Cane v. Stevenson et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
CHAD CANE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSH STEVENSON, JEFF
WOODFORD, JASON KUBOUSHEK,
EMMA BAKER, in their individual
capacities; and CASS COUNTY,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-3045 (LMP/LIB)
ORDER
Chad Cane, pro se.
Abigail Rose Kelzer and Maxwell Scott Blosser, Squires Waldspurger & Mace, P.A.,
Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants Josh Stevenson, Jeff Woodford, and Cass County.
Dyan J. Ebert, Resolute Law LLC, St. Cloud, MN, for Defendants Jason Kuboushek and
Emma Baker.
Plaintiff Chad Cane alleges that his property was “affect[ed]” by a “land use
enforcement proceeding” brought by Defendants Cass County, Cass County Administrator
Josh Stevenson, Cass County Environmental Services Director Jeff Woodford, and two
private attorneys hired by the County: Jason Kuboushek and Emma Baker. See generally
ECF No. 1. Kuboushek and Baker move to dismiss the claims against them, ECF No. 13,
and Cass County, Stevenson, and Woodford move for judgment on the pleadings, ECF
No. 44. 	Cane opposes both motions. 	ECF Nos. 24, 67. 	In addition, Cane moves to
disqualify Kuboushek’s and Baker’s attorney, Dyan Ebert, ECF No. 21, and asks the Court
to “clarify [the] authority” of Cass County’s attorney, Abigail R. Kelzer, to appear in this
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 1 of 17

2
matter, ECF No. 36. 	For the following reasons, the Court denies Cane’s motions, grants
Defendants’ motions, and dismisses the complaint without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Cane built and resides in a home on a parcel of land in Cass County, Minnesota.
ECF No. 1 ¶ 8. It appears from Cane’s pleadings that the land on which the home is located
is owned by a different person, Rhonda Aho. ECF No. 1-1 at 23. Cane alleges that Cass
County—represented by private attorneys Kuboushek and Baker—brought a “land use
enforcement proceeding affecting [his] property.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 9. Cane does not explain
how the land-use enforcement action “affected” his property. See id. ¶ 10 (alleging that the
enforcement proceeding “impact[ed] the property”); id. ¶ 25 (alleging that the enforcement
proceeding led to “orders that affect [Cane’s] home”); id. ¶ 56 (alleging that Cane is the
“builder, occupant, and person impacted by the enforcement order”); id. ¶ 57 (alleging that
Defendants secured court orders that “affect [Cane’s] rights and property”). 	However,
based on exhibits filed by Kuboushek and Baker, it appears that Cass County (through
Kuboushek and Baker) brought an enforcement action against Aho because she did not
obtain permits for the placement of six storage containers and a solar panel on her property.
ECF No. 16-1 at 4; ECF No. 46-3 at 4.1 Aho objected to the enforcement action on the
1 	Cane objects to the Court’s consideration of these exhibits, ECF No. 24 at 3; ECF
No. 67 at 2, but because Defendants raise a factual attack to subject-matter jurisdiction,
ECF No. 15 at 7; ECF No. 45 at 10 – 12, the Court may consider these exhibits in confirming
its own subject-matter jurisdiction, see Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908
(8th Cir. 2016). 	Moreover, each of these exhibits is either a brief or an order from a
Minnesota state court proceeding, and courts “may take judicial notice of judicial opinions
and public records.” Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005).
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 2 of 17

