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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Bashir K. A.,
Petitioner,
v.
Eric Klang, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 25-cv-4559 (KMM/DJF)
ORDER
On December 4, 2025, agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
arrested Petitioner Bashir K. A. (“Bashir” or “Petitioner”). Four days later, Bashir brought
this case seeking a writ of habeas corpus. (Dkt. 1.1) In a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) dated December 31, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster
recommended that Bashir’s petition be denied. (Dkt. 16.) This Court obtained clarification
of the record (Dkts. 17–19), and Bashir filed timely objections to the R&R (Dkt. 20). In
light of subsequent, supplemental filings, and for the reasons that follow, the Court declines
to adopt the R&R’s analysis and grants Bashir’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (providing for de novo review of an R&R when objections are filed).
Background
Bashir is a citizen of Somalia. (Dkt. 11-1 at 2.) On September 23, 2024, he entered
the United States from Mexico without inspection. (Id. at 1, 3–4.) He has no criminal
1 Bashir later filed an Amended Petition that the Court considers to be the operative
pleading. (Dkt. 13.)
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history. (Id. at 7.) United States Border Patrol apprehended him shortly after he crossed the
border and brought him to a detention facility. (Id. at 3–4.) On October 2, 2024, Bashir
requested asylum due to fear of persecution if he was returned to Somalia or South Africa,
his last country of residence. (Id. at 1; Dkt. 13 at 25.)
On October 16, 2024, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Bashir
with a Notice to Appear, charging him with being removable as an “alien present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled,” and requiring him to appear before an
immigration judge on October 31, 2024 in Calexico, California. (Dkt. 11-2 at 1 (citing
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)).) However, on October 18,
2024, ICE granted Bashir parole into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
(Dkt. 19-1 at 1), which is commonly referred to as the “humanitarian parole” provision. It
authorizes the Secretary of DHS to exercise discretion to grant entry into the United States
to a noncitizen “on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Bashir was simultaneously enrolled in the
Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) program.2 (Dkt. 19-1 at 3.)
While Bashir was released on humanitarian parole, he had “two missed virtual office
visits and a GPS monitor strap tamper alert,” which constituted violations of his ATD
program agreement. (Dkt. 11 ¶ 11.) In early December 2025, ICE arrested Bashir to
2 As explained in the R&R, “ATD is a supervised release program operated by ICE
that ‘enables aliens to remain in their communities – contributing to their families and
community organizations, and as appropriate, concluding their affairs in the U.S. – as they
move through immigration proceedings or prepare for departure.’” (Dkt. 16 at 2 n.1 (citing
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Alternatives to Detention, https://www.ice.gov/features/atd)
(last visited Feb. 6, 2026).)
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continue removal proceedings against him. (Id. ¶ 12.) When he filed his habeas petition,
Bashir was held at the Crow Wing County Jail (Dkt. 13 at 3) but now appears to be detained
at the Kandiyohi County Jail.3
Discussion
A court can issue a writ of habeas corpus if a person “is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). District
courts may grant writs of habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a). That power “includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-
related detention.” Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (D. Minn. 2025). “The
burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Id.
In his petition, Bashir claims that he has been misclassified for mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Dkt. 13 ¶ 21.) That provision only applies to “an alien who
is an applicant for admission,” whom an immigration officer determines “is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Bashir argues that he is
entitled to habeas relief under the interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) reflected in Belsai D.S. v.
Bondi, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025), and
other similar cases. (Dkt. 15 at 3–6.) Respondents4 claim that Belsai is inapplicable here,
3 	U.S. 	Immigr. 	& 	Customs 	Enf’t, 	Online 	Detainee 	Locator 	System,
https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search (last visited Feb. 9, 2026).
4 In his petition, Bashir names four respondents. The Court uses “Respondents” in
this Order to refer to the three federal officials named in the petition, excluding
Respondent-Sheriff Klang, who has not filed a response.
