981)). “[R]ather, the court should balance all the factors
in considering whether the injunction should be granted.” Id.
II. 	Likelihood of Success
First, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on
the merits of the claims raised in their motion for a preliminary injunction, which is often
considered the “most important” factor. Wildhawk Invs., LLC v. Brava I.P., LLC, 27 F.4th
587, 593 (8th Cir. 2022); see also Minn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors,
Inc. v. Blissenbach, 155 F.4th 1015, 1021 (8th Cir. 2025) (stating that the probability of
success is “the most significant factor”). Meeting the burden on this element “typically
require[s]” the movant “to demonstrate that it has a ‘fair’ chance of prevailing on the
merits[.]” Sleep Number Corp., 33 F.4th at 1016 (quoting Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451,
455–56 (8th Cir. 2019).12 In doing so, the Court does not determine whether the movant
“will ultimately win.” See Glenwood Bridge, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 940 F.2d 367, 371
(8th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted).
12 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs must “demonstrate that [they are] ‘likely to
prevail on the merits’” because they “seek[] to enjoin ‘the enforcement of federal
statutes[.]’” (Dkt. 33 at 13 (quoting Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530
F.3d 724, 731–32, 732 n.6 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).) Plaintiffs disagree that a heightened
standard applies in a challenge to the method of law enforcement rather than the
constitutionality of the law itself. The Court declines to resolve this dispute, finding that
Plaintiffs fail to clear even the lower hurdle.
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A. 	Tenth Amendment
The 	Constitution 	establishes 	a 	system 	of 	federalism 	where 	there 	is 	“dual
sovereignty” between the states and the federal government. Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)). That
system of dual sovereignty operates to “secure[] to citizens the liberties that derive from
the diffusion of sovereign power.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). The
Constitution grants certain enumerated powers to the federal government and, implicitly,
leaves “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty” to the states. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918–19
(quoting The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison)) (indicating that “[r]esidual state
sovereignty” is “reflected throughout the Constitution’s text” and is “implicit . . . in the
Constitution’s conferral upon Congress” of only “enumerated” powers). The Tenth
Amendment makes the implicit “express,” id. at 919, when it states, “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X.
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has addressed, in various contexts,
whether the exercise of federal power threatens to overstep and infringe on the power of
the states in our system of dual sovereigns. In relevant part, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the Tenth Amendment embodies an “anticommandeering principle” that
prevents the federal government from infringing on the sovereignty of a state. New York,
505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Murphy v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n,
584 U.S. 453 (2018). However, the principle “did not emerge in [Supreme Court] cases
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until relatively recently, when Congress attempted in a few isolated instances to extend its
authority in unprecedented ways.” Murphy, 584 U.S. at 471. The Supreme Court’s “first
experience with [federal commandeering of state governments] did not occur until the
1970’s,” when the Environmental Protection Agency passed regulations requiring states to
take various steps to regulate auto emissions. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925 (discussing EPA v.
Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (per curiam)). And, although the Brown case was dismissed
before the Supreme Court issued an opinion, its “later opinions . . . made clear that the
Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive
action, federal regulatory programs.” Id. (discussing Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. &
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), and Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)).
The federal government can run afoul of the anticommandeering principle in several
ways. For instance, the Tenth Amendment is violated when the federal government
attempts to compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. New York,
505 U.S. at 188 (invalidating a federal statute requiring states to either adopt federal
instructions for how to handle low-level radioactive waste or accept the waste, which
amounted to a “choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques”).
The federal government also cannot “command the States’ officers, or those of their
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program,” Printz, 521
at 935, because “[federal] laws conscripting state officers violate state sovereignty and are
thus not in accord with the Constitution,” id. at 925; see id. at 904, 933 (finding that a
federal statute violated dual sovereignty when it required state law enforcement officers to
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perform background checks on handgun purchasers in furtherance of federal law). Most
recently, the Supreme Court held that a federal statute “prohibiting state authorization of
sports gambling” violated the anticommandeering doctrine because it instructed state
legislatures on what they could or could not do. Murphy, 584 U.S. at 474–75.
