Redifer v. Vaught et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Michael Cane Redifer, Sr.,
Petitioner, 	Case No. 25-cv-00933 (ECT/LIB)
v. 	ORDER AND
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
T. Vaught, et al.,
Respondents.
Pursuant to a general referral made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule
72.1, this matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon Petitioner
Michael C. Redifer’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Docket No. 1]. Finding no hearing
necessary, the Court issues the present Report and Recommendation.1
For the reasons discussed herein, Petitioner’s Motion to Amend, [Docket No. 28], is
GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, and Petitioner’s Motion to Submit a Supplemental
Pleading, [Docket No. 30], is GRANTED.
Further, for the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends that Redifer’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, [Docket No. 1], be DENIED, and this action be DISMISSED without
prejudice.
1 Upon review of the present record, the Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary in this action because a hearing on
the present Petition would not aid the Court in its consideration of the present Petition. See Wallace v. Lockhart, 701
F.2d 719, 730 (8th Cir. 1983) (observing that dismissal of a “habeas petition without a hearing is proper . . . where the
allegations, even if true, fail to state a cognizable constitutional claim, where the relevant facts are not in dispute, or
where the dispute can be resolved on the basis of the record”).
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I. 	Petitioner’s Motion to Amend, [Docket No. 28], and Petitioner’s Motion to Submit a
Supplemental Pleading, [Docket No. 30].
Petitioner’s Motion to Amend seeks to correct a misstated date2 Petitioner included in his
Reply to Respondent’s Response, [Docket No. 24]; include Pam Bondi and William K. Marshall3
as the Respondents in the present action; and request additional relief relating to Pam Bondi
specifically. (Pet.’s Am. Writ [Docket No. 28-1] at 3). To the extent Petitioner’s Motion to Amend
seeks to correct a misstated date, Petitioner’s Motion to Amend, [Docket No. 28], is GRANTED.
The Court will not, however, include Pam Bondi and William K. Marshall as Respondents
in this action given “the only proper respondent to a prisoner § 2241 habeas petition is the warden
of the BOP facility where the prisoner is being held.” Malcom v. Starr, No. 20-cv-2503
(MJD/LIB), 2021 WL 931213, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2021); see Payen v. Jett, 610 F. App’x
594 (8th Cir. 2015); see also Simon v. L. LaRiva, No. 16-cv-00146, (ADM/TNL), 2016 WL
1626819, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 10, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1610603
(D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2016). As a result, the Court will also not consider Petitioner’s specific requests
for the Court to “certify” to Pam Bondi that § 3625 has been questioned, or Petitioner’s specific
requests for Pam Bondi to “release the BOP’s unpublished policy for executing Section 3621(b),”
and “‘answer to’ [Petitioner’s] amended issues and requests[.]” (Pet.’s Am. Writ [Docket No. 28-
1] at 3). Thus, to the extent Petitioner’s Motion to Amend seeks to include Pam Bondi and William
K. Marshall as Respondents, and include specific requests for relief relating to Pam Bondi,
Petitioner’s Motion to Amend, [Docket No. 28], is DENIED.
2 Petitioner erroneously stated he had begun the administrative remedy process in November 2024 instead of October
2024.
3 Pam Bondi is currently serving as the United States Attorney General. William K. Marshall is currently serving as
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
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Petitioner’s Motion to Submit a Supplemental Pleading, [Docket No. 30], seeks to include
Petitioner’s argument that consideration of a detainer lodged against him pursuant to an
outstanding 2012 arrest warrant in the revocation of Petitioner’s Second Chance Act (hereafter
“SCA”) credits is further evidence of the Bureau of Prison’s (hereafter “BOP”) unconstitutional
computation of Petitioner’s transfer to pre-release custody date. (Pet.’s Supp. Pleading [Docket
No. 30-1] at 2–5). To the extent Petitioner would like the Court to take his additional argument
into consideration, Petitioner’s Motion to Submit a Supplemental Pleading, [Docket No. 30], is
GRANTED.4
II. 	Background
On June 5, 2013, Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the District
of 	Kansas 	for 	Conspiracy 	to 	Possess 	with 	Intent 	to 	Distribute 	50 	Grams 	or 	More 	of
Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). United States v. Redifer,
631 F. App’x 548, 570–71 (10th Cir. 2015).5 Petitioner was sentenced to a 360-month term of
imprisonment to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release. United States v. Redifer,
728 F. App’x 804, 805 (10th Cir. 2018). On direct appeal, Petitioner’s case was remanded for
resentencing because “the presentence report (PSR) incorrectly calculated the drug quantity
attributable to Mr. Redifer.” Id. (citing Redifer, 631 F. App’x at 570, 571). On remand, upon a
4 On December 10, 2025, Petitioner filed a letter to inform the Court of his intention to file another Amended Writ of
Habeas Corpus in either January or early February. (See Pet.’s Letter [Docket No. 31]). The Court will not put the
present case on hold to provide Petitioner with a third attempt at amending his Writ. The Court’s decision, as outlined
herein, will not be subject to change regardless of the content of Petitioner’s amended Writ that he may file in January
or February.