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where Bashir is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). They
argue that because Bashir was apprehended at or near the border, shortly after he crossed
into the United States, and was subsequently granted humanitarian parole while his asylum
application was pending, he was never “admitted” to the U.S. within the meaning of the
INA. Therefore, according to Respondents, Bashir is an “applicant for admission” who
must be detained under § 1225(b)(1) until his asylum application is adjudicated. (Dkt. 10
at 4–6.) Alternatively, Respondents argue that if Bashir is not subject to detention under
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), he must be detained under § 1225(b)(2) because he is “seeking
admission” through his pending asylum application. (Id. at 7–10.) As explained below, the
Court 	finds 	that 	Bashir 	is 	not 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under 	either
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) or § 1225(b)(2).
This case presents questions of statutory interpretation, which “begin[s] with the
statute’s plain language, giving words the meaning that proper grammar and usage would
assign them. If the intent of Congress can be clearly discerned from the statute’s language,
the judicial inquiry must end.” Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 113 F.4th 823,
833 (8th Cir. 2024). Understanding the meaning Congress intended to give to statutory
terms requires consideration of their context. FCC v. AT & T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 405 (2011)
(stating that courts interpret statutory language “in light of the terms surrounding it”).
Therefore, the Court begins by examining the context and interplay of the relevant portions
of immigration laws before turning to what they mean for adjudicating Bashir’s petition.
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§ 1225 and Expedited Removal Process
There are two tracks for removal of noncitizens from the United States: (1) the
“usual removal process” under § 240 of the INA (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a); and
(2) “more expedited [removal] procedures for certain ‘applicants for admission’” under
§ 235 of the INA (codified at § 1225(b)(1)). See DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108–
09 (2020). “The usual removal process involves an evidentiary hearing before an
immigration judge, and at that hearing an alien may attempt to show that he or she should
not be removed.” Id. at 108. The expedited removal procedures “substantially shorten and
speed up the removal process” in comparison to the usual procedures under § 1229a. Make
the Rd. New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 618 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The expedited process set
forth in § 1225 is for noncitizens who are “applicants for admission.”5 Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. at 108–09. An “applicant for admission” is “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’
or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted[.]’” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)).
Noncitizens are subject to expedited removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(1) if they
are “inadmissible” because they engaged in fraud or misrepresented a fact material to their
effort to gain admission or lack the proper documentation to gain lawful entry into the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (referring to inadmissibility provisions in
§ 1182(a)(6)(C) and § 1182(a)(7)). The expedited removal procedures apply to such an
5 The INA defines “admission” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United
States 	after 	inspection 	and 	authorization 	by 	an 	immigration 	officer.” 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A).
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inadmissible alien “who is arriving in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). They
also apply to an inadmissible alien who: (1) has “not been admitted or paroled into the
United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II); (2) has not “been physically present in
the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the
determination of inadmissibility,” id.; and (3) “is among those whom the Secretary of
Homeland Security has designated for expedited removal,” see Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at
109 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(I)–(II)).
For ease of reference, the Court refers to § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) as the “Arriving Aliens”
provision and § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) as the “Designation Provision.” See Coal. for Humane
Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 1,
2025) (“CHIR”) (doing same). In sum, the expedited-removal provisions of § 1225(b)(1)
“govern[] noncitizens: (1) who are inadmissible for lack of proper entry documents or
because they engaged in fraud or a willful misrepresentation of a fact on their application
for admission; and (2) who fall within either the ‘Arriving Aliens Provision’ or the
‘Designation Provision.’” Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No. 2:25-cv-6065 (NJC), 2025
WL 3314420, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
(iii)(II)).
“Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally ordered removed ‘without further
hearing or review.’” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. But applicants for admission “can avoid
expedited removal by claiming asylum. If an applicant ‘indicates either an intention to
apply for asylum’ or ‘a fear of persecution,’ the immigration officer “shall refer the alien
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for an interview by an asylum officer.’” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 109 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii)).
