Chatman v. Centurion of Minnesota, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Vincent J. Moccio, BENNEROTTE & ASSOCIATES, P.A., 3085 Justice Way,
Suite 200, Eagan, MN 55121, for Plaintiff.
Anthony J. Novak and Carolin J. Nearing, LARSON KING, LLP, 30 East Seventh
Street, Suite 2800, St. Paul, MN 55101, and Julia A. Lines, THE KINETIC
GROUP, 900 Bob Ehlen Drive, Anoka, MN 55303 for Defendants Centurion
of Minnesota, LLC, and Lynn Stottler.
Jeffrey A. Timmerman, OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100, St. Paul, MN 55101, for Defendants Paul
Schnell, Rick Elstad, Keri Ovsak, and Katie Kneisel.
Plaintiff David Chatman suffered injuries to his feet while an inmate at Minnesota
Correctional Facility—Moose Lake (“Moose Lake”). On multiple occasions, Chatman, who
has diabetes and experiences numbness in his feet, suffered burns on his feet from the
heat register that was positioned on the wall above the bed in his cell. Chatman suffered
DAVID CHATMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CENTURION OF MINNESOTA, LLC; PAUL
SCHNELL; LYNN STOTTLER; RICK ELSTAD;
KERI OVSAK; KATIE KNEISEL; and JOHN
AND JANE DOE 1 THROUGH 15,
correctional officers,
Defendants.
Civ. No. 25-3147 (JRT/LIB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
DISMISS
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severe blisters, and in the months after he was released from Moose Lake, three of
Chatman’s toes were amputated.
Chatman brings this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserts that several
Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in
providing inadequate medical care and failing to ensure that Chatman was confined in
safe conditions. 	Defendants include employees of the Minnesota Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) and Centurion of Minnesota, LLC, a private company that contracts
with the DOC to provide medical services to inmates.
The parties have agreed to dismiss various counts against some Defendants, and
the Court will dismiss those claims without prejudice. The remaining claims under dispute
are for Eighth Amendment violations against Dr. Lynn Stottler, Nurse Practitioner Keri
Ovsak, and Nurse Rick Elstad, medical providers who treated Chatman while he was at
Moose Lake. Because Chatman’s Complaint alleges facts sufficient to plausibly support
his Eighth Amendment Claims, the Court will deny Defendants’ motions to dismiss as to
Count I against these three Defendants.
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTS
Chatman alleges the following facts in his Complaint. (See Compl., Aug. 7, 2025,
Docket No. 1.) Chatman entered custody at Moose Lake on December 4, 2024. (Id. ¶ 13.)
At intake, his “blood glucose was profoundly elevated,” and he “was started on insulin
and corrective sliding scale insulin.” (Id. ¶ 13.)
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Five days later, on December 9, Chatman reported to Nurse Rick Elstad that “he
fell asleep with his right foot on the heat register of his room and now has a burn and
increased pain.” 	(Id. ¶ 14.) 	Nurse Elstad’s notes state: “[Chatman] is a diabetic, Dx of
neuropathy, currently taking Gabapentin to help with pain. He states that he is having
increased pain since burning foot 2 days ago.” (Id.)
Chatman, “shortly thereafter,” was seen by Dr. Stottler, who implemented a
treatment plan of “monitor[ing] for worsening symptoms like increased pain, increased
discoloration, or skin changes.” (Id. ¶ 15.) “The nursing staff was directed to follow up
and check [Chatman’s] condition within a couple days of Dr. Stottler’s assessment.” (Id.)
Two days later, Nurse Practitioner Ovsak noted that Chatman “reports chronic numbness
and foot was against heater during sleep. 	Noted blister has now opened.” 	(Id. ¶ 16.)
Ovsak instructed Chatman on “signs and symptoms of infection to report promptly.” (Id.)
On December 14, 2024, Chatman was seen by Nurse Kneisel. (Id. ¶ 17.) Chatman
reported that he had again fallen asleep with his feet against the heater and burned his
right big toe and left second toe. (Id.) Nurse Kneisel made note of multiple blisters on
Chatman’s toes, prescribed him medication, and instructed to monitor for signs of
infection. (Id.) Chatman saw Nurse Kneisel again later that day. (Id. ¶ 19.) She noted
that Chatman’s blisters had begun draining and assessed a “suspected infection.” (Id. ¶
19.) She ordered an antibiotic and ordered Chatman to follow up two days later. (Id.)