The constitutional prohibition on the federal government “requir[ing] the States to
regulate” applies equally when the government “directly commands a State to regulate or
indirectly coerces a State to adopt a federal regulatory system as its own.” Nat’l Fed. of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012) (“NFIB”) (quoting New York, 505 U.S.
at 178). Even when the federal government purports to “offer[] state governments a
‘choice,’” it may “cross[] the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion.” New York,
505 U.S. at 175; but see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (finding that
conditioning receipt of federal funds amounting to 5% of South Dakota’s highway budget
on raising its drinking age to 21 was offering “relatively mild encouragement” to the state
and therefore was not “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into
compulsion’” (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937))).13
Against this backdrop, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ assertion that Operation Metro
Surge violates the anticommandeering principle. Plaintiffs essentially raise two theories in
support of their claim. First, in what the Court calls the “resources theory,” Plaintiffs
13 While Defendants argue in their supplemental memorandum that NFIB and Dole
are not strictly Tenth Amendment cases (Dkt. 129 at 3), the Court finds these cases
instructive regarding overall “structural limits upon federal power,” as they consider what
the federal government can permissibly “impose upon the sovereign States.” NFIB, 567
U.S. at 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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contend that Operation Metro Surge violates the anticommandeering doctrine and infringes
on Plaintiffs’ police powers by requiring Plaintiffs to expend significant state and local
resources to address the harmful effects of the surge on their respective jurisdictions,
ultimately diverting resources away from other matters of state and local priority. (See
Dkt. 8 at 33–41.) Plaintiffs’ second theory, which the Court refers to as the “improper
influence theory,” is advanced most clearly in their Reply. Under this theory, Plaintiffs
assert that Defendants are carrying out Operation Metro Surge in unlawful ways to coerce
Plaintiffs “through force . . . into abandoning policies they have a Tenth Amendment right
to adopt.” (Dkt. 60 at 16.) Pointing to Defendants’ own statements, Plaintiffs argue that
Operation Metro Surge is not a legitimate exercise of federal law enforcement power, but
is instead a campaign of pressure to force Plaintiffs to yield and abandon their “sanctuary”
policies. (Id. at 16–19.)
Though Plaintiffs’ position is not without merit, for several reasons the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have not shown the likelihood of success required for preliminary injunctive
relief on either theory. First, entry of a preliminary injunction would require the Court to
conclude there is a “fair chance” that the Supreme Court’s limited Tenth Amendment
anticommandeering precedent bars federal government action in the unprecedented
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situation presented in this case. While this alone does not render injunctive relief improper,
it weighs heavily against the issuance of an injunction.14
To be clear, the Court is not suggesting that the anticommandeering principle is
categorically inapplicable to actions taken by the Executive Branch. Indeed, the Tenth
Amendment itself refers to the powers granted to “the United States,” and the relevant
caselaw refers not only to Congress but also to limitations on what the “federal
government” may do. E.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 93515; New York, 505 U.S. at 156–57.
At the same time, the Supreme Court cases on which Plaintiffs principally rely
concerned statutes that either conscripted state law enforcement officers into federal
service, Printz, 521 U.S. at 922, directly compelled states to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program, New York, 505 U.S. at 166, or directly limited what legislation states
could or could not enact, Murphy, 584 U.S. at 470. Insofar as Plaintiffs’ Tenth Amendment
claims do not challenge the constitutionality of any federal statute, Defendants’ challenged
conduct does not fit neatly into the clearly defined prohibitions on the exercise of federal
authority. Instead, Plaintiffs ask the Court to extend existing precedent to a new context
14 Of course, this Order only considers the Tenth Amendment and Equal Sovereignty
implications of actions already taken and those still underway by Defendants during
Operation Metro Surge. Whether other future actions which might be taken by the
Executive Branch in furtherance of their operations in Minnesota—such as deployment of
the National Guard—could violate the Tenth Amendment are questions for another day.