Mandatory Detention Under § 1225(b)
Section 1225(b) authorizes detention of two categories of noncitizens. See Jennings,
583 U.S. at 287 (describing noncitizens covered by §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)). First, under
§ 1225(b)(1), mandatory detention may be permissible when a noncitizen indicates an
intent to request asylum. Specifically, “[i]f the officer determines at the time of the [asylum
application] interview that an alien has a credible fear of persecution . . . , the alien shall
be 	detained 	for 	further 	consideration 	of 	the 	application 	for 	asylum.” 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Read in the context of § 1225’s expedited removal procedures, if a
noncitizen who falls within the Arriving Aliens or Designation Provision indicates an intent
to apply for asylum, and the interviewing asylum officer determines that there is a credible
fear of persecution that might support the asylum application, the noncitizen, who is also
subject to expedited removal proceedings, shall be detained for further consideration of the
application. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii)(II), (b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Jennings, 583
U.S. at 287–88 (quoting § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)).
Second, § 1225(b)(2) contains a mandatory-detention provision. It provides that “in
the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). As another court recently explained, § 1225(b)(2) applies, for
example, to:
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noncitizens who are arriving in the United States, seeking
admission, and are inadmissible for some reason other than
misrepresentation or failure to meet document requirements
(such as those having certain types of criminal convictions or
those who would pose a foreign policy risk or are associated
with terrorists, the Communist party, or Nazi activity).
Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *11 (quoting Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, No. 25-
cv-7492, 2025 WL 2741654, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025)). The majority of courts to
have interpreted this provision have concluded it is not a broad authorization for the
government to detain every undocumented noncitizen who enters the United States without
permission and is found within its borders because the provision applies more narrowly to
applicants for admission who are “seeking admission.” See, e.g., Pedro L. v. Lyons, No. 26-
cv-00707 (MJD/ECW), 2026 WL 295386, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2026) (“Courts have
overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ interpretation that section 1225(b)(2) requires the
mandatory detention of all noncitizens living in the country who are ‘inadmissible’ because
they entered the United States without inspection.”) (quoting Martin R. v. Noem, No. 26-
CV-168 (JMB/LIB), 2026 WL 115024, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 2026)); see also Castanon-
Nava v. DHS, 161 F.4th 1048, 1060–62 (7th Cir. 2025); but see Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330, at *4–10 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).
Humanitarian Parole
A noncitizen who is subject to detention under § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2) “may
be temporarily released on parole ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit’” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing same).
Commonly known as “humanitarian parole,” it does not, however, count as an “admission”
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to the United States, and “when the purpose of the parole has been served, ‘the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his
case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for
admission to the United States.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
Petitioner’s Detention
Turning to Petitioner Bashir’s case, Respondents argue that Bashir is lawfully
detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) because (1) he was not “admitted” to the United
States despite receiving humanitarian parole; (2) he is deemed an applicant for admission
under the humanitarian-parole provision; (3) he has a pending application for asylum; and
(4) § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) provides that he “shall be detained” while the asylum application is
being considered. (Dkt. 10.) The Court is not persuaded.6
While Respondents are correct that humanitarian parole does not count as an
“admission” to the United States and that one whose parole has expired is deemed an
applicant for admission, Respondents ignore that § 1225(b)(1)(B) only applies to aliens
referred for interviews under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i) (“An asylum
officer shall conduct interviews of aliens referred under subparagraph (A)(ii), either at a
port of entry or at such other place designated by the Attorney General.”) (emphasis added).
By its own terms, subparagraph (A)(ii) applies to aliens who fall under the Arriving Alien
6 Because the Court finds that Respondents cannot place Bashir in mandatory
detention under either § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2), the Court finds it unnecessary to
address Bashir’s alternative argument that Respondents failed to comply with applicable
regulations when they terminated his parole without an individualized determination.
(Dkt. 20 at 4–6.)
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Provision or the Designation Provision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). In other words,
the “alien [who] shall be detained” within the meaning of subparagraph (B)(i) must also fit
within either the Arriving Alien Provision or the Designation Provision. Bashir does not.