3
grounds that Cane was not joined as a party. ECF No. 1-1 at 15–19. On January 28, 2025,
a Minnesota state court entered summary judgment in favor of Cass County, requiring Aho
to bring her property into compliance with Cass County’s zoning ordinances within 30
days. ECF No. 16-1 at 3–8; ECF No. 46-3 at 3–8. Although the state court order did not
require removal of the storage containers, the order allowed Cass County officials to enter
Aho’s property and the storage containers. ECF No. 16-1 at 7–8; ECF No. 46-3 at 7–8.
Aho appealed the state court order, arguing again that the state court lacked
jurisdiction over the enforcement proceeding because it failed to join Cane as a party. ECF
No. 16-3 at 4–5. On October 13, 2025, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the state
court order. See Cass County v. Aho, No. A25-0492, 2025 WL 2902154, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 13, 2025). 	As to Aho’s argument that Cane was a necessary party to the
enforcement proceedings, the Court of Appeals explained that “Cass County’s ordinance
imposes the duty to apply for permits on the ‘landowner or their agents with the
landowner’s written consent,’ not mere occupants.” Id. at *2 (citation omitted). Because
it was undisputed that Aho was the “sole owner” of the land, the Court of Appeals
“discern[ed] no error in the district court’s determination that [Cane] is not an indispensable
party to this action.”2 Id.
2 	On October 30, 2025, Aho sought review by the Minnesota Supreme Court of the
Court of Appeals’s decision. See Petition for Review, Cass County v. Aho, No. A25-0492
(Minn. filed Oct. 30, 2025). The Minnesota Supreme Court denied the petition for review
on December 17, 2025. See Order, Cass County v. Aho, A25-0492 (Minn. Dec. 17, 2025).
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 3 of 17

4
In this federal lawsuit, Cane brings three claims. 	First, he alleges a Section 1983
claim against all Defendants, alleging that Defendants deprived him of his property rights
without procedural due process by failing to join him in the enforcement action. Id. ¶¶ 9,
11, 23–26. Specifically, Cane alleges a property interest in Aho’s property under Article I,
Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution. Id. ¶ 8. Second, Cane brings an abuse-of-process
claim under Section 1983 against Stevenson, Woodford, Kuboushek, and Baker. Id. ¶¶ 27–
73. Third, Cane brings a Monell claim against Cass County, alleging that it maintains an
unconstitutional practice of bringing land-use enforcement actions to intimidate and
retaliate against residents. Id. ¶¶ 12–19, 74–80.
Kuboushek and Baker move to dismiss the claims against them, ECF No. 13, and
Cass County, Stevenson, and Woodford move for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 44.
Cane opposes both motions. 	ECF Nos. 24, 67. 	In addition to opposing Defendants’
motions, Cane moves to disqualify Ebert, Kuboushek’s and Baker’s attorney. ECF No. 21.
Cane states that Ebert has previously represented Cass County in unrelated matters and
argues that Ebert’s current representation of Kuboushek and Baker constitutes a conflict of
interest given Ebert’s past representation of Cass County. Id. Cane does not allege that he
has ever been Ebert’s client, see generally id., and Cass County has not objected to Ebert’s
representation of Kuboushek and Baker.
Cane also filed a motion requesting the Court to “clarify [the] authority” of Kelzer
to serve as Cass County’s attorney. ECF No. 36. Cane suggests that Kelzer has not been
validly appointed to serve as Cass County’s attorney in this action. Id. at 1–3. Cane does
not allege that he has ever been Kelzer’s client.
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 4 of 17

5
ANALYSIS
I. 	Cane’s Motions Regarding Opposing Counsel
Cane argues that Ebert must be disqualified as Kuboushek’s and Baker’s counsel
because 	of 	her 	“present, 	non-waivable 	conflict 	of 	interest” 	arising 	from 	her 	past
representation of Cass County. 	See ECF No. 21. Attorney disqualification is committed
to the discretion of the court. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 470, 484 (8th Cir.
1991). 	Because of the potential for abuse by opposing parties, “disqualification motions
should be subjected to particularly strict judicial scrutiny.” Harker v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 82 F.3d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A party’s right to select its own counsel is an important public right and a vital
freedom that should be preserved; the extreme measure of disqualifying a party’s counsel
of choice should be imposed only when absolutely necessary.” 	Macheca Transp. Co. v.
Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 463 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
Courts in this Circuit recognize that “[o]nly clients or former clients generally have
standing to seek disqualification based on a conflict of interest.” 	Der v. Connolly,
No. 08-cv-6409 (PJS/JJG), 2009 WL 10687762, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2009); see FDIC v.
Amundson, 682 F. Supp. 981, 987 (D. Minn. 1988); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848,
861 (W.D. Mo. 1980). Cane does not assert that he is either a current or former client of
Ebert, so as a general rule, Cane lacks standing to seek Ebert’s disqualification. And while
a party may also show standing by demonstrating “he will be prejudiced by the conflicted
representation” or “when there is a perceived threat to the fairness of the proceeding
because the conflicted parties are not aware of or are unable to appreciate the seriousness
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 5 of 17

