Wattleton v. Unknown Probation Officer et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
David Earl Wattleton,
Plaintiff,
v.
Unknown Probation Officer, Unknown Social
Worker, Jordan Gayser, and G. Koss,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-1145 (ECT/SGE)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint.1 (Dkt. 19.) Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus commanding his social worker
and probation officer to work with him to form a release plan. This matter has been referred
to the undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and D.
Minn. LR 72.1. For the reasons discussed below, this Court recommends GRANTING
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DENYING Plaintiff’s Application for Writ of
Mandamus (Dkt. 11) as moot.
BACKGROUND
In 1999, Mr. Wattleton was found not guilty by reason of insanity on one count of
making a telephonic threat and conveying false information concerning a series of bomb
1 Mr. Wattleton’s pleading was filed as a “Complaint,” but the document itself is titled
“Application for Writ of Mandamus.” (Dkt. 1 at 1.) For consistency, the Court refers to the
document as “Complaint.” Additionally, the Court refers to the parties as “Plaintiff” and
“Defendants” consistent with Dkts. 3, 5, and 8.
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threats and three counts of making telephonic threats to kill, injure or intimidate persons in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184, 1187, 1192
(11th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Wattleton, 1:99-cr-00306-TWT-LTW
(hereinafter “Wattleton Criminal Case”), Dkt. 62.2 Following the verdict, the court held a
hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4243 and determined that Wattleton had not shown that
his release from custody would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
person or serious damage to another’s property due to a present mental disease or defect.
See Wattleton Criminal Case, Dkt. 76; Wattleton, 296 F.3d at 1193; see also 18 U.S.C. §
4243. Consequently, the court committed Wattleton to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”). Wattleton, 296 F.3d at 1193.
Wattleton has remained in BOP custody since 2000. He is currently civilly
committed at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota. (Dkt. 1 at 3; Dkt. 20 at
2.) In both 2022 and 2024 the committing court in the Northern District of Georgia held
2 “In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts ordinarily do not consider matters outside
the pleadings.” Kaisamba-Kanneh v. Dakota Cnty. Dist. Ct., No. 22-CV-2661 (ECT/TNL),
2023 WL 1451561, at * 1 n.2 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2023) (citations omitted). “Courts may,
however, ‘additionally consider matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim,
items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the
record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is
unquestioned.’” Id. (quoting Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir.
2017)). Certain documents from Wattleton’s criminal proceedings in the Northern District
of Georgia do not appear in this action’s docket but nevertheless are relied on by
Defendants. Because these records are public court records, this Court may take judicial
notice of them, and they may be considered in the context of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. See, e.g., Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir.
2005) (citing United States v. Eagleboy, 200 F.3d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1999)); Bethune v.
Baker, No. 21-CV-2640, 2024 WL 2862132, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. June 6, 2024) (citing
Stutska, 420 F.3d at 760 n.2).
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hearings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) on whether Mr. Wattleton could be released.
Wattleton Criminal Case, Dkts. 413 at 4, 431 at 5. At the 2022 hearing the BOP agreed
that Wattleton could be safely released from custody under release conditions, however,
Wattleton requested the Court to grant him release without conditions. Id. The Court denied
Wattleton’ s request but held that it would release him on conditions if a plan of conditional
release was developed that Wattleton agreed to comply with. Dkt. 413 at 55. The parties
were given sixty days to develop a conditional release plan; however, they were unable to
agree to release terms. Id.; see also Dkt. 431 at 71-73.
Wattleton filed a new motion for release on August 26, 2024. See Wattleton
Criminal Case, Dkts. 427, 431.3 At the 2024 hearing, Wattleton again requested release
without conditions, relying on the Eleventh Circuit decision in United States v. Crape, 603
F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010). Wattleton’s counsel argued that under Crape the only release
conditions that could be imposed upon him were to “connect with the VA” and to obtain
“treatment from the VA as he and his providers there deem appropriate.” Wattleton
Criminal Case, Dkt. 431 at 69. The government opposed Wattleton’s argument
distinguishing Crape. Id. at 72-73. The court declined to release Wattleton with his
requested condition being only that he must consult with the VA about treatment finding it
“totally inadequate.” Id. at 77-78. The court gave the parties sixty days to develop a
conditional release plan. Id. at 79. After sixty days had passed, the court denied Wattleton’s
3 The document at Docket 427 in the Wattleton Criminal Case is sealed, however, the
transcript at Docket 431 refers to Docket 427 as a motion for release. See Wattleton
Criminal Case, Dkt. 431 at 9.
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motion for release on January 10, 2025. (Dkt. 5 (citing Wattleton Criminal Case, Sealed
Dkt. 432)).