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Twelve days later, on December 26, Chatman expressed concern to Moose Lake
officials regarding both of his feet. (Id. ¶ 21.) He also reported additional burns on his
toes. (Id.) Nurse Elstad examined Chatman, noting “open areas on right foot 2nd and 3rd
toes, Left foot 1 st , 2nd
, and 3 rd toes.” 	(Id.) 	Once escorted to health services, Nurse
Practitioner Ovsak evaluated Chatman, and she made note of Chatman’s various
symptoms on both of his feet. 	(Id.) 	Also on December 26, “[Chatman’s] insulin was
increased.” (Id. ¶ 20.)
On January 1, 2025, Dr. Stottler noted multiple blisters on several of Chatman’s
toes, and assessed as follows:
Foot lesion secondary to burns. 	Continue dressings as they
have been. Advised the patient to leave the blister skin intact
until it . . . mostly . . . falls off. Hope this will be healed by this
time of his anticipated release in 2 to 3 weeks. 	Diabetes
poorly controlled.
(Id. ¶ 21.)
On January 15, 2025, Chatman was seen by Nurse Practitioner Ovsak, who
observed that “distal aspect of first and third toes bilateral have black dry tissue. Pulses
not palpable. Feet are warm.” (Id. ¶ 23.) Nurse Practitioner Ovsak noted that they had
“discussed concern for arterial insufficiency and high glucose impairing healing . . . due to
upcoming release, will need to follow up with community provider.” (Id.)
Chatman was released from Moose Lake on January 21, 2025. 	On February 12,
2025, two toes on Chatman’s left foot needed to be amputated. (Id. ¶ 25.) His right big
toe was amputated in July 2025. (Id.)
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II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Chatman filed a Complaint against several Defendants on August 7, 2025. 	(See
Compl., Docket No. 1.) 	On August 29, Commissioner Schnell, Nurse Elstad, Nurse
Practitioner Ovsak, and Nurse Kneisel (collectively, “the State Defendants”) moved to
dismiss the entire Complaint. (Mot. Dismiss, Aug. 29, 2025, Docket No. 6; Defs.’ Mem.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“State Defs.’ Mem.”), Aug. 29, 2025, Docket No. 9.) Centurion and
Dr. Stottler (collectively, “the Centurion Defendants”) also moved to dismiss the entire
Complaint on August 29, 2025. (Mot. Dismiss, Aug. 29, 2025, Docket No. 16; Defs.’ Mem.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Centurion Defs.’ Mem.”), Aug. 29, 2025, Docket No. 19.)
Chatman filed a memorandum responding collectively to the two motions to
dismiss, in which he “acquiese[d] to the dismissal without prejudice of [all claims against]
Commissioner Schnell, Nurse Kneisel, Does and Centurion.” 	(Pl.’s Mem. Opp. Mot.
Dismiss (“Pl.’s Mem.”), Sept. 19, 2025, Docket No. 25.) Chatman stated that “Defendants’
motions should be denied as to Dr. Stottler, Nurse Elstad, and Nurse [Practitioner] Ovsak,”
and that “[t]he Complaint states a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Stottler,
Nurse Elstad, and Nurse [Practitioner] Ovsak.” (Id. at 2.)
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Accordingly, the only claim requiring the Court’s consideration is Count I—styled
in the Complaint as “Denial of Due Process Right to Adequate Medical Care”—as alleged
against Nurse Elstad, Nurse Practitioner Ovsak, and Dr. Stottler.1
DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
Court considers all facts alleged in the complaint as true to determine if the complaint
states a “claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588
F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). At the
motion to dismiss stage, the Court may consider the allegations in the complaint as well
as “those materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Schriener v. Quicken
Loans, Inc., 774 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2014).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	The Court construes the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 	Ashley Cnty. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). Although the Court accepts the complaint's
1 Chatman’s Complaint also brought claims against Elstad, Ovsak, and Stottler in Count
VIII, alleging Medical Negligence under state law. (Compl. ¶¶ 59–64.) But because Chatman’s
memorandum did not make any arguments supporting Count VIII, and argued only against the
dismissal of Count I, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss as to Count VIII.
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factual allegations as true and construes the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” 	Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 	In other words, a complaint
“does not need detailed factual allegations” but must include more “than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements” to meet the plausibility standard.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
II. 	DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
A. 	Applicable Eighth Amendment Standards
“The [Eighth] Amendment . . . imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must
provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates
receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–527). 	“[T]he offending conduct
must be wanton” to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 302 (1991). 	Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims are “analyzed
under a deliberate indifference standard.” Thomas-El v. Francis, 99 F.4th 1115, 1117 (8th
Cir. 2024) (emphasis added).