6
and injustice of the conflict,” Adams v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 8:24-cv-102, 2025 WL 1359007,
at *4 (D. Neb. May 9, 2025) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), Cane
neither argues for nor demonstrates either. In fact, the parties who would have standing to
seek disqualification—Kuboushek, Baker, and Cass County—are all parties to this
litigation, and none of them has objected to Ebert’s representation of Kuboushek and Baker.
Because Cane lacks standing to seek Ebert’s disqualification, his motion to disqualify
counsel is denied.
Similarly, Cane suggests that Kelzer does not have authority to act as Cass County’s
attorney in this matter. 	ECF No. 36. But again, Cane has not asserted that he is either a
former 	or 	current 	client 	of 	Kelzer. 	Accordingly, 	Cane 	lacks 	standing 	to 	seek
disqualification or clarification of Kelzer’s representation of Cass County. See Der, 2009
WL 10687762, at *6. Therefore, Cane’s motion to “clarify” Kelzer’s authority to represent
Cass County is also denied.
II. 	Motion To Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Kuboushek and Baker seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), ECF No. 10 at 5–6, while Cass County, Stevenson, and Woodford move for
judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), ECF No. 45 at 5.
The Court evaluates these motions under the same standard. See Spagna v. Phi Kappa Psi,
Inc., 30 F.4th 710, 715 (8th Cir. 2022). At this stage of the proceedings, the Court must
“accept as true all facts pleaded by the non-moving party and grant all reasonable
inferences from the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party.” 	Corwin v. City of
Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see Gorog v. Best Buy
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 6 of 17

7
Co., 760 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2014). But the complaint nevertheless must “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(citation omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff “pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court is limited to
reviewing 	the 	complaint, 	exhibits 	attached 	to 	the 	complaint 	whose 	authenticity 	is
unquestioned, documents “necessarily embraced by the complaint,” and “matters of public
record.” 	Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir. 2017) (citations
omitted); see Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010). 	Because
Cane is proceeding pro se, the Court is mindful to liberally construe his filings. 	See
Lamar v. Payne, 111 F.4th 902, 907 n.2 (8th Cir. 2024).
Defendants also raise jurisdictional challenges to Cane’s complaint. 	ECF No. 15
at 9–18; ECF No. 45 at 8–14. 	A defendant may raise either a “facial” or a “factual”
challenge 	to 	a 	court’s 	subject-matter 	jurisdiction 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(1). 	Scott 	v.
UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 3d 857, 861 (D. Minn. 2021). On a facial challenge,
“the court restricts itself to the face of the pleadings” and “the non-moving party receives
the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). 	By contrast, in a factual
attack, “the court considers matters outside the pleadings.” Id. In the latter case, the party
asserting federal jurisdiction must establish the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction by
a preponderance of the evidence, Moss v. United States, 895 F.3d 1091, 1097 (8th Cir.
2018), and the non-moving party’s factual allegations are not entitled to any presumption
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 7 of 17

8
of truth, Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6. 	Because the parties offer evidence outside of the
pleadings in challenging the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, see ECF No. 15 at 9–18;
ECF No. 45 at 12, the Court construes the motions to raise a factual attack to subject-matter
jurisdiction.
a. 	Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
i. 	Standing
“Federal court jurisdiction is restricted to cases and controversies.” Missouri v.
Yellen, 39 F.4th 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or
controversy.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). To meet the “irreducible
constitutional minimum” required to establish standing, a plaintiff has the burden to show
three elements: “(1) the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.” 	Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds, 94 F.4th 707, 710 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338). 	The standing inquiry is not “an assessment of the merits of a
plaintiff’s claim,” and in assessing standing the Court assumes that “on the merits the
plaintiff[] would be successful.” 	Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 836 F.3d 963, 968
(8th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
1. 	Cane Lacks Standing To Sue Baker
Although Cane names Baker as a Defendant and identifies her as an attorney for
Cass County in the land-use enforcement action, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 6, 10, 55, the complaint
contains no factual allegations about what misconduct Baker is alleged to have committed.
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 8 of 17