Mr. Wattleton filed his Complaint on January 24, 2025, in the Northern District of
Georgia.4 (Dkt. 1.) The case caption of his Complaint specifically includes the criminal
case number. (See Dkt. 1 at 1 (“1:99-cr-306-TWT”).) On March 4, 2025, a magistrate judge
recommended transferring this case to the District of Minnesota where venue would be
proper because both Wattleton and the social worker defendant are in Minnesota. (Dkt. 5
at 3.) The magistrate noted that if the Northern District of Georgia did have “venue over
the issues raised in this case, plaintiff should file a motion in [his criminal case] rather than
filing a separate civil action.” (Dkt. 5 at 3 n.1.) On March 28, 2025, the case was transferred
to the District of Minnesota. (Dkt. 9.)
ANALYSIS
I. Legal Standard
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. 19.)
When deciding whether a complaint states a claim, the Court accepts its factual allegations
as true and grants the plaintiff every reasonable inference. See, e.g., Varga v. U.S. Bank
Nat. Ass'n, 764 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc.
v. Twiestmeyer, 742 F.3d 845, 854 (8th Cir. 2014)). To withstand a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), litigants must properly plead their claims under
Rule 8 which requires a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to
4 The Complaint is dated January 10, 2025, but was stamped received and filed on January
24, 2025. (Dkt. 1 at 1, 3.)
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relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). A complaint “must contain sufficient factual allegations to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 547). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Lastly, a pro se
complaint must be liberally construed, but pro se status does not excuse a pro se plaintiff
from alleging sufficient facts to support his claims. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th
Cir. 2004); Schooley v. Kennedy, 712 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Although pro se
pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from compliance
with relevant rules of the procedural and substantive law.”).
II. Writ of Mandamus
A writ of mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy.” Pittston Coal Grp. v. Sebben,
488 U.S. 105, 121 (1988) (citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984)); see also,
e.g., Mitchael v. Colvin, 809 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Mandamus may issue
under § 1361 against an officer of the United States only in extraordinary situations . . . .”)
“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, mandamus may issue against an officer of the United States only
when the plaintiff has a clear right to relief, the defendant has a clear duty to perform the
act in question, and the plaintiff has no adequate alternative remedy.” Borntrager v. Stevas,
772 F.2d 419, 420 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing Piledrivers' Local Union No. 2375 v. Smith, 695
F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir.1982)). A writ of mandamus “is intended to provide a remedy for a
plaintiff only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief and only if the defendant owes
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him a clear nondiscretionary duty.” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984) (citations
omitted). “Further, whether a writ of mandamus should issue is largely a matter within the
district court's discretion.” Castillo v. Ridge, 445 F.3d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing
In re MidAmerican Energy Co., 286 F.3d 483, 486 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)).
Defendants assert that the Complaint fails to state a claim on grounds that it does
not allege the absence of any other remedy. Defendants argue that Mr. Wattleton has an
alternative remedy, namely, that he can seek the same relief in his criminal case in the
Northern District of Georgia. The Court finds that the Complaint fails to demonstrate that
Defendants owe a clear nondiscretionary duty and that Wattleton has no adequate
alternative remedy.
First, Wattleton’s Complaint alleges that the committing court “ordered the parties
to agree on a conditional release plan within 60 days from the order . . . .” (Dkt. 1 at 2.)
What the committing court stated at the hearing on October 10, 2024, was the following:
So I’ll say the same thing I did two years ago. I’ll give the parties 60 days to
see if you can work out a conditional release that complies with my
conditions for his release, not just Mr. Wattleton’s but my conditions and
those of his doctors. And I’ll say the same thing again, Mr. Wattleton, that I
did two years ago. You’re going to have to cooperate if you want to be
released. You may have to agree to some things you don’t like or don’ think
you need, but if you want a conditional release, you’re going to have to agree
to conditions that will protect you and protect the community.
(Dkt. 431 at 79 (emphasis added).) On January 20, 2025, approximately sixty days after
the hearing, the court entered an Order denying Wattleton’s motion for release and “urged
‘the parties to confer and attempt to establish a plan for [plaintiff’s] conditional release
should he become amenable to the conditions’ outlined in the Order.” (Dkt. 5 at 1-2 (citing
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sealed Dkt. 432 at 4).) Based on the above, this Court cannot conclude that Defendants owe
a clear nondiscretionary duty “to develop, agree and finalize a plan” as Wattleton asserts.