First, Bashir is not subject to expedited removal proceedings and mandatory
detention under the Arriving Aliens Provision, for the reasons set forth in Rodriguez-
Acurio. 2025 WL 3314420. The Court adopts the interpretation of the relevant statutory
text from § 1225(a)(1)(A)(ii), its surrounding structure and context, and its limitations on
which noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) set forth in
that decision. See id. at *19–21. And although it is unnecessary to repeat the entirety of the
Rodriguez-Acurio court’s analysis here, the Court highlights several key conclusions. The
Arriving Aliens Provision subjects an alien “who is arriving in the United States” to
expedited removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)(A)(ii); see Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025
WL 3314420, at *20 (quoting CHIR, 2025 WL 2192986, at *28) (“[T]he plain meaning of
the word ‘arriving’ is being ‘in the process of reaching’ a destination.”). Given the ordinary
meaning of “arriving,” it “refer[s] to a process that occurs upon physical entry into the
United States, not an interminable status that attaches to a noncitizen upon arrival.” Id.
(cleaned up).
As applied to Bashir, this means he was not in the process of arriving in the United
States when he was arrested on December 4, 2025, and therefore cannot be classified as an
“alien . . . who is arriving in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)(A)(ii). And, in turn,
he does not fall within the “arriving aliens” category of applicants for admission who may
be 	subjected 	to 	expedited 	removal 	procedures 	and 	mandatory 	detention 	under
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§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *21. By the time of his
arrest, Bashir had already crossed into the United States and been living in Minnesota for
over a year. See id. (explaining that it would be “illogical” to find that the petitioner was
still in the process of “arriving” in the United States “when she has been continuously
residing in the United States for more than three years after the expiration of her
humanitarian parole,” among other considerations).7
Second, the Designation Provision also does not apply to Bashir. The provision
applies to an alien “who has not been admitted or paroled into the United States[.]”8 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II). The most reasonable reading of this language is that the
7 Although the definition of “[a]rriving alien” in 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 states that an
“arriving alien remains an arriving alien even if paroled pursuant to [§ 1182(d)(5)], and
even after any such parole is terminated or revoked,” the INA itself does not define the
term “arriving.” Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *19–21. As explained in
Rodriguez-Acurio, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v.
Ramondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), do not defer to agency constructions, and instead “must
exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions[.]”
Rodrgiguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *20 (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 394). As
the court explained in Rodriguez-Acurio, 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 does not change the analysis
because the plain meaning of the term “arriving” in § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) precludes a
noncitizen who was initially detained at the border, but who received parole and lived in
the United States from being classified as an alien who is arriving in the Untied States.
2025 WL 3314420, at *21.
8 There does not appear to be any dispute that Bashir was not continuously present
in the United States for the two-year period immediately preceding the immigration
officer’s determination that he was inadmissible shortly after he was apprehended near the
southern border in September 2024. But the language of the Designation Provision applies
to those who were not present for that two-year period and have not been admitted or
paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (authorizing the Secretary of DHS to
designate as eligible for expedited removal those who have not been admitted or paroled
“and who has not affirmatively shown . . . that [he] has been physically present in the
United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the
determination of inadmissibility”) (emphasis added).
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provision subjects aliens who have never been paroled into the United States to expedited
removal proceedings, but not those who have, at any point, been paroled. Again, as to this
provision, the Court agrees with and adopts, without repeating in full, the thorough analysis
of the Rodriguez-Acurio court. 2025 WL 3314420, at *14–19 (examining the text of the
Designation Provision). The Court emphasizes that “the statutory text does not read that a
noncitizen is eligible for expedited removal if that person ‘is not currently on parole.’” Id.
at *15. Short of that, the Court is unpersuaded by Respondents’ argument that the
mandatory-detention provision in § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) and expedited removal proceedings
set forth in § 1225 apply to someone like Bashir, who was paroled into the United States
and later had his parole terminated. Consequently, this Court concludes, as others have,
that “the Designation Provision forbids the expedited removal of noncitizens who have
been, at any point in time, paroled into the United States.” CHIR, 2025 WL 2192986, at
*22. This conclusion places a noncitizen like Bashir outside the mandatory-detention
provision of § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).