5 Notably, Respondents misstate Petitioner’s current charges as “Enticement of a Minor to Engage in Sexual Activity”
in their Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [Docket No. 8], and their Response to Petitioner’s Amended
Writ of Habeas Corpus, [Docket No. 21]. Petitioner is not currently, and has never, been charged with or served a
sentence for Enticement of a Minor to Engage in Sexual Activity.
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recalculation of the quantity of drugs, Petitioner’s sentence was lowered from 360-months to 254-
months. Redifer, 728 F. App’x at 806.6
Petitioner is now currently incarcerated at FCI Sandstone in Minnesota. (Pet. [Docket No.
1] at 1).
III. 	Discussion
In the present Petition, Petitioner argues the BOP has calculated his First Step Act time
credits (hereafter “FTCs”) contrary to what is provided in the First Step Act (hereafter “FSA”).
(Pet. [Docket No. 1] at 3). Petitioner further contends that proper calculation of his FTCs, in
combination with his Good Conduct Time (hereafter “GCT”) days and SCA credits, would have
resulted in his transfer into pre-release custody in October 2022. (Id.). As a result, Petitioner seeks
an Order from this Court compelling the BOP to transfer him into pre-release custody immediately.
(Id.). Petitioner additionally asserts the BOP lacks the authority to even implement the FSA and
calculate FTCs. (Id. at 37–40).7
Petitioner’s Motion to Submit a Supplemental Pleading, [Docket No. 30], seeks to bolster
Petitioner’s contention that the BOP is unconstitutionally implementing the FSA. (See Pet.’s Supp.
Pleading [Docket No. 30-1]). Specifically, Petitioner believes the consideration of a recent detainer
lodged against him pursuant to an outstanding 2012 arrest warrant as a basis to revoke his SCA
credits was also unconstitutional. (Id. at 2–5).
6 Petitioner then challenged his 254-month sentence, but his appeal was dismissed. See Redifer, 728 F. App’x 804.
7 Given Petitioner alleges the BOP does not have the authority to implement the FSA and calculate FTCs, Petitioner
asks this Court to compel the Attorney General to repeal the BOP’s FSA policy and subsequently develop and release
a new FSA policy. (Pet. [Docket No. 1] at 3). It is well established, however, that “[a] habeas petition under § 2241
can only challenge the fact or duration of confinement.” Dorsey v. Wilson, No. 14-cv-4803, (SRN/SER), 2015 WL
3948604, at *3 (D. Minn. June 11, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 3948543 (D. Minn. June 26,
2015); see e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam). Thus, this Court will not consider Petitioner’s claims that seek to repeal the current FSA policy and enact
a new FSA policy as they are not cognizable claims under a § 2241 habeas petition.
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Respondents assert the BOP has correctly calculated and credited Petitioner’s FTCs, in
combination with his GCT days and SCA credits, in accordance with the BOP’s reasonable
interpretation of the FSA. (Gov’t.’s Response [Docket No. 21] at 12). In support of this assertion,
Respondents contend Petitioner’s FTCs were properly calculated pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3632(d)(4)(A), with Petitioner earning “10 days of FTCs for his first two 30-day programming
periods” and “[o]n July 17, 2019, he began earning 15 days of FTCs for every 30 days of successful
programming and has been earning at that rate ever since.” (Id.). Respondents additionally argue
this petition lacks “prudential ripeness” as Petitioner is not yet eligible for pre-release placement,
and this Court does not have the jurisdiction to review a BOP placement decision. (Id. at 8–10).
