Summit 360, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
SUMMIT 360, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant.
Case No. 25‐CV‐2202 (PJS/EMB)
ORDER
Matthew F. Bruno, Dylan Carson, Amar L. Thakur, and Rebecca A. Finkel,
MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP; and Stephen P. Safranski and Eric
P. Barstad, ROBINS KAPLAN LLP, for plaintiff.
Bradley Justus, James K. Hunsberger, Denise L. Plunkett, and Caroline P.
Boisvert, AXINN, VELTROP & HARKRIDER LLP; and Todd A. Wind, Joseph T.
Dixon, Zachary S. McFarland, and Miriam P. Solomon, FREDRIKSON &
BYRON, P.A., for defendant.
Plaintiff Summit 360, Inc. (“Summit”) is a “middleman” in the computer‐
networking equipment market. For the past 30 years, Summit has acquired new and
used products manufactured by defendant Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”) and other
original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) and then resold those products to end
users. Summit brought this lawsuit against Cisco, asserting antitrust and related tort
claims relating to Cisco’s efforts to control its distribution channels and combat
counterfeiting of its products. This matter is before the Court on Cisco’s motion to
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dismiss. ECF No. 34. For the reasons that follow, Cisco’s motion is granted, and
Summit’s complaint is dismissed for lack of antitrust standing.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Cisco rose to prominence during the “Dot‐Com Era” by manufacturing
computer‐networking equipment that enables computing devices to connect and share
data at a distance. Compl. ¶¶ 20–21, ECF No. 1. According to Summit, Cisco’s “early
entrance into the computer networking industry” enabled Cisco to amass and maintain
monopoly power in American and global markets for Ethernet switches and routers. Id.
¶ 27; see also id. ¶ 1 (describing Cisco as a “quintessential monopolist”). Ethernet
switches form a “fundamental building block” of a networking ecosystem by
connecting the various “computer components and devices” composing the network.
Id. ¶¶ 22–23. Routers complement switches by connecting devices across multiple
networks. Id. ¶ 23. Switches and routers “operate at different logical levels in a
network,” but both products are indispensable to a networking infrastructure. Id.
Summit alleges that “end‐users are disinclined to mix‐and‐match networking
devices or make wholesale changes to their network environment,” because switching
OEMs often requires replacing substantial amounts of hardware and retraining
personnel. Id. ¶¶ 25, 29, 93. The markets for Ethernet switches and routers are
therefore “characterized by high barriers to entry and expansion” for both “potential
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new entrants and existing competitors.” Id. ¶ 34. As a result, Cisco maintains “shares
commonly exceeding 50%, and at times above 70%” in each market. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33.
Summit identifies “just a handful of competing original equipment manufacturers” in
the relevant product markets: Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company (“HPE”); Juniper
Networks, Inc. (“Juniper”); Arista Networks, Inc. (“Arista”); and Fortinet, Inc.
(“Fortinet”). Id. ¶ 27.1
Cisco primarily sells its products to end users through an “army of contract
resellers and sales representatives.” Id. ¶ 3; see also id. ¶¶ 38–40 (describing Cisco’s
distribution channels). This network of Cisco employees and contractors represents
what the parties call the “Authorized Channel.” According to Summit, Cisco imposes
“onerous restrictions” on sellers in the Authorized Channel, including sales quotas and
limitations on the price and availability of products. Id. ¶¶ 40–44.
Alongside the Authorized Channel, independent resellers such as Summit have
emerged as an alternative source of supply that “fits customer needs and budgets.” Id.
¶ 3. This network of independent resellers represents what the parties call the
1HPE and Juniper merged in summer 2025, after Summit filed its complaint.
Press Release, Dep’t of Just.: Off. of Pub. Affs., Justice Department Requires Divestitures
and Licensing Commitments in HPE’s Acquisition of Juniper Networks (June 28, 2025),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice‐department‐requires‐divestitures‐and‐licensing‐
commitments‐hpes‐acquisition‐juniper; see also Compl. ¶ 28; ECF No. 36 at 3 n.2.
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“Independent Channel.”2 The Independent Channel acquires networking products
through secondary markets and then resells those products to end users—often
fulfilling orders more quickly and “at far lower prices” than Cisco’s Authorized
Channel. Id. ¶ 7; see also Mot. Hr’g Tr. 12:3–13:20, ECF No. 57 (Dec. 3, 2025) (“Tr.”)
