USA v. Levy Armstrong et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEKIMA LEVY ARMSTRONG,
Defendant.
Case No. 26-cr-25 (1) (LMP/DLM)
ORDER
Flavio Silveira DeAbreu, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN; and Robert
Keenan, 	Orlando 	Sonza, 	Greta 	Gieseke, 	and 	Joshua 	Zuckerman, 	United 	States
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff.
Jordan S. Kushner, Law Office of Jordan S. Kushner, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant
Nekima Levy Armstrong.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Nekima Levy Armstrong’s appeal
of Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko’s decision to deny her motion to modify conditions
of relief. 	ECF No. 132. After a de novo review, the Court will adopt Magistrate Judge
Micko’s decision as modified.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Levy Armstrong was initially charged by criminal complaint with conspiracy
against rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. 	ECF No. 1. 	In brief, the United States
alleges that on the morning of Sunday, January 18, 2026, at approximately 10:30 a.m., “a
group of approximately 30–40 agitators, working together in a coordinated manner”
entered a church in St. Paul during a religious service and engaged in conduct that
“disrupted the religious service and intimidated, harassed, oppressed, and terrorized the
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parishioners, including young children, and caused the service to be cut short and forced
parishioners to flee the church out of a side door, which resulted in one female victim
falling and suffering an injury.” 	Id. at 2–3. 	The complaint affidavit identifies Levy
Armstrong as the “apparent organizer” and “leader” of the demonstration at the church.
ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 9, 17. 	Since that time, Levy Armstrong has been charged by indictment
with conspiracy against rights of religious freedom at a place of worship (Count One) as in
the original complaint and with a new charge of injuring, intimidating, and interfering with
the exercise of rights of religious freedom at a place of worship (Count Two). ECF No. 39.
After Levy Armstrong made her initial appearance, Magistrate Judge Micko ordered
Levy Armstrong’s release on conditions. ECF No. 12. These conditions include:
• 	Condition 7(a): Submit to supervision by pretrial services.
• 	Condition 7(f): Remain within Minnesota unless a supervising officer
with pretrial services approves out-of-state travel.
• 	Condition 7(g): Comply with a no-contact list.
• 	Condition 7(k): Not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other
weapon.
• 	Condition 7(s): Report any interactions with law enforcement personnel
to pretrial services within 72 hours.
Id. at 2–4. The United States appealed Magistrate Judge Micko’s release order, which this
Court affirmed on January 23, 2026. 	ECF No. 22. 	In doing so, the Court imposed two
additional conditions of release: Condition 7(d), which requires Levy Armstrong to
surrender any passport to pretrial services; and Condition 7(e), which prohibits Levy
Armstrong from obtaining a passport during the pendency of these proceedings. Id. at 9.
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All of these conditions were also imposed on Levy Armstrong’s co-defendant, Chauntyll
Louisa Allen, who was also identified in the complaint affidavit as a “leader” of the
demonstration at the church. ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 17; see ECF No. 15 at 2, 4; ECF No. 22 at 9.
On February 1, 2026, Levy Armstrong moved to modify her conditions of release
to eliminate Conditions 7(a), (d), (e), (f), (g), (k), and (s). ECF No. 69. Levy Armstrong
noted that three additional defendants were recently released on their own recognizance
without the above conditions, and she argued that “[t]here is no rational basis for treating”
her differently from her co-defendants. Id. at 1. She asserts that she “regularly travels in
connection with her business and community activism, and should not be required to seek
permission from probation or the Court for trips to other states or other countries.” Id. at 2.
She also asserts that she is a “responsible and reliable member of the community, and
therefore need not be subject to the supervision of a probation officer.” 	Id. 	Finally, she
observes that her husband owns firearms for self-defense, but that pretrial services has
informed him that “he cannot have guns in his home in order for Ms. Levy Armstrong to
comply with the current conditions of release.” 	Id. 	The Government opposed Levy
Armstrong’s motion but agreed to “an order clarifying that [Levy Armstrong’s] husband
may retain his guns in compliance with Minnesota law, so long as [Levy Armstrong] does
not access, use, carry, transport, or otherwise handle the guns outside of their residence.”