9
Because Cane identifies no “challenged conduct” committed by Baker, he necessarily
cannot show an injury traceable to Baker’s nonexistent conduct. 	Arc of Iowa, 97 F.4th
at 710. All claims against Baker are therefore dismissed.
2. 	Cane Has Standing To Sue the Remaining Defendants
The remaining defendants argue that Cane lacks standing to bring claims against
them because he is not the title owner of the property that is subject of the enforcement
action. 	ECF No. 15 at 10–14; ECF No. 45 at 10–13. 	Specifically, they argue that Cane
has not demonstrated an injury-in-fact, asserting that the “lack of [Cane’s] legal interest in
the property negates any claim premised on an alleged right to use and enjoy the property.”
Id. at 11; see ECF No. 45 at 10–13.
Defendants put the cart before the horse because their argument is really one on the
merits. But the standing inquiry is not “an assessment of the merits of a plaintiff’s claim,”
and in assessing standing the Court assumes that “on the merits the plaintiffs would be
successful.” 	Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 836 F.3d at 968; see Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009) (“It is crucial . . . not to conflate Article III’s
requirement of injury in fact with a plaintiff’s potential causes of action, for the concepts
are not coextensive.”). 	Cane’s claim is that he had a property interest in Aho’s land and
the structures on the land under the Minnesota Constitution and that, therefore, he was a
necessary party to be joined in the enforcement action brought by Kuboushek. 	See ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 8–9. Assuming that claim is meritorious, the injury that results from Defendants’
pursuit of the enforcement action is the interference with Cane’s “right to exclude” others
from the land, Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 405 (2018) (citation omitted), given
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 9 of 17

10
that the state court’s order allowed Cass County officials to enter Aho’s land and structures
as they please, ECF No. 16-1 at 8. 	The interference with one’s property interest is a
cognizable injury for standing purposes. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413,
427 (2021). Whether Cane actually has any property interest in Aho’s land or the structures
on 	the 	land—and 	whether, 	based 	on 	that 	purported 	property 	interest, 	Cane 	was
constitutionally required to be joined as a party in the enforcement action—are merits
questions which are not part of the standing analysis.
ii. 	The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Does Not Apply
Defendants next argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Cane’s claims under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 	ECF No. 15 at 14–18; ECF No. 45 at 8–10. A federal court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case if that case is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.3 	See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92
(2005). That is because “only the United States Supreme Court has been given jurisdiction
to review a state-court decision, so federal district courts generally lack subject-matter
jurisdiction over attempted appeals from a state-court judgment.” Dodson v. Univ. of Ark.
for Med. Scis., 601 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
3 	The doctrine is named for the two U.S. Supreme Court cases articulating its
contours: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 10 of 17

11
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” 	Exxon
Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.
Although this case smacks of Rooker-Feldman—in that Cane essentially seeks
federal court review and rejection of the state court’s decision that he was not a necessary
party to the land-use enforcement action—the doctrine does not apply here because, as
Cane correctly points out, he was not a party to the enforcement action in state court. See
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (“Rooker-Feldman [is] inapplicable where the
party against whom the doctrine is invoked was not a party to the underlying state-court
proceeding.”). Rather, only Aho was party to the enforcement action. See ECF No. 16-1
at 1. Kuboushek argues that Cane was in “privity” with Aho, ECF No. 30 at 7–8, but he
does not cite any authority explaining why that fact, if true, matters in the Rooker-Feldman
analysis. Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman may not be used to bar Cane’s claims.
b. 	Failure To State a Claim
i. 	Count I: Procedural Due Process Claim
Cane alleges that Defendants deprived him of a property interest in Aho’s property
when they pursued the land-use enforcement action without joining him as a party. ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 8–9, 11, 23–26. 	To plausibly allege a deprivation of procedural due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, “a plaintiff must show that he has been deprived
of a constitutionally protected life, liberty or property interest.” Davenport v. Univ. of Ark.
Bd. of Trs., 553 F.3d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 2009). When analyzing procedural due process
claims, the Court first asks whether there is a constitutionally protected liberty or property
interest. 	Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). If such an interest
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 11 of 17