A. First Step Act
On December 21, 2018, the FSA became law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632. The FSA contains
various prison reforms, including the potential for certain federal inmates to earn FTCs which can
be applied toward time in pre-release custody or supervised release. See Id. As relevant to the
present action, the FSA provides that:
A prisoner, except for an ineligible prisoner under subparagraph
(D), 	who 	successfully 	completes 	evidence-based 	recidivism
reduction programming or productive activities, shall earn time
credits as follows:
(i) 	A prisoner shall earn 10 days of time credits for every
30 days of successful participation in evidence-based
recidivism reduction programming or productive
activities.
(ii) 	A prisoner determined by the Bureau of Prisons to be
at a minimum or low risk for recidivating, who, over
2 consecutive assessments, has not increased their
risk of recidivism, shall earn an additional 5 days of
time 	credits 	for 	every 	30 	days 	of 	successful
participation in evidence-based recidivism reduction
programming or productive activities.
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A).
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Congress gave the authority to develop and administer the FSA to the Attorney General
and the BOP, and Congress charged the Attorney General with the development of a risk and needs
assessment system, through which eligible inmates may earn FTCs. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a).
Congress also charged the BOP with “determin[ing] the type and amount of evidence-based
recidivism reduction programming that is appropriate for each prisoner and assign[ing] each
prisoner to such programming accordingly . . . based on the prisoner’s specific criminogenic
needs[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a)(3).
The risk and needs assessment system developed by the Attorney General is referred to as
the Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs (hereafter “PATTERN”). 18
U.S.C. § 3632(a). This system is used by the BOP to determine an eligible inmate’s recidivism
risk; classify each inmate as having minimum, low, medium, or high risk of recidivism; and
determine the appropriate type of evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive
activities appropriate for said inmate. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a). An inmate’s PATTERN score is to be
“periodically” reassessed. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a)(5).
B. The Second Chance Act
The BOP maintains the statutory authority to designate an inmate’s place of imprisonment.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). When exercising that authority, the BOP considers the following criteria:
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence—
(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to
imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as
appropriate; and
(5) 	any 	pertinent 	policy 	statement 	issued 	by 	the 	Sentencing
Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28.
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18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Additionally, pursuant to the SCA, the BOP “shall, to the extent practicable,
ensure that a prisoner . . . spends a portion of the final months of [the term of imprisonment] (not
to exceed 12 months) under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to
adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1).
The SCA further requires all Residential Reentry Center (hereafter “RRC”) assignments to
be “(A) conducted in a matter consistent with section 3621(b) of this title; (B) determined on an
individual basis; and (C) of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of successful
reintegration into the community.” Kriemelmeyer v. B.O.P., No. 09-cv-1231, (ADM/SRN), 2010
WL 1626884, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 24, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 09-cv-
1231, (ADM/SRN), 2010 WL 1626883 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3624(c)(6)).
C. Analysis
Petitioner presents his argument as one of statutory interpretation, arguing that the BOP’s
calculation of FSA time credits is contrary to statute and ultimately unconstitutional. (See Pet.
[Docket No. 1]). Petitioner further alleges the BOP lacks the authority to even implement the FSA
or calculate FTCs there under. (Id. at 37–40). Petitioner’s argument necessarily fails as it is based
on his own miscalculation of his FTCs and a fundamental misunderstanding of the FSA.
Petitioner is eligible to receive FTCs under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d). (See Gov’t.’s Ex. D
[Docket No. 22-4]). Petitioner earned FTCs at a rate of 10 days per every 30 days of programming
from December 21, 2018, through July 17, 2019. (Id. at 1). Due to Petitioner maintaining his
PATTERN score for two consecutive assessments, on July 17, 2019, he began earning 15 days per
every 30 days of programming. (Id.). As of June 18, 2025, Petitioner has earned 365 days of FTCs
towards an early release and 790 days of FTCs towards a pre-release RRC or home confinement
placement. (Id.).
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Petitioner’s full term prison sentence will expire on May 6, 2034. (Gov’t.’s Ex. A [Docket
No. 22-1] at 3). Petitioner is estimated to receive 1142 GCT days, making his projected statutory
prison release date March 21, 2031. (Id.).8 Petitioner’s additional 365 FTCs towards early release
move his projected release date to March 21, 2030. (Gov’t.’s Ex. D [Docket No. 22-4] at 2).
