Elbert et al v. Rollins et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
RICH ELBERT, JEFF A. KOSEK,
REICHMANN LAND & CATTLE LLP,
LUDOWESE A.E. INC., and MICHAEL
STAMER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BROOKE ROLLINS, PATRICIA
SWANSON, and DIRECTOR OF THE
FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-3668 (KMM/JFD)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Entry
of Default and for Additional Time to Respond to Complaint (Dkt. No. 20). Summonses
were returned executed on December 9, 2025, showing service occurred on the three
Defendants on November 19, 2025. (Dkt. Nos. 10–12.) No answers were filed by the
January 20, 2026 deadline, however, and the Court ordered Plaintiffs to notify Defendants
of their obligation to respond to the Complaint and of the risk of default if they did not.
(Dkt. No. 13.) Plaintiffs complied with the Court’s order and notified Defendants. (Dkt.
No. 14). When Defendants did not file an answer or a stipulation for an extension of time
to answer by the new deadline of February 20, 2026, Plaintiffs applied for default, and the
Clerk of Court entered default against Defendants on February 24, 2026. (Dkt. Nos. 14–
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17.) The Court alerted Defendants to the default in a letter dated March 6, 2026. (Dkt. No.
18.)
Defendants filed the motion to set aside the default on March 11, 2026. (Dkt. No.
20.) They explain that the initial status of service of process was uncertain, as the U.S.
Attorney’s Office has no record of ever having been served with a paper copy of the
Complaint. (Defs.’ Mot. Set Aside Default at 1.) Defendants concede that Plaintiffs have
since provided 	evidence that 	the 	Complaint was 	indeed 	served 	and received, 	and
Defendants do not contest the validity of service. (Id. at 1–2.) Defendants also acknowledge
that a stipulation for an extension of time to answer was discussed with Plaintiff’s counsel
but was never finalized, due to other work on immigration habeas cases and a staffing
shortage in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. (Id. at 2.) Defendants assert there is good cause to
set aside the default, and they ask for an extension of time until March 18, 2026, to answer
or otherwise respond to the Complaint. (Id. at 1, 3.) Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion
on March 16, 2026, stating they take no position on it. (Dkt. No. 22.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), “[t]he court may set aside an entry of
default for good cause.” Courts consider “whether the conduct of the defaulting party was
blameworthy or culpable, whether the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, and
whether the other party would be prejudiced if the default were excused.” Johnson v.
Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1998). The Court finds here that
Defendants’ conduct was not blameworthy or culpable, as the status of service was initially
uncertain; Defendants’ counsel made some attempt to stipulate to an extension with
Plaintiffs’ counsel; and Defendants’ counsel was otherwise occupied with immigration
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habeas cases. At this stage of the case, it is not known whether Defendants have a
meritorious defense, so this consideration is neutral. Plaintiffs do not claim they would be
prejudiced if the default is set aside. On balance, the Court finds good cause to set aside
the entry of default.
Good cause is also the legal standard governing a request for an extension of time
to answer or otherwise respond to a complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Because the time to
answer has already expired, however, the Court must also find excusable neglect. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Excusable neglect is a flexible concept “that empowers courts to accept,
where appropriate, late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as
by intervening circumstances beyond the party’s control.” Chorosevic v. MetLife Choices,
600 F.3d 934, 946 (8th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). The Court may consider any relevant
circumstance, but four factors are particularly important: (1) the possibility of prejudice to
the other party, (2) the length of the delay, (3) the reasons for the delay, and (4) whether
the moving party acted in good faith. Sugarbaker v. SSM Health Care, 187 F.3d 853, 856
(8th Cir. 1999).
The good-cause and excusable-neglect considerations overlap, and the Court
considers them together. As the Court has already noted, Plaintiffs have not claimed they
would be prejudiced by the extension of time. The Court has accepted Defendants’ reasons
for the delay, and there is no indication that Defendants have not acted in good faith in this
case. The proposed extension to March 18 is only about two months from the original
January 20 deadline and one month from the extended February 20 deadline. Taking all
relevant considerations into account, the Court finds that Defendants have shown both good
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cause to extend the deadline to answer and excusable neglect for their failure to meet the
deadline. The Court will extend the deadline for Defendants to answer or otherwise respond
to March 18, 2026.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside
or Vacate Entry of Default and for Additional Time to Respond to Complaint (Dkt. No.
20) is GRANTED, as follows:
1. 	The Clerk’s Entry of Default (Dkt. No. 17) shall be SET ASIDE; and
2. 	The deadline for Defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint
is extended to March 18, 2026.
Dated: March 16, 2026 	s/ John F. Docherty
JOHN F. DOCHERTY
United States Magistrate Judge
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