15 That the anticommandeering principle extends to actions taken by the Executive
Branch seems likely given the Printz Court’s observation that the Court’s first experience
with it arose in a case concerning regulations promulgated by the EPA, an executive
agency, not by Congress. 521 U.S. at 925 (discussing Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th
Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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where its application is less direct—namely, to an unprecedented deployment of armed
federal immigration officers to aggressively enforce immigration statutes. None of the
cases on which they rely have even come close. While the novelty of Plaintiffs’ claims does
not necessarily preclude their ultimate success on the merits, it weighs against the propriety
of preliminary injunctive relief.
Second, although the Court finds Plaintiffs’ improper-influence theory to be the
stronger of their two theories, the inferences to be drawn regarding the allegedly coercive
purpose of Operation Metro Surge are not as one-sided as Plaintiffs suggest. Plaintiffs argue
that Defendants are carrying out Operation Metro Surge in brazenly lawless ways
specifically to coerce Plaintiffs into modifying or repealing their “sanctuary” laws and
ordinances and otherwise cooperate with the Executive, thereby commandeering Plaintiffs’
legislative processes. Plaintiffs certainly have put forth evidence to support this theory,
including Attorney General Bondi’s letter to Governor Walz, which states as much, and
other statements by Defendants and other Executive Branch officials. (Dkt. 114, Exs. 1–6.)
And Plaintiffs’ theory finds additional support in more recent statements by executive
officials. For example, Border Czar Tom Homan said on January 29, 2026, that “[t]he
withdrawal of law enforcement resources here is dependent on cooperation” by state and
local officials with the Administration’s immigration priorities.16 Several courts have
already determined that the federal government cannot coerce “sanctuary” jurisdictions
16 Associated Press, LIVE: Border Czar Tom Homan Holds News Conference in
Minneapolis, 	at 	20:44–20:50 	(YouTube, 	Jan. 	29, 	2026),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQ1xHRIhdMo (“Homan News Conference”).
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into changing their laws or carrying out the Executive Branch’s immigration priorities by
threatening to withhold appropriated funds. E.g., City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Trump,
783 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed
on their Tenth Amendment challenges to executive orders directing the federal government
to withhold funds from sanctuary jurisdictions because they wielded “critical funding as a
cudgel with which to coerce localities that do not wish to cut essential programs into
accepting the federal government’s conditions in exchange for the funds they were
promised”); Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 534 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(similar). Using a surge of executive force against a “sanctuary” jurisdiction to accomplish
the same ends is arguably no less coercive than withholding funds, and the Court does not
dismiss Plaintiffs’ position as “legally frivolous,” as Defendants suggest it should. (Dkt. 33
at 13.)
However, there is also support that cuts the other way, both in the briefing and the
record, suggesting that there are other motivations behind Operation Metro Surge. Before
its outset, several Executive Branch officials emphasized that Operation Metro Surge was
a necessary response to allegations of widespread fraud in Minnesota against government
programs. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 55–59 (citing statements from President Trump and other Executive
Branch officials tying enforcement actions to alleged “fraud” in Minnesota).) Defendants
have introduced evidence that the operation was also launched to increase arrests of
noncitizens with criminal convictions in Minnesota and the Twin Cities, an effort they
claim 	has 	been 	hindered 	by 	Plaintiffs’ refusal 	to 	assist 	with 	federal 	immigration
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enforcement efforts. (See Olson Decl. ¶¶ 14–18; Harvick Decl. ¶ 7; cf. Dkt. 1 ¶ 113.17)
Based on the record before the Court, a factfinder could reasonably credit that Plaintiffs’
sanctuary policies require a greater presence of federal agents to achieve the federal
government’s immigration enforcement objectives than in a jurisdiction that actively
assists ICE. (See Olson Decl. ¶¶ 8–13; see also Harvick Decl. ¶ 16 (indicating that an
injunction would limit CBP’s ability to arrest and detain noncitizens with criminal
records).) Because there is evidence supporting both sides’ arguments as to motivation and
the relative merits of each side’s competing positions are unclear, the Court is reluctant to
find that the likelihood-of-success factor weighs sufficiently in favor of granting a
preliminary injunction. See Sanborn Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co.,
997 F.2d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court’s denial of preliminary injunction
where there was “evidence to directly support both [parties’] arguments”).18
Relatedly, Plaintiffs’ improper-influence claim invites the Court to identify the
precise point at which a legitimate effort to enforce federal immigration law becomes
unconstitutionally coercive and infringes on a state’s sovereignty. On this record, there are
17 Defendants do not concede that the federal agents involved in Operation Metro
Surge are engaged in brazen lawlessness, but state that “the actions of federal officers over
the past six weeks match” the operation’s purpose of “enforcement of federal law.”