Considering Petitioner’s projected FTCs, Petitioner has an FSA conditional placement date of
March 12, 2027. (Id.). Petitioner’s Unit Team additionally recommended he receive the maximum
SCA benefit of 365 days, which had placed his conditional transition to community date at March
12, 2026. (Pet.’s Supp. Pleading App’x [Docket No. 30-2] at 29). However, due to a detainer
recently lodged against Petitioner pursuant to an outstanding 2012 arrest warrant, he is no longer
eligible for the maximum SCA benefit of 365 days. (Id. at 32). Petitioner’s Unit Team has now
recommended an RRC placement date of March 22, 2027. (Id.).
Petitioner argues proper calculation of his FTCs, in combination with his GCT days and
SCA credits, would have resulted in his transfer into pre-release custody on October 2022. This is
due to Petitioner’s belief that the BOP has “arbitrarily and capriciously developed a system that is
absolutely ‘not in accordance with law’ in any way.” (Pet.’s App’x [Docket No. 5-1] at 24). How
Petitioner does his own GCT and FTC calculations and what exact BOP “system” he is referring
to is unclear. However, he believes an incorrectly applied “system” has resulted in an
unconstitutional computation of his FTCs, and he believes that by his calculation under the FSA
he should have been transferred into pre-release custody in October 2022. (Id. at 6).
Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable in habeas. Petitioner brings the Petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (See Pet. [Docket No. 1] at 1). In relevant part, § 2241 provides that, “[t]he writ of habeas
8 Inmates may earn fifty-four days of GCT for every year they display “exemplary compliance with institutional
disciplinary regulations.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). If the BOP determines an inmate has not “satisfactorily complied
with such institutional regulations,” they may receive no credit towards their sentence, or a lesser amount of credit
determined by the BOP. (Id.).
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corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [he] is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Because the statute addresses
“custody,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that habeas corpus is a proper
remedy only when the prisoner is “‘challenging the validity of his conviction or the length of his
detention.’” Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 470 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kruger v. Erickson,
77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)); see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973) (stating that the “essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the
legality of that custody,” and that habeas’s “traditional function . . . is to secure release from illegal
custody”).
The relief Petitioner seeks here, less time in prison, more time in an RRC, would reduce
his time in a traditional prison setting. For § 2241 purposes, however, transferring a prisoner from
a prison to an RRC does not alter the fact that he is still in custody; it merely changes the place of
confinement. And so, a petition seeking such a transfer does not challenge the legality of detention
and is not cognizable in habeas. See e.g., Hernandez v. Eischen, No. 24-cv-0027 (KMM/DLM),
2024 WL 4839827, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
4839158 (D. Minn. Nov. 20, 2024); Shay v. Rardin, No. 24-cv-3418 (PAM/DTS), 2024 WL
4574391, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 19, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4573895
(D. Minn. Oct. 24, 2024). At root, Petitioner's claim here is a conditions-of-confinement claim.
When a pro se petitioner improperly raises such a claim in a habeas petition, the District
Court should either dismiss the action without prejudice or seek the petitioner’s consent to
recharacterize the claim as being brought under a more appropriate procedural vehicle. See
Haynes, 774 F.3d at 471. A court addressing the issue should “consider the potential detriment”
of recharacterizing the petitioner’s claim. See Spencer, 774 F.3d at 471; Elhers v. Smoot, No. 18-
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cv-1814 (ECT/LIB), 2019 WL 919078, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2019) (referring to Spencer),
report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 917204 (D. Minn. Feb. 25, 2019).
Converting this action into a standard civil case would not benefit Petitioner. Even if one
ignores the $350 statutory filing fee for civil actions, a potentially large expense, Petitioner likely
cannot state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Petitioner’s belief that proper calculation
of his FTCs, in combination with his GCT days and SCA credits, would have resulted in his
transfer into pre-release custody in October 2022 is categorically incorrect. This Court finds no
substance to the unexplained method by which Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to an October
2022, pre-release transfer date. A proper calculation of Petitioner’s FTCs in compliance with the
FSA, in combination with his GCT days and SCA credits, does not result in a pre-release transfer
date of October 2022. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to effectively rebut the BOP’s calculation,
which results in a projected RRC placement date of March 22, 2027.