(providing an example of how Summit sources equipment for resale). Independent
resellers are “manufacturer agnostic,” meaning that they offer products to meet their
customers’ needs without regard to who manufactured those products. Tr. 22:20–23:13;
see also Compl. ¶¶ 3–7, 44.
Summit alleges that Cisco has engaged in a “systemic anticompetitive scheme
designed to eliminate independent networking equipment resellers” like itself. Id. ¶ 3.
The complaint describes coercive tactics such as “disruptive and costly audits,
expensive hardware recertifications, suspended services and support, unavailable
software updates, and even threatened legal action.” Id. ¶ 94. Specifically, Summit
identifies four “categories” of anticompetitive conduct: (1) spreading fear, uncertainty,
and doubt about Cisco products sold outside the Authorized Channel, including
warning that such products may be counterfeit or unsupported (id. ¶¶ 49–56);
(2) auditing customer networks to identify and penalize end‐users who purchased
Cisco products from the Independent Channel and to “lock end‐users into purchasing
2The Court uses the terms “Independent Channel” and “independent resellers”
interchangeably.
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exclusively through Cisco’s Authorized Channel” in the future (id. ¶¶ 57–65);
(3) offering maintenance services, software updates, and subscription packages only for
Cisco equipment purchased through the Authorized Channel (id. ¶¶ 66–77); and
(4) leveraging concerns about counterfeit equipment to dissuade end users from
purchasing products from the Independent Channel (id. ¶¶ 78–86).
Summit contends that Cisco’s practices constitute a “concerted effort by a
monopolist” to “eliminate a channel that is selling both [Cisco] products as well as other
products”—harming both interbrand competition (Cisco products vs. non‐Cisco
products) and intrabrand competition (Cisco products vs. Cisco products).3 Tr. 9:2–6.
Summit brings claims for monopolization and attempted monopolization under § 2 of
the Sherman Act and Minn. Stat. § 325D.52 (Counts I–III), as well as a claim for tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage arising from the same conduct
(Count IV). See Compl. ¶¶ 101–129.
3“Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the
same generic product . . . . In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition
between the distributors—wholesale or retail—of the product of a particular
manufacturer.” Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and
draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Par v. Wolfe Clinic, P.C., 70 F.4th
441, 445–46 (8th Cir. 2023). Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they
must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
Prior to the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) (itself an antitrust case), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), courts were
sometimes “hesitant to dismiss antitrust actions before the parties have had an
opportunity for discovery.” Double D Spotting Serv., Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc., 136 F.3d 554,
560 (8th Cir. 1998). More recently, however, the Eighth Circuit has endorsed a
“reasonably aggressive” approach to “weeding out meritless antitrust claims at the
pleading stage.” Insulate SB, Inc. v. Advanced Finishing Sys., Inc., 797 F.3d 538, 543 (8th
Cir. 2015) (quoting NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also
Little Rock Cardiology Clinic, PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 601 (8th Cir. 2009)
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(affirming dismissal where plaintiff could not “establish the necessary predicate for [its]
antitrust claims” and discovery “could not cure the defects in [plaintiff’s] legal theory”).
B. Sherman Act Claims
Summit brings claims for monopolization and attempted monopolization under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2. Cisco contends that those claims must be
dismissed because (among other reasons) Summit has not plausibly alleged that it has
suffered an antitrust injury—“a threshold issue that plaintiffs must establish in order to
have standing to sue under the antitrust laws.” Fischer v. NWA, Inc., 883 F.2d 594, 597
n.5 (8th Cir. 1989); see also Gen. Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 809
(8th Cir. 1987) (noting that statutory standing in an antitrust action “goes beyond the
constitutional standard of injury in fact”). Because antitrust standing is generally
“limited to a consumer or competitor that proximately suffers antitrust injury,” Gen.
Indus. Corp., 810 F.2d at 809 (quotation omitted), the court must determine at the outset
whether a plaintiff is the “proper party to bring a private antitrust action,” McDonald v.
Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1374 (8th Cir. 1983).
In Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters (“AGC”), the Supreme Court directed that, in determining whether a private
plaintiff has antitrust standing, courts should “evaluate the plaintiff’s harm, the alleged
wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship between them.” 459 U.S. 519, 535
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(1983).4 Within the AGC framework, the Eighth Circuit has “recognized a potentially
dispositive point: a federal antitrust plaintiff who has not suffered an ‘antitrust injury’
lacks standing.” Lovett v. Gen. Motors Corp., 975 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1992); see also
Midwest Commc’ns, Inc. v. Minn. Twins, Inc., 779 F.2d 444, 450 (8th Cir. 1985) (“Although
the Supreme Court has developed a multifactor balancing test to determine whether a
plaintiff has standing to sue under the antitrust laws, the threshold inquiry must focus
on the plaintiff’s alleged injury.”).
To have antitrust standing, a plaintiff must “prove more than injury causally
linked to an illegal presence in the market.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl‐O‐Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). Rather, an antitrust plaintiff “must prove antitrust
injury”—that is, competitive injury (1) “of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent” and (2) “that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Id.
4The Eighth Circuit distilled the AGC test into six factors:
(1) The causal connection between the alleged antitrust
violation and the harm to the plaintiff; (2) Improper motive;
(3) Whether the injury was of a type that Congress sought to
redress with the antitrust laws; (4) The directness between
the injury and the market restraint; (5) The speculative
nature of the damages; [and] (6) The risk of duplicate
recoveries or complex damage apportionment.
McDonald, 722 F.2d at 1374 (citing AGC, 459 U.S. at 537–45). The first and third factors
correspond to the “antitrust injury” requirement. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl‐O‐
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
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(emphasis added). Where “the injury alleged or proven is not an ‘antitrust injury,’ the
plaintiff does not have a claim cognizable under the antitrust laws.” Midwest Commc’ns,
779 F.2d at 450.
The Court finds that, because Summit does not pleaded an antitrust injury,
Summit does not have standing to bring its Sherman Act claims.5
1. Injury to Competition in the Relevant Market
Summit’s alleged injuries are not “of a type that Congress sought to redress with
the antitrust laws.” McDonald, 722 F.2d at 1374. The Sherman Act “directs itself not
against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which
unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.” Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S.
447, 458 (1993); see also AGC, 459 U.S. at 538 (noting the Sherman Act’s “central interest
in protecting the economic freedom of participants in the relevant market”). Standing is
therefore “generally limited to the actual participants in the relevant market:
competitors and consumers.” South Dakota v. Kan. City S. Indus., Inc., 880 F.2d 40, 47
5Summit seeks both treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15,
and injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. The same antitrust
injury requirement applies to both remedies, although the threshold showing differs
slightly. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110–12 (1986); Midwest
Commc’ns, 779 F.2d at 450, 452. To recover damages, Summit must allege an actual
antitrust injury, whereas to obtain injunctive relief, Summit need only allege a threatened
antitrust injury. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111–13. For the reasons explained above, Summit
lacks standing to pursue either remedy.
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(8th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by In re Fed. Fountain, 165 F.3d 600 (8th Cir.
1999). Summit is neither.
Summit’s complaint alleges a campaign by Cisco “to foreclose or otherwise
eliminate the Independent Channel through which customers can (i) purchase
equipment from manufacturers that compete with Cisco and (ii) secure Cisco products
for a lower price.” Compl. ¶ 96. According to Summit, Cisco’s conduct harms
competition by “forcing customers into more expensive, contracted channels,” id. ¶ 99,
and harms Summit by causing it to lose “customers, sales, revenues, and profits,” id.
¶ 96, and by damaging “its goodwill and reputation in the networking industry,” id.
¶ 100. At bottom, Summit alleges direct harm to customers and only derivative harm to
itself. What the complaint fails to plausibly allege, however, is harm to competition in
the relevant market.
Summit was the master of its own complaint, and Summit chose to define the
relevant market at the interbrand level—that is, competition among manufacturers of
Ethernet switches and routers. See Compl. ¶ 27–37. (Summit’s choice was no doubt
strategic, as there are likely hundreds—if not thousands—of sellers and resellers of
Cisco equipment worldwide, and thus, a claim that Cisco exercises monopoly power in
the sellers/resellers market would be a nonstarter.) Summit was, of course, free to
define the relevant market in this manner. See, e.g., Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.
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Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025) (noting that, as the “master of the complaint,” a
plaintiff “controls much about her suit”) (quotation omitted); Energy Conversion Devices
Liquidation Tr. v. Trina Solar Ltd., 833 F.3d 680, 688 (6th Cir. 2016) (“As the master of the
complaint, the plaintiff may decide what claims to bring and how to prove them. But it
cannot avoid responsibility for dealing with each aspect of the claim at each phase of
the case.”). But having done so, Summit must plausibly allege harm to competition
within that market. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Kinze Mfg., No. 4:20‐CV‐0389‐RGE‐SHL, 2022
WL 22933709, at *8 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 16, 2022) (dismissing complaint because plaintiff had
failed to allege “facts demonstrating a harm to competition in the [relevant] market”).