(Dkt. 129 at 4 (citing Olson Decl. ¶¶ 14, 16).)
18 The Court is particularly reluctant to take a side in the debate about the purpose
behind Operation Metro Surge. Not only is it difficult to identify a single motivation for a
significant multifaceted operation, but doing so would venture into a uniquely controversial
political question. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“To turn these matters over to the federal judiciary is to inject the courts into
the most heated partisan issues.”).
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both quantitative and qualitative challenges to this line-drawing. Quantitatively, Plaintiffs
cannot point to what number of federal officers would demonstrate a de facto Tenth
Amendment anticommandeering violation. Qualitatively, there is no clear way for the
Court to determine at what point Defendants’ alleged unlawful actions (e.g., racial
profiling, excessive force, deployment of chemical irritants, wearing face coverings,
switching 	license 	plates, 	overusing 	city 	parking 	lots, 	among 	others) 	becomes 	so
problematic that they amount to unconstitutional coercion and an infringement on
Minnesota’s state sovereignty. Plaintiffs have provided no metric by which to determine
when lawful law enforcement becomes unlawful commandeering, simply arguing that the
excesses of Operation Metro Surge are so extreme that the surge exceeds whatever line
must exist. (Dkt. 126 at 31.) A proclamation that Operation Metro Surge has simply gone
“so far on the other side of the line” is a thin reed on which to base a preliminary
injunction.19
The line-drawing difficulties highlight a doctrinal challenge as well. The Supreme
Court’s anticommandeering caselaw involves situations where the federal government’s
19 Plaintiffs’ quantitative hurdles are compounded by recent conflicting reports
regarding whether the government is planning to “draw down” the number of federal agents
in Minnesota. See, e.g., Jeff Day, Homan Plans to Reduce Number of Federal Agents in
Minnesota, Minn. Star Trib. (Jan. 29, 2026, 7:32 AM), https://www.startribune.com/ice-
raids-minnesota/601546426; see generally Homan News Conference. But see Brooks
Johnson, Trump Says ‘Nothing is Going to Change’ on Immigration Enforcement in
Minnesota, Minn. Star Trib. (Jan. 29, 2026, 7:49 PM), https://www.startribune.com/ice-
raids-minnesota/601546426. A possible reduction in force highlights the uncertainty of
how to determine when a federal presence would cross into (or out of) a Tenth Amendment
violation.
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infringement on state sovereignty is not a question of fact, but a legal on-off switch: there
is either a clearly identifiable congressional (or regulatory) command that violates state
sovereignty, or there is not. When, for example, Congress tells the States that they cannot
enact laws authorizing sports betting, a court can hold, based on the statute itself, that
Congress cannot give such a command. Murphy, 584 U.S. 480 (explaining that the “direct
command to the States” in the challenged statute was “exactly what the anticommandeering
rule does not allow”). But even when it is clear what the coercion is, the caselaw does not
describe a way by which the Court could draw the line between constitutionally permissible
“pressure” and impermissible “compulsion.” See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 578 (indicating that
federal statutes placing conditions on states’ receipt of federal funds should not “exert a
power akin to undue influence”) (quotation omitted); Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (observing that
in some circumstances, “the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion”). And this
jurisprudence certainly does not provide guidance on how the Court should make that
determination as to a broad immigration law enforcement initiative.