The 	“deliberate 	indifference 	standard 	has 	two 	components: 	an 	objective
component and a subjective component.” 	Id. 	“First, the alleged violation must be,
objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. (cleaned up). In the context of a claim challenging
the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, the objective component requires that “the
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deprivation must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”
Id. (cleaned up). The subjective prong mandates that “a prison official may only be found
liable under the Eighth Amendment for a conditions of confinement violation if the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Id. (cleaned up).
In the context of a prisoner's medical care, “[a] prison official is deliberately
indifferent if she ‘knows of and disregards’ a serious medical need or a substantial risk to
an inmate’s health or safety.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The Eighth Circuit has held:
[m]edical malpractice alone . . . is not actionable under the Eighth
Amendment. For a claim of deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show
more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere
disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a
constitutional 	violation. 	Deliberate 	indifference 	is 	akin 	to 	criminal
recklessness . . . .
Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 499 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). 	“Negligent misdiagnosis does not create a
cognizable claim under § 1983.” McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 2009).
Deliberate 	indifference 	to 	the 	serious 	medical 	needs 	of 	a 	prisoner 	may 	include
“intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care, or intentionally interfering with
treatment or medication that has been prescribed.” Vaughn v. Lacey, 49 F.3d 1344, 1346
(8 th Cir. 1995).
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B. 	Analysis
The Court concludes that Chatman has stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim
as to Nurse Elstad, Nurse Practitioner Ovsak, and Dr Stottler; therefore, the Court will
deny the State Defendants’ and Centurion Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss as to Count I.
1. 	Nurse Elstad and Dr. Stottler
Chatman states that his “theory of liability against Nurse Elstad and Dr. Stottler” is
“not that Nurse Elstad and Dr. Stottler made an inadequate medical judgment, but that
they were deliberately indifferent when they failed to act in a manner that mitigated the
known risk posed to Chatman by a condition of his confinement.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 13–14.)2
Defendants offer two core rebuttals to this claim. 	First, they contend that
Chatman’s wounds arose from his own failure to sleep in the correct orientation on his
bed even after he was expressly directed to do so, which precludes any finding that Elstad
and Stottler acted with deliberate indifference. The State Defendants assert that “[t]here
is no indication in the Complaint that Chatman was unable to understand and follow
Nurse Elstad’s common sense command to avoid further harm, or that it was foreseeable
2 Centurion Defendants argue that Chatman’s Complaint specifically brings a claim for
inadequate medical care against Dr. Stottler not a conditions of confinement claim, and that
“Plaintiff cannot abandon his pled claims and articulate new claims in motion briefing[.]”
(Centurion Defs.’ Reply Mem., Oct. 3, 2025, Docket No. 27.) However, the Court concludes that
Count I of Chatman’s Complaint, which alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment, and the facts
supporting Count I, are sufficient to support Chatman’s theory of liability as to Nurse Elstad and
Dr. Stottler as argued in his response memorandum. See Schriener, 774 F.3d at 444 (stating that
the Court may “consider those materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings” when
ruling on a motion to dismiss.).
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to Nurse Elstad that Chatman would make the same mistake twice.” (State Defs.’ Reply
Mem. at 3, Oct. 2, 2025, Docket No. 26.) 	The Centurion Defendants make similar
arguments.
Second, the Centurion Defendants raise the issue of whether Dr. Stottler had a
duty, or even had the authority, to move Chatman to a different cell—they emphasize
that “Dr. Stottler . . . is a medical doctor” not a “member of facility administration,” and
thus she was without “a legal duty . . . in the context of” Chatman’s claim that the Dr.
Stottler should have facilitated Chatman’s move to a cell where his feet were not at risk.
(Centurion Defs.’ Reply Mem. at 2–3, Oct. 3, 2025, Docket No. 27.)