According to Summit, the relevant (interbrand) market contains five and only
five participants: Cisco, HPE, Juniper, Arista, and Fortinet. Compl. ¶ 27. In other
words, Summit itself does not even participate in the relevant market. Putting that
aside, the anticompetitive conduct in which Cisco allegedly engages does not in any
way harm competition in the relevant market. Indeed, if Summit is correct, Cisco’s
conduct makes its products less competitive with the products manufactured by the
other OEMs—by making Cisco products more expensive and more difficult for end
users to purchase. See generally id. ¶¶ 49–86; id. ¶ 48 (alleging that “Cisco’s unlawful
and anticompetitive practices directly impact Summit,” but stating in the next sentence
the ways in which Summit’s “customers have encountered Cisco’s anticompetitive
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tactics”) (emphasis added). Put differently, those injured by Cisco’s “anticompetitive”
conduct are not Cisco’s OEM competitors in the relevant market, but instead end users
and those who sell to them—entirely different markets.
Again, Summit does not manufacture switches, routers, or other networking
equipment. Summit only sells such equipment. According to Summit, Cisco’s conduct
makes it more difficult for Summit to compete with other sellers and resellers of Cisco
equipment. What Cisco describes, then, is harm to intrabrand competition among those
who sell or resell Cisco networking products, not harm to the competing manufacturers
who participate in the interbrand market that Summit has identified as relevant.
This mismatch is fatal. Admittedly, antitrust protection is not confined “solely to
consumers, competitors, buyers, and sellers,” but “the fact that a party is not a
participant in the relevant market must be weighed heavily against a grant of standing.”
Kan. City S. Indus., 880 F.2d at 46 n.16; see also Alpha Shoe Serv. v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 849
F.2d 352, 354 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing because their
“injury did not arise from anticompetitive activity in an economic market in which
plaintiffs participated”); Midwest Commc’ns, 779 F.2d at 451 (affirming district court’s
conclusion that plaintiff lacked standing because it was not an “actual or potential
competitor[] foreclosed from the applicable market” or a “buyer[] hurt by the
[anticompetitive conduct]”).
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Summit invokes the Supreme Court’s decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Graphic Products
Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983), in support of its decision to
define the relevant market by the “end product.” See Tr. 6:13–9:6, 70:15–72:22 (arguing
that the “product markets are the proper markets because [they are] end user and
consumer centric”). Summit claims that defining the market in this way conforms with
the primary goal of antitrust law to promote consumer welfare. Id. at 72:4–22.
But neither case addressed the threshold defect present here: an interbrand
market coupled with only intrabrand injury. Graphic Products addressed the sufficiency
of the evidence after a full jury trial, not pleading‐stage questions of antitrust standing.
See 717 F.2d at 1575. In that case, the evidence showed that the defendant’s “system of
territorial restraints” had “totally foreclosed intrabrand competition.” Id. Under such
circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit held that “intrabrand restrictions . . . can have a
substantial adverse effect on consumer welfare.” Id. at 1572 n.20. Likewise, Sylvania
merely emphasized that interbrand competition is “the primary concern of antitrust
law” and noted that “the degree of intrabrand competition is wholly independent of the
level of interbrand competition confronting the manufacturer.” 433 U.S. 52 n.19. An
impact on intrabrand competition may indeed support antitrust standing in cases in
which the intrabrand market is relevant (apples and injury to apples), but here Cisco
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pleads an interbrand market and then relies solely on harm to intrabrand competition
(apples and injury to oranges).
Summit also cites a recent decision from this District that denied a motion to
dismiss claims that were supposedly “based on similar allegations of harm.” ECF
No. 39 at 37–38 (citing Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Allen Interchange LLC, No. 22‐
CV‐1681 (KMM/JFD), 2023 WL 5206884, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 14, 2023)). In Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., an independent distributor of Toyota replacement parts alleged antitrust
violations arising from Toyota USA’s efforts to reduce the sale of “gray market” Toyota
parts in the United States. 2023 WL 5206884, at *1, 5. In that case, however, the plaintiff
was asserting claims against its “direct competitor, Toyota USA,” not “the manufacturer,
Toyota Japan.” Id. at *5 (emphasis added). Apples and injury to apples. Toyota
therefore does not present this case’s mismatch between a pleaded interbrand market
and an alleged intrabrand injury.