12
exists, the Court then asks whether the procedures used in the deprivation of that interest
were constitutionally sufficient. Id.
Cane alleges only one purported property interest at stake: a “superior interest” in
Aho’s property pursuant to Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution. ECF No. 1
¶ 8. That provision of the Minnesota Constitution provides, in full:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt in this state, but this shall not
prevent the legislature from providing for imprisonment, or holding to
bail, persons charged with fraud in contracting said debt. 	A reasonable
amount of property shall be exempt from seizure or sale for the payment
of any debt or liability. The amount of such exemption shall be determined
by law. Provided, however, that all property so exempted shall be liable
to seizure and sale for any debts incurred to any person for work done or
materials furnished in the construction, repair or improvement of the
same, and provided further, that such liability to seizure and sale shall also
extend to all real property for any debt to any laborer or servant for labor
or service performed.
It is wholly unclear how this provision of the Minnesota Constitution grants Cane a
“superior interest” in Aho’s property or the structures on that property. 	This provision
relates to limiting the power of the state to seize certain property to repay debt, such as
through a homestead exemption. See In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989).
Cane does not allege, however, that any of his property has been seized to repay a debt nor
that he has a homestead exemption in Aho’s property (or that any such homestead
exemption has been interfered with). 	Accordingly, Cane has not plausibly alleged the
existence of a constitutionally protected property interest, which dooms his procedural due
process claim. See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460.
This holding disposes of Cane’s claim against Cass County, Stevenson, and
Woodford, as they sought outright dismissal of this claim. ECF No. 45 at 14–16. However,
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 12 of 17

13
Kuboushek only sought qualified immunity on this claim. ECF No. 15 at 22–24. “Under
the doctrine of qualified immunity, a court must dismiss a complaint against a government
official in his individual capacity that fails to state a claim for violation of ‘clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” 	Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity analysis requires a
two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a
constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the
time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” 	Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 738
(8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Unless both questions
are answered affirmatively, qualified immunity applies. Id.
The Court recognizes that Cane requests injunctive and declaratory relief, ECF
No. 1 at 9–10, and that qualified immunity does not ordinarily apply to requests for
injunctive and declaratory relief, see Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1994).
However, the Court has answered the qualified immunity question on the first step by
finding no constitutional violation. 	Accordingly, “[a]lthough declaratory and injunctive
relief are not affected by the defense of qualified immunity, because this court concludes
qualified immunity applies and that no constitutional violation was demonstrated, that
conclusion also defeats [Cane’s] claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.” See Stanko v.
South Dakota, No. 5:18-cv-05088-KES, 2019 WL 10890199, at *11 (D.S.D. June 11,
2019); see Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1077 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that if a
claim fails on the first step of the qualified-immunity analysis, then the “plaintiff’s claim
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 13 of 17

14
fails as a matter of law because plaintiff did not prove an essential element of the § 1983
claim”); Falls v. Nesbitt, 966 F.2d 375, 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that injunctive relief
is inappropriate without a showing of a constitutional violation).4 	Accordingly, the
procedural due process claim is dismissed in its entirety.
ii. 	Count II: Abuse of Process Under Section 1983
Cane alleges that Defendants’ actions to “secur[e] a state-court judgment” and
“prosecut[e] an improper action that excluded” him constitutes abuse of process under
Section 1983. 	ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27–73. 	As an initial matter, the Eighth Circuit has not
recognized an “abuse of process” claim under Section 1983. 	See Fagnan v. City of Lino
Lakes, 745 F.3d 318, 324 n.5 (8th Cir. 2014). 	However, to the extent such a theory of
liability exists, Cane would still need to demonstrate that any abuse of process deprived
him of his constitutional rights. See Cameo Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Senn, 738 F.2d 836,
845 (7th Cir. 1984); Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943, 945 (4th Cir. 1981); Kleiss v.
Short, 805 F. Supp. 726, 727 (S.D. Iowa 1992). Holding otherwise would transform every
state-law abuse of process claim into a constitutional claim, which would run counter to
Section 1983’s textual limitation to remedy “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
4 	In any event, Cane’s request for injunctive and declaratory relief against Kuboushek
would be destined for dismissal, since Kuboushek is sued only in his individual capacity,
ECF No. 1 ¶ 6, and injunctive and declaratory relief is unavailable against state actors sued
under Section 1983 in their individual capacities, see Hummel v. Minn. Dep’t of Agric.,
430 F. Supp. 3d 581, 593, 593 n.5 (D. Minn. 2020); Chilcoat v. San Juan County, 41 F.4th
1196, 1214 (10th Cir. 2022) (“Under § 1983, a plaintiff cannot sue an official in their
individual capacity for injunctive or declaratory relief.”).
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 14 of 17