To the extent that Petitioner argues the BOP even lacks the authority in the first instance
to calculate his FTCs, this argument also fails. Section 3621(b), in relevant part, grants the BOP
authority to “designate the place of [a] prisoner’s imprisonment” and explicitly states that
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this
subsection is not reviewable by any court.”9 As a result, courts in this District have consistently
held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review BOP decisions regarding a prisoner’s
confinement location. See e.g., Vang v. Eischen, No. 23-cv-721 (JRT/DLM), 2023 WL 5417764,
at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5403793 (D. Minn.
Aug. 22, 2023); Cottman v. Fikes, No. 21-cv-2393 (SRN/TNL), 2023 WL 2482878, at *3 (D.
9 While the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) allows federal courts to review certain challenges to federal
decision-making, 18 U.S.C. § 3625 expressly exempts from APA review BOP decisions made under § 3621.
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Minn. Feb. 21, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2482879 (D. Minn. Mar. 13,
2023).
Considering Petitioner’s erroneous calculation of his FTCs, in combination with his GCT
days and SCA credits, and the BOP’s continued authority to designate a prisoner’s place of
imprisonment, the Court concludes that recharacterizing Petitioner’s pre-release custody claim
into a claim under a nonhabeas procedural vehicle would not benefit him.
The Court now considers Petitioner’s additional argument asserted in his Motion to Submit
a Supplemental Pleading, [Docket No. 30], which alleges that the BOP improperly considered a
recent detainer lodged against him pursuant to an outstanding 2012 arrest warrant when revoking
his 365 SCA credits. (Pet.’s Supp. Pleading [Docket No. 30-1] at 2–5).10
The BOP maintains the statutory discretion of whether to place inmates in an RRC facility,
and, if placement is appropriate, for how long. See McCarthy v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 10-
cv-745, (PJS/SRN), 2010 WL 4320507 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2010), report and recommendation
adopted, 2010 WL 4312851 (D. Minn. Oct. 22, 2010). Courts have routinely held that prisoners
do not have an enforceable legal right to a twelve-month placement in an RRC. Arthur v. Roal,
No. 09-cv-3043 (RHK/JSM), 2010 WL 3025019, at *7 (D. Minn. July 6, 2010) (“[t]here is nothing
in [the applicable law] that gives inmates the right to 12 months of RRC placement”); O'Hara v.
Rios, No. 08-cv-5160 (JRT/JJK), 2009 WL 3164724, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2009) (citing
Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir.2004); Morrow v. Rios, No. 08-cv-320 (JRT/RLE),
2009 WL 924525, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2009)). In fact, a prisoner has no legal right or
entitlement to any period of RRC placement. McCarthy, 2010 WL 	4320507 *2 (citing
Kriemelmeyer, 2010 WL 1626884, at *5. “Rather, federal law simply requires that the BOP make
10 As explained above, the revocation of Petitioner’s SCA credits alters his projected date for transfer into an RRC
facility from March 12, 2026, to March 12, 2027.
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an individualized determination of the appropriate RRC period, with attention to the specific
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).” O’Hara, 2009 WL 3164724, at *2.
Petitioner’s Unit Team, in consideration of Petitioner’s recently issued detainer, revoked
Petitioner’s previously recommended 365 SCA credits towards pre-release placement in an RRC.
When considering an inmates allotted RRC period, “Section 3621(b) expressly authorizes
consideration of ‘the history and characteristics of the prisoner,’ criteria that plausibly include the
petitioner’s criminal history.” McCarthy, 2010 WL 4320507 *3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)).
Section 3621(b) provides for the consideration of an inmate’s criminal history, which would
logically include Petitioner’s recent detainer related to an outstanding 2012 warrant. There is
nothing on the record now before the Court to reflect any improper consideration by the BOP in
revoking Petitioner’s 365 SCA credits.
Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend denying the Petition in its entirety.
IV. 	Conclusion
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Petitioner’s Motion to Amend, [Docket No. 28], is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in
part, as set forth above; and
2. 	Petitioner’s Motion to Submit a Supplemental Pleading, [Docket No. 30], is GRANTED,
as set forth above.
Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Redifer’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, [Docket No. 1], be DENIED; and
2. 	The present action be DISMISSED without prejudice.
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Dated: December 29, 2025 	s/Leo I. Brisbois
Hon. Leo I. Brisbois
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
N O T I C E
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “[a] party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days after being served with
a copy of the recommended disposition.” A party may respond to those objections within 14 days
after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must
comply with the word or line limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).
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