ECF No. 89 at 8. Magistrate Judge Micko denied Levy Armstrong’s motion. ECF No. 101.
This appeal follows.
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ANALYSIS
If a defendant is ordered released by a magistrate judge on conditions, the defendant
may challenge the imposition of those conditions before the district judge. 	18 U.S.C.
§ 3145(a)(2). In considering such a challenge, this Court must review the record de novo.
See United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1481–82 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 	The Bail
Reform Act provides that the Court must impose the “least restrictive” conditions that “will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
The Court is not persuaded by Levy Armstrong’s arguments to eliminate Conditions
7(a), (d), (e), (f), (g), (k), and (s). As an initial matter, Levy Armstrong does not dispute
the Government’s characterization of her as a “leader” of the demonstration at the St. Paul
church. ECF No. 132 at 2–3. Effectively, then, Levy Armstrong concedes that she is not
similarly situated to the three additional defendants recently released on their own
recognizance. 	Rather, Levy Armstrong is more similarly situated to Allen, who is also
identified in the complaint affidavit as a “leader” of the demonstration and who is subject
to the same conditions of release as Levy Armstrong. ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 17; see ECF No. 15
at 2, 4; ECF No. 22 at 9. And although Levy Armstrong argues that her status as an alleged
“leader” of the demonstration is irrelevant to the safety of the community or risk of flight,
see id. at 2, courts regularly consider a defendant’s alleged leadership role in a crime in
considering pretrial release, see United States v. Chrestman, 525 F. Supp. 3d 14, 26–28
(D.D.C. 2021); United States v. Ingram, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1080–81 (N.D. Fla. 2019).
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Moreover, all of the conditions that Levy Armstrong challenges are standard,
relatively non-invasive release conditions imposed on defendants charged with a felony.
Indeed, in 2024, the release condition ordered most often in the federal courts “was pretrial
services supervision, which was imposed on 87 percent of defendants released.” 	United
States 	Courts, 	Pretrial 	Services—Judicial 	Business 	2024, 	available 	at
https://perma.cc/K26B-YMTM. 	Compliance with a no-contact list also furthers the
Court’s “duty to protect its processes and to protect prospective witnesses.” United States
v. Smith, 444 F.2d 61, 62 (8th Cir. 1971). And although Levy Armstrong seeks to travel
freely for work, ECF No. 132 at 4, “pretrial releasees must suffer certain burdens that
ordinary citizens do not, such as the requirement that they ‘seek formal permission from
the 	court 	before 	travel[ing] 	outside 	the 	jurisdiction.’ 	These 	requirements 	are
unquestionably related to the government’s special need to ensure that the defendant not
abscond.” United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 872 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation modified).
As the United States points out, too, Levy Armstrong is not prohibited from traveling
outside of the state; she simply needs to seek approval from pretrial services or the Court.1
ECF No. 12 at 2.
The Court therefore affirms Magistrate Judge Micko’s denial of Levy Armstrong’s
motion to eliminate Conditions 7(a), (d), (e), (f), (g), (k), and (s), but with one modification.
1 	Given Levy Armstrong’s stated intention to readily comply with the conditions of
release, it is this Court’s expectation that approval for work-related travel and limited
personal travel will be freely given by U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services or by leave of
Court.
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Given that the Government agrees that Condition 7(k) should not be interpreted to restrict
Levy Armstrong’s husband from possessing firearms, ECF No. 137 at 7–8, the Court
modifies Condition 7(k) to clarify that Levy Armstrong’s husband may retain his guns in
their residence in compliance with Minnesota law, so long as Levy Armstrong does not
access, use, carry, transport, or otherwise handle the firearms. 	If Levy Armstrong
demonstrates a pattern of compliance with the remaining conditions of release, she may
seek to modify those conditions in the future.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that
1. 	Levy Armstrong’s Appeal/Objection of a Magistrate Judge’s Decision (ECF
No. 132) is SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART; and
2. 	Magistrate Judge Micko’s Order Denying Levy Armstrong’s Motion to
Modify Conditions of Release (ECF No. 101) is ADOPTED AS MODIFIED.
Dated: February 24, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
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