Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Victor G.,
Petitioner,
v.
Todd Lyons, in his capacity as Acting
Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Pamela
Bondi, U.S. Attorney General; Daren K.
Margolin, Executive Office for Immigration
Review; David Easterwood, Field Office
Director of St. Paul Field Office for U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, United
States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal
Operations,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-119 (ECT/SGE)
OPINION AND ORDER
________________________________________________________________________
Thomas R. Anderson, III, Anderson & Anderson Law, LLC, Minneapolis, MN, for
Petitioner Victor G.
Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Todd
Lyons, Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, Daren K. Margolin, and David Easterwood.
Petitioner Victor G. is a Mexican citizen who has lived in the United States since
January 2009, when he entered without inspection.1 Pet. [ECF No. 1] at 4 ¶ 1 (under the
heading “Parties”), 11 ¶ 1. 	In October 2024, Victor and his family applied for a U-visa
1 	Victor also lived in the United States from 2004 until he left in December 2008. Pet.
at 11 ¶ 1. No party argues that Victor’s previous time in the United States affects the legal
analysis here.
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certification. Id. at 12 ¶ 4; see ECF No. 5 ¶ 4. On November 29, 2025, Victor was given
a bona fide determination by USCIS, which also gave him employment authorization and
placed him in deferred action for four years. Pet. at 12 ¶ 4, 13 ¶ 5; ECF No. 1-1 at 8, 10;
ECF No. 5 ¶ 5. 	Victor’s criminal history includes violations for driving without a valid
driver’s license, driving with a revoked driver’s license, failing to carry auto insurance, and
speeding.2 	Pet. at 12 ¶ 3. 	On January 7, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) 	officers 	arrested 	Victor 	in 	Blaine, 	Minnesota, 	“while 	conducting 	targeted
enforcement operations.” 	ECF No. 5 ¶ 7. 	Victor was “transferred to El Paso, Texas for
administrative removal processing,” and he is “currently awaiting an immigration removal
hearing.” ECF No. 5 ¶ 7. 	However, at least as of his January 14, 2026 reply brief, Victor
“still [has] not been placed in Removal Proceedings and has never been issued a Notice to
Appear.” ECF No. 6 at 2. There is nothing in the record indicating that USCIS has revoked
Victor’s grant of deferred action, which is set to last until 2029. 	See ECF No. 1-1 at 8
(November 29, 2025 USCIS Bona Fide Determination Notice stating that Victor’s
“employment authorization document and grant of deferred action are valid for a period of
four years”).
Victor challenges his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	See Pet. 	His arguments
are threefold. First, he asserts that because he received a bona fide determination and work
authorization for a U-visa application, he was granted deferred action and should never
2 	There is no argument that these offenses subject Victor to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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have been detained. Pet. at 12 ¶ 4. Second, he claims he has been wrongly classified as
an 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is mandatory) rather than a 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226 detainee (whose detention is discretionary and who is entitled to a bond hearing).
Id. at 2–3, 6–10; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961–62 (D. Minn. 2025)
(explaining legal framework). 	According to him, that misclassification and denial of a
bond hearing violate 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and his right to due process under the Fifth
Amendment.3 Pet. at 15–17. Third, he asserts that he is a member of the class certified in
Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), and thus
not subject to mandatory detention. 	Pet. at 10–11. 	Victor seeks a declaration that his
detention is unlawful; issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release
him 	immediately 	or 	provide 	him 	with 	a 	bond 	hearing; 	an 	injunction 	forbidding
Respondents from transferring him out of the District of Minnesota during the pendency
of his habeas petition; an injunction preventing Respondents from denying his bond under
§ 1225(b)(2); if an immigration judge grants such a bond, an injunction prohibiting
Respondents from invoking the auto-stay provision found at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2)
during the pendency of any bond appeal; and any other relief the Court “deems just and
proper.” Pet. at 16–17.
Victor’s deferred action argument is persuasive. 	Judge Laura M. Provinzino
thoroughly and succinctly described the U-visa legal framework in M.M. v. Shea. Order
3 	Though the Petition mentions the Administrative Procedure Act, see Pet. at 14–15,
16–17 (under “Prayer for Relief”), Victor does not bring an Administrative Procedure Act
claim, see id. at 15–16.
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Dismissing Habeas Petition, M.M. v. Shea, No. 25-cv-2830 (LMP/ECW) (D. Minn. Aug.
1, 2025), ECF No. 24 at 2–5. That framework is incorporated herein by reference. See id.;
see also Nevarez Jurado v. Freden, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-CV-943, 2025 WL 3687264,
at *3–4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2025) (describing legal framework). 	“Deferred action” is “an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion that defers the removal of the [noncitizen] based on the
[noncitizen’s] case being made a lower priority for removal” but “does not confer any
immigration status upon a[] [noncitizen].” See Order Dismissing Habeas Petition, M.M. v.
Shea, No. 25-cv-2830 (LMP/ECW) (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2025), ECF No. 24 at 5 n.3
(alterations in original) (quoting New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity;
Eligibility for “U” Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53014, 53015 n.2 (Sep. 17, 2007)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.14) (“U-visa Interim Rule”)). 	“Approval of deferred action
status means that, for . . . humanitarian reasons[,] . . .no action will thereafter be taken to
proceed against an apparently deportable alien, even on grounds normally regarded as
aggravated.” 	Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999)
(Scalia J.) (quoting 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, & S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law &
Procedure § 72.03[2][h] (1998)); accord Nevarez Jurado, 2025 WL 3687264, at *4. “[A]n
ever-growing number of district courts across the country have concluded[] that an
unrevoked grant of deferred action prevents removal.” 	Nevarez Jurado, 2025 WL
3687264, at *8 (citing cases).