Finally, Summit relies heavily on a series of decisions against Cisco out of the
Eastern District of Texas where the court purportedly “rejected nearly identical
arguments . . . that an independent reseller failed to show antitrust injury.” ECF No. 39
at 38; see also Compl. ¶ 89 n.14; Tr. 25:22–26:17, 31:9–15, 73:8–75:19. In Dexon Computer,
Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the court distinguished “antitrust injury” in the standing
context from the “injury‐to‐competition” element of a substantive Sherman Act claim.
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No. 5:22‐CV‐0053‐RWS‐JBB, 2023 WL 2941414, at *36–40 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2023), report
and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2730656, at *25 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2023) (“[I]njury
to competition, while often a necessary component to substantive liability, need not be
pleaded as an element of standing for a plaintiff’s antitrust claim to survive a motion to
dismiss.”); see also Walker v. U‐Haul Co. of Miss., 747 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1984) (“The
requirement of antitrust inquiry is not inconsistent with the presumption of injury to
competition in Section 2 cases.”). But in the Eighth Circuit, courts “largely conflate” the
two concepts, “incorporat[ing] an injury‐to‐competition requirement into the analysis of
antitrust standing.” TheMLSonline.com, Inc. v. Reg’l Multiple Listing Serv. of Minn., Inc.,
840 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180 (D. Minn. 2012) (collecting cases); see also Inline Packaging,
LLC v. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1136 (D. Minn. 2016) (noting
that “the interplay between injury‐to‐competition and direct injury to a plaintiff when
evaluating antitrust standing is not always clear”).
Further, the Dexon reasoning relies on Fifth Circuit precedent “holding that
‘injury to competition is presumed to follow from the conduct proscribed by § 2.’”
Dexon Comput., 2023 WL 2730656, at *30 (quoting Walker, 747 F.2d at 1013). The Eighth
Circuit, by contrast, indulges no such presumption and treats antitrust injury as a
threshold inquiry, properly resolved at the outset of the case before consideration of the
merits. Compare Walker (arguing that “[t]he inquiry into antitrust injury . . . does not
even begin until the court finds that a violation has been alleged and that the plaintiff
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has been injured by it”) (quoting William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic
Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. C HI . L. R EV . 467, 488 (1980)), with Fischer,
883 F.2d at 597 n.5 (“[A]ntitrust injury is a threshold issue that plaintiffs must establish
in order to have standing to sue under the antitrust laws.”); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 416–18 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(describing the antitrust standing inquiry as “the first step” and stating a preference for
deciding the case on standing grounds rather than the “merits of the § 2 claim”). In
other words, the Fifth Circuit precedent applied in the Eastern District of Texas differs
from the Eighth Circuit precedent applied by this Court.
Finally, none of the Dexon decisions cited by Summit meaningfully address the
interbrand/intrabrand mismatch problem. The issue surfaces only in a passing footnote,
in which the court said that it would not address the issue because Cisco had not
“sufficiently develop[ed]” its argument. Dexon Comput., 2024 WL 180775, at *4 n.3 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 17, 2024).
In sum, Summit has alleged only intrabrand injuries within an interbrand
market. See AGC, 459 U.S. at 539–40 & n.40 (concluding that “the Brunswick test is not
satisfied” when the plaintiff was “neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market”
and the “allegedly unlawful conduct involve[d] predatory behavior directed at ‘certain’
parties, rather than a claim that output ha[d] been curtailed or prices enhanced
throughout an entire competitive market”). Because such injuries do not reflect the type
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of competitive harm that the antitrust laws were enacted to prevent, Summit cannot
satisfy the first prong of the antitrust‐injury requirement.
2. Causation
Even if the mismatch were not fatal to Summit’s claims, Summit would still need
to allege injuries that “flow[] from that which makes [Cisco’s] acts unlawful.”
Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. Summit claims that its “losses are a direct byproduct” of
Cisco’s “coercion, deception, technological barriers, and other anticompetitive conduct.”