The absence of doctrinal instruction on how to draw the necessary line, compounded
by the challenges in drawing such a line in the context of Operation Metro Surge, means
that issuing the requested injunctive relief—halting the operation entirely—could overstep
the judicial role. As the Eighth Circuit very recently cautioned, “federal courts do not
exercise general oversight of the Executive Branch.” Tincher v. Noem, No. 26-1105, 2026
WL 194768, at *2 (8th Cir. Jan. 26, 2026) (per curiam) (quoting Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606
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U.S. 831, 861 (2025)). Plaintiffs’ improper-influence theory invites the Court to risk doing
just that.
Many of these same problems also weigh against a finding that Plaintiffs are likely
to succeed on the merits of their resources theory. In addition to suffering from the same
line-drawing problems discussed above, Plaintiffs’ claims under this theory face an
additional jurisprudential barrier. In United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670 (2023), Texas and
Louisiana sued DHS, arguing that DHS was not doing enough to arrest and remove
noncitizens from the United States, and in doing so, “impose[d] costs on the States”
because they had “to incarcerate or supply social services such as healthcare and education
to noncitizens who should be (but are not being) arrested by the Federal Government.” Id.
at 674. There, the Supreme Court held that Texas and Louisiana lacked standing to bring
those claims, in part, because of the substantial discretion the Executive Branch has over
arrest and detention decisions, as well as the absence of “meaningful standards for
assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area.” Id. at 679–80. Moreover, the
Supreme Court explained that “in our system of dual federal and state sovereignty, federal
policies frequently generate indirect effects on state revenues or state spending,” and “when
a State asserts, for example, that a federal law has produced only those kinds of indirect
effects, the States’ claim for standing can become more attenuated.” Id. at 680 n.3. If such
downstream costs of Executive Branch enforcement decisions do not constitute an injury
in fact sufficient for states to have standing to sue, it seems unlikely that the effect of such
costs could form the basis of a Tenth Amendment anticommandeering violation.
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For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot cross the foremost hurdle in
their request for an injunction on their Tenth Amendment claims because they have not
shown a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits.
B. 	Equal Sovereignty
The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have not shown a sufficient likelihood of success
on their Equal Sovereignty claim. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have targeted Minnesota
for unequal treatment—by deploying a massive surge of armed immigration enforcement
officers—that is unrelated to a valid law enforcement purpose. Plaintiffs contend that the
true motivation behind Operation Metro Surge, which has “drained state and local police
resources and made Minnesota less safe,” is partly political retribution. (Dkt. 8 at 41–45.)
Plaintiffs allege that that disproportionate deployment of law enforcement agents to
Minnesota is indefensible when other states with much larger populations of undocumented
residents are not experiencing anything close to Operation Metro Surge.
In support of this claim, Plaintiffs rely primarily on Shelby County v. Holder, 570
U.S. 529 (2013). But Shelby County does not support the relief Plaintiffs seek. There, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the “principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty,” id. at
535, but did so in a very different context. Shelby County involved a challenge to the
constitutionality of § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which subjected certain states to
additional 	restrictions 	due 	to 	their 	histories 	of 	racially 	discriminatory 	election
administration. Id. at 537 (describing the operation of §§ 4(b) and 5 of the VRA). In holding
that § 4(b)’s formula, which resulted in certain jurisdictions being “singled out” for
disparate treatment, was outdated and could no longer be constitutionally justified, id. at
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550–51, the Supreme Court stated that “a departure from the fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently
related to the problem that it targets,” id. at 542.