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Moreover, the Court agrees with the Rodriguez-Acurio court that neither the
language of § 1182(d)(5)(A), nor the “entry fiction” described in Thuraissigiam9 supports
a conclusion that a noncitizen like Bashir is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *17–18; see also id. at *25–
27 (distinguishing the position of the noncitizen in Thuraissigiam from a noncitizen who
has entered the country and established connections with the United States after receiving
parole). As Respondents point out, humanitarian parole is not “admission” and a noncitizen
is deemed an applicant for admission once parole is terminated, but § 1182(d)(5) “does not
say that parolees ‘return, upon the termination or expiration of their parole, to the position
of an applicant for admission standing at the threshold of entry.’ . . . Nor does it say that
[they] are ‘restored to the status that they had at the time of parole.” Rodriguez-Acurio,
2025 WL 3314420, at *17 (quoting CHIR, 2025 WL 2192986, at *24) (quotation and
citation omitted).
In Respondents’ Supplemental Brief, they argue that the Rodriguez-Acurio court’s
analysis 	of 	the 	humanitarian 	parole 	provision 	“departs 	from 	the 	plain 	text 	of
9 In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court stated that noncitizens “who arrive at ports
of entry—even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal—are
‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the border.” 591 U.S. at 139. Creation
of the so-called “entry fiction” to preserve the executive’s “sovereign prerogative” of
governing admission to the country and finding that the Due Process Clause did not require
greater recognition of rights beyond those provided by statute. Id. at 139–40. But
Thuraissigiam was never paroled into the United States while his removal proceedings
were pending; he was stopped 25 yards from the border, and, thereafter, he was subjected
to continuous detention. Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *26. Given that the Court
is reviewing the scope of the government’s authority to detain under the language that
Congress enacted, rather than considering any additional due process protections, the Court
finds that the entry-fiction from Thuraissigiam does not control the outcome here.
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§ 1182(d)(5)(A)” because it requires a person whose humanitarian parole has ended to
“return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled,” and Bashir cannot be
returned to “a discretionary-detention framework under § 1226(a) that never applied in the
first place.” (Dkt. 23 at 2, 4). The Court disagrees that this language requires mandatory
detention and renders § 1226(a)’s discretionary framework completely inapplicable. First,
the “returned to custody” language in the humanitarian parole provision does not
“affirmatively authorize[] detention[.]” See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *18
(quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005)). Second, recall that mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) applies to an alien who is “arriving” under the Arriving
Aliens provision, but § 1182(d)(5)(A) does not transform someone like Bashir into an
“arriving” alien because he is no longer, in any sense, in the process of arriving in the
United 	States. 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 	Third, 	mandatory 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) also applies to aliens who are subject to expedited removal because
they fall within the Designation Provision, but the Designation Provision only applies to
an alien “who has not been . . . paroled into the United States,” § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)
(emphasis added), and Bashir has been paroled. Respondents’ argument would use the
language in the humanitarian parole provision to rewrite the terms of § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii),
and the Court finds such a construction is inconsistent with § 1225(b)(1)’s text.
Again, this Court agrees with Rodriguez-Acurio, and finds that being treated like
any other applicant for admission as discussed in § 1182(d)(5)(A) means “that rather than
reverting to any prior status, a noncitizen whose parole has expired is treated like the vast
majority of undocumented immigrants currently living in this country who are not
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subjected to expedited removal.” Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *17 (discussing
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) and citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)). And the return-to-custody
phrase “may permit [Bashir] to be returned to ICE custody, but [his] case, which necessarily
includes the procedures required before detention, ‘shall continue to be dealt with in the
same manner as that of any other applicant for admission[.]’” Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL
3314420, at *18. And “any other applicant for admission residing in the United States . . .
would be detained under § 1226.” Id.