Defendants’ arguments fail at this stage. 	Chatman’s Eighth Amendment claims
against Nurse Elstad and Dr. Stottler center on demonstrating that they “knowingly left
Chatman in a cell where it was exceedingly likely that he would further seriously injure
himself,” meaning that they “completely and totally failed to provide care that mitigated
the substantial risk that Chatman would be further injured by the vent in his cell.” (Pl.’s
Mem. at 10, 12.) To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Chatman must allege sufficient
facts to plausibly support a claim that: (1) Chatman’s cell created an “excessive risk to
inmate health or safety;” and (2) that Elstad and Stottler actually knew of the danger, and
disregarded it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Thomas-El, 99 F.4th at 1117. Chatman
alleges in his Complaint that he repeatedly raised concerns regarding the proximity of the
heat register in his cell relative to his bed, and that Nurse Elstad and Dr. Stottler knew
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Chatman was sustaining repeated wounds to his feet as a result. 	(Compl. ¶¶ 14–23.)
Nevertheless, Chatman alleges that he was left to remain in the cell that presented a
danger to his health. 	Taken as true, these allegations support a plausible Eighth
Amendment claim.
The Court will therefore deny Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Count I as to Nurse
Elstad and Dr. Stottler.
2. 	Nurse Practitioner Ovsak
Chatman’s Eighth Amendment claim as to Nurse Practitioner Ovsak is premised on
allegations of inadequate medical care. 	Chatman alleges that “five days before [his]
release, Plaintiff was seen by Nurse [Practitioner] Ovsak who noted ‘distal aspect of first
and third toes bilateral have black dry tissue. 	Pulses not palpable. 	Feet are warm.’”
(Compl. ¶ 23.) 	“She noted they ‘discussed concern for arterial insufficiency and high
glucose 	impairing 	healing,’” 	but 	ultimately 	concluded 	“due 	to 	upcoming 	release,
[Chatman] will need to follow up with community provider.” 	(Id.) 	Chatman therefore
argues that despite Nurse Practitioner Ovsak’s “admission that [Chatman] needed further
and elevated care,” she “disregard[ed] Chatman’s need for further and elevated care
based on his upcoming release date.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 18.)
The State Defendants seek dismissal, emphasizing the reasonableness of Nurse
Practitioner Ovsak’s medical care. 	They emphasize that Ovsak increased Chatman’s
insulin dosage, “mere days before his release from prison.” (See Timmerman Decl. ¶ 3 &
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Ex. B., Aug. 29, 2025, Docket Nos. 10–11)3 and that Chatman’s claim essentially amounts
to a disagreement with Ovsak’s judgment calls in providing medical care. 	Defendants
urge that such a dispute is insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim.
To ultimately prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care,
a plaintiff must meet an exceedingly high bar. Disagreement with medical judgment is
insufficient—“[m]edical malpractice alone . . . is not actionable under the Eighth
Amendment,” and “even . . . gross negligence,” is not enough to support a violation.
Popoalii, 512 F.3d at 499. However, the Court concludes that the allegations in Chatman’s
Complaint, if taken as true—including that Nurse Practitioner Ovsak had witnessed the
development of Chatman’s condition, knew of the severe risk to Chatman’s feet, but
ultimately did not provide further treatment because she knew of his imminent release,
which ultimately led to the amputation of three of Chatman’s toes—are sufficient to state
a plausible claim, and thus survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
The Court will therefore deny the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count I as
to Nurse Practitioner Ovsak.4
3 The Court considers this fact, although raised by Defendants and not alleged in the
Complaint, because it is based on Chatman’s Moose Lake medical records which are repeatedly
referenced in the Complaint.
4 State Defendants also briefly raise the doctrine of qualified immunity as a defense to
Chatman’s claims—in a footnote in their memorandum, and in one sentence in their reply. (State
Defs.’ Mem. at 13 n.9; State Defs.’ Reply at 4.) The Court rejects Defendants’ cursory argument
based on qualified immunity at this stage.
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CONCLUSION
The Court will dismiss all claims brought in Chatman’s Complaint aside from Count
I as alleged against Rick Elstad, Keri Ovsak, and Lynn Stottler. 	The Court will therefore
grant the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss in part but will deny the motions in part as to
the remaining disputed claims, because Chatman’s Complaint alleges facts sufficient to
support plausible claims for relief against each of these Defendants under the Eighth
Amendment.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	The State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No [6]) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART as follows:
a. 	The motion is DENIED as to Count I as alleged against Rick Elstad and Keri
Ovsak;
b. 	The motion is GRANTED without prejudice as to all other claims.
2. 	The Centurion Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. [16]) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
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a. 	The motion is DENIED as to Count I as alleged against Lynn Stottler;
b. 	The motion is GRANTED without prejudice as to all other claims.
DATED: March 10, 2026
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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