Seizing on that line, Plaintiffs argue that “Operation Metro Surge fails that test” and
that “Shelby County’s reasoning applies with equal force [here because] it teaches that the
federal government cannot single out States for disparate treatment without a strong and
narrowly tailored justification.” (Dkt. 60 at 23.) But Plaintiffs do not point to any authority
applying Shelby County’s equal-sovereignty “test” in any other context. Nor do they
explain how it applies to the Executive Branch’s discretionary decisions about where to
deploy federal personnel to enforce duly enacted federal laws. The Court can readily
imagine scenarios where the federal executive must legitimately vary its use of law
enforcement resources from one state to the next, and there is no precedent for a court to
micromanage such decisions. Under the circumstances presented here, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have not shown the required likelihood of success on the merits of their Equal
Sovereignty claim.
In sum, the Court concludes that the likelihood-of-success factor weighs against
issuing an injunction.
III. 	Additional Considerations
As courts have frequently observed, an “absence of a likelihood of success on the
merits strongly suggests that preliminary injunctive relief should be denied[.]” CDI Energy
Servs. v. W. River Pumps, Inc., 567 F.3d 398, 402 (8th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, the Court
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briefly discusses the threat of irreparable harm to Plaintiffs in the absence of an injunction
and the countervailing the threat of harm to Defendants if an injunction were issued.
Plaintiffs have made a strong showing that Operation Metro Surge has had, and will
likely continue to have, profound and even heartbreaking, consequences on the State of
Minnesota, the Twin Cities, and Minnesotans. Since Operation Metro Surge began, there
have been multiple shootings of Minnesota residents by federal immigration enforcement
agents. Additionally, there is evidence that ICE and CBP agents have engaged in racial
profiling, excessive use of force, and other harmful actions. And Defendants do nothing to
refute the negative impacts described by Plaintiffs in almost every arena of daily life, from
the expenditure of vast resources in police overtime to a plummeting of students’
attendance in schools, from a delay in responding to emergency calls to extreme hardship
for small businesses. It would be difficult to overstate the effect this operation is having on
the citizens of Minnesota, and the Court must acknowledge that reality here.
However, those are not the only harms to be considered. The Eighth Circuit has
recently reiterated that entry of an injunction barring the federal government from
enforcing federal law imposes significant harm on the government. Tincher, 2026 WL
194768, at *2 (quoting CASA, 606 U.S. at 861); Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303
(2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (“Any time a state is enjoined by a court from
effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable
injury.”). And Defendants have presented evidence that entry of the injunction requested
by Plaintiffs would harm the federal government’s efforts to enforce federal immigration
laws. (Olson Decl. ¶¶ 16–18; Harvick Decl. ¶¶ 8–9, 15–16.) Balancing the harms described
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by Plaintiffs against the interests of Defendants is not as straightforward as Plaintiffs
suggest.
Ultimately, the Court finds that the balance of harms does not decisively favor an
injunction. Paired with the Court’s finding of an insufficient likelihood of success on the
merits, the Court need not further weigh the competing interests of the parties. See Oglala
Sioux Tribe v. C&W Enters., Inc., 542 F.3d 224, 233 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding it “unnecessary
to assess the remaining factors for injunctive relief” where the movant failed to show a
likelihood of success).
Finally, even if the likelihood of success on the merits and the balance of harms each
weighed more clearly in favor of Plaintiffs, the Court would still likely be unable to grant
the relief requested: an injunction suspending Operation Metro Surge. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently vacated a much more circumscribed injunction which limited
one aspect of the ongoing operation, namely the way immigration officers interacted with
protesters and observers. Tincher, 2026 WL 194768, at *1–2. The injunction in that case
was not only much narrower than the one proposed here, but it was based on more settled
precedent than that which underlies the claims now before the Court. Nonetheless, the
Court of Appeals determined that the injunction would cause irreparable harm to the
government because it would hamper their efforts to enforce federal law. Id. at *2. If that
injunction went too far, then the one at issue here—halting the entire operation—certainly
would.
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ORDER
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs’
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 5) is DENIED.
Date: January 31, 2026 	s/Katherine M. Menendez
Katherine M. Menendez
United States District Judge
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