Dalluge v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
MICHAEL D. DALLUGE,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.
Case No. 25-CV-4215 (LMP/EMB)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Michael D. Dalluge’s “motion for
relief” under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (“Petition”), which the Court construes as a
petition for habeas relief under § 2241. (Dkt. No. 1.) For the reasons below,
the Court recommends denying the Petition and dismissing this action.1
Mr. Dalluge is a federal inmate at the Federal Medical Center in
Rochester, Minnesota (“FMC-Rochester”). (See id. at 1). The Petition
challenges the medical care provided for his opioid dependence and alleges
constitutional violations. (See id.) Specifically, Mr. Dalluge claims that
FMC-Rochester staff have administered Vivitrol—which makes him
1 Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the U.S. District
Courts, “[i]f it plainly appears from [a] petition . . . that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief,” the judge must summarily dismiss the petition. Although
Mr. Dalluge proceeds under § 2241, the Court exercises its discretion under
Rule 1(b) of the § 2254 Rules to apply Rule 4 here.
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“violently ill”—to treat his addiction and refused to prescribe Suboxone
despite the benefits he asserts. See id. at 1–2. He alleges a violation of his
“8th Amendment rights to medical care.” Id. at 1. He asks the Court to order
his current doctor to administer Suboxone and to order his primary-care
physician to be changed. Id. at 2.
The Petition faces a threshold problem. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3),
“[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized this “custody”
requirement: “It is clear . . . that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by
a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
So “[i]f [a] prisoner is not challenging the validity of his conviction or
the length of his detention, such as loss of good time, then a writ of habeas
corpus is not the proper remedy.” Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073
(8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see also Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469–70
(8th Cir. 2014) (recognizing habeas petition was an improper vehicle
challenge officer’s use of forcible restraints).
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When a claim alleges some other wrong—for example, a challenge to
the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement—habeas is not the proper remedy.
See Spencer, 774 F.3d at 470; see also Boe v. Clay Cnty. Sheriff Off., No. 25-
CV-3005 (NEB/LIB), 2025 WL 2842075, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025), report
and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2840817 (D. Minn. Oct. 6, 2025).
Mr. Dalluge’s claims are conditions-of-confinement challenges. He does
not dispute the validity of his conviction or sentence, nor does he claim that
the Bureau of Prisons is executing his sentence in a way that affects his
release date. Instead, he challenges the medical care he has received during
incarceration. Claims of inadequate or improper medical treatment are
standard conditions-of-confinement claims, which he must raise in a civil
action, not a habeas petition.
Where, as here, a § 2241 petition raises non-habeas claims, the Court
has two options: it can either dismiss them without prejudice or
recharacterize them under a more appropriate procedure. See Spencer, 774
F.3d at 471; Walton v. Rardin, No. 25-CV-1673 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL
1788385, at *2 (D. Minn. May 22, 2025), report and recommendation adopted,
2025 WL 1787523 (D. Minn. June 27, 2025). Before choosing which path to
take, the Court must “consider the potential detriment” to the petitioner. See
Spencer, 774 F.3d at 471 (citing Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839 (7th
Cir.2011)); Walton, 2025 WL 1788385, at *2.
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The undersigned recommends dismissal of this action because, for two
reasons, recharacterization would not benefit Mr. Dalluge. First, a civil
action carries a $350 filing fee payable up front or in installments, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b), and Mr. Dalluge should have the opportunity to decide whether to
incur that cost. Second, he would likely face serious obstacles in stating a
claim even if the Court were to recharacterize his petition. He seeks a
specific medical treatment that FMC-Rochester officials have declined to
provide, but “a prisoner’s mere difference of opinion over matters of expert
medical judgment or a course of medical treatment fails to rise to the level of
a constitutional violation.” Barr v. Pearson, 909 F.3d 919, 921–22 (8th Cir.
2018) (quoting Meuir v. Greene Cnty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115, 1118–19
(8th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up)); see also Bakambia v. Ghebre, No. 24-CV-3653
(LMP/DJF), 2025 WL 2936880, at *14 (D. Minn. May 23, 2025) (making a
similar point and citing cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
2528591 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025).
The Court therefore recommends denying the Petition. Given this
recommendation, the Court also recommends denying as moot Mr. Dalluge’s
Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. No. 4).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
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1. Petitioner Michael D. Dalluge’s “motion for relief” under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. No. 1) be DENIED.
2. Mr. Dalluge’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
(Dkt. No. 4) be DENIED as moot.
3. This action be DISMISSED.
Dated: December 10, 2025 s/Elsa M. Bullard
ELSA M. BULLARD
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or
judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations
within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a
copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses
must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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