Nevarez Jurado is instructive. 	Like Victor, Nevarez Jurado received a bona fide
determination on his U-visa application and was given an employment authorization
document and placed in deferred action for four years. 	Id. 	at *2. 	Less than three years
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into his deferred action, Nevarez Jurado was detained by ICE, and a prior order of removal
was reinstated. Id. There was “nothing in the record [to] indicate that USCIS ha[d] revoked
Nevarez Jurado’s grant of deferred action.” Id.; see also id. at *9 n.10 (“USCIS apparently
has done nothing to terminate Nevarez Jurado’s deferred action.”). 	Relying in part on
Supreme Court cases in the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) context,
the court in Nevarez Jurado concluded that because Nevarez Jurado’s deferred action
remained valid when he was detained, and that deferred action grant had not been revoked,
he was “protected from removal.” Id. at *10. As the Nevarez Jurado court stated:
At bottom, it is difficult to square the government’s conception
of deferred action here—as an exercise of pure discretion that
can 	shift 	on 	a 	dime—with 	the 	Supreme 	Court’s 	past
pronouncements on the topic. 	For example, in his partial
concurrence in Regents, Justice Thomas described the effect of
DACA’s provision of deferred action as creating “a new
category 	of 	aliens 	. 	. 	. 	exempt 	from 	statutory 	removal
procedures,” [Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal.,] 591 U.S. [1,] 54 [(2020), (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)] (emphasis added), while Chief
Justice 	Roberts, 	writing 	for 	the 	Court, 	characterized 	the
program as providing a “two-year forbearance of removal,” id.
at 9 (emphasis added). This understanding of deferred action
in the context of Nevarez Jurado’s case makes sense—the
government has exercised its discretion and set a time frame in
which 	its 	decision 	applies. 	And 	agreeing 	with 	the
government’s argument in this case would result in a system
where grants of deferred action would have no effect—not the
system envisioned by Justice Scalia where “no action will . . .
be taken to proceed against an apparently deportable alien,
even on grounds normally regarded as aggravated.” See [Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.], 525 U.S. at 484, (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
2025 WL 3687264, at *9. Because Nevaro Jurado’s “unrevoked grant of deferred action”
had not expired, he had shown that “there [was] no significant likelihood of his removal in
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the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	Id. at *10 (quotation omitted). 	The court further
determined that Nevarez Jurado’s ongoing detention violated his rights under the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process clause. Id. at *10–12. 	Nevaro Jurado was released. Id. at *12.
Respondents here argue that Victor “incorrectly alleges that his pending U-Visa
application impedes Respondents’ ability to detain and potentially remove him.” 	ECF
No. 4 at 18. 	Respondents maintain that “deferred action is an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion,” id. at 18, and when Victor was arrested on January 7, 2026, “ICE determined
that Navarro was not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted to the United
States,” ECF No. 5 ¶ 7. While it is true that a petitioner “may be removed from the waiting
list, and the deferred action or parole may be terminated at the discretion of USCIS.” 	8
C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3), Respondents here have not provided any legal authority to support
that Victor’s arrest in an immigration sweep was an act of their discretion on Victor’s U-
visa application or deferred action, nor have they provided any facts supporting that any
circumstances have changed since less than two months ago when he was granted deferred
action. 	Respondents provide no facts indicating that Victor’s employment authorization
was revoked, that his deferred action was terminated, or that a determination was made that
the employment authorization or deferred action were “no longer warranted or were
granted in error.” See ECF No. 1-1 at 8 (notifying Victor that USCIS “reserve[d] the right
to revoke [his] employment authorization and terminate the grant of deferred action at any
time if it determines they are no longer warranted or were granted in error.”) Indeed, Victor
explains that as of his January 14, 2026 reply brief, he has “still not been placed in Removal
Proceedings and has never been issued a Notice to Appear” despite being detained since
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January 7, 2026. ECF No. 6 at 2. There are simply no factual allegations to support that
Respondents revoked Victor’s deferred action, and as such, no basis for his detention. See
Nevarez Jurado, 2025 WL 3687264, at *10.
“In the context of deferred action recipients, district courts have found both
immediate release and a bond hearing to be appropriate remedies.” Santiago v. Noem, No.
EP-25-CV-361, 2025 WL 2792588, at *13 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025); accord Nevarez
Jurado, 2025 WL 3687264, *12. Here, USCIS has already determined that Victor is not a
“risk to national security or public safety” by virtue of its bona fide determination and grant
of employment authorization and deferred action. See B.D.A.A. v. Bostock, Civ. No. 6:25-
cv-02062, 2025 WL 3484912, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2025) (quoting Kothari v. Dir. of
USCIS, No. 3:24 C 50101, 2025 WL 732075, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2025)); see also
Nevarez Jurado, 2025 WL 3687264, at *12 (noting that USCIS “determines whether the
petitioner poses a risk to national security or public safety” and conducts “background and
security 	checks” 	(quoting 	USCIS 	Policy 	Manual, 	Vol. 	3, 	Part 	C, 	Ch. 	5,
https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-3-part-c-chapter-5 	(last 	visited 	Jan. 	17,
2026))). Accordingly, Victor will be ordered released. 4
4 	Victor’s claims that he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or that
he is a member of the Maldonado Bautista class need not be addressed in light of the
resolution of the Petition on deferred action grounds. 	See Pet. at 6–11. Likewise, to the
extent Victor raises an Administrative Procedure Act or regulatory claim, see Pet. at 14–
15, 17, those issues will not be addressed.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
ORDERED THAT Petitioner Victor G.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1]
is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	The Court DECLARES Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, but
not later than within 48 hours of this Order.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 17, 2025, at 3:50 p.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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