15
As best the Court can tell, the only deprivation of constitutional rights that Cane
alleges is a deprivation of a property interest in Aho’s property, in violation of Cane’s due
process rights. 	See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 57 (alleging that Defendants’ conduct “affect[ed]
Cane’s rights and property”); id. ¶ 58 (alleging that Defendants’ conduct “suppress[ed] due
process”); ECF No. 67 at 4 (arguing that Defendants’ conduct “alter[ed] Plaintiff’s property
rights”).5 	But as explained above, Cane has not plausibly alleged that he has a property
interest in Aho’s property. Accordingly, without a property interest in Aho’s property, Cane
cannot demonstrate a procedural due process violation resulting from any land-use
enforcement action. And because Cane does not show a due process violation (or any other
constitutional 	violation), 	his 	abuse 	of 	process 	claim 	under 	Section 	1983 	must 	be
dismissed.6
iii. 	Count III: Monell Claim
Finally, Cane brings a Monell claim against Cass County, alleging that it maintains
an unconstitutional custom of bringing land-use enforcement actions to intimidate and
retaliate against residents. 	Id. ¶¶ 74–80. 	A municipality cannot be held liable for a
5 	Cane also suggests in passing that Defendants’ conduct was taken “to foreclose
Plaintiff’s ability to pursue federal constitutional claims.” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 22, 73. It is wholly
unclear what type of constitutional violation Cane is alleging here, so the Court need not
consider it. 	See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (explaining that conclusory allegations are “not
entitled to be assumed true”). 	More to the point, the fact that Cane is pursuing federal
constitutional claims in this lawsuit renders implausible his allegation that he has been
foreclosed from raising those claims.
6 	Again, although Kuboushek only sought qualified immunity on the Section 1983
abuse of process claim, ECF No. 15 at 22–24, because Cane has not alleged a constitutional
violation necessary to support an abuse of process claim under Section 1983, that claim
must be dismissed against Kuboushek in its entirety.
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 15 of 17

16
constitutional violation under Section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. 	See
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 	Rather, under
Monell,“[l]iability for a constitutional violation will attach to a municipality only if the
violation resulted from an official municipal policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately
indifferent failure to train or supervise an official or employee.” 	Bolderson v. City of
Wentzville, 840 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2016). However, “for municipal liability to attach,
individual liability first must be found on an underlying substantive claim.” Brockinton v.
City of Sherwood, 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Because the Court
has dismissed all of Cane’s constitutional claims against the individual Defendants, the
Court must likewise dismiss the Monell claim against Cass County. 	See id.; Stearns v.
Wagner, 122 F.4th 699, 704 (8th Cir. 2024) (“Because [plaintiff’s] constitutional rights
were not violated, his Monell claim fails.”).
CONCLUSION7
Based upon the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Cane’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel (ECF No. 21) is DENIED;
2. 	Cane’s Motion to Clarify Authority of Counsel to Appear on Behalf of Cass
County (ECF No. 36) is DENIED;
3. 	Kuboushek’s and Baker’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED;
7 	Because the Court has concluded that the complaint fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, the Court need not address Defendants’ argument that the Court
should abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
ECF No. 15 at 24–27; ECF No. 45 at 6–8.
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 16 of 17

17
4. 	Cass County’s, Stevenson’s, and Woodford’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (ECF No. 44) is GRANTED; and
5. 	The complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in
its entirety.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: April 10, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
CASE 0:25-cv-03045-LMP-LIB Doc. 85 Filed 04/10/26 Page 17 of 17