Compl. ¶ 99. But Summit’s alleged injuries—lost sales, lost customers, and reputational
harm—flow from conduct that Cisco directs at end‐users, not at sellers or resellers in
the Independent Channel. See Compl. ¶ 96 (alleging that Summit’s injury “flows from
Cisco’s efforts to raise prices, reduce quality, lower output, and eliminate competition”);
see also id. ¶¶ 97–100.
The Eighth Circuit routinely finds causation of antitrust injury lacking when a
plaintiff has alleged only derivative harm. See, e.g., Midwest Commc’ns, 779 F.2d at 451
(“To have standing to sue under the antitrust laws, the plaintiff must be the target of the
anticompetitive activity, not one who has merely suffered indirect, secondary, or remote
injury.”) (quotation omitted); Lovett, 975 F.2d at 521 (“In short, consequential injury is
not an antitrust injury.”); Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 650 F.3d 1139, 1145
(8th Cir. 2011) (“[A] plaintiff may be targeted [by an effort to monopolize the market]
and found to have not suffered an antitrust injury that is cognizable under the antitrust
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laws.”). Because Summit alleges only an “indirect,” “secondary,” or “consequential”
injury—the existence and extent of which depends entirely on the decisions of its
customers—Summit has not pleaded a cognizable antitrust injury. Summit’s Sherman
Act claims are accordingly dismissed.
B. Minnesota Antitrust Claim
Cisco asks the Court to dismiss Summit’s Minnesota antitrust claim for the same
reason that the Court is dismissing the Sherman Act claims. See ECF No. 36 at 13; ECF
No. 40 at 3. “Minnesota antitrust law is generally interpreted consistently with federal
antitrust law,” although the two are not identical. Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d
619, 626 (Minn. 2007) (“The desire for harmony between federal and state antitrust law
relates more to prohibited conduct than to who can bring a lawsuit.”). For instance,
“Minnesota antitrust law permits indirect purchasers to recover” damages for antitrust
violations, while federal law does not. Id. at 626–27 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977)); see also Insulate SB, 797 F.3d at 547 n.8 (noting that “Minnesota law
differs from federal law” with respect to standing, but the state statute “still imposes
some ‘prudential limits’ on antitrust plaintiffs, including a showing of proximate
cause”) (quoting Lorix, 736 N.W.2d at 631).
Although there are a few circumstances under which a plaintiff may have
antitrust standing under Minnesota law but not federal law, Summit has not suggested
that such circumstances exist here. Instead, Summit treats its state and federal antitrust
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claims as coextensive. See ECF No. 39 at 10 n.2. Because Summit lacks standing to
bring its federal antitrust claims—and because the parties do not identify any material
differences between Minnesota and federal law—Summit’s Minnesota antitrust claim is
also dismissed. See, e.g., Insulate SB, 797 F.3d at 547 (affirming dismissal of Minnesota
antitrust claim where the plaintiff “agree[d] our analysis of its federal claims also
applie[d] to its Minnesota claim”); Sherr v. HealthEast Care Sys., 262 F. Supp. 3d 869,
886–87 (D. Minn. 2017) (“[W]here the federal antitrust claims fail, the Minnesota
antitrust claims must fail as well.”), aff’d on other grounds, 999 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2021).
C. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
Summit’s final claim fares no better. To state a claim for tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage under Minnesota law, a plaintiff must allege
“that the defendant’s tortious interference was intentional and either independently
tortious or in violation of a state or federal statute or regulation.” Gieseke ex rel.
Diversified Water Diversion, Inc. v. ICDA, Inc., 844 N.W.2d 210, 219–20 (Minn. 2014).
The “independently tortious or unlawful” conduct pleaded in Summit’s
complaint is closely tied to its failed antitrust claims. Id. at 218; see also Compl. ¶ 125
(alleging that Cisco engaged in “various, independent, tortious acts, including acts
in contravention with Section 2 of the Sherman Act”). Because Summit has not
identified any other reason why Cisco’s conduct is tortious or unlawful, Cisco’s
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tortious‐interference claim falls with its antitrust claims. See, e.g., Engelhardt v. Qwest
Corp., 918 F.3d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Because [defendants] have not violated federal
or state law, and because their interference was not independently tortious, [plaintiff’s]
tortious interference with prospective business relations claim fails as well.”); see also
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 2023 WL 5206884, at *11 (denying motion to dismiss tortious‐
interference claim because plaintiff had “plausibly alleged violation of antitrust laws”).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Defendant’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 34] is GRANTED.
2. 	Plaintiff’s complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 30, 2026 	/s/ Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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