(Dkt. 1 at 3.) The committing Court encouraged the parties to work together to develop
conditions for release, it did not include language mandating a plan be produced, thereby
creating a nondiscretionary duty. Even if the Court had mandated a plan be produced, it is
clear from the transcript that Mr. Wattleton was to cooperate in developing a plan that
incorporated conditions, and his Complaint is devoid of any indication that he has become
amenable to conditions or attempted to cooperate. (See Dkt. 1.)
Second, Mr. Wattleton alleges in the Complaint that he “made a formal demand”
which was not fulfilled and that he “has no remedy except for this action.” (Dkt. 1 at 2-3.)
However, this conclusory sentence falls short of the factual allegations required to state a
claim for mandamus relief. Kaisamba-Kanneh v. Dakota Cnty. Dist. Ct., No. 22-CV-2661
(ECT/TNL), 2023 WL 1451561, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2023) (“[C]onclusory allegations
and legal conclusions are not enough to sustain a complaint.”) (citing Glick v. W. Power
Sports, Inc., 944 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2019)). Moreover, Mr. Wattleton has an alternative
avenue of relief—he may file a motion with the committing court seeking the relief he
requests.5 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h); Debenedetto v. Kallis, No. 19-CV-2110 (SRN/ECW), 2019
5 The Court acknowledges that it appears that Mr. Wattleton tried to file his Complaint in
the correct court by including the criminal case number in the caption. (See Dkt. 1 at 1;
Dkt. 26 at 5 (“[E]mbedded in the introductory party of the writ was the name of the court
of which petitioner was requesting relief from and the criminal c[a]se number where
authority to grant the relief is to be applied.”).) Instead of filing Wattleton’s request in the
case number he provided in the caption (Dkt. 1), this matter was opened as an entirely new
action in the Northern District of Georgia. Had Wattleton titled his request “motion”
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WL 4454521, *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2019) (“[A] civil detainee can seek release from his
commitment directly in the Court that committed him.”) (citing Archuletta v. Hendrick,
365 F.3d 644, 647-48 (8th Cir. 2004)), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 4450815 (D. Minn. Sept.
17, 2019); Wattleton v. Samuels, No. 13-0587, 2013 WL 1832344 (April 26, 2013) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 4243(f)) (denying mandamus request on grounds that there were alternative
remedies because “the court which ordered his commitment” could address Wattleton’s
treatment concerns). Here, the court which committed Mr. Wattleton can provide the relief
requested, and in fact has encouraged the parties on two different occasions to confer on a
release plan incorporating appropriate conditions. Wattleton Criminal Case, Dkt. 413 at
55-56; Dkt. 431 at 77-79 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f)). Consequently, the Court concludes
that Mr. Wattleton fails to state a claim for mandamus relief and recommends granting
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Lastly, in the interest of thoroughness, the Court briefly addresses Mr. Wattleton’s
arguments for habeas relief made in subsequent filings. As an initial matter, Mr.
Wattleton’s Complaint did not raise a habeas claim, rather he mentions habeas for the first
time only in his separately filed Application for Mandamus (Dkt. 11) and in his Response
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 26.) “A complaint may not be amended by the
briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Morgan Distrib. Co. v. Unidynamic Corp.,
868 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1989) (citation modified); see also Herrera v. Bondi, No. 25-
instead of an “Application,” perhaps it would have been filed in the criminal case as he
intended. (See Dkt. 5 at 3 n.1 (“To the extent that this Court has venue over the issues raised
in this case, plaintiff should file a motion in [his criminal case] rather than filing a separate
civil action.”).)
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CV-01369 (KMM/DLM), 2025 WL 2978724 (D. Minn. Oct. 22, 2025) (“However,
[plaintiff] did not raise these claims in her Complaint, and is not allowed to raise them for
the first time here in her Response.”) (citations omitted). Thus, a habeas claim is not
properly before this Court. Even if it were, the Complaint fails to state a claim for the same
reason—Mr. Wattleton has an alternative remedy for the relief he seeks. See
Archuleta, 365 F.3d at 648 (“[H]abeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy typically
available only when ‘the petitioner has no other remedy.’”) (quoting Taniguchi v.
Schultz, 303 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir.2002)).6
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, an all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMNEDED that:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 20) be GRANTED;
2. Mr. Wattleton’s Complaint (Dkt. 1) be DISMISSED; and
3. Mr. Wattleton’s Application for Mandamus (Dkt. 11) be DENIED as moot.
Dated: November 14, 2025 s/Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
6 Additionally, Mr. Wattleton is seeking an Order from the court directing a social worker
and probation officer to develop a plan of release, even construing the Complaint liberally,
this Court cannot conclude that Mr. Wattleton is challenging the legality of his custody
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule
72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth
in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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