Other courts have found the mandatory-detention provisions of § 1225(b) do not
apply to a noncitizen who was apprehended at the border but then granted release into the
United States on humanitarian parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A). E.g., Martinez Gamez v.
Easterwood, No. 4:26CV3009, 2026 WL 295400, at *4 (D. Neb. Feb. 4, 2026) (“Nothing
about the fact [that] Martinez Gamez was paroled into the United States upon his initial
arrival changes the above determination that he is not subject to mandatory detention.”);
CHIR, 2025 WL 2192986, at *22–27; Rodriguez v. Rokosky, Civil Action No. 25-17419
(CPO), 2025 WL 3485628 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2025); Vazquez-Rosario v. Noem, No. 25-cv-
7427, 2026 WL 196505 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-
13202, 2025 WL 3022294 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Bashir is not subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(1).
Detention under § 1225(b)(2)
Alternatively, Respondents argue that Bashir is subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b)(2) because there is no dispute that he is an “applicant for admission,” and
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the fact that he has a pending asylum application means he is “seeking admission” within
the meaning of the statute. (Dkt. 10 at 9–10.) As the Court has previously explained, it does
not find this position persuasive. Specifically, the fact that Bashir has applied for asylum
does not support mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). See, e.g., Ahmed M. v. Bondi et.
al, No. 25-cv-4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25627, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (explaining
that “several courts have determined that asylum applications filed in like circumstances
do not change the outcome.”) (collecting cases); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d
475, 488 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“To the extent that Respondents might point to [petitioner’s]
asylum application to argue that he continues to ‘seek’ something, what he seeks is not
‘admission’ or ‘lawful entry’ to the United States, but to obtain a lawful means to remain
here.”) (emphasis in original); Mahamed C.A. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-4551 (MJD/JFD), 2025
WL 3771299, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2025), R. & R. adopted sub nom. Awaale v. Noem,
No. 25-cv-4551 (MJD/JFD), 2025 WL 3754012 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2025). Accordingly,
the Court finds that Bashir is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).
Propriety of Immediate Release
The Court concludes that immediate release is appropriate in this case. Because
Bashir is not properly detained under § 1225(b), his detention must be authorized, if at all
under § 1226(a).10 Respondents have not claimed to have a “warrant issued by the Attorney
General” supporting Petitioner’s recent arrest, nor has the government produced one to the
Court. “Section 1226 provides that ‘[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien
10 Respondents do not suggest, and there is no evidence to support a finding, that
Bashir is subject to detention under § 1226(c).
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may be arrested and detained.’” Ahmed M., 2026 WL 25627, at *3. The issuance of a
warrant is a prerequisite to even discretionary detention under § 1226(a), and where none
is provided, immediate release is an appropriate remedy. Id.; see also Juan S.R. v. Bondi,
26-cv-05 (PJS/LIB) (Order, Dkt. 8, Jan. 12, 2026) (same). That is the proper remedy here,
where Bashir is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2), and
Respondents have provided no evidence that he was arrested based on a warrant.
ORDER
Based on the above, and on the full record before the Court, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Petitioner Bashir K. A.’s Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 13)
is GRANTED.
2. 	The Court DECLARES that Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2) and ENJOINS Respondents from denying
release or other relief on the basis that he is subject to such mandatory detention.
3. 	The Court ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner, subject only
to any conditions in place prior to his arrest and no later than 5:00 p.m. on
February 18, 2026.
4. 	Upon his release, Respondents must return all of Petitioner’s personal effects
seized as a result of his arrest, including but not limited to immigration
paperwork. His property must be returned in the same condition as it was in at the
time he was arrested.
5. 	Finally, the Court ORDERS Respondents to file a notice within 24 hours of
Petitioner’s release, specifying the date, time, and location of his release.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: February 17, 2026 	s/Katherine M. Menendez
Katherine M. Menendez
United States District Judge
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